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ABSTRACT 
 
Since refugees and asylum seekers became a significant part of South African society in the 
1990s, the defining characteristic of the discourse about them has been the incongruity 
between the constitutional and legislative frameworks for their protection, and the actual 
experiences of refugees and asylum seekers. While the many rights accorded to them 
suggests that they occupy a reasonably comfortable position in South Africa, the reality is 
quite different; actual and adequate enjoyment of most of those rights remain in the realm of 
theoretical possibility. 
Premised on the fact that access to justice is essential, if rights are to be actually enjoyed, this 
thesis set out to examine the extent to which refugees and asylum seekers are able to access 
justice in South Africa, both for the enforcement of their rights and to settle disputes or other 
interests at law.  
In doing this, the thesis examines the obligations that South Africa owes to refugees and 
asylum seekers on access to justice, and how it gives effect to those obligations. Utilising 
three sets of evaluative criteria – international law, constitutional provisions and policy 
framework – the thesis demonstrates that, notwithstanding the constitutional value framework 
which undergirds them, the policies and programmes which are designed to promote access 
to justice in the country, largely ignore South Africa‘s obligations to refugees. Not only are 
those policies and programmes detached from the commitments made to refugees under 
international law, they fail to give effect to the cardinal principle of equality of access, which 
is central to the concept of access to justice under international law and the Constitution.  As 
a result, the ability of refugees and asylum seekers to access justice in South Africa is 
severely curtailed.  
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
Human rights concerns go to the essence of the cause of refugee movements, as well as to 
the precepts of refugee protection and the solution of refugee problems .
1
 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Africa currently has about 2.405 million refugees and asylum seekers,
2
 most of whom are 
driven from their homes by conflicts, political persecution and natural disasters. As the 
continent‘s seemingly endless catastrophes propel its people outside their own countries, 
many are forced to seek protection in South Africa, one of the few countries on the continent 
which has a relatively strong economy, a largely stable polity, a relatively responsive 
government and a Constitution committed to upholding human rights, and is thus seen as a 
haven of peace and prosperity. According to the United Nations High Commission for 
Refugees (UNHCR), South Africa receives the largest number of asylum applications in the 
world, with 222,000 submitted in 2009.
3
 There are currently 47,970 recognised refugees 
living in South Africa as at June 2010 and another 309,800 persons are seeking asylum in the 
country.
4
 These refugees have come to South Africa from as far afield as Bangladesh and 
Pakistan.
5
 However the largest numbers are from African countries, including the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Angola, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Somalia, Burundi and Rwanda.
6
 The three 
countries with the largest number of recognised refugees are the Democratic Republic of 
                                                 
1
 Sadako Ogata in The state of the world's refugees, 2000: Fifty years of humanitarian action (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000) 150. 
2
 United Nations High Commission for Refugees (hereinafter UNHCR) ‗2010 Regional Operations Profile – 
Africa‘. Available at www.unhcr.org [Accessed 18 July 2010]. This figure does not include refugees and asylum 
seekers in North Africa. UNHCR groups North Africa alongside the Middle East to make up its Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) regional grouping.  
3
 ‗UNHCR Global Report 2009: South Africa‘ Available at www.unhcr.org [Accessed 18 July 2010]. 
4
 Ibid.  
5
 Department of Home Affairs www.dha.gov.za [Accessed 18 July 2010]; See also Forced Migration Studies 
Programme ‗Population movements in and to South Africa‘ Migration Fact Sheet 1 June 2010 Forced 
Migration Studies Programme, University of the Witwatersrand, 2–3. 
6
 Ibid.  
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Congo (11,700); Somalia (9,700) and Angola (5,800). Zimbabweans make up the vast 
majority of asylum seekers.
7
  
From its earliest origins, refugee law has recognised that ‗the characteristic and 
essential feature of [refugee] problem [is] that persons classed as ―refugees‖ have no regular 
nationality, and are therefore deprived of the normal protection accorded to the regular 
citizens of a State‘.8 They are essentially at the mercy of the foreign state in which they have 
sought refuge, and unlike other classes of aliens, do not have the safeguard of diplomatic 
protection from their home countries.
9
 The onus of protection therefore falls on the host state 
and its institutions. How these host states, such as South Africa, treat refugees and asylum 
seekers is regulated by a number of international treaties and conventions, all of which are 
anchored in the overarching duty of States to protect the rights of everyone within their 
territories as recognised in international law. This duty is entrenched in Article 2(1) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
10
 which states:
 
 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its 
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction 
of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status. 
It is obvious in view of the universal language in which it is couched, that this provision 
includes refugees. But beyond this general provision, there are a number of refugee-specific 
instruments which define the obligations of host states as well as the status, rights and 
obligations of refugees and asylum seekers which will be discussed later.
11
 The norm of 
                                                 
7
 UNHCR Global Report, note 3 above.   
8
 ‗Report by the Secretary-General on the future organization of refugee work‘ LN Doc.1930.XIII.2 (1930) 3. 
9
 Paul Weiss ‗The international protection of refugees‘ (1954) 48 American Journal of International Law 193, 
199; Atle Grahl-Madsen The status of refugees in international law, Volume I: Refugee character. (Leyden: 
Sijthoff, 1966) 79; Michael Reiterer The protection of refugees by their state of asylum (Braumüller, 1984) 16; S 
Prakash Sinha Asylum and international law (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971) 96.  
10
 GA Res 2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR Supp. (No 16) 52, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 UNTS 171, entered 
into force 23 March, 1976. 
11
 South Africa has ratified the following treaties regarding the treatment of refugees and asylum seekers: United 
Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 1951 (189 UNTS 150, entered into force 22 April, 1954 
(hereinafter UN Refugee Convention)), Protocol to the UN Convention on the Status of refugees (606 UNTS 
267, entered into force 4 October, 1967); OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee 
Problems in Africa (1969 1001 UNTS 45, entered into force 20 June, 1974 (hereinafter OAU Refugee 
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general international law, pacta sunt servanda requires States to fulfil in good faith their 
treaty and customary international law obligations, and to refrain from conduct intended to 
frustrate their object and purpose.
12
 States must therefore ensure that their domestic 
legislation, policies and practices are compatible with their obligations under international 
law. For refugees, this translates into an obligation on the part of a host state to adopt 
effective legislation and practices, which ensure that refugees in its territory are treated in 
accordance with internationally-accepted standards, including respect for the cardinal 
principle of non-refoulement,
13
 freedom from discrimination
14
 and the enjoyment of civil, 
economic and social rights.
15
 One of those rights – the right of access to justice as envisaged 
in various international instruments
16
 – and how refugees experience it in South Africa – is 
the subject of this study. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Convention)). These treaties were ratified by the Senate on 14 September 1995, (Hansard col. 2966) and by the 
National Assembly on  11 October 1995, (Hansard col 4361). The government formally acceded to the OAU 
Refugee Convention on December 12 1995, and to the UN Refugee Convention and its Protocol  on 12 January 
1996.  
12
 Art 26, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1155 UNTS 331, 8 ILM 679, entered into force 27 
January, 1980 (hereinafter Vienna Convention); for discussion of pacta sunt servanda see Ian Brownlie 
  in ipl   o  p  li  in   n  ion l l   (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1998) 62. 
13
 Non-refoulement is a principle of international law that prohibits States from returning persons to a country 
where they may face persecution or danger to their lives or liberty. It is codified in Art 33(1) of the UN Refugee 
Convention which states: ‗No Contracting State shall expel or return (‗refouler‘) a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion‘. This principle is of such 
crucial importance to the protection of refugees that it is non-derogable and State Parties are proscribed from 
entering reservations to it (see Art 42(1) of the UN Refugee Convention and Article VII of the Protocol Relating 
to the Status of Refugees. The OAU Refugee Convention takes the principle even further by stating that this 
includes the duty not to reject refugees at frontiers (Art 2(3)). 
14
 See for instance Art 2(1) ICCPR; Art 2 African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 ILM 58 (1982), entered into force 21 October, 1986 (hereinafter ‗African Charter‘)). 
15
 Arts 17, 21, 22, 23 and 24 of the UN Refugee Convention for instance, grant refugees the rights to wage-
earning employment, housing, public education, public relief, and social security respectively.  
16
 These include Arts 8 and 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (GA Res. 217A (III), UN Doc 
A/810 at 71 (1948), hereinafter UDHR); Arts 2(3) and 14 of the ICCPR; Art 7 of the African Charter, Art 6 of 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ETS 5, 213 UNTS 
222, entered into force 3 September 1953; as amended by Protocols Nos 3, 5, and 8 which entered into force on 
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1.2 SUBJECT MATTER AND PURPOSE OF THE STUDY  
It is recognised that in both domestic and international law, only the availability of and access 
to effective judicial remedies can guarantee respect for and protection of human rights.
17
 For 
any right to be meaningful, there must be a way of enforcing it – one must be able, when that 
right is violated or in danger of being violated, to have recourse to an entity that is separate 
and independent from the alleged perpetrator of the violation.
18
 This tenet, rooted in the 
fundamental principle of the rule of law that anyone may challenge the legality of any law or 
conduct, is the foundation of access to justice as a human right. It is an important right, 
recognised in many international human rights treaties and in constitutions around the 
world.
19
  
For refugees, this right takes on even more significance, because, even though the 
expectation behind international refugee treaties was that the primary responsibility to assist 
them to enforce their rights would rest with the state parties to the Conventions,
20
 in practice, 
refugees often have to look to the host country‘s courts to secure respect for those rights.21 
This emphasises the importance of the right of access to justice as well as the role played by 
courts, and the entire justice system, in ensuring that the experiences of refugees in host 
                                                                                                                                                        
21 September 1970, 20 December 1971 and 1 January 1990 respectively, hereinafter ECHR); Art 16 of the UN 
Refugee Convention.  
17
 Francesco Francioni ‗The rights of access to justice under customary international law‘ in Francesco 
Francioni (ed) Access to justice as a human right (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007) 1; Bertrand G 
Ramcharan Contemporary human rights ideas (Oxford: Routledge, 2008) 145. 
18
 Iain Currie & Johan de Waal The Bill of Rights handbook, 5
th
 ed (Cape Town: Juta, 2005) 704. 
19
 Note 13 above; s 34 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 (hereinafter the 
South African Constitution); Art 36, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria CAP 24 of 1999; Arts 32 
and 39 of the Constitution of India Act 45 of 1860 [examiner – should be art 32 of 1950 const]; s 24 of the 
Constitution Act of Canada 1982, among others.  
20
 For a background discussion on the development of refugee law, see generally James C Hathaway ‗A 
reconsideration of the underlying premise of refugee law‘ (1990) 1 Harvard International Law Journal 129; 
Peter Macalister-Smith & Gudmundur Alfredsson (eds) The land beyond: Collected essays on refugee law and 
policy by Atle Grahl-Madsen (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001); Claudena M Skran ‗The 
international refugee regime: the historical and contemporary context of international responses to asylum 
problems‘ in Gil Loescher (ed) Refugees and the asylum dilemma in the West (Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 1992). 
21
 James C Hathaway The rights of refugees under international law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
2005) 628. 
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countries approximate to that envisaged for them in international conventions and local 
legislations. Moreover, the fact that the right of access to justice developed in international 
law as a subset of the law of state responsibility for injury to aliens and the treatment of 
aliens
22
 further highlights its significance to refugees and asylum seekers.  
Yet, there is a paucity of studies on access to justice as it relates specifically to refugees 
and how refugees interact with the legal system, whether in the South African context or in a 
global context. Discussions about refugees often revolve around the very serious social, 
economic and security challenges that they face around the world, detailing concerns about 
administrative procedures, livelihoods, resettlement and integration, mental and physical 
health, xenophobia, cultural challenges and security issues among others.
23
 Unlike these other 
areas of vulnerability, research on refugees‘ access to the legal system (beyond status 
determination) is scanty. Thus, far more is known about refugees‘ social, economic and 
cultural adaptation than about what Hein and Beger
24
 term their ‗legal adaptation‘: the 
adjustment process which enables international migrants to proactively participate in the host 
society‘s legal system to seek redress for grievances.25 As the law is a central institution in 
South Africa, like in many societies, the ability to proactively use it can affect every aspect of 
refugees‘ and asylum seekers‘ well-being. Their legal adaptation therefore takes on greater 
significance and their interaction with the justice system becomes an important subject.  
This study stems from a recognition that the right of access to justice is very important 
to refugees in South Africa, not only for the reasons stated above, but also because it raises 
                                                 
22
 Francioni (note 17 above) 9–15. 
23
 See generally, Guy Goodwin-Gill ‗Non-refoulement and the new asylum seekers‘  (1985–1986) 26 Virginia 
Journal of International Law 897; Human Rights Watch South Africa, living on the margins: Inadequate 
protection for refugees and asylum seekers in Johannesburg (New York: Human Rights Watch 2005); Cindy 
Horst ‗Refugee livelihoods: Continuity and transformations‘ (2006) 25 Refugee Survey Quarterly 2;  David 
Hollenbach Refugee rights: Ethics, advocacy, and Africa (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2008); 
Mariano-Florentino Cuellar ‗Refugee security and the organizational logic of legal mandates‘ (2006) 37 
Georgetown Journal of International Law 1302; Joan Fitzpatrick ‗Flight from asylum: Trends toward temporary 
refuge and local responses to forced migrations‘  (1994–1995) 35  Virginia Journal of International  Law 13; 
Morton Beiser ‗The mental health of refugees in resettlement countries‘ in Howard Adelman (ed) Refugee 
policy: Canada and the United States (Toronto: Centre for Refugee Studies, York University, 1991) 425–442. 
24
 Jeremy Hein & Randall R Beger ‗Legal adaptation among Vietnamese refugees in the United States: How 
international migrants litigate civil grievances during the resettlement process‘ (2001) 35 International 
Migration Review 420–448. 
25
 Ibid, 421. 
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fundamental questions linked to their protection, especially in view of the xenophobic 
environment in which foreigners generally, and refugees in particular, live in the country. 
While it would be impossible to claim that merely having access to justice is the solution to 
all of the problems that refugees face, the fundamental nature of law and access to remedies 
is such that it is central to resolving the majority of the issues. The ability to resort to court, 
seek redress for violation of rights and other injustices, and to resolve disputes have an 
impact on refugees‘ ability to access the asylum process, enjoy the rights accorded under 
domestic and international law, combat xenophobia and resolve disputes within and outside 
their own ethnic communities.  
The host state, as a primary duty bearer to refugees has important obligations to ensure 
that an enabling environment, necessary for such access, is made available. This study 
proceeds on the premise that South Africa, having adopted a rights-based approach to refugee 
issues, must ensure that refugees within its territory are able to enjoy those rights, and if 
violated, be able to access remedies. In other words, that refugees in its territory must have 
effective access to justice. As very little work has been done in this area, it is hoped that this 
study will shed new light on the subject and present a clear picture of South Africa‘s success 
and/or failings in its relationship with the refugees it hosts. It is also hoped that the results 
will help to inform policy changes where necessary.  
 
1.3 SCOPE OF STUDY  
This study is concerned with the issue of access to justice by refugees and asylum seekers in 
South Africa. In view of its status as an important refugee-receiving country in Africa, the 
study looks at how well South Africa meets its obligations to refugees and asylum seekers in 
this important area. The evaluation is done in the context of the country‘s international law 
obligations and its constitutional, legislative and policy framework on access to justice. 
Another aspect, the actual experiences of refugees and asylum seekers in accessing justice, 
helps to illustrate the challenges identified in the constitutional, legislative and policy 
contexts.  
As a starting point, it is acknowledged that the term ‗access to justice‘ is fraught with 
misunderstanding and confusion, as it is often used interchangeably to describe access to a 
justice system – courts and other formal forums; access to justice – fair and equitable results; 
or access to legal aid – advice and representation for the needy.  This study adopts a broad 
meaning that encompasses all of those elements. Thus what is examined, with reference to 
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refugees, is the accessibility of the South African justice system, outcomes from recourse to 
it, parallel methods of seeking justice and the availability of assistance to facilitate access. 
The study aims to answer the following questions: 
 What are South Africa‘s international law obligations to refugees and asylum 
seekers on access to justice? 
 Do its Constitution, laws and policies live up to those obligations? 
 How do refugees and asylum seekers experience justice in the country? Do they rely 
on the State, and if so do their experiences approximate to those envisaged under 
international law and the constitution? If they do not rely on the State, how do they 
seek justice? 
 What lessons can be learned from refugees and asylum seekers access to justice in 
South Africa?  
 
1.4 METHODOLOGY AND MATERIALS   
This study adopts a two-pronged approach to the discussion of refugees‘ access to justice in 
South Africa. The first is an archival and library research of the scholarship relevant to the 
subject matter, as well as of various pieces of legislation, international instruments and 
jurisprudence on the subject. Source materials include books, journals, the internet, 
magazines, research reports, seminar and conference proceedings, among others.  
The archival research involves an examination of policy documents, government 
gazettes, newspapers, monographs and other materials related to access to justice, 
immigration and refugees. It also involves an analysis of over 5000 cases in the case log of 
the University of Cape Town Law Clinic dating from 2005–2008. The data obtained from 
both the library and archival research helped to establish the theoretical framework for 
understanding the two key concepts that form the subject of the thesis, that is, ‗refugees‘ and 
‗access to justice‘ and the matters they confront. It also forms the basis for answering the 
question whether or not South Africa‘s approach to access to justice conforms to international 
standards, and whether enough is being done to ensure that it does. 
The second approach is a field research involving interviews, surveys and participant 
observation within the refugee community and with refugee service providers in their quest 
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for justice and as they interact with the justice system.
26
 This aspect of the research was 
designed to provide some ‗grounding‘ to the discussion, by going beyond theoretical 
postulations, to providing practical illustrations of how issues identified in the library and 
archival research affect refugees and asylum seekers in real-life situations. While this aspect 
of the study offers a broader insight into the subject of access to justice as it relates to 
refugees, it is important to enter the caveat that the data presented does not make any 
generalised claims on the subject. Scholars of forced migration are quick to point out that the 
diversity and size of migrant populations make representativeness of any research about them 
an important issue.
27
 Therefore large-scale quantitative data is often required if one is to 
make any assertions or well-founded policy recommendations on migrant populations.
28
  
This obviously has an impact on the ability to generalise the findings of isolated, small-
scale case studies such as this one.
29
 That however, does not mean that the data presented in 
the study offers no value. On the contrary, the study provides a useful and rich store of 
                                                 
26
 Chapter five discusses in greater detail the methodology adopted for this aspect of the study, including the 
demographics, selection criteria and limitations. 
27
 See generally Karen Jacobsen & Loren B Landau ‗Researching refugees: Some methodological and ethical 
considerations in social science and forced migration‘ Working Paper No 90 (Geneva: UNHCR, 2003); Alice 
Bloch ‗Methodological challenges for national and multi-sited comparative survey research‘ (2007) 20 Journal 
of Refugee Studies 230–247; James T Fawcet & Fred Arnold ‗The role of surveys in the study of international 
migration: An appraisal‘ (1987) 21 (4) International Migration Review 1523–1540; Darshan Vigneswaran ‗Lost 
in space: Residential sampling and Johannesburg‘s forced migrants‘ Paper Submitted to the African Migrations 
Workshop: Understanding migration dynamics in the continent 18–21 September  2007, Accra, Ghana; Catriona 
Mackenzie et al ‗Beyond ―Do no harm‖: The challenge of constructing ethical relationships in refugee research‘  
(2007) 20 (2) Journal of Refugee Studies 299–319; Eileen Pittaway et al ‗Stop stealing our stories‘: The ethics 
of research with vulnerable groups‘ (2010) 2 (2) Journal of Human Rights Practice 229–251; Oliver Bakewell 
‗Research beyond the categories: The importance of policy irrelevant research into forced migration‘ (2008) 21 
Journal of Refugee Studies 432–453; Oliver Bakewell ‗Researching refugees: Lessons from the past, current 
challenges and future directions‘ (2007) 26 (3) Refugee Survey Quarterly 6–14; Tara Polzer ‗The value of non-
probability surveys: Collecting data on migrants through service provider NGOs‘ Paper presented at the African 
Migrations Workshop, Rabat, Morocco 26–29 November 2008. Available at  http://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/pdfs/tara-
polzer-amw-08 [accessed 2 February 2010]. 
28
 Jacobsen & Landau (note 27 above) 11; Vigneswaran (note 27 above) 5; Bakewell ‗Research beyond the 
categories‘ (note 27 above) 441. 
29
 Chapter 5 provides an extensive discussion of the methodology used for this aspect of the research, including 
its limitations.  
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descriptive and anecdotal data on how refugees perceive and experience justice in country. 
While not generalisable, the data establishes the existence of trends, and suggests patterns, 
variables and hypotheses that can serve as the basis for further study in this area. That in 
itself, according to scholars of forced migration, is an important aspect of scholarship, 
because in areas or circumstances about which little is known (such as this one), descriptive 
data which are obtained from in-depth interviews reveal much about how forced migrants 
live, the problems they encounter, their coping or survival strategies, and the shaping of their 
identities and attitudes.
30
  The data therefore offers an angle to look at the subject matter in a 
manner that provides an insight into how access to justice is seen from a refugee‘s point of 
view. Lastly, juxtaposing practical experiences with ‗what the law says‘ offers another  
option for evaluating South Africa‘s success or failure in the promotion, protection and 
realisation of the right of access to justice by refugees. 
The entire study itself is structured in such a way that the evaluation of access to justice 
is done using two different indicators. The first barometer is, of course, compliance with 
international law and treaty standards. This is the most important aspect of the study, and it is 
here that the study answers the research questions raised earlier. The second uses the 
perceptions and experiences of refugees as its barometer. Informed by the legal and policy 
analysis undertaken in the first aspect, this second barometer relies on existing scholarship 
and those of the limited empirical work done for this study to evaluate if the actual 
experiences of refugees and asylum seekers approximate to that which is envisaged for them 
under international law. 
 
1.5 BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE THESIS  
Refugees have become a highly visible part of South African society over the past 15 years, 
but ironically, it is negative occurrences such as xenophobia and administrative inefficiency 
in dealing with refugees that have propelled them into the national consciousness. The irony 
stems from the fact that they live in the new South Africa – a country that has consistently 
declared and demonstrated its commitment to human rights since its emergence from 
apartheid.
31
 Given such commitment, it is only right to expect that the rights of refugees as a 
                                                 
30
 Jacobsen & Landau (note 27 above) 6.  
31
 Thabo Mbeki  ‗Statement on behalf of the African National Congress, on the occasion of the adoption by the 
Constitutional Assembly of ―The Republic of South Africa Constitutional Bill 1996‖‘ 8 May 1996. Available at 
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class of people would be protected and every effort would be made to ensure their realisation. 
Yet the scholarship suggests otherwise.
32
 While South Africa does have refugee legislation 
that accords them many rights, whether or not they enjoy those rights is another matter. It is 
trite that merely having rights in law does not automatically translate into an enjoyment of 
those rights, nor does it guarantee that those rights will not be violated. When rights are 
violated, access to justice, an essential component of the system of protection and 
enforcement of human rights, becomes of fundamental importance.
33
  The importance of this 
has been alluded to, and cannot be overemphasised.  
As seen above, the aim of this study is to evaluate South Africa‘s commitments and 
efforts to ensure that refugees within its territory have access to justice, and by extension are 
able to enjoy other rights or seek remedies for the violation of those other rights. This 
evaluation is done on three levels – firstly, at the constitutional level, to determine how well 
the right of access to justice is protected under the South African Constitution and whether 
this conforms to international law; secondly at the legislative, policy and programmatic level 
in order to see how well the guarantees are given effect; and thirdly at the level of the day-to-
day experiences and real life situations of the target population, that is, refugees, to see how 
all of the above translate in real life.  
This is a legal study that adopts, to some extent, an interdisciplinary approach. I begin 
by setting the context for South Africa‘s reception of refugees and asylum seekers. It is 
inevitable that, given its history and the changes that have occurred in the country‘s recent 
past, any examination of South African law, policies and practices will have an apartheid and 
post-apartheid context. A lot of the discussion takes that form.  
                                                                                                                                                        
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mbeki/1996/sp960508.html [Accessed 4 May 2010]; Geoff Budlender 
‗Human rights groups face new challenges in South Africa‘ (1996) 3 Human Rights Brief 2. 
32
 See eg Handmaker et al (eds) Advancing refugee protection in South Africa (New York: Berghahn Books, 
2008); Loren Landua & Karen Jacobsen ‗Forced migrants in the new Johannesburg‘ Working paper No 6, 
Forced Migration Studies Programme, University of the Witwatersrand; Jonathan Crush & Vincent Williams 
(eds) Evaluating refugee protection in South Africa Migration Policy Brief No 7 (Cape Town: Southern African 
Migration Project, 2002); Human Rights Watch ‗―  ohi i  d p   on ‖: A     o   ndo  m n  d mig  n  , 
asylum-   k   ,  nd     g    in So  h A  i  ‘ (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1998); Jean Pierre Misago 
‗Xenophobic violence in South Africa: Reflections on causal factors and implications‘ (2009) 10 Policy Studies 
Bulletin of the Centre for Policy Studies 3–9. The conditions under which refugees live in South Africa will be 
discussed more extensively in subsequent chapters.  
33
 Francioni (note 17 above) 1. 
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Chapter one provides a concise overview of the historical and social frameworks within 
which refugees come to and remain in South Africa. By the time South Africa was welcomed 
back into the comity of nations in the early 1990s, significant developments had occurred 
around the world on the treatment of refugees. Refugee treaties had been adopted at the 
United Nations and regional levels. Refugee rhetoric was rapidly shifting from ‗control‘ to 
‗human rights‘, and refugee-specific legislation had become or was becoming a feature of 
many countries‘ corpus juris. Although South Africa had provided a home to refugees for 
decades, racial, rather than human rights or international law considerations, was the 
foundation of its relationship with them. It suddenly also had to deal with many legitimate 
refugees who had lived within its borders for years without recognition as such, and it had to 
deal with them in a manner consistent with international standards. How South Africa reacted 
to these challenges would obviously impact on the rest of the continent, for many of those 
refugees were coming from African countries with which it had not previously had contact. 
This chapter explores the dynamics of how South Africa went about dealing with this 
relatively new area and some of the challenges involved. Issues of access to justice that 
refugees may have historically had to deal with are explored.   
Having entered into an era of international acceptance and recognition, South Africa 
went about crafting new laws and policies that conformed to international standards. It 
became a party to many international instruments that it had previously been precluded from. 
Some of these had a direct bearing on how it would treat the refugees in its territory. The next 
chapter, Chapter two, sets out to evaluate what obligations South Africa took on when it 
signed and/or ratified those treaties, and what these mean for its policy and praxis. The 
chapter starts with a review of some of the literature on access to justice and in the process 
sets the theoretical context for the concept of access to justice, its often-changing and 
dynamic nature, and its place as a human right. It then looks at the international human rights 
law regime on access to justice generally and in relation to refugees specifically. The 
obligations of States derived from those international treaties are examined closely as they set 
the context for the evaluation of South Africa‘s compliance or otherwise with international 
law. This is particularly important given that South Africa has adopted and frequently restates 
its commitment to a rights-based approach to refugee issues.
34
 This chapter provides an 
insight into what international law expects of States generally and serves as a benchmark by 
                                                 
34
 Note 31 above. 
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which South Africa‘s Constitution, laws and policies on access to justice for refugees can be 
measured.  
Having determined what international human rights and refugee law expect of state 
parties in respect of access to justice, subsequent chapters close in on South Africa 
specifically. The country‘s effort to ensure access to justice for refugees is examined in two 
parts. The first part, in Chapter three, looks at the constitutional provisions on access to 
justice. It evaluates how well the South African Constitution responds to the principles 
distilled from the discussion of international law in the previous chapter. The relevant 
provisions of the Constitution, the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court as well as the 
commentaries of respected scholars on those provisions form the basis of this discussion. It 
also offers an opportunity to see some of the influences of the jurisprude ce of other courts, 
such as the European Court of Human Rights on the interpretation of the South African 
Constitution.  
The second part, in Chapter four, looks at South African legislation, policies and 
programmes on access to justice. The hazard inherent in this approach is obvious, given that 
very many pieces of legislation and policies do have a bearing on access to justice, even 
when that is not their primary purpose. There is therefore the potential to enter into an endless 
discussion of legislation, policy documents and policy directives. In order to avoid this, only 
those policies and legislation having access to justice directly as their main objective will be 
examined. This discussion of policy also necessitates a discussion, at least on a superficial 
level, of programmes developed to implement those policies. In discussing these, I will focus 
on how they impact upon refugees specifically.  
The best evaluation of any policy is the result it achieves and the next chapter deals 
with that. Chapter five presents the result of an empirical study on refugees‘ experiences with 
and their perceptions of the justice system in South Africa. It is based on the results of a field 
study in which refugees, asylum seekers and service providers were interviewed to obtain 
first hand reports of their experiences with seeking justice, and their interactions with the 
justice system. It also draws extensively on work done by other scholars, which have a 
bearing on the subject. The aim here is to see if those laws and policies discussed in Chapters 
three and four are having the desired results, or whether they fall short of their stated 
objectives, and if so why? The study provides practical illustrations of what the issues 
identified in the previous chapters mean to refugees and asylum seekers in their everyday 
lives. 
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Knowing this will help in framing recommendations and, it is hoped, will be fully taken 
into consideration in the ongoing work of improving refugee protection and of ensuring 
access to justice for the populace. In view of the broad interpretation of access to justice that 
the study adopts, the survey described above did not limit itself to obtaining the experiences 
of refugees only in specific state-sanctioned forums, but also looks at parallel methods by 
which they seek justice. The next chapter, chapter six, therefore also discusses the other 
forums in which refugees and asylum seekers seek justice and why they use those forums. 
The chapter will also give an insight into how refugees mobilise around social and ethnic 
networks for the purposes of seeking justice and what this means for the State, which is after 
all, the primary organ vested with the duty to administer justice.  
Having evaluated refugees‘ access to justice on the basis of compliance with 
international law, and on the basis of the user-friendliness or otherwise of State efforts, the 
final chapter, chapter seven summarises the study and its findings.  
This next section provides a historical context for refugee protection in South Africa. It 
traces the road South Africa has travelled to reach this point where the rights of refugees has 
become a significant part of the national discourse. 
 
1.6 HISTORICAL CONTEXT  
As Handmaker et al point out, any perspective on refugee protection in South Africa is bound 
to be new, not only because of the relative novelty of the experience to South Africa, but 
more importantly, in the way it demonstrates the close linkages to policies of international 
migration and to apartheid.
35
 This history of refugee protection in South Africa is therefore 
also a history of its immigration policy and the role of apartheid in that policy. A parallel but 
cursory look at refugee policies in the rest of Southern Africa within the same period frames 
the somewhat unique context within which refugee protection developed in South Africa.  
Unlike in most other Southern African countries, where refugee policies have 
undergone transformation in three phases over a long period of time, South Africa‘s refugee 
policy was more abrupt, swinging from one extreme of exclusion over decades, to a liberal, 
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rights-based approach within a few years.
36
 The first phase of refugee policies in Southern 
Africa saw most countries treating refugee issues as an integral part of immigration law, 
which concerned itself primarily with entry and residence, but remained silent on issues of 
refugee protection. Refugee-specific legislation did not exist in these countries for many 
years.
37
 This was also true of South Africa, although its immigration policy was more about 
control and deportation than planning and managed entry.
38
 
The country began receiving refugees (mostly Europeans fleeing the pogrom in Russia) 
since the latter part of the 19
th
 century, but it was not until the 1990s that a proper legislative 
framework was put in place.
39
 Until then, refugee reception was ad-hoc and very much 
dependent on the political anxieties of the government of the time.
40
  The most pressing issue 
that faced the newly established Union of South Africa in 1910 was the question of how to 
make the country ‗a great White man‘s land ... for ourselves and for generations to come‘.41 
Therefore, the immigration policy that emerged between 1910 and 1913 was, as one scholar 
puts it, more concerned at its core with exclusion rather than inclusion, characterised as it was 
by the racial prejudices that reflected the anxieties of the government, and were designed to 
control the entry of particular racial groups.
42
 It formed the basis of all immigration laws 
going forward. These laws, even though they regulated the presence of a group as highly 
                                                 
36
 Bonaventure Rutinwa ‗Asylum and efugee policies in Southern Africa: A historical perspective‘, paper 
presented at the ‗Regional Integration, Migration and Poverty Conference‘, Human Sciences Research Council, 
Pretoria, April 2002. Available at www.sarpn.org.za [Accessed 13 September, 2006]. 
37
 Ibid. 
38
 Jonathan Crush ‗Immigration, human rights and the Constitution‘ in Jonathan Crush (ed) Beyond control: 
Immigration and human rights in a democratic South Africa (Cape Town: IDASA, 1998) 2. 
39
 Jonny Steinberg A mixed reception: Mozambican and Congolese refugees in South Africa (Pretoria: Institute 
for Security Studies, 2005) 2; Jeff Handmaker et al ‗Introduction‘ in Handmaker et al  (note 31 above) 2; 
Richard Mendelsohn & Milton Shain The Jews in South Africa: An illustrated history (Johannesburg: Jonathan 
Ball Publishers, 2008) 85; Ed Stoddard ‗Lithuanian Jews make big impact in South Africa‘ Southern Africa 
Migration Project. Available at http://www.queensu.ca/samp/news/artic1.htm [Accessed 12 February 2007]. 
40
 Sally Peberdy S l   ing immig  n  : N  ion l id n i y  nd So  h A  i  ‘  immig   ion poli i   1910–2008 
(Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2009) Chapter 3. 
41
 Louis Botha, at Inaugural Congress of the South African Party, Bloemfontein, cited in Daniel W Kruger (ed) 
South African parties and policies, 1910–1960 (Cape Town: Human & Rousseau, 1960) 51–52.    
42
 Sally Peberdy ‗A brief history of South African immigration policy‘ in Jonathan Crush & Faranaaz Veriava 
(eds) Transforming South African migration and immigration policy (Cape Town: SAMP, 1998) 23. 
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vulnerable as refugees, were anchored in ideologies antithetical to human rights.
43
 They 
fostered a tendency to label all potential refugees as illegal immigrants with attendant 
consequences such as deportations. As will be seen shortly, they also severely curtailed 
refugees‘ rights of access to justice.  
The main feature of the immigration laws was often the very strict criteria which 
prospective immigrants had to meet, failing which they were declared ‗prohibited 
immigrants‘.44 The most important criterion was that the potential immigrant had to be 
‗readily assimilable with the European inhabitants of the union‘.45 By virtue of these laws 
therefore, only whites could be immigrants. Africans were recognised only as migrants or 
guest workers, who could be sent back across the border when they were no longer useful.
46
 
This remained the case until the dying years of apartheid.
47
  
Subsequent Acts were characterised by sweeping, almost despotic, powers conferred on 
the Minister of the Interior which enabled him to exclude entire classes of people from 
entering into the country as well as the discretion to allow certain classes of people entry who 
would otherwise have been excluded.
48
 This ensured access to an African labour force to 
                                                 
43
 Crush (note 38 above) 3. 
44
 Sally Peberdy & Jonathan crush ‗Rooted in racism: The origins of the Aliens Control Act‘ in Crush (note 38 
above) 20. 
45
 Crush (note 38 above) 3. 
46
 Marie Wentzel & Kholadi Tlabela ‗Historical background to South African migration‘ in Pieter Kok et al 
(eds) Migration in South and Southern Africa: Dynamics and determinants (Cape Town: HSRC, 2006) 76; 
Jonathan Crush ‗An historical overview of cross-border movement in Southern Africa‘ in David A McDonald 
(ed) On borders: Perspectives on international migration in Southern Africa (Ontario: Southern Africa 
Migration Project, 2000) 12, 20. 
47
 Crush (note 45 above). 
48
 Section 4(1)(a) of the Immigrant Regulation Act, No of 1913 (Act No 22 of 1913) for instance, provided that 
‗any person or class of persons deemed by the Minister on economic grounds or on account of standard or habits 
of life to be unsuited to the requirements of the Union, or any particular Province thereof‘ shall be a prohibited 
immigrant.‘ Acting under this provision, the Minister of the Interior subsequently published the following notice 
on 1 August 1913: 
Under the powers conferred on me by paragraph ( a ) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 4 of the Immigrants 
Regulation Act, 1913 (Act No. 2.2 of 1913), I hereby deem every Asiatic person to be unsuited on 
economic grounds:–  
(1) to the requirements of the Union; and  
(2) to the requirements of every Province of the Union;  
(a) in which such person is not domiciled; or  
(b) in which such person is not, under the terms of any statute of such Province, entitled to reside. 
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work the mines and agricultural sector while at the same time preventing them from 
becoming immigrants.
49
 The Immigrant Regulation Act of 1913, one of the founding 
legislations of the Union of South Africa, remained the cornerstone of South Africa‘s 
immigration legislation into the 2000s.
50
 The primary purpose of the 1913 Immigrants 
Regulation Act was to stem the tide of Indian immigration.
51
 Alarmed by the expanding 
Indian population and the threat posed to white businessmen and its vision of a white South 
Africa, the government declared its intention to exclude ‗Asiatics‘ and this legislation was 
designed to achieve that.
52
  
Section 4(1)(a) of the same Act was subsequently used to exclude Jews fleeing the 
upheaval in Europe at the end of the First World War.
53
 This section empowered the Minister 
of the Interior to deem any ‗class of persons‘ as ‗unsuited to the requirements of the Union or 
any Province thereof‘ and thus keep them out. Even though most were legitimate refugees 
fleeing Eastern Europe in the upheavals that followed the First World War, they were viewed 
as being different from the original white inhabitants of South Africa and were therefore ‗a 
threat to the future of the nation‘.54 Sustained anti-Semitic sentiment was the inspiration for 
the next immigration law – the Immigration Quota Act of 1930,55 which was modelled on 
                                                                                                                                                        
The effect of this notice should have been that all persons from Asia became prohibited immigrants under the 
Act. However, this was not so, as Jews and Syrians (deemed white) were admitted under this law. The 
provision, it was decided, applied only to ‗coloured Asiatics‘. See Generally Rex v Padsha (1923) AD 281, 287; 
Gandur v Rand Township Registrar (1913) AD 250. 
49
 See note 46 above; Ruth First Black gold: The Mozambican miner, proletarian and peasant (New York: St. 
Martin Press, 1983); Peberdy & Crush (note 43 above) 20; Jonathan Crush & David A McDonald ‗Introduction 
to special issue: Evaluating South African immigration policy after Apartheid‘ (2001) 48 (3) Africa Today 1–13.  
50
 Peberdy (note 40 above) 33. 
51
 Eric Anderson Walker The Cambridge history of the British Empire, Volume 7, Part 1 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1963) 656–657; Peberdy (note 40 above) 31–55. 
52
 Peberdy (note 40 above) 40. 
53
 Ibid, 33. 
54
 Ibid; Gideon Shimoni Community and conscience: The Jews in apartheid South Africa (Lebanon: Brandeis 
University Press, 2003) 11–12. 
55
 Act No 8 of 1930. 
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similar legislations in other white settler societies at the time including the United States, 
Canada and Australia.
56
  
Hitler‘s rise to power in Germany and the consequent persecution of Jews led to 
another wave of Jewish immigration into South Africa. Again, even though these were 
refugees fleeing anti-Semitism and other forms of persecution, the ruling Afrikaner 
nationalist government, which had overt Nazi sympathies, did not extend the same welcome 
it had accorded to other Europeans.
57
 In spite of its hostile stance, the government found the 
provisions of existing legislation inadequate to keep the refugees out, for under the 
Immigration Quota Act of 1930, they were nationals of a scheduled country (Germany), and 
because they were literate, often professionals and solvent, they met the entry requirements of 
the 1913 Act.  
This created a dilemma for the government which wanted to encourage German 
immigration but not the immigration of German Jews. Consequently, the Aliens Act of 
1937
58
 (Aliens Act) was passed. It defined an alien as any person who was not a ‗natural-born 
British subject or a Union National‘.59 This Act formed the basis of all subsequent 
immigration legislation, and for sometime formed the legislative framework for the reception 
of refugees into South Africa. It was in this Act that the word ‗alien‘ was first used to 
describe unwanted immigrants, and it later became entrenched in legislation.
60
 Although 
government policy on immigration was often changed to deal with the challenges of the 
times, such as World War II, apartheid, independence struggles in Africa and the Cold War, 
the structures established under the Aliens Act endured and were strengthened through 
various amendments. The Act, in its various amended versions survived into the advent of 
democracy.
61
  
 
                                                 
56
 See generally Roger Daniels Coming to America (New York: Haper Collins 1990); Freda Hawkins, Critical 
years in immigration: Canada and Australia compared (Quebec: McGill-Queens University Press, 1991) for 
similar discussions on the question of Jewish immigration to these countries. 
57
 Milton Shain The roots of anti-Semitism in South Africa (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1994) 
137–143. 
58
 Act No 1 of 1937. 
59
 Section 1, Aliens Act 1937. 
60
 Peberdy (note 42 above) 23. 
61
 Peberdy & Crush (note 44 above) 33. 
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1.6.1 Denial of access to justice under immigration laws 
A common thread that ran through these pieces of legislation was the tight leash they put on 
the judiciary and the direct impact this had on refugees‘ access to justice. Indeed some of 
apartheid‘s most effective instruments of control can be found in these laws. One of these, the 
‗ouster clause‘, was particularly popular and heavily relied upon in immigration law. Ouster 
clauses are provisions contained in legislation ousting or limiting the courts‘ jurisdiction to 
enquire into the legal validity of certain laws or conduct by the State. They purport to give the 
State a free hand to do as it pleases ‗without regard for the standard of lawfulness, 
reasonableness and procedural fairness‘.62 Also, they gave very wide discretion to 
immigration officials which meant that courts, even when they assumed jurisdiction, could 
not inquire into the merits of the decisions of the officials. Section 3 (1) of Immigrant 
Regulation Act of 1913, for instance provided: 
No court of law in the Union shall except upon a question of law reserved by a board as in this section 
provided, have any jurisdiction to review, quash, reverse, interdict or otherwise interfere with any 
proceeding, act, order, or warrant of the Minister, a board, a passport control officer or a master, had, 
done, or issued under this Act, and relating to the restriction or detention, or to the removal from the 
Union or any Province, of a person who is being dealt with as a prohibited person.  
Similarly couched, s 5(1) of the same Act ousted the jurisdiction of any court to interfere with 
the proceedings of an immigration authority relating to the restriction, detention or removal 
of persons who are dealt with as prohibited immigrants. Section 11 of the Admissions of 
Persons to the Republic Regulation Act,
63
 which later consolidated the 1913 Immigrants 
Regulation Act and its various amendments, contained a similar provision.
64
 Interpreting 
these provisions, the court in Union Government v Fakir,
65
 held that the only grounds on 
which the court could interfere were cases in which there was a manifest absence of 
                                                 
62
 Cora Hoexter Administrative law in South Africa (Cape Town: Juta, 2007) 522. 
63
 Act No 59 of 1972. 
64
 It provides:  
‗No court of law shall, except upon a question of law reserved by a board under sec. 12, have any 
jurisdiction to review, quash, reverse, interdict or otherwise interfere with any proceeding, act, order or 
warrant of the Minister, a board, a passport control officer or master of a ship, had, done, or issued under 
this Act, and which relates to the restriction or detention, or the removal from the Republic or any 
Province, of a person who is being dealt with as a prohibited person‘. 
65
 Union Government v Fakir (1923) AD 466, 470; See also Narainsamy v Principal Immigration Officer (1923) 
AD 673. 
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jurisdiction or if an order were made or obtained fraudulently. To justify such interference, 
however, the fraud or absence of jurisdiction that is alleged must appear from the papers. 
This, the court acknowledged, left it with ‗extremely limited jurisdiction‘.66  
The impact of these clauses on refugees was obvious – they had no access to remedies 
even if their rights were violated through atrocious administrative action.  Indeed, as the court 
noted in Wray v Minister of the Interior and Another
67
   
Unless a person being treated as a prohibited immigrant can allege and prove that the action or proposed 
action of the passport control officer to deport him is one for which no warrant at all exists in the Act in 
the sense that he has no jurisdiction at all to perform such an act, or that, having jurisdiction to deport 
him, it is done fraudulently or mala fide, the Court cannot interfere, even if it were for some reason 
illegal.
68 
 
1.6.2 The era of refugee-specific policies 
Concern about the plight of European refugees fleeing post-war Eastern Europe led to the 
adoption of the UN Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol.
69
 While South Africa 
grappled with refugee issues under the auspices of its immigration laws, Southern Africa, like 
the rest of Africa, was in the grip of anti-colonial liberation struggles that gained momentum 
post-World War II. This gave rise to a new group of refugees fleeing persecution across 
borders and led to the adoption of the OAU Refugee Convention. This state of unrest also 
gave birth to what could be termed ‗second-generation‘ refugee policies in the sub-region. 
The policies were characteris d by laws designed to regulate selected aspects of refugee 
protection and were primarily aimed at controlling refugees as their long titles attested.
70
 In 
spite of this shortcoming, they had the advantage that they were refugee specific-legislation 
and recognised the person of the refugee and their disadvantaged position.   
This was not the case in South Africa. Neither the UN Refugee Convention nor the 
OAU Refugee Convention had any impact on its refugee policy. The country had by this time 
                                                 
66
 Barday v Passport Control Officer (1967) 2 SA 346 (A) 358. 
67
 Wray v Minister of the Interior and Another 1973 (3) SA 554 (W). 
68
 Ibid, 561. 
69
 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 606 UNTS 267, entered into force 4 October, 1967.  
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 Eg Tanzania‘s Refugee Control Act No 2 of 1966; Botswana‘s Refugee (Control and Recognition) Act, (Cap 
25:03) of 1968; Zambia‘s Refugee (Control) Act  No 40 of 1970; Swaziland‘s Refugee Control Order No 5 of 
1978.  
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become a refugee producing country as persons fleeing the apartheid regime fled to other 
African countries and Europe.
71
 On the other hand, while a number of persons fitting the 
definition of refugee contained in the UN Refugee Convention found refuge in South Africa, 
their admission was ad-hoc, race based and was facilitated under the Aliens Control Act. The 
broad discretion accorded by the Act continued to be used to facilitate generous entry to 
desirables like immigrants from Western Europe and anti-communists from Eastern Europe 
in the Cold War era. It also enabled the country to open its doors to receive and grant full 
citizenship status to a large number of mostly white persons fleeing from Rhodesia and 
Mozambique as the settler colonial systems in these countries crumbled in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s.
72
 However, the same hospitality was not extended to black Mozambicans fleeing 
the South African-sponsored civil war in Mozambique.
73
 Entry of black Africans continued 
to be strictly limited to bi-lateral contract-labour treaties between South Africa and 
neighbouring countries to provide cheap labour.
74
 South Africa‘s failure to recognise them as 
refugees left them vulnerable in terms of access to protection and to justice. It meant they 
could be and were indeed repatriated contrary to the principle of non-refoulement and they 
had no access to international assistance.
75
 They could not resort to court to have their rights 
upheld.   
South Africa‘s crackdown on anti-apartheid activists, the civil wars it supported in 
many Southern African countries, such as Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia 
                                                 
71
 Ivor C Jackson The refugee concept in group situations (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999) 302–
307. 
72
 Crush (note 46 above) 20; Lee Anne de la Hunt ‗Refugee migration to South Africa‘ Southern Africa 
Migration Project Available at http://www.queensu.ca/samp/ [Accessed 14 August 2010]. 
73
 Christina Murray ‗Mozambican refugees: South Africa‘s responsibility‘ (1986) 2 South African Journal of 
Human Rights 154–163, 161; Lee Ann de la Hunt ‗Refugees and immigration law in South Africa‘ in Crush 
(note 38 above) 125; Human Rights Watch The treatment of refugees and asylum-seekers in South Africa (New 
York: Human Rights Watch, 1998) 24, 29. 
74
 Jeff Handmaker & Jennifer Parsley ‗Migration, refugees and racism in South Africa‘ (2001) 20 (1) Refuge 40; 
Jonathan Crush The struggle for Swazi labour 1890–1920 (Ontario: McGill-Queen‘s University 1987) 90, 93-
94.  
75
 Murray (note 73 above) 155, 163; Chris Dolan & Vusi Nkuna ‗Refugees, illegal aliens and the labour market: 
The case for a rights-based approach to labour movement in South Africa‘ University of the Witswatersrand 
Rural Facility, January 1995.  
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continued to produce refugees fleeing across the sub-region‘s borders.76 It was during this 
period, in the 1980s, that a third generation of refugee policies emerged in Southern Africa. 
They were characterised by the enactment of refugee laws modelled on and approximating 
the standards found in the international refugee conventions.
77
 Again, South Africa lagged 
behind. Indeed, it refused to recognise the presence of refugees in the country even when they 
had become a very visible part of South African society. Most were Africans who had fled 
the bloody civil wars in Mozambique and Angola and sought refuge in South Africa.
78
 They 
mostly stayed in the homelands and rural areas, and as long as they did not venture into the 
cities, they were left alone.
79
 As the country still had not adopted any laws to deal with 
refugee matters, their status as refugees and asylum seekers was ignored and they were dealt 
with as a class of prohibited persons.
80
 In 1991, all the various immigration legislation was 
compiled and consolidated into a single act – the Aliens Control Act of 1991.81 As apartheid 
died and the country moved inexorably towards democracy, the increasing number and 
visibility of refugees and asylum seekers made it expedient to deal with matters relating to 
their status determination under section 41(1) of the 1991 Aliens Control Act. The section 
empowered the Minister to issue temporary permits to ‗prohibited persons‘ to enable them 
enter and reside in South Africa.   
The whole Act itself did not provide any major shift from previous immigration laws. 
Section 55 for instance, continued the tradition of ouster clauses, providing that no decision 
of the DHA was reviewable by a court or tribunal, and persons could be held in detention 
                                                 
76
 Phyllis Johnson & David Martin Apartheid terrorism: The destabilisation report (London: Commonwealth 
Secretariat and James Currey, 1989) chap 1; Africa Watch Angola: Violations of the laws of war by both sides 
(New York: Human Rights Watch, 1989) 8; Alex Vines RENAMO: From terrorism to democracy in 
Mozambique? (London: James Currey, 1991) 18–19; Crush (note 45 above) 20–21. 
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 For instance Zimbabwe‘s Refugee Act, No 13 of 1983; Lesotho‘s Refugee Act, No 18 of 1983; Angola‘s 
Refugee Status Act, No 8 of 1990; Mozambique‘s Refugee Act, No 21 of 1991. 
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 Crush (note 46 above) 20–21. 
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 Nicola Johnston The point of no return: Evaluating the amnesty for Mozambican refugees in South Africa 
Migration Policy Brief No 6 (Cape Town: Southern African Migration Project, 2001) 1. Crush describes the 
actions of the South African government in causing displacement by virtue of its own policies and then 
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81
 Act No 96 of 1991. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
22 
 
indefinitely, without judicial review.
82
 The Act was much criticised by human rights activists 
and has been described as a ‗draconian apartheid throwback‘ and ‗an Act rooted in racism‘.83 
Following a spate of criticism and expressions of concern by international and local 
organisations
84
 on the enforcement of the Aliens Control Act, particularly as they relate to 
refugees, the government responded by actively promoting fundamental changes in policy 
and legislation.
85
   
In the final days of apartheid, the government made rapid efforts to establish an 
acceptable refugee regime. It began by signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with 
the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) in 1991 on the repatriation of 
South African refugees from their countries of asylum.
86
 These refugees, as stated earlier, 
were mostly members of the opposition or liberation movements who had fled the crackdown 
by the apartheid government. In 1993, a Tripartite Commission consisting of the UNHCR, 
and representatives of the South Africa and Mozambican governments signed a tripartite 
agreement on the repatriation of some 300,000 Mozambican refugees in South Africa.
87
 Until 
then, these Mozambican refugees had never been officially recognised as refugees by the 
South African government.
 88
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 This section was amended by the Aliens Control Amendment Act, No 76 of 1995. 
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International Journal of Refugee Law 293.  
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Returnees, 4 September 1991 (1992) 31 ILM 522.  
87
 Tri-partite Agreement between the Government of the Republic of South Africa, the Government of the 
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 Marjoleine Zieck UNHCR and voluntary repatriation of refugees: A legal analysis (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1970) 339, 341.  
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The end of apartheid ushered in an era of public declarations of commitments to human 
rights, tolerance, prosperity and regional integration by the government. These commitments 
were expressed in the adoption of a new Constitution, the ratification of human rights treaties 
and an active role in the development of structures of regional integration.
89
 This period of 
policy re-engineering in South Africa coincided with a period of great turmoil on the African 
continent. With about three different conflicts going on in the Great Lakes region, Somalia on 
the road to statelessness, the protracted conflict in Angola and horrible civil wars playing out 
in Liberia and Sierra Leone,
90
 South Africa suddenly found itself a favoured destination for 
beleaguered refugees from countries with which it had previously not had much contact. 
Within a short period, it had moved from a refugee producing country to officially becoming 
a refugee receiving one. As the first MoU between the government and UNHCR did not give 
UNHCR access to refugees inside South Africa, a legal framework for their reception became 
necessary and in the absence of a refugee legislation, the government entered into a Basic 
Agreement with the UNHCR to enable it establish a temporary presence in South Africa and 
for the grant of certain diplomatic privileges to the Commission.
91
 The Basic Agreement 
allowed for the establishment of procedures for the reception, determination of refugee status 
and grant of asylum to refugees in South Africa.
92
 The parties agreed to ‗establish all the 
necessary arrangements and mechanisms for the execution of measures designed to improve 
the situation of asylum-seekers and refugees in South Africa‘.93 The government further 
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 Guy Goodwin-Gill ‗International and national responses to the challenges of mass forced displacement‘ in 
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 See generally Gil Loescher & James Milner Protracted refugee situations: Domestic and international 
security implications (New York: Routledge, 2005); Scott Peterson Me against my brother: At war in Somalia, 
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agreed to ‗apply internationally accepted principles pertaining to the protection and treatment 
of asylum-seekers and refugees‘.94 
On 12 December 1995, the government acceded to the OAU Refugee Convention, and 
on 12 January 1996, it acceded to both the UN Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol. 
Having launched itself into the global arena, all that was needed was legislation to give effect 
to the obligations that the country had committed to.  However, in spite of the rapid pace at 
which things started, enactment of a law to protect refugees was slow, and it was not until 
1998 that the a new refugee-specific Act was enacted.
95
 Even so it did not become 
operational for another two years. This was due in part to the climate of xenophobia, 
exacerbated by the presence of the new immigrants from the north who did not fit into the 
whole new project of nation building; and bureaucratic inertia.
96
  
Nevertheless, the process of developing a legislative framework for refugee protection 
went ahead, and in a move that was inconsistent with its usual practice, the Department of 
Home Affairs (DHA) adopted a participatory process that encouraged civil society and the 
public to comment on a Draft Refugees Bill. Civil society feedback was enthusiastic.
97
 
Submissions supported a strong human rights and constitutional focus and emphasised 
protection.
98
 A key feature of the consultation process was the general consensus that 
migration and immigration on the one hand, and refugee issues on the other, had to be dealt 
with as two separate subjects of legislative reform, a suggestion adopted by the DHA.
99
 
Unfortunately, this inclusionary process did not produce the results that civil society and 
                                                 
94
 Ibid.  
95
 Refugees Act No 130 of 1998. 
96
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others interested in refugee issues had hoped for; the legislation that resulted from the process 
was considerably weakened by last-minute intervention from ‗conservative forces within the 
Department of Home Affairs‘100 who had ‗a mentality of strong central control‘.101  Some of 
the areas of concern were that grounds for exclusion were not in full compliance with 
international law; the Act did not include mechanisms to ensure that the Standing Committee 
on Refugee Affairs and the Refugee Appeal Board were independent and could act without 
bias; that only a limited number of rights of refugees were enumerated; and that a section 
allowed for detention of refugees.
102
 
In spite of its shortcomings, the Refugees Act that emerged has been described as an 
important step forward in the protection of refugees.
103
 On the immigration front, a new 
Immigration Act was signed into law in late 2002 which laid out a more immigration-friendly 
framework focused on attracting skilled immigrants.
104
 While the Refugee Act has been 
severely criticised
105
 and its implementation led to several confrontations between DHA, the 
organ of state responsible for its implementation, and civil society, its value and 
progressiveness cannot be denied. It serves as the framework within which refugees and 
asylum seekers reside in South Africa. The Act adopts a broad definition of refugees which 
encompasses the definitions in both the UN Refugee Convention and the OAU Refugee 
Convention.
106
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The foregoing historical and legislative context has attempted to recount sequentially, 
how South Africa came to be where it is in terms or refugee protection. It serves to highlight 
two key points, namely that: 
 An ad hoc approach to refugee protection, without a proper legal framework that 
references international standards, has the potential to facilitate abuse of human 
rights, as was the case of African refugees during apartheid. Treating them as just 
another class of migrants while failing to recognise their unique vulnerabilities as 
forced migrants meant that matters crucial to refugee protection, including 
protection from refoulement, were ignored. 
 Denial of access to justice is inimical to refugee protection. As the discussion of 
South Africa‘s use of ouster clauses shows, when refugees are prevented from 
approaching the courts, they are rendered powerless to challenge decisions and 
practices that could expose them to danger. They are thus, not really protected, 
regardless of the country‘s decision to allow them into its territory. This is especially 
so when one considers that some of the dangers they could be exposed to are similar 
to what they experienced or could experience in their home countries if they did not 
have the ‗protection‘ of this host state.      
By showing in a logical manner how things have progressed – from an era of ignoring 
refugee rights to one of recognition of those rights – the setting is provided for an 
examination of the current era, the era of rights rhetoric and compliance with international 
obligations, which is at the heart of this thesis. The next logical question is therefore whether 
refugees are able to convert those recognised legal rights into effective protection. In order to 
answer this question, it is necessary to take a brief look at what currently obtains – the social 
context in which refugees live in South Africa. 
 
1.7 THE SOCIAL CONTEXT 
Refugee settlement patterns often take one of two models. The first is a camp-based one in 
which refugees are restricted to specific camps. This is also referred to as ‗warehousing‘.107 It 
is the model adopted by most countries in Africa and in many parts of Europe. The camps are 
usually run by the UNHCR with the contribution of local and international non-governmental 
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organisations and government agencies.
108
 The second model, more commonly found in 
European countries and North America is what the UNHCR refers to as the ‗urban refugee‘ 
policy. The model essentially means that refugees are not restricted to camps and are allowed 
to live wherever they choose. In line with global population trends of rural to urban 
migration, most refugees and asylum seekers choose to stay in the urban areas which hold 
more promise for employment and other social benefits.
109
  The model is predicated on the 
expectation that refugees would temporarily integrate into the local community.
110
 According 
to its 1997 Policy on Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Urban Areas,
111
 UNHCR's 
expectations for asylum seekers and refugees in structured urban environments are that host 
governments should play a significant role in protecting them and searching for durable 
solutions to solve their problems, as opposed to the UNHCR having the principal 
responsibility.
112
  
South Africa has adopted an urban refugee policy. An obvious implication of the policy 
is that a refugee-specific framework for service delivery (as would be the case in camp 
settings), does not exist and refugees have to access social and other services in much the 
same way as everybody else.  In fact, despite its intention to protect the welfare and dignity 
of those seeking refugee status in South Africa, the country‘s refugee policy reflects almost 
no state obligations for providing specialised assistance. Rather, its explicit obligations are 
limited to bureaucratic processes intended to facilitate access and integration.
113
  
Since refugees have to seek out necessary services by themselves, a situation of conflict 
has arisen in South Africa‘s host-refugee relations. This is manifested in resentment and 
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hostility towards refugees and asylum seekers by the local population,
114
 while refugees find 
themselves disadvantaged in the contest for limited resources.
115
 Research in the field of 
forced migration in general and refugees in particular have detailed the difficulties that this 
arrangement raises, particularly the problems faced by refugees – pervasive xenophobia, 
administrative inefficiency at the DHA which make access to the Refugee Status 
Determination (RSD) process and documentation very difficult; difficulties in accessing jobs 
and other social services; pervasive discrimination by state personnel and institutions, not to 
mention government recalcitrance in extending any kind of benefits to refugees.
116
 On-going 
evaluations of asylum practices consistently show that all is not well with the system. The 
recurrent theme is that though refugees‘ rights are well defined, translating them into tangible 
physical benefits has been a more difficult task to accomplish.
117
 Across all spectrums of 
their lives, they face significant challenges; from the initial process of obtaining 
documentation (for which extensive delays and bribery are the norm),
118
 denial of access to 
banking and financial services,
119
 difficulties in accessing housing, health and educational 
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services,
120
 constant harassment by law enforcement officials and xenophobia.
121
 Research by 
the Consortium on Refugees and Migrants in South Africa on refugees‘ access to 
government-funded social services, for instance, found that despite the existence of laws 
which entitle refugees and asylum seekers to a range of basic social services including 
emergency medical treatment, education, disability grants and social assistance, few 
Departments or public service providers have adequate policies and practices to implement 
this. The study found that:  
 Many refugees, asylum seekers, and other migrants reported being refused access to 
treatment at public clinics and hospitals. Many faced discrimination and ignorance 
of their rights when they try to access these services. 
 Refugees and asylum seekers reported being unable to access Anti-Retroviral 
Treatment (ART) because they did not have green, bar-coded ID documents – 
contrary to the provisions of the Refugees Act which makes the section 24 and 
section 22 permits the accepted forms of documentation for refugees and asylum 
seekers respectively. They are often  referred out of the public sector to NGOs to 
access ART, despite a directive from the National Department of Health to the 
contrary. 
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 Close to one third of school age non-national children were not enrolled in schools 
due to an inability to pay fees, the costs of transport, uniforms and books, or explicit 
exclusion by school administrators. 
 Non-national children in schools reported being regularly subjected to xenophobic 
comments by teachers or other students. 
 Despite legislative and administrative provisions for certain forms of social 
assistance for non nationals from the government, in practice such assistance is 
almost never available. The Department of Social Development had not made the 
provisions for refugees to access Disability Grants despite being legally compelled 
to do so. 
 In the absence of direct assistance from the government, many non-nationals were 
heavily reliant on assistance from under-staffed and under-resourced NGOs, refugee 
self-help organisations and religious organisations. 
 In terms of housing, whilst South Africa‘s refug e policy encourages integration, 
asylum seekers and refugees are completely excluded from various national housing 
policies. This, says CoRMSA, is an obstacle to migrants‘ social and economic 
integration into the communities in which they live. To further compound the 
problem, those who live in informal townships around the country are often 
displaced by xenophobic violence which erupts from time to time. Yet when seeking 
private accommodation outside townships, they are regularly discriminated against 
by landlords who do not distinguish between documented and undocumented 
foreigners. In many instances, landlords refuse to rent to non-nationals regardless of 
their legal status. Others take advantage of their vulnerability to charge them higher 
rental rates than South Africans. 
 Delays in the processing of documents by the DHA greatly limits the employment 
opportunities for refugees and asylum seekers. 
 Banks often refuse banking services and access to credit to refugees and asylum 
seekers due to concerns regarding the validity of their permits even though these are 
legal under the Refugees Act. They are therefore more likely to be victims of crime 
and police extortion because their assets remain in cash. Indeed this reason has been 
adduced by the police force and government officials on several occasions as the 
reason behind attacks on foreigners including refugees and asylum seekers. 
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 Unaccompanied minor asylum seekers from neighbouring countries often face 
exploitation by the police who deport them illegally or detain them in illegal 
conditions – such as detention with adults or for extended periods of time; many of 
them work in exploitative conditions in various sectors, including farming and 
domestic work.
122
 
These well-documented challenges stand in stark contrast to the generous protection that 
South Africa‘s Refugees Act and Constitution offers to refugees and asylum seekers. But 
then, as was stated at the beginning of this chapter, mere recognition of rights amounts to 
nothing – it is only when effective remedies for their violation are available and accessible 
that respect for and protection of human rights can be guaranteed.
123
 The question therefore is 
whether the existence and scale of the problems highlighted above mean that effective 
remedies are unavailable or inaccessible to refugees and asylum seekers in South Africa? In 
other words, do refugees and asylum seekers enjoy the right of access to justice which is 
essential for vindicating their rights?  This is the question that this study will attempt to 
answer.  
 
1.8 CONCLUSION   
The historical and social contexts set out above demonstrate the long way that refugee 
protection has come in South Africa, its dramatic transformation from an issue obsessively 
focused on exclusion,
124
 to one which, in legislation at least, is focused on inclusion, on 
human rights and protection. The shift has been from an ad hoc, self-determined refugee 
policy regime which rigorously limited access to justice, and whose only criterion was that it 
sat conveniently with government agenda.  
Today, South Africa‘s refugee policy reflects an objective set of internationally adopted 
standards and a coherent legislative framework is in place, but the question regarding access 
to justice still remains. This is not because there are any indications that odious devices, such 
as ouster clauses and near-despotic ministerial powers that handicap access to justice still 
exist in immigration or refugee laws, but because an incongruous situation exists whereby 
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 Consortium on Refugees and Migrants in South Africa ‗Protecting refugees, asylum seekers and immigrants 
in South Africa‘  CoRMSA Report 2008. Available at www.cormsa.org.za [Accessed 21 July 2008]. 
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 Francioni (note 17 above) 1.   
124
 Crush & Peberdy (note 44 above).  
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generous rights are accorded to refugees in law, but in reality flagrant violations of those 
rights appear to be the order of the day.  
Given the oft-stated and trite observation that it is only the availability of and access to 
effective judicial and other remedies that can guarantee respect for and protection of human 
rights,
125
 the question lingers in the mind whether the reason for this situation is because 
refugees do not have access to said judicial remedies. If there is such a wide gap between 
refugees‘ legally enforceable rights and actual experiences, to what extent has the legal 
system been employed to change the situation? The fact that there is very little reported or 
unreported refugee case law within the corpus juris of South Africa seems to suggest that the 
answer is ‗not much‘. The reason for this could very well be that refugees are ignorant of 
their rights, including the right to challenge in courts, many of the discriminatory practises 
which affect their lives. On the other hand, it could be that the problem lies not with refugees 
and asylum seekers, but with the country‘s policies on access to justice or practices within the 
justice system.  
Unfortunately, while there is an abundance of studies on the difficulties experienced by 
refugee and asylum seekers‘ in accessing social services, hardly anything has been done in 
relation to access to justice. What cannot be denied, however, is that the rights-based 
paradigm adopted by South Africa means that the government of South Africa has bound 
itself to a certain standard of responsibility and accountability that comes with adopting 
human rights standards. Just as it has certain duties with regard to core issues like the right to 
protect refugees and asylum se kers from refoulement, so it has duties with regard to the right 
of access to justice. What these duties are first need to be established. Thereafter, an 
examination of how well or how badly South Africa is doing with respect to those duties will 
follow. The next chapter examines what South Africa‘s access to justice obligations are under 
the international human rights treaties to which it is a party.   
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Chapter Two 
Conceptual and Theoretical Framework 
of Access to Justice 
I am not here to dispense justice. I am here to dispose of this case according to the law.  
Whether this is or is not justice is a question for the legislature to determine.
1
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the meaning and development of access to justice from a historical 
perspective. It looks at its growth and recognition as a human right and the normative 
framework that exists in international law on access to justice generally, and as it relates to 
refugees in particular. The fact that access to justice is recognised as a human right in 
international law is important because this helps to establish a minimum standard of 
accountability to which States can be held.
2
 It serves as the foundation upon which objective 
answers can be found, not only to the question of whether or not a State is meeting its 
obligations under international law, but also what those obligations are precisely. The chapter 
will demonstrates that the obligation of States, in this case South Africa, extends beyond 
merely providing the machinery for the administration of justice. It includes an obligation to  
ensure that a number of other elements are guaranteed which enable persons within its 
territory to enjoy a certain quality of judicial protection which measures up to internationally 
accepted standards of fairness and equity. 
Following its return to the global stage in the early 1990s, South Africa made various 
efforts to align its laws a d policies with internationally accepted standards and human rights. 
It set about enacting new laws and ratifying major international treaties it had previously 
neglected. With regard to refugees, as was noted in the previous chapter, it has ratified two 
key treaties, namely UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951
3
 and the OAU 
                                                 
1
Thomas W Taylor, Chief Justice of Manitoba (1887–99), quoted in Andrew J Roman ‗Barriers to access: 
Including the excluded‘ in Allan C Hutchinson (ed) Access to civil justice (Toronto: Carswell Publishers, 1990) 
177. 
2
 Louis Henkin ‗International human rights standards in national law: The jurisprudence of the United States‘ in 
Benedetto Conforti & Francesco Francioni (eds) Enforcing international human rights in domestic courts (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997) 189. 
3
 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951 (189 UNTS 150, entered into force 22 
April, 1954 (hereinafter UN Refugee Convention)). 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
34 
 
Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 1969.
4
 At the 
national level it has enacted laws to protect refugee rights and regulate their presence in the 
country.
5
 This is in addition to a number of human rights instruments that will be discussed 
below, which have a bearing upon the right of access to justice for both its citizens and others 
within its territory. South Africa‘s obligations deriving from the commitments it has made at 
the international level are therefore an appropriate vehicle for measuring its success or failure 
in the area of access to justice. International and comparative jurisprudence is also useful in 
assessing the nature and content of the right of access to justice, as are the pronouncements of 
important international monitoring bodies mandated to interpret international law 
instruments. Frequent references are therefore made to the pronouncements of bodies such as 
the United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC), the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples‘ Rights (ACHPR), The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (IACHR).   
 
2.2 WHAT IS ACCESS TO JUSTICE? 
It is a truism that without the rule of law and its institutions, human rights cannot be protected 
or realised. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) recognises this vital truth in 
its preamble: 
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged 
the conscience of mankind … it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last 
resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of 
law…6 
Yet the concept of the rule of law – the basic principle that citizens, government and its 
agencies are constrained by law, while also having effective and enforceable legal rights 
against one another – is itself underpinned by the right of access to justice. For without 
effective means for their enforcement and vindication, the rights of citizens and governments 
would have no value. It is no wonder therefore that it has been said the right of access to 
                                                 
4
 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (1969 1001 UNTS 45, 
entered into force 20 June, 1974 (hereinafter OAU Refugee Convention)).  
5
 Refugees Act No 130 of 1998.  
6
 Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (GA Res. 217A (III), UN Doc A/810 at 71 (1948). 
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justice is one of the most essential features of any democracy,
7
 and if human rights norms 
were to be classified, the right to access justice would rank as one of the most important 
ones.
8
 As Cappelletti and Garth remind us,    
Within the existing culture of rights ... the right of effective access to justice is of paramount importance, 
since the possession of rights is meaningless without the mechanisms for their effective vindication. 
Effective access to justice can thus be seen as the most basic requirement – the most basic ‗human right‘ 
– of a modern egalitarian legal system which purports to guarantee and not merely proclaim the right of 
all.
9
 
It can therefore be said the right of access to justice is not just a human right; it is a human 
right which exists to ensure the enjoyment of other rights. Despite its recognised importance, 
however, the concept of ‗access to justice‘ is not easily defined. Its highly nuanced, and in 
many ways, subjective nature, makes a universal definition difficult.
10
 The United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) for instance found that when people think of ‗access to 
justice‘, they are not necessarily thinking of the justice system. Rather, the understanding of 
access to justice is highly interpretative and contextual, and is linked to the specific socio-
                                                 
7
 Asbjørn Eide et al (eds) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A commentary (Oslo: Scandinavian 
University Press, 1992) 144; Bryant G Garth ‗Access to justice‘ in Malcolm Rowat et al (eds) Judicial reform in 
Latin America and the Caribbean: Proceedings of a World Bank conference (Washington DC: World Bank, 
1995) 88. 
8
 Lord Steyn ‗The centrality of the right to fair trial as a human rights norm‘ in Developing human rights 
jurisprudence, Vol 8: Eighth judicial colloquium on the domestic application of international human rights 
norms (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2001) 64. 
9
 Mauro Cappelletti & Brian Garth ‗Access to justice: The worldwide movement to make rights effective‘ in 
Mauro Cappelletti & Brian Garth (eds) Access to justice – Vol 1, A world survey (Milan: Sijthoff and Noordhoff 
1978) 8. 
10
 Good considers the lack of a conclusive definition in itself problematic, for while it gives commentators the 
leeway to use the term in any way that they choose, it is unhelpful to courts seeking to determine issues on 
access to justice considerations and may  blind them to the full potential of the term. Matthew Good ‗Access to 
justice, judicial economy and behavior modification: Exploring the goals of Canadian class action‘  (2009) 47 
(1) Alberta Law Review 185, 191; Richard Moorhead & Pascoe Pleasence  ‗Introduction‘ in Richard Moorhead 
& Pascoe Pleasence (eds) Access to justice after universalism: Re-engineering access to justice (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing (2003) 2; Pia Letto-Vanamo ‗Access to justice: A conceptual and practical analysis with 
implications for justice reforms (2005) 2 (1) Voices of Development Jurists Paper Series 4.  
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political conditions of people.
11
 Thus in India,  it found that whereas slum dwellers prioritised 
access to justice with regard to economic issues, members of marginalised castes were more 
concerned with the social dimensions of access, and indigenous minorities highlighted the 
political dimension.
12
  
What cannot be denied, however, is that the phrase almost always tends to focus 
attention on the legal system and the administration of justice. It serves to draw attention to 
two basic purposes of the legal system, which are that the system must be equally accessible 
to all, and that it must lead to results that are individually and socially just.
13
 Still, one cannot 
fail to notice its somewhat political message – the implication that, somehow, there is 
something wrong with the current administration of justice. As Sarat puts it, access to justice 
advocates for greater responsiveness in the administration of the law, while at the same time 
being an admission that the current legal order is not sufficiently responsive.
14
 
One could attempt a definition by focusing on the two key words that make up the 
phrase, ‗access‘ and ‗justice‘. But even though these two words are easily conceptualised in 
our minds, they are so aligned to various ideological leanings that a universally acceptable 
meaning is impractical. The word ‗access‘ carries with it a political undertone that underpins 
much of the agitation on governance and development today. To quote Johnson, 
The term ‗access‘ has become shorthand for a bundle of problems and a variety of goals. In this 
ambiguity, it is akin to words like ‗accountability‘ and ‗participation‘. Everyone has his own conception 
of what is meant; some take a narrow view, while others encompass in that single word, nearly every 
problem experienced in the judicial system.
15
 
Whether it is in respect of information, resources or justice, the word ‗access‘ conjures up 
barriers. It is no wonder therefore, that the dictionary defines access as the ‗freedom or ability 
                                                 
11
 UNDP Programming for justice: A       o   ll. A p    i ion  ‘  g id   o h m n  igh  -based approach to 
access to justice (Bangkok: United Nations Development Programme, Asia Pacific Rights and Justice Initiative, 
2005) 4. 
12
 Ibid. 
13
 Cappelletti & Garth (note 9 above) 6; Greg Connellan ‗Access to justice‘ (2001) 13  Legaldate 5, 5. 
14
 Austin Sarat ‗Book review: Access to justice by Mauro Cappelletti and Brian Garth‘ (1981) 94 (8) Harvard 
Law Review 1911, 1911. 
15
 Earl Johnson Jr ‗Thinking about access: A preliminary typology of possible strategies‘ in Mauro Cappelletti 
& Brian Garth (eds) Access To Justice: Emerging issues and perspectives Vol III (Milan: Sijthoff and 
Noordhoff Publishers 1979) 5, 7–8. 
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to obtain or make use of‘ something.16 In everyday rhetoric, however, the mistake is often 
made of equating access with availability, missing out on the important distinction between 
the two: while availability refers to the question of whether a service exists or is provided for 
clients, access refers to the question of whether a service is actually secured by a consumer.
17
  
The second component of the phrase ‗access to justice‘ inevitably leads to the timeless 
question ‗what is justice‘? This question has occupied the mind of humans for ages, from 
Plato to modern day philosophers like John Rawls, from laymen to judges. The meaning of 
justice evolves as society changes,
18
 but the constant thread is that justice is often located 
within the values of fairness,
19
 or of equity and reasonableness combined with good morals,
20
 
and is often understood in the context of Rousseau‘s ‗Social Contract‘.21 In order not to get 
bogged down in a theoretical discussion of the meaning of ‗justice‘, it is expedient to adopt a 
pragmatic approach to the term within the context of access to justice. For this purpose, 
‗justice‘ can be said to be what is right, fair and appropriate, with the redress of wrong or 
accountability for wrong behaviour being its core components. ‗Justice‘ would in short, mean 
the negation of injustice.
22
 The idea of ‗justice‘ as ‗the negation of injustice‘ ties in well with 
what this thesis seeks to examine – how do refugees and asylum seekers negate the injustice 
that results from the violation of their rights or from the state‘s failure to ensure the 
                                                 
16
 W       ‘   hi d n   in   n  ion l di  ion  y o   h  Engli h l ng  g  (unabridged) (Springfield: Merriam-
Webster, 2002). 
17Andrew J Roman ‗Barriers to access: Including the excluded‘ in Hutchinson (note 1 above) 177, 180.  
18
 Janet Gross Stein & Adam Cook ‗Speaking the language of justice‘ in Julia Bass et al (eds) Access to justice 
for a new century: The way forward. (Toronto: Law Society of Upper Canada 2005) 163. 
19
 John Rawls, A theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1971) 3. William E Conklin ‗Wither 
justice: The common problematic of five models of ―access to justice‖ ‘ (2001) 19 Windsor Yearbook of Access 
to Justice 297; Nada Korac-Kakabadse ‗Inequality of discourse: Problematic consumption of justice in the 
common law legal system‘ (2001) 16 (3) Women in Management Review 126–14, 127. 
20
 DH Van Zyl ‗Justice and its concomitants in a new constitutional dispensation‘ in Jeremy Sarkin & William 
Blinchy (eds) The Administration of justice: Current themes in comparative perspective (Dublin: Four Courts 
Press, 2004); Andrew J Roman ‗Barriers to access: Including the excluded‘ in Allan C Hutchinson supra, (note 1 
above) 180. 
21
 Rawls (note 19 above) 297. 
22
 Marc Galanter ‗Access to Justice as a moving frontier‘ in Bass (note 18 above) 147–161; see also Marc 
Galanter ‗Access to justice in a world of expanding social capability‘ (2010) 37 Fordham Urban Law Journal 
115, 122–128.  
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realisation of those rights? How do they negate the injustices they face in everyday 
interactions with others in society?  
Galanter, however, espouses a paradigm whereby the term ‗justice‘ in the phrase 
‗access to justice‘ is not just a vindication of rights and entitlements or a stable and 
determinate concept, but rather a fluid and labile thing, which moves to include new kinds of 
troubles, and the troubles of new sorts of people who were previously neglected, such as 
people with disabilities and sexual minorities
23
 – and to that one could add refugees and other 
migrant groups. While this understanding of access to justice may suggest greater access for a 
wider variety of people, since many claims that are currently seen as beyond the pale will 
eventually be located within the boundaries of recognised claims,
24
 it also has implications 
for access to justice resources, whether it be time, personnel or infrastructure. It would, of 
course, be self-defeating to advocate a dormant interpretation of justice in order to avoid the 
difficulties that will be associated with increased resource demand, but one must also 
acknowledge that an expansion of valid claims would also translate into reduced access to 
justice as more and more claims emerge, competing for the same limited resources – thus 
creating a barrier and defeating the initial objective.  
Using the definition of the two words above as a guide, one could define access to 
justice as the freedom or the ability to prevent one‘s right or interest from being violated, or 
to obtain fair and equitable results when wronged. Subsequent discussions will show that 
there is more involved in access to justice than this simplistic definition covers. However, the 
current definition suffices for our current purposes. It also helps to establish that what is 
under discussion goes beyond the narrow confines of ‗access to courts‘ or ‗fair trial rights‘ as 
access to justice is sometimes referred to. This is important because as Roman observes, there 
is an unfortunate tendency in academic literature to equate ‗access to court‘ with ‗access to 
justice‘. Scholars and service providers in the field tend to evaluate access to justice by 
quantitative measures of specific units of litigation service provided, or in the case of legal 
aid
 
clinics, by the statistics of case files opened and types of cases involved,
25
 and not by the 
results achieved. This misses the whole point. ‗Access to court‘ includes a person‘s right to 
make use of the state‘s judicial apparatus when necessary, but this does not necessarily 
translate into justice. Similarly, the right to a fair hearing is designed to protect individuals 
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 Galanter ‗Access to justice as a moving frontier‘ (note 22 above) 155. 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 Roman (note 1 above) 180.  
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from the unlawful and arbitrary curtailment or deprivation of other basic rights and freedoms, 
the most prominent of which are the right to life and liberty of the person.
26
 This is mostly 
concerned with procedural guarantees, that may or may not translate into substantive justice, 
which is arguably what people seeking justice desire.
27
 As important as access to the courts 
and the right of a fair trial are, it is obvious that access to justice, seen as a concept that 
incorporates both of these elements, goes even further. It is concerned not only with effective 
access to the law courts, but also with the attainment of recognised rights which are set out in 
existing law or the remedying of perceived wrongs, and also, for the most part, with 
removing the barriers to such attainment or remedy. 
 
2.2.1 A side note: ‘The Florence Access to Justice Project’ 
Any discussion of access to justice today would be incomplete without reference to one of the 
most influential works ever done on the subject, if only to get an understanding of the 
evolutionary process that defined the modern day understanding of the concept. Mauro 
Cappelletti‘s Florence Access to Justice Project,28 is a comprehensive reference work of 
essays in four volumes which sought to map and provide a global reform agenda for access to 
justice. Written over 30 years ago, this work is still the most definitive reference point on 
access to justice today. The authors describe the evolution of the access to justice movement 
as having proceeded in three distinct ‗waves‘ of change.29 The first wave, which began in the 
1960s, saw the emergence of legal aid in the form of state subsidised legal representation for 
the economically disadvantaged citizens.  
                                                 
26
 Lawyers Committee for Human Rights What is a fair trial? A basic guide to legal standards and practice 
(New York: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 2000) 1; Nsongurua J Udombana ‗The African 
Commission on Human and Peoples‘ Rights and the development of fair trial norms in Africa‘ (2006) 6 African 
Human Rights Law Journal 299.   
27
 No clearer demonstration of the distinction between procedural and substantive justice can be found than in 
the words of Justice Antonin Scalia of the US Supreme Court in re Troy Anthony Davis (557 US ____ (2009) 2) 
when he stated: ‗This Court has never held that the Constitution forbids the execution of a convicted defendant 
who has had a full and fair trial but is later able to convince a habeas court that he is ―actually‖ innocent‘. 
Available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/08pdf/08-1443Scalia.pdf [Accessed 15 October 2010]. 
28
 Note 9 above. 
29
 Ibid; Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth ‗Access to justice: The newest wave in the worldwide movement to 
make rights effective‘ (1978) 27 Buffalo Law Review 181–292. 
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The second wave progressed from and built upon the first wave‘s emphasis on assuring 
the right to legal representation through legal aid, to an emphasis on the representation of 
group and collective interests. Such interests included the rights of consumers and 
environmentalists. By helping to develop procedural solutions to the problems of these 
diffuse interests, the second wave led to ‗the rethinking of very basic traditional notions of 
civil procedure and the role of the courts‘.30 This wave saw the advent of public interest 
litigation and class action suits to address systemic problems of inequality.
31
 The third wave, 
which Cappelletti and Garth refer to as the emergence of a fully developed access to justice 
approach, saw the growth of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms which are mostly 
informal in nature. These mechanisms would complement the formal justice system, which 
would itself, be simplified to facilitate accessibility.
32
  
 
2.3 ACCESS TO JUSTICE AS A HUMAN RIGHT – ORIGINS AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
The concept of access to justice has its origins in the following comment from the Magna 
Carta:
33
  
No free man shall be taken or imprisoned or dispossessed, or outlawed, or banished, or in any way 
destroyed, nor will we go upon him, or send upon him, except by the legal judgment of his peers or by 
the laws of the land, and to no one will we sell, to no one will we deny, or delay right or justice.
34 
Sir Edward Coke, the towering jurisprudential figure, resurrected and interpreted chapter 29 
of the 1297 Magna Carta, seeing these remedy provisions as jurisprudential rights.
35
 The 
                                                 
30
 Cappelletti & Garth (note 9 above) 35. 
31
 David Trubek ‗Public advocacy: Administrative government and the representation of diffuse interests‘ in 
Cappelletti & Garth (note 15 above) 445–494, 445. 
32
 Mauro Cappelletti ‗Alternative dispute resolution processes within the framework of the world-wide access-
to-justice movement‘ (1993) 56 Modern Law Review 282–296; Cappelletti & Garth (note 29 above). 
33
 See generally Deborah L Rhode Access to justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) 47; James C Holt 
Magna Carta 2
nd
 ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) particularly chapters 4 and 5; Alexander 
AM Irvine Human rights, constitutional law and the development of the English legal system: Selected essays 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003) 251–272, 266. 
34
 Chapter 29, Magna Carta 1297.  
35
 Edward Coke The second part of the institutes of the laws of England, I, 55–56 (1642) (New York: Garland 
1979) cited in Leonard W Schroeter ‗The fundamental right to access to justice: The historical antecedents‘. 
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origins of institutions for providing access to justice to citizens reach back centuries in 
several European countries in which craft guilds and other organizations provided assistance 
to members with legal problems.
36
 Thereafter, access to justice evolved to mean an 
individual‘s formal right to make use of the government‘s judicial institutions in order to seek 
remedy against a wrong done to his person or chattel or to have his rights enforced subject to 
his ability to afford the related expenses.
37
 It basically described the aggrieved individual‘s 
formal right to litigate or defend a claim without a corresponding requirement of positive 
action on the part of the state to ensure their protection. The theory was that while access to 
justice may have been a ‗natural right‘, natural rights did not require positive state action for 
their protection.
38
 Their preservation required only that the state did not allow them to be 
infringed by others. Essentially, the government‘s role was to provide the facilities and pay 
the salaries of court personnel. It did not have a duty to ensure that the legal system was 
effectively available to citizens.
39
  
Although there are many antecedents, the modern access to justice movement can be 
traced to the rise of the welfare state in most western countries during the immediate post-
World War II era. As these new welfare states ‗sought to arm individuals with substantive 
rights in their capacities as consumers, tenants, employees and even citizens‘, the right of 
access to justice gained attention and ‗is increasingly recognized as being of paramount 
importance among  the new individual and social rights, since the possession of rights is 
meaningless without mechanisms for their effective vindication‘.40  
Today, the right of access to justice has undergone such transformation that it is no 
longer limited to issues of whether or not a person has the right to make use of the law courts. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Available at http://www.wsba.org/media/publications/barnews/archives/1999/may-99fundamental.htm. 
[Accessed 22 March 2007]. 
36
 Albert Currie ‗Riding the third wave: Rethinking criminal legal aid within an access to justice framework‘ 
available at http://www.justice.gc.ca/en/ps/rs/rep/2003/rr03-5/rr03-5_01.html [Accessed 19 April 2007]. 
37
 Cappelletti & Garth (note 9 above) 6–8; Galanter ‗Access to Justice as a Moving Frontier‘ (note 22 above) 
147. 
38
 Capelletti & Garth (note 9 above); see also A John Simmons The Lockean theory of rights (Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1992) 68.  
39
 Cappelletti & Garth (note 9 above) 92; Galanter ‗(note 22 above) 115; Gerald Friedman ‗Access to justice‘ 
(1996) 113 South African Law Journal 335–343, 336.  
40
 Ibid; Tamara Goriely ‗The government‘s legal aid reforms‘ in Adrian Zuckerman & Ross Cranston (eds) 
Reform of civil procedure (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) 347. 
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The focus is now on substantive rather than procedural justice, i.e.  on access to justice as an 
issue about justice.
41
 Scholastic and policy discourses on the issue now take into 
consideration sociological, political, psychological and economic factors.
42
 And despite its 
western origins, the access to justice movement has gone beyond the confines of the wealthy 
welfare states of the industrialised world, and has spread to the development projects often 
financed by the same wealthy countries in other parts of the world.
43
  Access to justice 
problems are today being addressed in its many facets: from South Africa‘s focus on legal aid 
to empower women in their fight against discriminatory practices,
44
 to the establishment of 
arbitration structures to relieve state courts in Sri Lanka,
45
 access to justice is playing an 
important role in the drive for social justice. 
Access to justice cemented its place as a human right in the modern world when 
provisions related to it were included in the international human rights instruments that were 
adopted post-World War II.
46
 As the world struggled to come to terms with the atrocities that 
had occurred in Nazi Germany, the desire of the international community was to establish a 
new world order characterised by peace, the prevention of conflicts and respect for human 
                                                 
41
 Mary Jane Mossman & Heather Ritchie ‗Access to justice: A review of Canadian legal academic scholarship, 
1977–1987‘ in Hutchinson (note 1 above) 53–76. 
42
 See for instance Rebecca Sandefur (ed) Access to justice: Sociology of crime, law and deviance series Vol 12 
(Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing, 2009); UNDP Access to justice practice note (New York: United Nations 
Development Programme Democratic Governance Group, 2004). 
43
 Christina Jones-Pauly & Stefanie Elbern (eds) Access to Justice: The role of court administrators and lay 
adjudicators in the African and Islamic contexts (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002) vii; Stephen 
Golub ‗Legal empowerment: Impact and implications for the development community and the World Bank‘ in 
Caroline Sage & Michael Woolcock (eds) The World Bank Legal Review: Law, equity, and development, Vol 2, 
(Washington: Martinus Nijhoff, 2006); Benjamin Van Rooij ‗Bringing justice to the poor: Bottom-up legal 
development cooperation‘ Available at http://ssrn.com/1368185 [Accessed 12 September 2010]; Michael R 
Anderson ‗Access to justice and legal process: Making legal institutions responsive to poor people in LDCs‘ 
IDS Working Paper, No 178 (2003). 
44
 Lorenzo Cotula Gender and law: Women's rights in agriculture.  FAO Legislative Study 76, 2007 revision 
(Rome:  Food And Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2002) 156, 160–161 
45
 United Nations Development Programme   og  mming  o  j   i  : A       o   ll. A p    i ion  ‘  g id   o 
human rights-based approach to access to justice (Bangkok: United Nations Development Programme, Asia 
Pacific Rights and Justice Initiative, 2005). 
46
 James Spigelman ‗Keynote address: Access to justice and human rights treaties‘ (2000) 22 (1) Sydney Law 
Review 141. 
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rights, one in which governments could no longer blatantly abuse the rights of their citizens 
and where concrete human rights standards existed to which nations could be held.
47
 This led 
the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)
48
 of the newly established United Nations (UN) 
to create the Commission on Human Rights.
49
 The Commission‘s task was to submit 
proposals, recommendations and reports regarding: 
(a) an international bill of rights; 
(b) international declarations or conventions on civil liberties, the status of women, freedom of 
information and similar matters; 
(c) the protection of minorities;  
(d) the prevention of discrimination on grounds of race, sex, language or religion.50 
The work of the Commission led to the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR)
51
 on 10 December 1948. The UDHR included several provisions which 
recognised the right to procedural and substantive access to the administration of justice.
52
 
These provisions were the first universal recognition of access to justice as a human right. 
The UDHR has been widely accepted since its adoption in 1948,
53
 but it is a non-treaty 
                                                 
47
 Pre-amble United Nations Charter 26 June 1945, 59 Stat 1031, TS 993, 3 Bevans 1153, entered into force 24 
October 1945; see also Johannes Morsink The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, drafting, and 
intent (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000) in particular Chapter 2. 
48
 Established under Art 61 of the UN Charter, supra.  
49
 ECOSOC Resolution 5 (1) of 16 February 1946, E/20 15 February 1946. 
50
 ECOSOC Resolution 5 (2), supra. 
51
 Note 6 above. 
52
 Arts. 8, 10, and 11.  
53
 As evidenced by votes on its adoption  (48 votes for, none against, and 8 abstentions)  and also by the fact that 
of the over 200 declarations, conventions, protocols, charters, treaties and agreements that exist today at the 
international level, at least 65 mention the UDHR as a source of authority and inspiration. Johannes Morsink, 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, drafting, and intent (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2000) 20; See generally Gudmundur Alfredsson & Asbjørn Eide The Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights: A common standard of achievement (Hague: Kluwer Law Publishers, 1999); Krzystof 
Drzewicki ‗The United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights‘ in Raija Hanski & 
Markku Suksi (eds) An introduction to the international protection of human rights: A textbook (Åbo: Åbo 
Akademi University, 1999). 
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declaration, which means that it lacks formal binding force.
54
 However, many of its 
provisions have become binding on states as part of customary international law.
55
  
With the goal of establishing mechanisms by which the rights recognised in the UDHR 
could be enforced, the Commission on Human Rights was mandated to draft legally binding 
treaties which define those rights.
56
 Consequently, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights
57
 (ICCPR) and its optional Protocols
58
 and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
59
 (ICESCR) came into being. Collectively known as 
the ‗International Bill of Human Rights‘, the UDHR, the ICCPR and the ICESCR are the 
main sources of the modern conceptions on human rights, including the right of access to 
justice. Many international and regional treaties, including several to which South Africa has 
become party, have subsequently adopted the principles contained in the international bill of 
rights. 
Few of these instruments use the term ‗access to justice‘ in their provisions, but there is 
no doubt that the concept is the subject of, or lies at the core of the various provisions related 
to the administration of justice, due process and fair trial that they contain. Variously referred 
to as the right to an ‗effective remedy‘, ‗access to courts‘, ‗right to a fair and public hearing‘, 
‗the right to a remedy‘ and/or basic ‗common-law rights‘, each of those provisions lay down 
minimum standards regarding recourse to mechanisms for the administration of justice for 
dispute resolution or for obtaining remedies for violations of rights or other interests at law, 
                                                 
54
 Morsink (note 53 above) 20.  
55
 Theodore Meron Human rights and humanitarian norms as customary law (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1989); HJ Steiner & Philip Alson International human rights in context: Law, politics, morals 2
nd
 ed 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000) 987. 
56
 General Assembly Resolution 421 (V) of 4 December 1950 ‗Draft international covenant on human rights and 
measures of implementation: Future work of the Commission on Human Rights‘.  
57
 GA Res 2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 52, UN Doc A/6316 (1966), 999 UNTS 171, entered 
into force 23 March 1976. 
58
 First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (OP), GA Res 2200A 
(XXI), 21 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 59, UN Doc A/6316 (1966), 999 UNTS 302, entered into force 23 March 
1976 (hereinafter First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR); Second Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty GA Res 44/128, annex, 44 
UN GAOR Supp. (No. 49) 207, UN Doc A/44/49 (1989), entered into force 11 July 1991. 
59
 GA Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR Supp (No 16) 49, UN Doc A/6316 (1966), 993 UNTS 3, entered into 
force 3 January 1976. 
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as well as how people should be treated when they are in contact with the law – all of which 
are central ideas of access to justice.  
Since these instruments set standards that states must meet in order to be in compliance 
with their obligations on access to justice for citizens and others within their jurisdictions, 
they serve as an appropriate framework for evaluating South Africa‘s success or failure in 
meeting the rights of refugees to access justice. The next section will therefore examine the 
broad normative framework on access to justice generally and as it relates to refugees 
specifically.  It will look at the obligations that South Africa as a States Party has in order to 
meet its obligations to ensure access to justice for citizens and non-citizens alike. 
 
2.4 ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Given its pre-eminent position as the principal international treaty on human rights and its 
universal applicability, the provisions of the ICCPR will serve as the primary source for 
looking at access to justice in international law. The Gen ral Comments of the HRC, the 
body set up to monitor implementation of the ICCPR and its two Optional Protocols, are 
important interpretations of the ICCPR. So also are the Committee‘s decisions on individual 
communications under the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. Recourse will therefore be 
had to these comments and decisions. The judgments and findings of regional courts, 
commissions and bodies offer important guidance as to the interpretation of customary 
international law and the provisions of regional treaties. As a party to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples‘ Rights (African Charter),60 South Africa has obligations under that 
treaty; therefore, the provisions of the African Charter on access to justice as well as the 
pronouncements of ACHPR will offer guidance here.  
Although the provisions of the African Charter that relate to access to justice, contained 
in Arts 6 and 7 have been described as incomplete
61
 and ‗woefully inadequate‘,62 The 
                                                 
60
 African Charter on Human and Peoples‘ Rights, adopted 27 June 1981, OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/3 rev 5, 21 
ILM 58 (1982), entered into force 21 October 1986. 
61
 Christof Heyns Human rights law in Africa 1998 (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001) 141. 
62
 Christof Heyns ‗The African regional human rights system: In need of reform?‘ (2001) 1 African Human 
Rights Law Journal 155, 159. Scholars are critical of many of the African Charter provisions, saying that they 
leave many gaps and that some of its formulations are unsatisfactory and poorly worded. See generally Fatsah 
Ouguergouz Th  A  i  n Ch      on H m n  nd   opl  ‘ Righ  : A  omp  h n iv   g nd   o  h m n digni y 
and sustainable democracy in Africa (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003) 139–141; Evelyn A 
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ACHPR  is empowered by Articles 60 and 61 of the Charter ‗to draw inspiration from 
international law on human rights and to take into consideration as subsidiary measures, other 
general or special international conventions, customs generally accepted as law, general 
principles of law recognised by African States as well as legal precedents and doctrine‘.63 
The ACHPR has often made use of articles 60 and 61
64
 to develop standards, 
guidelines, resolutions and recommendations that fill in the gaps and bring the African 
Charter in line with international standards.
65
 Although those resolutions, recommendations 
and guidelines are not hard law, they serve a very useful purpose in that they give practicality 
to the broad and often vague formulations contained in the African Charter. They provide 
useful guidelines to give operational effect to its provisions and, consequently, the 
expectations that can be placed on the ACHPR.
66
 Frequent references to those resolutions, 
recommendations and guidelines have also invested them with the status of norms, though to 
a lesser extent than the provisions of the African Charter.
67
 Discussions of the provisions of 
the African Charter will therefore make considerable reference to the declarations, resolutions 
                                                                                                                                                        
Ankuma Th  A  i  n Commi  ion on H m n  nd   opl  ‘ Righ  :      i    nd p o  d     (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 1996); Christof Heyns ‗Civil and political rights in the African Charter‘ in Malcolm 
David Evans & Rachel Murray (eds) Th  A  i  n Ch      on H m n  nd   opl  ‘ Righ  : The system in 
practice, 1986–2000 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Rachel Murray The African Commission 
on H m n  nd   opl ‘  Righ    nd in   n  ion l l   (Portland: Hart Publishing, 2000) in particular Chap 2. 
63
 Media Rights Agenda (on behalf of Niran Malaolu) v Nigeria, (2000) AHRLR 262 (ACHPR 2000) para 51. 
64
 These two articles empower the ACHPR to draw inspiration from international law on human rights, 
including the provisions of the UDHR and other instruments adopted by the United Nations and by African 
countries in the field of human rights, as well as the Charters of the United Nations and the Organization of 
African Unity (now African Union). As subsidiary measures to help it determine the principles of law, the 
ACHPR is also empowered to take into consideration other general or special international conventions which 
lay down rules expressly recognized by member states of the AU, African practices consistent with international 
norms on human rights, customs generally accepted as law, general principles of law recognized by African 
states as well as legal precedents and doctrine. 
65
 Heyns (note 61 above) 169. Heyns maintains that on the strength of these provisions, the ACHPR has ‗in 
substantial respects reinvented the Charter and compensated for its flaws‘. The areas of access to justice, fair 
trial and the independence of the judiciary in particular have benefited from the Commission‘s use of the 
discretion that Arts 60 and 61 provide. The various guidelines and resolutions passed in enhancement are 
discussed in further detail later on.   
66
 Udombana (note 26 above) 306. 
67
 Ibid. 
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and decisions through which the ACHPR has attempted to rectify these short-comings or fill 
in existing gaps.  
The provisions of other regional treaties and decisions of other regional courts such as 
the ECtHR and the IACHR and the pronouncements of their monitoring bodies will also be 
referred to for guidance. While the decisions of regional courts may apply only to particular 
regional treaties, their jurisprudence can be applied broadly
68
 and are therefore useful for this 
discussion.  
The access to justice provisions in international law contain two distinct but related 
rights: the procedural right of effective access to a fair hearing as well as the substantive right 
to a remedy. Both encompass the minimum guarantees in the administration of justice in both 
the criminal and civil contexts,
69
 and will now be looked at separately.  
 
2.5 ACCESS TO REMEDIES  
A basic premise of human rights law is that legal rights would be illusory without entitlement 
to procedural mechanisms to give them effect
70
 – in order words, a right without effective 
remedy is not a right at all.  Not surprisingly therefore, one of the first obligations that the 
ICCPR in Art 2(3), places upon states is in the area of access to remedies – an obligation to 
ensure that everyone has access to remedies for violation of any of the rights the Convention 
recognises. That article expands upon of Art 8 of the UDHR which provides that ‗everyone 
has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the 
fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law‘. 
These provisions
71
 constitute an acknowledgement by the international community that, 
regardless of the theoretical existence of the rights and freedoms which treaties recognise, 
                                                 
68
 Vincent Obisienunwo Orlu Nmehielle The African human rights system: Its laws, practice, and institutions 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001) 43. 
69
 Dinah Shelton Remedies in international human rights law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999) 14, 
182. 
70
 Jan Paulsson Denial of justice in international law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 134.  
71
 There are numerous other provisions related to access to justice which are to be found in other human rights 
instruments not discussed here. These include: Art 6 of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination, 660 UNTS 195, entered into force 4 January 1969; Art 14 of the United 
Nations Convention against Torture and other Cruel Inhuman and Degrading Treatment, GA Res 39/46, [annex, 
39 UN GAOR Supp (No. 51) 197, UN Doc A/39/51 (1984)], entered into force 26 June 1987; Art 40 
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‗their true enjoyment ultimately depends on securing the existence of an ‗effective remedy‘ 
for anyone who claims that there has been a violation of his rights and freedoms‘.72 In this 
regard, the HRC has stated in respect of the remedy provision of Art 2(3) that its enjoyment 
requires States Parties take steps to appropriately adapt available remedies so as to take 
account of the special vulnerability of certain categories of person, including, in particular, 
children.
 73
 It is submitted that refugees and asylum seekers fall under this category of 
vulnerable persons, as this thesis will later show. 
The first observation to be made regarding Art 2(3) of the ICCPR and Art 8 of the 
UDHR is that although they link all other human rights to this one right, the rights they 
envisage differ to some extent. Whereas the ICCPR links the right to remedies to the rights 
recognised within it, the UDHR makes clear that the right is relevant to all rights recognised 
in constitutions and in national laws. Various regional instruments include these remedy 
provisions, but also differ in their wording regarding which rights they apply to. The ECHR 
                                                                                                                                                        
Convention on the Rights of the Child, GA Res 44/25, annex, 44 UN GAOR Supp (No 49) 167, UN Doc 
A/44/49 (1989), entered into force 2 September 1990. 
 In addition, there are other human rights standards which though non-binding, provide normative guidance on 
specific issues and could be considered indicative of consensus developing in the international community on 
those issues, and possibly the direction of future international legal framework. These usually exist in the form 
of principles, guidelines, rules and recommendations. They include:  the United Nations Basic Principles and 
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human 
Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, GA Res 60/147, UN Doc A/RES/60/147 
(16 December 2005); the United Nations Draft Principles Governing the Administration of Justice Through 
Military Tribunals, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/58 at 4 (2006); the United Nations Basic Principles on the role of 
Lawyers, Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, 
27 August to 7 September 1990, UN Doc A/CONF 144/28/Rev 1 at 118 (1990); the United Nations Body of 
Principles for the Protection of all Persons under Any form of Detention or Imprisonment, GA Res. 43/173, 
annex, 43 UN GAOR Supp No 49 at 298, UN Doc A/43/49 (1988); the United Nations Standard Minimum 
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, GA Res 40/33, annex, 40 UN GAOR Supp No 53 at 207, UN Doc 
A/40/53(1985) ; the United Nations standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice GA Res 
40/33, annex, 40 UN GAOR Supp No 53 at 207, UN Doc A/40/53 (1985); Declaration of Basic Principles of 
Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, GA Res 40/34, annex, 40 UN GAOR Supp (No. 53) 214, UN 
Doc A/40/53 (1985).  
72
 Dominic McGoldrick The Human Rights Committee: Its role in the development of the international covenant 
on civil and political rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991) 279. 
73
 Human Rights Committee General Comment 31, Nature of the General Legal Obligation on States Parties to 
the Covenant, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev1/Add13 (2004) para 15. 
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takes a similar position to the ICCPR in that the right to a remedy is in respect of the rights 
contained in it.
74
 
The American Convention on Human Rights
75
 (ACHR) on the other hand merges the 
approach of both the ICCPR and the UDHR. It provides for effective remedy for violation of 
rights recognised in constitutions and laws of contracting states as well as the rights in the 
Convention itself.
76
 The position of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of 
Man
77
 (American Declaration), is similar to the ACHR, but adopts less direct language:   
Every person may resort to the courts to ensure respect for his legal rights. There should likewise be 
available to him a simple, brief procedure whereby the courts will protect him from acts of authority that, 
to his prejudice, violate any fundamental constitutional rights.
78
 
In referring simply to legal rights, the inference here is that the provision relates to all rights 
recognised in constitutions and national instruments but excludes moral rights.  
The African Charter on its part links the right to remedies to a wider scope of rights 
than those envisaged in these other instruments, including in its purview rights recognised by 
‗conventions, laws, regulations and customs in force‘. Unlike the other treaties above 
however, the African Charter does not use the term ‗right to remedy‘. Instead it provides for 
the ‗right to an  pp  l‘ to competent authorities. 
1. Every individual shall have the right to have his cause heard. This comprises: (a) the right to an appeal 
to competent national organs against acts of violating his fundamental rights as recognized and 
guaranteed by conventions, laws, regulations and customs in force;
79 
 
The dilemma here is that since ‗appeal‘ generally refers to action taken after failure at a court 
or other forum of first instance, should this provision be read as referring only to appeal 
proceedings? Given the context and the purpose that the article wishes to achieve, it can be 
                                                 
74
 Art 13(1) European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ETS 5, 213 
UNTS 222, entered into force 3 September 1953; as amended by Protocols Nos 3, 5, and 8 which entered into 
force on 21 September 1970, 20 December 1971 and 1 January 1990 respectively. (Hereinafter ECHR). 
75
 OAS Treaty Series No 36, 1144 UNTS 123, entered into force 18 July 1978, reprinted in Basic Documents 
Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser LV/II82  doc6  rev1 at 25 (1992). 
76
 Art 25 ACHR. 
77
 OAS Res XXX, adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States (1948); Basic Documents 
Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc 6 rev 1 at 17 (1992). 
78
 Art XVIII.  
79
 Art 7 African Charter. 
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surmised that the section refers to access to courts of first instance, as it would be bizarre to 
guarantee the right to appeal a judgment, but not the right to have the matter heard in the first 
place. Guidance on this can be taken from the HRC which has stated in respect of Art 14 of 
the ICCPR, which guarantees the same rights that Art 7 of the African Charter sought to 
protect that the right of equal access to a court, which is embodied in Art 14(1) concerns 
access to first instance procedures and does not address the issue of the right to appeal or 
other remedies.
80
 According to Art 60 of the African Charter, the ACHPR can draw 
inspiration from other international instruments for the protection of human and peoples‘ 
rights. This provision enables the ACHPR to be inspired, by the provisions of other treaties 
including the ICCPR, ECHR and ACHR among others.  
As mentioned above, the ACHPR, in order to cure some of the deficiencies of the 
African Charter has developed various guidelines and resolutions which provide more clarity 
on the issue at hand. In this respect, the ACHPR has developed the ‗Principles and Guidelines 
on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa‘81 (Guidelines on Fair Trials). Para 
C of the Guidelines set out the parameters of access to justice. The paragraph confers on all 
persons, the right to an effective remedy by competent national tribunals for acts violating the 
rights granted by the constitution, by law or by the Charter. This right applies even when the 
acts in question were committed by persons in an official capacity. The guidelines then define 
the right to an effective remedy to include (a) access to justice (b) reparation for the harm 
suffered and (c) access to the factual information concerning the violations.  
The paragraph goes on to impose an obligation on States to ensure that persons whose 
rights have been violated have an effective remedy, and that such right to remedy should be 
determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities. It further imposes 
an obligation on States to ensure that remedies granted are enforced and that any organ of 
state against which a judicial order or other remedy has been granted complies fully with 
such an order or remedy. Lastly, the paragraph declares the granting of amnesty to absolve 
perpetrators of human rights violations from accountability as a violation of the right of 
                                                 
80
 Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 32, Article 14: Right to equality before courts and tribunals 
and to a fair trial, UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/32 (2007) Para 12. This General Comment replaces ‗General Comment 
13, Article 14 (Twenty-first session, 1984)‘ U.N Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev1 at 14 (1994). 
81
 African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial 
and Legal Assistance in Africa 2001, DOC/OS(XXX)247; 12 International Human Rights Report 1180 (2005). 
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victims to an effective remedy.
82
 These expansive provisions, in effect, bring the African 
Charter in line with other international human rights instruments in respect of access to 
remedies.  
While an important aspect of access to justice, the right to remedies per se is not the 
subject of this thesis, but rather the broader concept of both remedies and procedural access.  
The issue of remedies is a highly developed aspect of international law, especially under the 
ICCPR and there is a large body of literature
83
 which discusses the work of the HRC on 
remedies pursuant to provisions of the First Optional Protocol which confer on the HRC the 
power to hear individual complaints.
84
 The remedy provisions above are minimum standards 
linked to other protections which are to be found in different provisions scattered around the 
ICCPR including, for instance, the provision on compensation in Art 14 which deals with fair 
trials,
85
 and in other treaties referred to. As the HRC has noted, the remedy provisions of Art 
2(3) relates to violations of rights and is limited to remedies after the fact:  
The Covenant provides that a remedy shall be granted whenever a violation of one of 
the rights guaranteed by it has occurred; consequently, it does not generally prescribe 
preventive protection, but confines itself to requiring effective redress ex post facto.
86
Access 
to justice, however, goes beyond access to remedies after the fact. It includes the ability to 
obtain fair and equitable access to justice whether for determination of civil rights, 
administrative or in criminal matters.   
 
2.6 ELEMENTS OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Art 14 of the ICCPR contains substantive provisions on access to justice. It goes much further 
than Art 2(3) in the sense that it applies to a wider range of issues than merely to the rights 
contained in the ICCPR. It provides: 
                                                 
82
 Ibid, para C. 
83
 Dinah Shelton (note 69 above); Christine D Gray Judicial remedies in international law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1990); Chittharanjan Félix Amerasinghe Local remedies in international law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
84
 See Arts 1, 2 and 5 of the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR (note 58 above). 
85
 The provisions of this article are discussed in further detail later on.  
86
 CF v Canada Communication No. 113/1981, UN Doc CCPR/C/OP/1 at 13 (1980) para 6.2. 
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1. All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge 
against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public 
hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law. ...  
Such determination must be carried out in public unless special reasons, such as morality, 
public order, national security in a democratic society, or the interest of the private lives of 
the parties so require.  The rest of the article then goes on to set out the minimum standards of 
protection that must be granted to persons charged with a criminal offences. This includes the 
right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law; to have full information 
regarding the charge against him; to have adequate time and facilities to prepare his defence, 
including the right to communicate with counsel of his own choosing, and if he is unable to 
afford one, to have one assigned to him where the interests of justice so require; to be tried 
without undue delay and in his presence; to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against 
him; to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the 
language used in court; and not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt. 
The article provides for special consideration to be taken where the accused person is a 
minor, and for the right of all convicted persons to have their conviction reviewed by a higher 
tribunal according to law. Where such review or newly discovered facts reveals a wrongful 
conviction or a miscarriage of justice, the article provides for compensation to the victim, 
unless the victim was responsible for non-disclosure of the unknown fact in time. Lastly, the 
article prohibits double jeopardy – convicting or punishing a person again for an offence for 
which he or she has already been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law 
and penal procedure of each country.
87
 
These provisions expand upon Arts 10 and 11 of the UDHR
88
 and are often referred to 
as ‗fair trial‘ provisions – a term which describes the norm of international human rights law 
designed to protect individuals from the unlawful and arbitrary curtailment or deprivation of 
                                                 
87
 See also Art 6 ECHR (note 74 above).  
88
 Art 10:   
Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and   impartial 
tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him. 
Art 11: 
1. Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty 
according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence. 
2. No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not 
constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor 
shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal offence was 
committed. 
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other basic rights and freedoms, the most prominent of which are the right to life and liberty 
of the person.
89
 In P, C and S v United Kingdom,
90
 the European Court of Human Rights held 
that the equivalent provision in the ECHR, Art 6, contains two inter-related rights: the right 
of access to court, and a right to a fair trial once one is before a court.
91
  
The HRC in its General Comment No. 32 noted that Art 14 of the ICCPR is of a 
complex nature, with different aspects of its provisions requiring specific comments.
92
 State 
Parties must respect the guarantees it contains, regardless of their legal traditions and their 
domestic law.
93
 The purpose of the article, according to the HRC, is to ensure ‗the proper 
administration of justice and, to this end, guarantees a series of specific rights‘.94 As the 
subject of this thesis is access to justice generally, the focus will be on those general 
obligations that States have in all types of cases – whether civil, criminal, administrative or 
other matters. 
 
2.6.1 Types of matters 
As seen above, most of Art 14 of the ICCPR pertains to due process safeguards in criminal 
proceedings. It details the minimum guarantees to which an accused person is entitled and is 
designed to protect the personal liberty of such an accused as well as all interests that may be 
affected by guilty verdicts and criminal sanctions. The provisions involve consideration of a 
familiar triangulation: the interest  of the victim, the accused and the society.
95
 These 
guarantees include the presumption of innocence, the right to counsel, the right against self-
incrimination, ne bis in idem principle, etc. The provisions of Art 14 of the ICCPR are often 
evoked in discussions about the basic minimum guarantees of how persons accused of crimes 
should be treated, but they go beyond the rights of an accused to guarantees which  anyone 
approaching an adjudicative body should enjoy. They elaborate the right to a fair and public 
hearing in all civil and criminal cases, which, according to Nowak, is the core of the concept 
                                                 
89
 Lawyers Committee for Human Rights What is a fair trial? A basic guide to legal standards and practice 
(New York: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 2000) 1.  
90
 P, C and S v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 31.  
91
 Ibid, paras 89 and 91. 
92
 General Comment No 32 (note 80 above) Para 3. 
93
 Ibid, para 4.  
94
 General Comments No 32 (note 80 above) para 2. 
95
 Lord Steyn (note 8 above) 64. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
54 
 
of due process of law. The article contains an institutional guarantee that imposes a positive 
obligation on states to ensure its fulfilment – they must set up necessary structures, i.e.  
courts, and provide them with the competence to hear matters brought before them.
96
   
While it is obvious that the majority of the provisions contained in Art 14 relate to 
criminal proceedings, the HRC has also noted that certain aspects of it are also relevant for 
non-criminal matters, and apply equally to determination of rights and obligations in a suit at 
law‘.97 While the HRC has not defined what ‗suit at law‘ means, its interpretation of the term 
shows that it hinges on the nature of the right involved or the particular adjudication forum, 
rather than on the status of one of the parties
98
 (whether governmental, parastatal or 
autonomous statutory entities).
99
 It includes civil as well as administrative cases. The concept 
of a suit-at-law has been interpreted to encompass judicial procedures aimed at determining 
rights and obligations in the area of private law, including contracts, property and torts. It also 
encompasses equivalent notions in the area of administrative law such as the termination of 
employment of civil servants other than for disciplinary reasons, the determination of social 
security benefits or the pension rights of soldiers, or procedures regarding the use of public 
land or the taking of private property. It may, in addition, cover other procedures which must 
be assessed on a case by case basis in the light of the nature of the right in question.
100
 
In interpreting Art 6(1) of the ECHR
101 
(equivalent to Art 14(1) of the ICCPR), the 
jurisprudence of the European Court shows that the only clear requirement for Art 6(1) to be 
applicable is the existence of a dispute between parties, who can be either individuals or an 
                                                 
96
 Manfred Nowak UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary, 2
nd
 ed (Strasbourg: NP 
Engel, 2005) 302–357, 314.  
97
 General Comment 32 (note 80 above) para 15. 
98
 YL v Canada, Communication No. 112/1981, UN Doc Supp. No. 40 (A/41/40) 145 (1986).  
99
 Alex Conte & Richard Burchill Defining civil and political rights: The jurisprudence of the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee 2
nd
 ed (Surrey, Ashgate Publishing, 2009) 160. 
100
 General Comment 32 (note 80 above) para 16; see also McGoldrick (note 72 above) 415. 
101
 Art 6(1) of the ECHR provides:  
‗In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is 
entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded 
from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic 
society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to 
the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would 
prejudice the interests of justice‘. 
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individual and the State. In Ringeisen v Austria,
102
 one of the issues before the Court was the 
meaning of the phrase ‗civil rights and obligations‘ in Art 6(1) of the ECHR. The applicant 
had been involved in contracts for sale of land. Under the Upper Austrian Real Property 
Transactions Act, he had to obtain the permission of the Regional Real Property Transactions 
Commission in order to transfer land. His application was refused, but he continued to sell 
land without the required permit. He alleged that he was a victim of a violation of Art 6(1) of 
the ECHR in respect of the civil proceedings he had brought to challenge the authorities‘ 
refusal to approve a contract related to the farmlands in question. The government contended 
that Art 6(1) was inapplicable as this was not a ‗determination of civil rights and obligations‘. 
It argued that the proceedings before the Regional Commission was administrative and 
therefore did not fall within the meaning of ‗determination of ... civil rights and obligations‘. 
Furthermore, the government contended that for this article to be applicable, both parties to 
the proceedings had to be private persons. The court disagreed. It was of the opinion that this 
article ‗covers all proceedings, the result of which is decisive for private rights and 
obligations‘, including those before administrative bodies.103 The characters of both the 
legislation which governs how the matter is to be determined and of the authority vested with 
jurisdiction on the matter were of little consequence.
104
  
The African Charter does not include an independent article which corresponds in all 
material respects with Art 14 of the ICCPR. Arts 5, 6, 7 and 26
105
 of the African Charter, read 
in conjunction, are the closest that the African Charter comes to Art 14 of the ICCPR. 
However, even with this conjunctive reading, the African Charter falls short in many 
respects. It does not provide for a number of internationally recognised fair hearing 
guarantees, including the requirement of equality, fair and public trial before an independent 
and impartial tribunal established by law, or for public pronouncement of judgment. To cure 
this mischief, the ACHPR, recognising the importance of the right to a fair trial and legal 
                                                 
102
 Ringeisen v Austria (1971) 1 EHRR 455.  
103
 Ibid, para 94.  
104
 Ibid. See also König v Federal Republic of Germany (1978) 2 EHRR 170, 192–193; Feldbrugge v The 
Netherlands (1986) 8 EHRR 425 and Deumeland v Germany (1986) 8 EHRR 448. 
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 Art 26 reads:  
‗States parties to the present Charter shall have the duty to guarantee the independence of the Courts and 
shall allow the establishment and improvement of appropriate national institutions entrusted with the 
promotion and protection of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the present Charter‘.  
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assistance and the need to strengthen the provisions of the African Charter relating to right of 
access to justice, adopted the ‗Resolution on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in 
Africa‘ at its 26th session in November 1999.106 The Resolution included a decision to 
establish a Working Group on Fair Trials and formally adopted the ‗Dakar Declaration and 
Recommendations on the Right to a Fair Trial in Africa‘, which identified various factors 
militating against fair trials on the continent and made recommendations on practical steps to 
ensure and enhance the implementation of fair trial standards.
107
 
The Working Group established under the auspices of the Resolution was tasked with 
preparing a draft of general principles and guidelines on the right to a fair trial and legal 
assistance under the African Charter.
108
 This task culminated in Guidelines on Fair Trials.
109
 
Viewed in the light of these Resolutions, Declarations and Guidelines, the fair trial 
guarantees contained in the African Charter are, as will be seen below, practically identical to 
those of the ICCPR.
110
 The rights guaranteed and the concomitant obligation of States will 
now be examined individually.  
 
2.6.2 The right to equality before the law 
Unlike Art 14 of the ICCPR, Art 7 of the African Charter does not refer to equality in the 
context of fair trials. However, as the jurisprudence of the ACHPR, as well as paragraph 2 of 
its Guidelines on Fair Trials show,
111
 much thought has been given to the issue and the 
question of equality is incorporated in the Charter‘s contemplation of fair trials.  
                                                 
106
 ACHPR/Res.41(XXVI) 99: Resolution on the Right to Fair Trial and Legal Aid in Africa (1996). 
107
 The Right to a Fair Trial: The Dakar Declaration (2001)45 (1) Journal of African Law 140–142. 
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 Note 106 above, para 4.  
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 Note 81 above.  
110
 Ouguergouz (note 62 above) 143. 
111
 The paragraph provides:  
‗The essential elements of a fair hearing include: 
(a) equality of arms between the parties to a proceedings, whether they be administrative, civil, criminal, 
or military; 
(b) equality of all persons before any judicial body without any distinction whatsoever as regards race, 
colour, ethnic origin, sex, gender, age, religion, creed, language, political or other convictions, national or 
social origin, means, disability, birth, status or other circumstances; 
(c) equality of access by women and men to judicial bodies and equality before the law in any legal 
proceedings‘. 
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There are two dimensions to this general principle on equality – it refers to both equal 
access to court
112
 and to equal treatment by that court without any discrimination.
113
 This 
principle of equality is especially important to refugees and asylum seekers, as their status 
cannot be used as a reason to deny them such access or to justify any discriminatory 
treatment in the course of seeking justice. In General Comment No 32, the HRC made this 
very clear: 
The right of access to courts and tribunals and equality before them is not limited to 
citizens of States parties, but must also be available to all individuals, regardless of 
nationality or statelessness, or whatever their status, whether asylum seekers, refugees, 
migrant workers, unaccompanied children or other persons, who may find themselves in the 
territory or subject to the jurisdiction of the State party.
114
 South Africa as a State party to the 
ICCPR is therefore obliged to ensure that its courts are accessible to refugees, and having had 
such recourse, ensure that its courts do not discriminate against or between them in any way.  
With regard to equality of access, the ability to go before a court is a critical element as 
the ECtHR has found. In Golder v UK,
115
 the Court was of the opinion that it would be 
inconceivable to allow for the situation where Art 6(1) were ‗to describe in detail the 
procedural guarantees afforded to parties in a pending lawsuit and should not first protect that 
which alone makes it in fact possible to benefit from such guarantees, that is access to 
court‘.116  The aspect of equality requires that such access must not be discriminatory. 
The HRC has stated that there is a violation of Art 14(1) if certain persons are barred 
from bringing suits against any other persons on the basis of any of the grounds for 
discrimination listed in Art 2(1) of the ICCPR, ie, race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
117
 
Paragraph (b) of the Guidelines on Fair Trials also makes discrimination on those grounds a 
                                                 
112
 Oló Bahamonde v Equatorial Guinea, Communication  No 468/1991, UN Doc CCPR/C/49/D/468/1991 
(1993).  In that case the HRC said that ‗the notion of equality before the courts and tribunals encompasses the 
very access to the courts and that a situation in which an individual's attempts to seize the competent 
jurisdictions of his/her grievances are systematically frustrated runs counter to the guarantees of Art 14, 
paragraph 1‘. Para 9.4. 
113
 General Comments 32 (note 80 above) para 8. 
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violation of the African Charter. Art 14(1) of the ICCPR also prohibits any distinctions 
regarding access to courts and tribunals that are not based on law and cannot be justified on 
objective and reasonable grounds.
118
 The HRC found Art 168 of the Peruvian Civil Code to 
be in violation of the ICCPR because it limited the right to institute cases involving 
matrimonial property to the husband, thus denying married women the right to sue.
119
 Within 
the American system of human rights, the IACHR has found that laws which granted 
amnesty to persons who were to be tried for human rights violations in Argentina
120
 and 
Uruguay
121
 breached the right of the victims and their families to have recourse to courts in 
respect of the wrongs done to them. These laws in effect blocked the victims from bringing 
any kind of claims in court. Similarly, decrees which purport to oust the jurisdiction of the 
courts to hear any claims related to it, especially when those claims involve the violation of 
rights was not only an assault on the jurisdiction of the courts, it also constitutes a violation of 
the right to be heard,
122
 or the right of access to the courts. ‗An attack of this sort on the 
jurisdiction of the courts is especially invidious‘, said the ACHPR, ‗because while it is a 
violation of human rights in itself, it permits other violations of rights to go unredressed‘.123 
While the ability to gain entry and present one‘s case before the courts is a critical 
element of this right of access to courts, the jurisprudence has tended to support the view that 
the concept is broader than the mere right to make use of the judicial apparatus. Decisions of 
the European Court on Art 6 of the ECHR are particularly useful in this regard. The Court‘s 
interpretation shows that the article goes beyond merely guaranteeing the right of access to 
courts, to including a right for all persons, regardless of financial state, effectively to place 
their case before the courts. In Airey v Ireland,
124
  the applicant wished to obtain a decree of 
judicial separation but was unable to afford a lawyer. As there was no legal aid for civil 
matters in Ireland, she alleged that her right of access to court was effectively denied to her 
by the Irish legal system. The government argued that the applicant in fact enjoyed the right 
                                                 
118
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of access to court since she could take her case to the High Court or hire a lawyer if she could 
afford one. The Court rejected this argument on the ground that it took no account of the 
effectiveness principle. The test, according to the court, is whether the applicant would be 
able to present her case properly and satisfactorily. The court was of the opinion that, in view 
of the nature of her case and the complexity of the procedure of the Irish High Court, it was 
unlikely that that she could have represented herself effectively. The court said: ‗The 
Convention is intended to guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory, but rights that 
are practical and effective ... This is particularly so of the right of access to the courts in view 
of the prominent place held in a democratic society by the right to a fair trial‘.125  
The right of access to courts therefore means more than the legal right to bring a case 
before a court; it includes the ability to achieve this. The first, critical element in this regard is 
knowledge on the part of the would-be litigant, for in order to be able to bring a case before 
the courts, he or she must have knowledge of the applicable law. He or she must also be 
aware of the possibility of obtaining a remedy from the courts and must have some 
knowledge about what to do in order to gain access to the courts. Lastly, he or she must have 
the necessary skills to be able to initiate the case and present it to the court.
126
  
With regard to equal treatment, the requirement is that the parties must have procedural 
equality. This is not a guarantee of equality of results or absence of error on the part of the 
competent tribunal.
127
 Furthermore, equal treatment does not mean identical treatment. 
Rather, it means that when objective facts are alike, the response of the judiciary should also 
be similar.
128
 The ACHPR found in Avocats sans Frontières (on behalf of Bwampamye) v 
Burundi,
129
 that equal treatment means that both parties should argue their cases before the 
jurisdiction on an equal footing.
130
 There is a breach of the principle of equality if judicial or 
administrative decisions are applied in a discriminatory manner. In that case, the ACHPR 
found that the Ngozi Court of Appeal in Burundi had ‗violated the right to equal treatment, 
one of the fundamental principles of a right to a fair trial‘ when it refused the accused 
person‘s plea for an adjournment of the proceedings owing to the absence of a lawyer, 
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especially in view of the irreversible character of the death penalty involved, although it had 
earlier accepted an adjournment requested by the prosecutor.
131
 Similarly, in Robinson v 
Jamaica
132
 the author had been refused an adjournment to obtain legal representation even 
though the prosecution had already obtained several adjournments because its witnesses were 
unavailable or unready. The HRC was of the view that there had been a violation of Art 14(1) 
of the ICCPR due to inequality of arms between the parties.
133
 The ECtHR has further 
explained the principle of equality contained in Art 6(1) of the ECHR to mean that ‗... each 
party must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his case under conditions that do 
not place him at a disadvantage vis-à-vis his opponent. In this context, importance is attached 
to appearances as well as to the increased sensitivity to the fair administration of justice‘.134 
The first obligation of a state party, such as South Africa therefore is to ensure that both its 
citizens and aliens, including refugees, are able to access its courts, and when they do, that 
they are treated equally.  
 
2.6.3 Language  
Linked to the notion that each party must be able to effectively place his case before the 
courts on an equal footing with his opponent is the issue of language proficiency. This is an 
issue of great importance to all persons utilising the justice system, including citizens. Since 
refugees and asylum seekers are, by definition, not citizens of the States in which they find 
refuge, there is a greater likelihood that they do not speak the local languages, and hence Are 
more likely to find language as a problem. Art. 14(3)(f) of the ICCPR and Art 6(3)(e) of the 
ECHR both provide that persons accused of crimes are entitled to ‗the free assistance of an 
interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court‘. Art 8(2)(a) of the 
American Convention guarantees ‗the right of the accused to be assisted without charge by a 
translator or interpreter, if he does not understand or does not speak the language of the 
tribunal or court‘. The African Charter does not include an equivalent provision, however, 
Para 2(iv) of the ACHPR‘s Resolution on the Right to Recourse and Fair Trial fills that gap. 
It provides that persons accused of a crime are entitled to ‗have the free assistance of an 
                                                 
131
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interpreter if they cannot speak the language used in the court‘. Para N of the Guidelines on 
Fair Trials goes even further, setting out details of what the right entails, much of which is 
derived from the jurisprudence of other international bodies as will be seen below.
135
  
As articulated in the jurisprudence of the various international bodies, this right does 
not confer a right o be tried in a language of one‘s choosing, but rather in a language that one 
understands. In Dominique Guesdon v France,
136
 the author contended that the refusal of the 
French Tribunal Correctionnel to allow him to address the court and adduce evidence in 
Bréton, with the assistance of an interpreter, violated his right under Art 14(3)(f) of the 
ICCPR. The HRC disagreed. It held that since the author and his twelve witnesses were 
proficient in French, the official language of the court, his right to a fair trial had not been 
violated. Art 14(3)(f) cannot be construed as encompassing the right of the accused to express 
himself in the language of his choice. Only if the accused or the defence witnesses have 
difficulties in understanding, or in expressing themselves in the court language, did a State 
Party have an obligation to provide the services of an interpreter.
137
  
The scope of interpretation required is not limited to oral statements made at the trial 
but extends to pre-trial proceedings. It also extends to the translation or interpretation of all 
documents or statements in the proceedings which it is necessary for a person to understand 
in order to have the benefit of a fair trial.
138
 On this point, the ACHPR has found that the 
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right to a defence includes the right to understand the charges brought against oneself, and 
where the accused persons did not speak the language of the court fluently, this constitutes a 
violation of Art 7(1)(c) of the African Charter.
139
 It is clear from the use of the terms ‗free‘, 
and ‗without charge‘ in the various provisions above that the cost of such interpretation is to 
be borne by the State, and this is regardless of the outcome of the case.
140
 Thus, where a 
German court had attributed the costs of the interpretation to the applicants, article 6(3)(e) of 
the Convention was found to have been violated.
141
  
Most of the jurisprudence on this issue relates to criminal trials, and there are very few 
in the civil context. However, it this does not mean that the right to interpretation applies in 
criminal matters only. Some jurisprudence suggests that the same right applies in civil 
matters, subject to some stringent considerations,
142
 as well as in matters involving 
immigrants and asylum seekers. Asylum seekers have a right to have interpretation at State 
expense when he is unable to speak the language in use in the court.
143
  
 
2.6.4 Competent, independent and impartial courts or tribunal established by law 
The next aspect of Art 14(1) of the ICCPR guarantees the right to ‗competent, independent 
and impartial‘ courts or tribunal. This requirement of competence, independence and 
impartiality is an absolute right that is not subject to any exception,
144
 and they apply to all 
courts and tribunals, whether ordinary or specialised, civilian or military.
145
 The state‘s 
obligation is therefore to ensure that its courts and tribunals meet these criteria. Each of the 
elements contained in the description of the courts are important in the proper administration 
of justice. There are three aspects to the notion of independence of the judiciary. First of all, 
the tribunal must function independently of the executive, which means it must base its 
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decisions on its own free opinion about the facts and applicable law.
146
 Secondly, guarantees 
must exist that allow the court to function independently. Such guarantees need not be that 
judges are appointed for life, but it should be such that they cannot be discharged at will or on 
improper grounds by the authorities. Lastly, any semblance of dependence must be 
avoided.
147
 In its Guidelines on Fair Trials, the ACHPR describes measures that are required 
to ensure such independence, including that: 
 judicial independence must be a constitutional requirement, i.e.  State Parties must 
include in their constitutions and laws, provisions that guarantee the independence of 
the judiciary and of judicial officers; 
 inappropriate or unwarranted interference with the judicial process by the executive 
is discouraged, as is the creation of military or other special tribunals that do not use 
duly established legal procedures, and which purport to displace the jurisdiction of 
ordinary judicial bodies; 
 transparency and accountability in the process for appointments to judicial bodies 
must be ensured and whatever method is used in the selection of judicial officers 
must safeguard the independence and impartiality of the judiciary; and 
 the tenure, remuneration and other conditions of service of judicial officers must be 
prescribed and guaranteed by law.
148
 
The principles of independence and impartiality are overlapping concepts in the sense that 
both are designed to ensure the separation of powers. But the notion of impartiality has 
another dimension designed to remove personal interest, bias or prejudice on the part of the 
decision maker.
149
 It implies ‗that judges must not harbour preconceptions about the matter 
put before them, and that they must not act in ways that promote the interests of one of the 
parties‘.150 In other words, it is a safeguard for objectivity.  
                                                 
146
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The HRC has not considered the meaning of ‗competence‘ in its comments, but its 
ordinary meaning refers to suitable qualification and experience as a consideration in the 
appointment of judicial officers.
151
 The Guidelines on Fair Trials expressly refer to the 
qualification of persons to be appointed to judicial office.
152
 
The issue of what constitutes a competent, independent and impartial court or forum is 
one on which the ACHPR has pronounced extensively – hardly surprising, given the 
propensity of many African dictatorships to set up special military courts in order to obtain 
what they consider ‗quick justice‘.153 In one such case, International Pen and Others v 
Nigeria,
154
 the ACHPR found that special tribunals whose composition was at the discretion 
of the executive violate Art 7(1)(d) of the African Charter and that their very existence 
constituted a violation of the principles of impartiality and independence of the judiciary and 
of the right to a fair trial.
155
 In Constitutional Rights Project (in respect of Zamani Lekwot 
and 6 Others) v Nigeria,
156
 seven men were tried and sentenced to death by a special tribunal 
created under the Civil Disturbances (Special Tribunal) Act. The tribunal was composed of 
one judge and four members of the armed forces. The Commission noted that:  
The tribunal is composed of persons belonging largely to the executive branch of government, the same 
branch that passed the Civil Disturbances Act ... Regardless of the character of the individual members of 
such tribunals, its composition alone creates the appearance, if not actual lack of impartiality. It thus 
violates Article 7(1)(d) [of the African Charter].
157
 
                                                 
151
 Conte & Burchill (note 99 above) 165.  
152
 Paras: 1(i) ‗The sole criteria for appointment to judicial office shall be the suitability of a candidate for such 
office by reason of integrity, appropriate training or learning and ability ... 
1(4)(a) No person shall be appointed to judicial office unless they have the appropriate training or learning that 
enables them to adequately fulfil their functions‘ 
153
 Oji Umozurike ‗The African Charter on Human and People‘s Rights‘ in Developing human rights 
jurisprudence, volume 3: A third judicial colloquium on the domestic application of international human rights 
norms (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1991) 40. 
154
 International Pen and Others v Nigeria Communication Nos. 137/94, 139/94, 154/96 and 161/97 (1998).  
155
 Ibid, para 86. 
156
 (87/93), 8
th
 Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and People‘s Rights, 1994–1995, 
ACHPR/RPT/8
th
/Rev.I.;  
157
 Ibid, paras 14 and 15; see also Constitutional Rights Project (in respect of  Wahab Akamu, G Adega and 
Others) v Nigeria Communication No 60/91 (1995). 
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Given the qualifying requirement contained in Arts 14(1) of the ICCPR and 6(1) of the 
ECHR that the courts and tribunals be ‗established by law‘158 it is worth asking the question 
whether non-state structures are not recognised, or if recognised, whether they are exempt 
from the provisions of these treaties? The HRC only made a brief reference to this issue in 
General Comment 32, emphasising that the notion of a ‗tribunal‘ referred to in Art 14(1) 
designates a body that is established by law, regardless of what it is called.
159
 The idea that 
non-state structures could possibly be included is effectively disproved. The Dakar 
Declaration, on the other hand, while not directly addressing non-state justice systems 
specifically, does address traditional justice systems, which by nature, could be state or non-
state.
160
 It recognised that traditional courts are capable of playing a role in the achievement 
of peaceful societies and exercise authority over a significant proportion of the population in 
African countries.
161
 It also recognised that these courts have serious shortcomings, which 
result in many instances in a denial of a fair trial, and that Traditional courts are not exempt 
from the provisions of the African Charter relating to fair trial.
162
  
Ancillary to the right to a hearing before a competent, independent and impartial 
tribunal is the requirement that the hearing must be conducted in public. This ensures 
                                                 
158
 The Guidelines on fair Trials use the term ‗legally constituted competent, independent and impartial judicial 
body‘ Para 1. 
159
 Para 18. 
160
 The South African Constitution for instance recognises the role of traditional leadership and their functions 
as justice structures, which therefore means they are ‗forums recognised by law‘. See ss. 166(e) and 211 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act No 108 of 1996. In Mozambique on the other hand, traditional 
and religious courts are not recognised. The Constitution specifically ignores traditional courts, providing  in Art 
223 that: 
1. In the Republic of Mozambique there shall be the following courts: 
a) The Supreme Court; 
b) The Administrative Court; 
c) The judicial courts. 
2. Other administrative, labour, fiscal, customs, maritime, arbitration and 
community courts can also be established‘...  
Art 233 Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique 16 November 2004. Community Courts are quite different 
from traditional courts in the sense that the judges are elected officials rather than chiefs and traditional rulers. 
See AfriMap/Open Society Foundation Mozambique: Justice sector and the rule of law (Johannesburg: Open 
Society Initiative for Southern Africa, 2006) specifically Chapter 6G. 
161
 Para 4. 
162
 Ibid.  
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transparency of proceedings and provides an important safeguard for the interest of the 
individual and of society at large.
163
 There are certain conditions under which courts may 
exclude all or part of the public from hearings. These include reasons of morals, public order 
or national security in a democratic society, or when the interest of the private lives of the 
parties or the interest of minors so requires, or in special circumstances where, in the opinion 
of the court, publicity would be prejudicial to the interests of justice.
164
  
 
2.6.5 Provision of legal assistance 
Art 14(3)(d) of the ICCPR provides that every accused person is entitled to defend himself in 
person or through legal assistance of his own choosing. If he is unable to afford legal 
assistance, he is entitled to have legal assistance assigned to him free of charge if the interests 
of justice so requires. There is thus, no doubt that there exists in international law a basic 
obligation on states to provide legal aid in some form in order to ensure access to justice. The 
ACHPR has emphasised this duty in the Dakar Declaration, stating that it is the duty of 
governments to provide legal assistance to indigent persons in order to make the right to a fair 
trial more effective, and that the contribution of the judiciary, human rights NGOs and 
professional associations should be encouraged in this regard.
 165
 
The HRC has noted that Art 14(3)(d) of the ICCPR obliges State parties to provide 
legal aid only within the frame work of criminal proceedings,
166
 but the jurisprudence shows 
that even then, the right to free legal assistance is not unconditional. Certain criteria, such as 
the gravity of the offence,
167
 the severity of the penalty involved
168
 and the complexity of the 
case are to be considered in deciding whether legal assistance should be provided. Thus in 
OF v Norway,
169
 where the accused was charged with a minor offence (speeding) which 
                                                 
163
 General Comments 32 (note 80 above) para 29. 
164
 Ibid.  
165
 Note 107 above, para 8.  
166
 Mr JO, Mrs ZS and their daughter SO v Belgium, Communication No 1417/2005, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/85/D/1417/2005 (2005). 
167
 Leonard John Lindon v Australia Communication No 646/1995, UN Doc CCPR/C/64/D/646/1995 (25 
November 1998) para 6.5. 
168
 Robinson LaVende v Trinidad and Tobago, Communication No. 554/1993, UN Doc CCPR/C/61/D/554/1993 
(17 November 1997) para 5.8; Aliboeva v Tajikistan Communications No 985/2001, para 6.4; Barno Saidova v 
Tajikistan, Communication No. 964/2001, UN Doc CCPR/C/81/D/964/2001 (2004). Para 6.8. 
169
 OF v Norway Communication No 158/1983, UN Doc CCPR/C/OP/2 at 44 (1990). 
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would have in practice only led to a small fine, the HRC found that the State was not required 
to provide legal assistance. The HRC has also opined that Art 14(3)(d) does not entitle the 
accused to choose counsel provided to him free of charge. However, the legal aid provided 
must be effective.
170
  
While also guaranteeing the right to free legal aid in criminal cases, the ECtHR has 
applied similar tests in determining whether there is a violation of Art 6(3) of the ECHR. In 
Granger v United Kingdom,
171
 the applicant was refused legal aid to appeal against a 
conviction for perjury following which he was sentenced to five years‘ imprisonment. In 
view of the severity of the penalty, the ECtHR noted that there could ‗thus be no question as 
to the importance of what was at stake in the appeal‘. But the severity of the sentence was not 
the only consideration. The court further considered that the applicant had not been in a 
position fully to comprehend the pre-prepared speeches submitted to the High Court of 
Justiciary by the Solicitor General, or the opposing arguments submitted to the court, and that 
even if he were, he would not have been able to make an effective reply to those arguments 
or to questions from the bench. The complicated nature of the case was demonstrated by the 
fact that one of the grounds for appeal raised an issue of complexity and importance that was 
so difficult that the High Court had to adjourn its hearing and call for a transcript of the 
evidence given at the applicant‘s trial, so as to be able to examine the matter more 
thoroughly. In view of all these considerations, the ECtHR concluded that ‗it would have 
been in the interests of justice for free legal assistance to be given to the applicant‘ since this 
would have ‗served the interests of justice and fairness by enabling the applicant to make an 
effective contribution to the proceedings ... ‘172  
On its part, the African Charter is silent on the question of legal aid, but the Guidelines 
on Fair Trials lays out detailed guarantees in this area. First of all, it requires States to ensure 
that efficient procedures and mechanisms for effective and equal access to lawyers are 
provided for all persons within their territory and subject to their jurisdiction, without 
distinction of any kind.
173
 The prohibited grounds of distinction on access to lawyers include 
national origin, which means that such efforts on the parts of states must take into 
                                                 
170
 Paul Kelly v Jamaica, Communication No 253/1987, UN Doc CCPR/C/41/D/253/1987 at 60 (1991) Para 
5.10. 
171
 Granger v United Kingdom (1990) 12 EHRR 469. 
172
 Ibid, para 46. See also Webb v United Kingdom (1983) 33 DR 133; Pakelli v Germany (1983) 6 EHRR 1 
173
 Guidelines on Fair Trials supra (note 81 above) para G(a). 
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consideration the needs of refugees and asylum seekers, along with other classes of aliens. 
Recognising that the number of qualified lawyers is low in many state parties to the African 
Charter, the Guidelines encourage states to create enabling environments for para-legals to 
play a part in the provision of legal assistance.
174
  
In criminal matters, the Guidelines on Fair trials sets out criteria which correspond with 
those developed in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and HRC for determining whether legal 
assistance should be provided as discussed above. What should be considered are the 
seriousness of the offence and the severity of the sentence.
175
 In this regard, the ACHPR 
declared that the right to legal assistance is a fundamental element of the right to fair trial, 
and should always be available where the interests of justice demand it.
176
 
With regard to the right to legal assistance in civil case, the positio  under the African 
human rights regime is clearer than under the ICCPR and the ECHR. Civil matters are 
included in the ambit of cases in which State Parties to the African Charter have an obligation 
to provide legal assistance. This can be inferred from the Dakar Declaration which refers to 
‗accused and aggrieved‘ persons. More compellingly, the Guidelines on Fair Trials provides 
that ‗[t]he accused or a party to a civil case has a right to have legal assistance assigned to 
him or her in any case where the interests of justice so require and without payment by the 
accused or party to a civil case if he or she does not have sufficient means to pay for it‘.177 
Thus, the deciding factor for parties to he African Charter in the determination of whether or 
not to provide legal aid is not the nature of the matter at stake, but rather whether ‗the interest 
of justice‘ requires it. The Guidelines offers some parameters on the application of the 
‗interest of justice‘ test in respect of civil cases.178 The ‗interests of justice‘ are to be 
determined by  the complexity of the case and the ability of the party to adequately represent 
himself or herself;
179
 the rights that are affected;
180
 and the likely impact of the outcome of 
the case on the wider community. It is apparent that these provisions are derived from the 
                                                 
174
 Ibid, para H(g)–(k). 
175
 Avocats sans Frontières (on behalf of Bwampamye) v Burundi (note 128 above). 
176
 Ibid, para 30. 
177
 Guidelines on Fair Trials supra (note 81 above) para H(a), emphasis added.  
178
 Ibid, para H(b) 
179
 Airey v Ireland (note 124 above); Fransson v Sweden (2004) 39 EHRR SE1. 
180
 Aerts v Belgium (1998) ECHR 64  para 59. 
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principles formulated by the ECtHR and HRC in their extensive jurisprudence on this matter 
as seen in the cases seen above.  
The position of the court in Airey discussed above is instructive of the European 
position on the right to legal assistance in civil matters. Despite the fact that Art 6 of the 
ECHR does not make express provision for civil legal aid, Airey suggests that the State has 
an obligation to provide legal assistance where such assistance is indispensable for an 
effective access to court. The Court has held further, in A v United Kingdom,
181
 that the 
obligation exists in cases where ‗such assistance proves indispensable for effective access to 
the court, either because legal representation is rendered compulsory or by reason of the 
complexity of the procedure or of the case‘.182 The position is given further credence in 
Bobrowski v Poland
183
 where the ECtHR held that while there is no obligation to grant legal 
aid in all disputes, States should be guided by principles of fairness. States should ensure that 
a party in civil proceeding is able to participate effectively by being able to put forward 
arguments in support of his or her claims.
184
 
Although the HRC has stated that Art 14(3)(d) of the ICCPR obliges State parties to 
provide legal aid only within the frame work of criminal proceedings, as previously noted, it 
has also gone on to say that State Parties are encouraged to provide free legal aid in civil 
matters too.
185
 In some non-criminal cases, it said, they may even be obliged to do so.
186
 This 
would include for instance, a situation involving a person sentenced to death, who seeks to 
avail himself of available constitutional review of irregularities in a criminal trial but does not 
have sufficient means to pay for the legal assistance required to pursue such remedy.
187
 This 
is not a criminal matter per se, because the issue in question is not whether the applicant was 
innocent or guilty of a crime, but whether his constitutional right of access to justice had been 
violated. The role of the Constitutional Court in such an instance is not the determination of a 
criminal charge, but to ensure that applicants receive a fair trial in all cases, whether criminal 
                                                 
181
 A v United Kingdom (2003) 13 BHRC 623. 
182
 Ibid, para 96. 
183
 Bobrowski v Poland (2008) ECHR 64916/01 (17 June 2008). 
184
 Cf however the findings of the Court in S and M v United Kingdom (1993) 18 EHRR CD172 and A v United 
Kingdom supra, that the United Kingdom was not in breach of Art 6(1) for failing to provide legal aid for 
bringing and for defending libel actions. 
185
 General Comments 32 (note 80 above) para 10. 
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 Ibid.  
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 Currie v Jamaica Communication No 377/1989 CCPR/C/50/D/77/1989 (1994).  
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
70 
 
or civil. In this instance, the State has obligations under Arts 2(3) and 14(1) of the ICCPR to 
provide free legal assistance in order to make available and effective, the remedies in the 
Constitutional Court which address violations of fundamental rights.
188
  
For refugees, a non-criminal matter in which the State would be obliged to provide free 
legal assistance would be asylum proceedings, the results of which could mean that a refugee 
or asylum seeker faces refoulement to a place where his life or liberty would be in jeopardy 
on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion. The inherent threat is similar to that of an accused persons faced with 
serious penalties if convicted, therefore, taking into consideration the various criteria 
established by the various bodies above, the obligations of the state should be the same.  
Lastly, it should be pointed out that even where an obligation exists to provide legal 
assistance, whether in civil or criminal matters, States ‗enjoy a free choice of the means to be 
used in guaranteeing litigants the right to a fair trial‘,189 and legal aid schemes are but one of 
those means. Furthermore, the right of access to a lawyer is not absolute and may be subject 
to restrictions, provided that those restrictions pursue a legitimate aim and are 
proportionate.
190
 
The foregoing discussion has established the international law obligations of States on 
access to justice. These obligations are of a general nature, applicable to all persons including 
refugees and asylum seekers. However, as the focus of this thesis is refugees, the next section 
will examine what specific obligations, if any, States have in respect of access to justice for 
refugees and asylum seekers within their jurisdictions.  
 
2.7 ACCESS TO JUSTICE UNDER INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW 
Among the various protection that general international human rights law offers, the one with 
potentially the most value for refugees, is the duty of non-discrimination. As an overarching 
principle which is applicable on a wide variety of fronts, it is an effective means by which to 
empower refugees, enabling them to enjoy the rights guaranteed in various human rights 
instruments.
191
 The core guarantee of non-discrimination is found in Art 26 of the ICCPR. 
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The HRC emphasised the universal nature of the ICCPR, making clear that its provisions do 
not inhere only in citizens of a State Party when it declared: ‗each one of the rights of the 
Covenant must be guaranteed without discrimination between citizens and aliens‘.192 It 
further reiterated and clarified this in its General Comments No 31:  
The enjoyment of Covenant rights is not limited to citizens of States Parties but must also be available to 
all individuals, regardless of nationality or statelessness, such as asylum seekers, refugees, migrant 
workers and other persons, who may find themselves in the territory or subject to the jurisdiction of the 
State Party.
193
 
Therefore, all of the access to justice guarantees discussed above apply equally to refugees.  
Beyond these generally applicable guarantees however, there exists a refugee-specific 
system of rights primarily contained in the UN Refugee Convention and also to be found in 
regional refugee instruments such as the OAU Refugee Convention and the Cartagena 
Declaration on Refugees.
194
 The rights of refugees found in these Conventions derive from 
the general standards of international human rights law (including those discussed above) in 
which they have their origins.
195
  
The OAU Refugee Convention, to which South Africa is party, is considered the most 
generous and flexible international agreement on refugee protection,
196
 providing a more 
extensive definition of refugees than does the UN Refugee Convention and extending the 
                                                 
192
 General Comment No 15 The position of aliens under the Covenant (1986) UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev 1, at 
18, (1994), para 2.  
193
 General Comment No 31 Nature of the general legal obligation on states parties to the Covenant UN Doc 
CCPR/C/21/Rev 1/Add 13 (2004), para 10. 
194
 OAS Doc OEA/Ser L/V/II.66/doc 10, rev 1, at 190–93 (1984–85), 17 April 1998. 
195
 Erika Feller ‗International refugee protection 50 years on: The protection challenges of the past, present and 
future (2001) 843 (83) International Review of the Red Cross - Humanitarian Debate: Law, Policy, Action 581, 
582; Hathaway argues that traditional customary international law cannot be a source for refugee rights since 
only very few rights are universally accepted under international law. These are the right against discrimination 
and the right to be free from arbitrary deprivation of life, from torture, and from genocide. He therefore suggests 
that the UN Refugee Convention must be the first source for the rights of refugees under international law, 
followed by the other international human rights treaties. Hathaway (note 191 above) 15–40. 
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 George Okoth-Obbo ‗OAU Convention remains a key plank of refugee protection in Africa after 40 years‘ 
Available at http://www.unhcr.org/4aa7b80c6.html [accessed 10 September 2010]. 
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guarantee of non-refoulement to include non-rejection at frontiers.
197
 In this way, it covers 
situations specific to Africa that were not explicitly covered by the UN instrument and meant 
refugees from Africa could not effectively access asylum even when they had legitimate 
claims.
198
 It does not in any way supersede the UN Refugee Convention. Indeed, it recognises 
the UN Refugee Convention as ‗the basic and universal instrument relating to the status of 
refugees‘199 and describes itself as the ‗effective regional complement in Africa‘ of the UN 
Refugee Convention.
200
 The OAU Convention thus serves as a supplement to the UN 
Refugee Convention, which means that the provisions contained in the latter, including the 
rights contained therein, are wholly incorporated into the former and so the rights enumerated 
in the UN Refugee Convention also apply under the OAU Refugee Convention.   
These international refugee rights instruments do not exist as alternatives to or in 
competition with general human rights.
201
 Rather they exist as a ‗mechanism by which to 
answer situation-specific vulnerabilities that would otherwise deny refugees meaningful 
benefit of the more general system of human rights protection‘.202 Thus, for instance, the 
ICCPR, while applicable to refugees, is addressed primarily to persons who reside in their 
                                                 
197
 Other unique features of the OAU Convention include the concept of burden-sharing among member states 
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state of citizenship and does not deal with refugee-specific concerns.
203
 Even when the 
subject matter of a particular provision is relevant to refugees, the rights are formulated on 
the basis of inappropriate assumptions say critics.
204
 The assumption with respect to judicial 
remedies for instance is that refugees and other aliens are able to freely invoke it like citizens 
do, but that is often not the case.
205
  
The UN Refugee Convention attempts to fill these gaps by guaranteeing a broad range 
of rights applicable to refugees specifically. It defines four standards of treatment that should 
be applied by host states in the implementation of those rights. These are:  
 Treatment as favourable as that accorded to nationals of the host state. 206 
 Treatment as favourable as that accorded to aliens generally in the same 
circumstances.
 207
  
 Most favourable treatment accorded to nationals of a foreign country or most-
favoured foreigner treatment.
208
 This means that where a host state has an agreement 
with another country the terms of which are more favourable than those which it has 
with other states, refugees are to be treated at the level of the first state in question. 
Two rights in the Convention are guaranteed at this level – the right to freedom of 
non-political association and to engage in wage earning employment.
209
 
                                                 
203
 Ibid.  
204
 Ibid. 
205
 Ibid, 121.  
206
 Arts 4 (freedom of religion); 14 (artistic rights and industrial property), 16(2) (access to legal aid and 
exemption from cautio judicatum solvi), 20 (rationing), 22(1) (elementary education), 23(public relief) 24(1) 
(labour legislation and social security), 29 (taxes and other fiscal charges). 
207
 Art 13 (moveable and immoveable property), 18 (self-employment), 19 (practice of liberal professions), 21 
(housing), 22(2) (education other than elementary education), 26 (freedom of movement).  
Art 6 defines the term ‗in the same circumstances‘ to imply that ‗any requirements (including requirements as to 
length and conditions of sojourn or residence) which the particular individual would have to fulfil for the 
enjoyment of the right in question, if he were not a refugee, must be fulfilled by him, with the exception of 
requirements which by their nature a refugee is incapable of fulfilling‘. Thus for instance with regard to the right 
to acquire movable and immoveable property under Art 13, if the law in South Africa required all non-citizens 
to be resident in the country for at least three years before they could buy property, then refugees would be 
subject to the same conditions. 
208
 Arts 15 (freedom of non-political association) and 17 (right to engage in wage-earning employment). 
209
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 Treatment not approximating to any defined standard.210 These are rights not defined 
to require treatment at any of the three levels stated above. These rights are 
guaranteed absolutely to refugees and must be respected even if the citizens of the 
host state do not enjoy those rights.
211
 Some of these rights, apart from being 
absolute to the extent that they are not defined by any standards are also so 
fundamental that States cannot enter reservations to them. These rights are: 
protection from non-refoulement, protection against discrimination, religious 
freedom and, significantly for the purposes of this thesis, the right of access to 
courts.
212
 
Not only is the right of access to court non-derogable in terms of Art 42(1) of the UN 
Refugee Convention, the right is of such an absolute character that by it, refugees have the 
right of free access to courts even if the citizens of the host states do not. This is because it is 
one of those rights not defined by any standard of treatment.
213
 It is provided for in Art 16 of 
the UN Refugee Convention: 
1. A refugee shall have free access to the courts of law on the territory of all Contracting States.  
2. A refugee shall enjoy in the Contracting State in which he has his habitual residence the same 
treatment as a national in matters pertaining to access to the courts, including legal assistance and 
exemption from cautio judicatum solvi.  
3. A refugee shall be accorded in the matters referred to in paragraph 2 in countries other than that in 
which he has his habitual residence the treatment granted to a national of the country of his habitual 
residence. 
Article 16(1) applies to any refugee, regardless of where he has his habitual residence, even if 
it is not within the territory of a state party to the Convention.
214
 In the event he has his 
habitual residence in a state that is not party to the Convention, he still has the right to access 
the courts of any States Party ‗subject only to the rule underlying the Convention that each 
Contracting State must determine for its own purposes whether a person is to be considered 
                                                 
210
 Arts 16(1) (access to courts), 25 (administrative assistance), 27 (identity papers), 28 (travel documents), 30 
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211
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as a refugee or not‘.215 Furthermore, the right of access to court as envisaged in Art 16(1) is 
not limited to the courts of the country where the refugee is located, but includes access to the 
courts in the territory of all contracting States.
216
 Thus, where a person granted refugee status 
in South Africa finds it necessary to sue a national of another contracting State, that other 
contracting State must grant him access to its courts and afford him the same treatment as that 
afforded to a national of South Africa with respect to legal aid and cautio judicatum solvi.   
Lastly, the right contained in Art 16(1) is not limited to recognised refugees alone, but 
extends to asylum seekers as well.
 217
 If this were not the case, said the court in R v Secretary 
of State for the Home Department, ex parte Jahangeer et al
218
 an asylum seeker ‗might find 
that he could have no right of audience before the court because the means of establishing his 
status would not be available to him‘.219 
Article 16(2) entitles refugees to have access to legal assistance when it is required. 
However, unlike the absolute nature of the right in paragraph 1, refugees are assimilated to 
nationals of the asylum state for purposes of assistance to access to courts including legal 
aid.
220
 Thus, refugees in South Africa would enjoy legal aid only to the extent that South 
African citizens do. This, however, applies only in countries where state-funded legal aid 
exists. Where legal aid is provided by bar associations or other bodies, the article does not 
apply.
221
 This right to legal assistance would appear restricted in the light of the extremely 
generous nature of the absolute right of access to court. In reality, however, considering that 
it is the same treatment that the citizens of the host state enjoy, that is not the case. Besides, 
the absolute nature of the right to access to court is highly theoretical, given the unlikelihood 
that any country that would deny its citizens the right of access to court would offer that 
privilege to refugees.  
Explaining why treatment equal to that of a national should be the required standard 
when it comes to legal assistance and technical requirements like cautio judicatum solvi, the 
Secretary General of the United Nations has stated that, while the right of refugees to sue and 
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be sued in principle is not challenged, in practice, insurmountable difficulties to the exercise 
of this right by needy refugees usually exist, and these include the refusal to grant refugees 
the benefit of legal assistance, and a requirement to furnish cautio judicatum solvi – a 
financial guarantee that an alien is obliged to provide when bringing an action before the 
courts of a country against a national of that country. This security for costs is required to 
ensure payment of costs and damages which may result from the trial.
222
  
In many countries, according to the Secretary General, legal assistance is available only 
to nationals and those foreigners who could invoke a treaty of reciprocity.
223
 Such difficulties 
he said, make the right of access to court illusory. ‗Refugees should therefore be exempted, as 
was done in the Conventions of 1933 and 1938, from the obligation to furnish security for 
costs and enjoy the benefit of legal assistance on the same conditio s as nationals‘.224 
Therefore, by virtue of Art 16 of the UN Refugee Convention, refugees‘ right to access courts 
is not to be blocked or limited by the requirement of a financial guarantee.
225
 The reference to 
free access, however, does not exempt refugees from payment of court fees or other charges 
required in order to pursue an action, but such fees and charges may not be higher than those 
levied on nationals and they should not be any additional obstacles for refugees.
226
  
In the light of the Airey decision discussed above, even though Art 16 refers to access 
to courts, what is envisaged must of necessity go beyond mere ability to bring proceedings 
before the state‘s courts system and extend to the practicalities of instituting them as well. On 
this point, Hathaway notes that, although Art 16 above refers only to access to courts, the 
qualitative dimension of that access to the courts is regulated by Art 14(1) of the ICCPR. 
                                                 
222
 Hathaway (note 191 above) 882. 
223
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224
 Memorandum by the United Nations Secretary General to the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and 
Related Problems 3 January 1950 UN doc E/AC32/2, at 30, cited in Hathaway supra (note 182 above) 882. 
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 In Lindon v Australia (note 158 above) the HRC noted that such financial obstacles could give rise to a 
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Thus, all of the guarantees set out in Art 14 of the ICCPR as discussed above apply to 
refugees also. What this means therefore, is that the bodies before which refugees are entitled 
to establish their claim must be established by law and they must be jurisdictionally 
competent, independent and impartial. They must, moreover, be positioned to deliver a fair 
and public hearing, meaning that access should be reasonably expeditious, the rules of natural 
justice respected, procedural equality between the parties ensured, it is possible reasonably to 
present one‘s case, and the hearing (or at least the judgment, where special circumstances 
exist) is accessible to all.
227
 These requirements also have implications for those states which 
keep refugees in camps, away from the major cities, as this could conceivably affect access if 
there are no courts nearby.
228
  
Lastly, it bears pointing out that unlike the ICCPR, the UN Refugee Convention does 
not provide for effective remedies for violations of the rights contained in it. However, this 
omission need not constitute a barrier as most of the rights contained in the UN Refugee 
Convention are equally protected in the ICCPR, which it has been established,  also applies to 
refugees. Refugees can therefore claim a right to a remedy under the auspices of the ICCPR.   
 
2.8 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has traced the growth and development of access to justice, from its Anglo-
Saxon common law roots where it was recognised as a basic foundation of the rule of law to 
the present day where it holds an esteemed place as a legal right in many international human 
rights instruments. Yet for all of its acknowledged importance, access to justice is a complex 
and highly nuanced concept which is difficult to define. It is certainly impossible to discuss 
all of the theories and nuances related to it in the short space of a chapter in a thesis. I have, 
however, attempted to explore some of the factors that shape the ways in which it is 
understood, its history and place as a human right. It is obvious from the scholarship on the 
subject that access to justice can be seen both broadly and narrowly. If seen broadly, it is 
accepted that it means the ‗ability to avail oneself of the various institutions, governmental 
and non-governmental, judicial and non-judicial in which a claimant might find justice‘,229 
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with the obtainment of appropriate remedy being the ultimate intent. In such a view, access to 
justice would include issues of social, economic and environmental justice among others and 
include a variety of forums. Those who prefer a narrow definition on the other hand would 
see it in terms of access to courts. But even in this view, it is accepted that such access must 
involve effective and expeditious access to legal services, or state institutions. Regardless of 
political and ideological standpoints, access to justice is accepted as a strategy to make the 
quest for justice more equitable and the administration of justice more efficient and 
responsive to public demands. The jurisprudence certainly supports this.  
The conclusion therefore is that even in international law, access to justice is less 
concerned with the availability of judicial infrastructure than it is with meaningful and 
effective access to a process that provides fair and equitable results. It is also as much about 
overcoming barriers as it is about the establishment of structures to facilitate access. For 
within any society, there are those who are disadvantaged and are more vulnerable than 
others and for whom achieving access to justice will be even more challenging. Among these 
are refugees and asylum seekers, persons who, as outsiders, may face significant difficulties 
in negotiating legal processes in their host country which they do not understand for a variety 
of reasons.
230
  
Ideally, a system should exist that meets the peculiar needs of vulnerable persons, but 
this is not always possible. The practical route is usually to adapt existing rules to address the 
peculiar vulnerabilities in question. For refugees, the international community has established 
an international regime to guide how they are treated. With respect to access to justice, 
comprehensive guarantees exist in international law to protect refugees through the 
instrumentality of generally applicable international human rights instruments and their non-
discrimination clauses, as well as through refugee-specific legal instruments.  
A range of international norms and standards exist which oblige states to ensure that 
refugees within their territory have access to justice. The most obvious guarantee evinced 
from these provisions is the right of access to courts. It is emphasised in all the international 
and regional instruments referred to. But while these instruments highlight the integral nature 
of access to court in the pursuit of justice, it bears pointing out that the two are not exactly the 
same. Whereas access to courts focuses on procedural justice, access to remedies or 
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substantive justice is the critical element of access to justice, and as we have seen in the 
international instruments in question, equal credence is attached to both. The conditions 
necessary for refugees, like everyone else, to achieve substantive justice are set out in these 
instruments and include equality of arms, access to legal representation, availability of 
competent, independent and impartial courts and the ability to have wrongs remedied or 
redressed.  
In view of the foregoing, it cannot be said that there is any ambiguity as to what is 
expected of South Africa with respect to its obligations to refugees on access to justice. The 
question to consider is therefore: how well is South Africa meeting these obligations? Do its 
laws and policies measure up to the international standards set out above and is 
implementation effective? If not, what are the areas that need to be addressed? The next 
chapter will examine South Africa‘s constitutional position on access to justice and see how 
this puts the country in compliance with international law and what implications, if any, these 
have on the country‘s sizable refugees and asylum population. 
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Chapter Three 
The Constitutional Framework  
for Access to Justice in South Africa 
Our new Constitution emphasises the attainment of substantive social justice,  
and not merely formal justice under the law.  
It places at its forefront an overriding commitment to equality.
1
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The preceding chapter discussed the meaning and import of the term ‗access to justice‘. It 
was established that both scholastic and jurisprudential discourses show that any 
understanding of it must necessarily go beyond the mere ability to gain entry to a state-
sanctioned forum for the administration of justice, to include effective and meaningful access 
to processes that provide fair and equitable results in the quest for justice. It was also seen 
that in the international sphere, there are obligations that States have in the area of access to 
justice. States assume some of these obligations either when they formally become parties to 
a particular international instrument or because some international instruments are of such a 
fundamental nature that States are deemed to be bound by their provisions whether or not 
they formally recognise them. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a case in point 
here.  
In this chapter and the next, I examine how well the access to justice obligations set out 
in the preceding chapter find expression in South Africa‘s Constitution, legislation and 
policy. This chapter focuses on the constitutional guarantees and the jurisprudence that has 
developed from them. As the supreme law of the land, the obligations the Constitution 
imposes must be fulfilled
2
 and it is important to see what those obligations are and if they 
measure up to internationally accepted standards. I start by looking first at how South Africa 
came to have any obligations under international law and why it should concern itself with 
whether or not its constitutional guarantees meet those standards. In other words, what role, if 
any, does international law play in South Africa? Thereafter, I look at the constitutional 
guarantees on access to justice, mirroring in the constitutional context, the discussion of the 
                                                 
1
 Edwin Cameron ‗Academic criticism and the democratic order‘ (1998) 14 (1) South African Journal of Human 
Rights 106, 108. 
2
 Section 2, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996. (Hereinafter the South African 
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substantive and procedural components of access to justice as was done in chapter two. As 
noted above, that chapter showed that the notion of access to justice under international law 
goes beyond mere ability to access courts. Can it also be said that the South African 
Constitution and the judicial interpretations of its provisions support meaningful access as 
opposed to access for the sake of it?  
While the chapter is an examination of how the South African Constitution protects the 
right of access to justice generally, specific focus will be placed on how refugees and asylum 
seekers who are the subject of this thesis, are impacted. Thus, the chapter will pay greater 
attention to those elements of access to justice that are particularly significant for refugees 
and asylum seekers. This is not to say that there are certain elements that are important to 
refugees but not to other people. Rather, it is a recognition that refugees, by their very nature, 
are persons with unique vulnerabilities which other segments of society, including other 
migrants, do not share. While other migrants may be able to call upon some form of 
protection that comes with being citizens of a State, refugees have no such luxury. They 
could therefore be more significantly impacted by lack of access to justice than citizens and 
other migrants would be. Similarly, they could be more significantly impaired by some of the 
previously identified elements of access to justice than citizens would be. Challenges in 
language proficiency or lack of legal representation in proceedings that could result in 
refoulement are cases in point.  
Thus, this chapter will not merely repeat in the constitutional context, all of the 
elements previously discussed in chapter two. Instead, it will point out briefly, how South 
Africa‘s constitutional provisions on access to justice guarantee those elements and meet the 
standard set by international law. Thereafter, it will focus on those aspects that are critical to 
refugees‘ access. This will in turn, guide the examination and critique of policy and 
legislation in the next chapter, as well as the analysis of the problems confronting refugees as 
they seek to access justice in subsequent chapters. In concluding this chapter, I will look at a 
few cases that demonstrate how the constitutional guarantees discussed take the issue of 
access to justice for refugees beyond mere abstraction that is only of academic importance, to 
one that has great meaning for refugees and asylum seekers in their everyday lives.  
 
3.2 SOUTH AFRICA’S INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS 
Apartheid was characterised by a complete disregard for human rights at all levels – in 
legislation, in the judicial interpretation of legislation, in state practice and even in foreign 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
82 
 
policy.
3
 The worldwide movement towards the protection of human rights, which found 
expression in the adoption of various human rights treaties at the international level, had very 
little influence on South Africa. Indeed developments in human rights were met with 
antagonism and aloofness,
4
 as South Africa refused to be party to any international human 
rights treaties
5
 and was one of only eight countries that had abstained from voting on the 
resolution to pass the UDHR, dismissing it as communist propaganda.
6
 Not surprisingly, 
therefore, one of the biggest tasks that faced the country as it emerged from over four decades 
of apartheid was the establishment of a new legal order in which respect for human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law were given the prominence they deserved. The machinery was 
consequently set in motion for the creation of a new Constitution, the ratification of 
international human rights treaties, and bringing the country‘s laws into compliance with 
international human rights standards.  
Negotiations to end apartheid were long and difficult, but the one thing both sides 
agreed on from the outset was that the country needed a new Constitution.
7
  Previous 
Constitutions
8
 had maintained a principle of (white) parliamentary sovereignty and the denial 
of human rights to non-white South Africans.
9
 The only way forward was the adoption of a 
                                                 
3
 John C Mubangizi The protection of human rights in South Africa: A legal and practical guide (Cape Town: 
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monitoring (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 276. 
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Quarterly 628–665, 633. 
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 John Dugard International law: A South African perspective 3
rd
 ed (Cape Town: Juta, 2005) 54; Iain Currie & 
Johan de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 5
th
 ed (Cape Town: Juta, 2005) 4. 
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Africa Act 1909 (9 Edw VII, c 9)) the Republic Constitution (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 
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new Constitution in which power was not concentrated in the hands of a few and the rights of 
all were respected.
10
 Eventually, an interim Constitution was adopted in 1993.
11
 For the first 
time in its constitutional history, South Africa had a Constitution that contained a Bill of 
Rights which guaranteed a wide range of civil, political, economic, social and cultural 
rights.
12
  This Constitution became the supreme law of South Africa,
13
 guiding the country 
through the period of transition to a democratic government and formed the basis of the final 
Constitution which was adopted in 1996.
14
 The final Constitution also included a Bill of 
Rights – one so extensive it has been described as one of the most progressive in the world.15 
It envisages an egalitarian society ‗based on democratic values, social justice and 
fundamental human rights‘.16  The influence of the international bill of rights is evident in 
both Constitutions as they imitate the language and structures of those instruments and 
recognise the same categories of rights contained therein.
17
  
At the same time, as progress was being made on the constitutional front, the country 
set about signing, ratifying or acceding to all the major human rights treaties.
18
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Under the rules that govern international law, states are obliged to respect the treaties 
they enter into and give effect to them domestically.
19
 How they are to do this is however not 
prescribed in international law.
20
 In some states, treaties are incorporated directly into 
municipal law once they are ratified. This position derives from the monist theory of law 
which views international and national law as part of a single legal order, and therefore 
considers that domestic courts are obliged to apply rules of international law directly without 
the need for any act of adoption by courts or transformation into local law by means of 
legislation.
21
 Some versions of monism in fact hold the view that domestic law derives its 
                                                                                                                                                        
against Women, GA res 54/4, annex, 54 UN GAOR Supp (No 49) 5, UN Doc A/54/49 (Vol I) (2000) entered 
into force December 22, 2000; Convention on the Rights of the Child GA res 44/25, annex, 44 UN GAOR Supp 
(No 49) 167, UN Doc A/44/49 (1989) entered into force September 2, 1990 (ratified 16 June 1995); Convention 
Against Torture and other Cruel Inhuman and Degrading Treatment, GA res 39/46, annex, 39 UN GAOR Supp 
(No 51) 197, UN Doc A/39/51 (1984) entered into force June 26, 1987(ratified 10 December 1998) and the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities GA Res 61/106, Annex I, UN GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp 
No 49, at 65, UN Doc A/61/49 (2006), entered into force May 3, 2008 (ratified November 30, 2007). It has 
signed but not ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights GA res 2200A (XXI) 
21 UN GAOR Supp (No 16) 49, UN Doc A/6316 (1966) 993 UNTS 3, entered into force January 3, 1976 
(signed October 3 1994); the Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture (signed September 20 2006) 
the International Convention on the Protection of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families GA res 
45/158, annex, 45 UN GAOR Supp (No 49A) 262, UN Doc A/45/49 (1990) entered into force July 1, 2003. 
19
 Arts 26 and 27, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention) 1155 UNTS 331, 8 ILM 679, 
entered into force January 27, 1980. 
20
 There are certain exceptions to this general rule. Art 2(2) of the ICCPR for instance, requires state parties to, 
in accordance with their constitutional processes and the provisions of the ICCPR, adopt legislative or other 
measures that may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the ICCPR. Also, by virtue of Art 
2(3)(b) they must ensure that persons whose rights are violated have effective remedy. Similarly, Art 2(1) of the 
United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
requires each state party to ‗take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts 
of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction‘. Art 4 also requires states to make the act of torture an offence 
under their criminal laws. See also Arts 4 and 5 of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (78 UNTS 277, entered into force January 12, 1951) for similar 
provisions. See also Louis Henkin ‗International human rights standards in national law: The jurisprudence of 
the United States‘ in Benedetto Conforti & Francesco Francioni (eds) Enforcing international human rights in 
domestic courts (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997) 189.  
21
 Myers S McDougal ‗The impact of international law upon national law: A policy-oriented perspective? 
(1959) 4 South Dakota Law Review 25, 27–31; JG Starke Introduction to international law 10th ed (London: 
Butterworths, 1989) 75–76. 
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legitimacy and validity from international law.
22
 Other states, of the dualist tradition, require 
that treaties be first incorporated into the domestic legal systems by means of legislation 
before they become part of the country‘s laws.23 This approach considers international and 
national law as distinct legal orders. South Africa has historically been of the dualist tradition 
and so international treaties entered into required Acts of Parliament to incorporate them into 
municipal law. Although this remains the case under the new Constitution,
24
 it seems more 
accurate to describe the approach under the Constitution as a mixed or dual approach, in the 
sense that while dualism is prescribed in respect of treaties,
25
 it takes a monist approach with 
regard to customary international law, providing that ‗Customary international law is law in 
the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament‘.26  
Although incorporation of legal treaties was duly carried out under apartheid, 
‗international law received no constitutional recognition ... , was largely ignored by courts 
and lawyers ... [and] was generally viewed as an alien and hostile legal order‘.27 However, 
not only has international law received constitutional recognition in post-apartheid South 
Africa, it has been given prominence in the interpretation of South African law. Section 39(1) 
of the Constitution obliges courts to consider international law when interpreting the Bill of 
Rights. It goes on to provide that they may also, but are not obliged to, consider foreign law 
in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights, thus making a clear distinction between 
international law and foreign law. The Constitutional Court defined the ambit of this 
provision in S v Makwanyane.
28
 Interpreting the equivalent provision in the interim 
Constitution, s 35(1), the Court stated:   
In the context of s 35(1), public international law would include non-binding as well as binding law. 
They may both be used under the section as tools of interpretation. International agreements and 
customary international law accordingly provide a framework within which chap 3 can be evaluated and 
understood, and for that purpose, decisions of tribunals dealing with comparable instruments, such as the 
United Nations Committee on Human Rights, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the European Commission on Human Rights, and the European 
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 Malcolm Nathan Shaw International law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 122–123. 
23
 Henkin (note 20 above) 189. 
24
 S. 231 of the South African Constitution.   
25
 Ibid. 
26
 S. 233 of the South African Constitution.   
27
 John Dugard ‗International law and the South African Constitution‘ (1997) 1 EJIL 77–92, 92. 
28
 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
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Court of Human Rights and, in appropriate cases, reports of specialised agencies such as the International 
Labour Organisation, may provide guidance as to the correct interpretation of particular provisions of 
chap 3.
29 
 
It is therefore clear that in interpreting South Africa‘s laws and constitutional guarantees on 
access to justice, there is an imperative to consider international law and the jurisprudence of 
other international bodies as well. The access to justice obligations deriving under 
international law, as described in chapter two of this thesis, are therefore applicable and 
relevant to the interpretation of South Africa‘s guarantees on access to justice.  In this regard, 
South Africa‘s access to justice obligations are referenced from the two principal 
international treaties as in chapter two of this thesis – the ICCPR and the African Charter.  
South Africa ratified the ICCPR on 10 December 1998. By virtue of Art 49, the ICCPR 
entered into force in South Africa in March 1999, i.e.  three months after it deposited its 
instrument of ratification. With its ratification, South Africa assumed the obligation ‗to 
respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the 
rights recognised in the [ICCPR] without distinction of any kind ... ‘30 In furtherance of this, 
it undertook to ‗take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and 
with the provisions of the [ICCPR] to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be 
necessary to give effect to the rights recognised in the [ICCPR]‘.31 South Africa signed, 
ratified and deposited its instrument of ratification of the African Charter on 9 July 1996. By 
virtue of Art 65, the African Charter entered into force in South Africa in October 1996, i.e.  
three months after the date it deposited its instrument of ratification. By so doing, it 
undertook to adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to the rights, duties and 
freedoms in the African Charter.
32
 Although South Africa is not a party to the ECtHR, as the 
most valuable source of international human rights law,
33
 its jurisprudence offers useful 
guidance here and will be referred to. I will now proceed to examine the constitutional 
framework for South Africa‘s access to justice obligations.  
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 Art 2(1) ICCPR. 
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32
 Art 1 African Charter. 
33
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3.3 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
The South African Constitution includes in Chapter II, a Bill of Rights that contains a number 
of provisions bearing on access to justice. The most directly applicable are found in s. 33 
(administrative justice), s. 34 (access to court), s. 35 (fair trial in criminal cases), and s. 38 
(constitutional remedies and enforcement of rights). Section 9 (equality before the law) is not 
a direct access to justice provision. It applies in respect of all the rights contained in the 
Constitution. However, given that this is a discussion about a class of people who, as chapter 
one already showed, often face challenges specifically related to their non-citizenship status, 
the provisions of s. 9 are of significance to this discussion and will be referred to.  
As established in chapter two, this work looks only at those access to justice guarantees 
which apply across board to all persons seeking justice, whether in a civil or criminal context. 
Therefore, the fair trial rights contained in s. 35 will not be discussed individually except 
insofar as they are relevant to civil matters as well. I start by setting the context in which 
refugees and asylum seekers can claim the right of access to justice under the Constitution. I 
will then look at the general aspects of the Constitutions‘ access to justice provisions before 
moving on to those aspects which are of particular significance to refugees. In order to avoid 
duplication, the issue of administrative justice will not be discussed here, but rather in chapter 
five which focuses on refugees‘ experiences with the justice system, including in the 
administrative context.  
 
3.4 THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND ITS APPLICATION TO REFUGEES AND 
ASYLUM SEEKERS 
In discussing refugees‘ and asylum seekers right of access to justice under the South African 
Constitution, it is important first to establish that the constitutional guarantees to be examined 
apply to them. According to s. 7(1) of the Constitution, the Bill of Rights applies to everyone 
in South Africa, regardless of their citizenship
34
 and regardless of the legality or otherwise of 
their presence in the country.
35
 This was the finding of the Constitutional Court in 
                                                 
34
 Art 7(1) provides that ‗This Bill of Rights ... enshrines the rights of all people in our country and affirms the 
democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom‘. 
35
 The Constitutional Court has recognized instances in which a right in the Bill of Rights would apply only to 
persons legally in the country – for instance in Khosa and Others v Minister of Social Development and Others 
2004 (6) SA 505 (CC) the right of access to social security was declared to apply to all persons legally within 
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Mohammed v President of the Republic of South Africa (Society for the Abolition of the 
Death Penalty in South Africa and Another Intervening.
36 
There the Court held that the 
handing over of Mohammed by South Africa to the United States for him to stand trial on 
criminal charges in respect of which he could, if convicted, be sentenced to death, infringed 
Mohammed's rights to human dignity, to life and not to be treated or punished in a cruel, 
inhuman or degrading way under the South African Constitution. This was regardless of the 
fact that Mohammed had been an illegal alien in the country. This universal applicability is 
important for it establishes that the rights of access to court and the right to equal protection 
of the law in s. 9(1) discussed below apply to refugees and asylum seekers in the country.  
In respect of the right to access to justice, this universal applicability of the Bill of 
Rights puts South Africa in compliance with its obligations in international law as discussed 
in chapter two. As will be recalled, the HRC stated that the right of access to justice is not 
limited to citizens of States Parties, but must also be available ‗to all individuals, regardless 
of nationality, statelessness or status, whether they are asylum seekers, refugees, migrant 
workers, unaccompanied children or other persons, who find themselves in the territory or 
subject to the jurisdiction of the State Party‘.37  
The right of asylum seekers to access South Africa‘s courts was specifically addressed 
in Baramoto v Minister of Home Affairs.
38
 Declaring as unwarranted, a statement by the 
Minister of Home Affairs that the three asylum seekers‘ decision to approach the court was 
an abuse of the judicial process, the court stated that South Africa‘s courts are there to protect 
all persons and are open to all persons who find themselves in South Africa.
39
 The applicants, 
who were asylum seekers, were therefore entitled to seek the protection of the court. The 
court stated further: ‗Where it is the government that is acting against the applicants, this 
Court is their only refuge. Where they have sought relief from the courts, and have done so 
successfully as appears from this judgment, their conduct cannot by any stretch of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
South Africa. The reasoning is obvious – it would place unbearable burden on the State to expect it to provide 
social assistance even for people who are illegally in the country. This case is discussed in greater detail below.  
36
 Mohammed v President of the Republic of South Africa (Society for the Abolition of the Death Penalty in 
South Africa and Another Intervening 2001 (3) SA 893 CC; See also Lawyers for Human Rights v Minister of 
Home Affairs 2004 (4) SA 125 (CC).  
37
 Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 32, Article 14: Right to equality before courts and tribunals 
and to a fair trial, UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/32 (2007) para 9.  
38
 Baramoto v Minister of Home Affairs 1998 (5) BCLR 562 (W). 
39
 Ibid, 566.  
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imagination be regarded as an abuse of the judicial process‘.40 Clearly therefore, refugees 
have a right to access justice in South Africa, and all of the elements required for such access 
apply equally to them. I will now look at those general elements of access to justice and how 
the interpretation given to them puts South Africa in compliance with international law.  
 
3.5 ACCESS TO JUSTICE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION  
3.5.1 The nature of section 34 
The Constitution‘s substantive provision on access to justice provides: ‗Everyone has the 
right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair 
public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another independent and impartial 
tribunal or forum‘.41 It will have been noticed that it refers to ‗access to courts‘ and not 
‗access to justice‘. As the discussion which follows will show, the argument advanced in 
chapter two, that even when they refer to ‗access to courts‘, the application of similar 
provisions in international law shows that the substantive element is access to justice, also 
hold true here. 
Section 34 bears some semblance to Art 14(1) of the ICCPR and Art 6(1) of the ECHR, 
but it should not be seen as a mere transplantation of these provisions which is meant to bring 
the Constitution into conformity with international law. Section 34 has at least some of its 
historical basis in the need to prevent the apartheid-era legislative practice of ousting the 
jurisdiction of courts to enquire into the validity of certain state laws and conduct – a practice 
which engendered much injustice and human rights violations.
42
 As was seen in chapter one, 
that practice had severe consequences for refugees and asylum seekers.
43
 
Section 34 is a constitutional affirmation that access to justice is an integral anchor of 
the rule of law.  As the Constitutional Court noted in Lesapo v North West Agricultural Bank 
and Another
44
 s. 34 and the access to courts it guarantees are a manifestation of a deeper 
principle – the rule of law – which underlies the South African democratic order.45 In that 
                                                 
40
 Ibid, 566–577. 
41
 Section 34, South African Constitution. 
42
 Jason Brickhill & Adrian Friedman ‗Access to courts‘ in Woolman et al Constitutional law of South Africa 
Vol. 4, 2
nd
  ed (Cape Town: Juta 2009) 59–1, 59–2. 
43
 See section 1.6.1. 
44
 Lesapo v North West Agricultural Bank and Another 2000 (1) SA 409 (CC). 
45
 Ibid, 416 para 16. 
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case, the Constitutional Court in affirming the cardinal importance of the right of access to 
court, described it as a ‗bulwark against vigilantism‘, one that ensures the ‗peaceful, regulated 
and institutionalised mechanisms to resolve disputes, without resorting to self-help‘. Any 
reasonable and justifiable limitation to it, the court said, would require very powerful 
considerations.
46
  
In order to be effectively enjoyed, the right in s. 34 imposes a number of negative and 
positive obligations on the State. The first is a negative obligation not to impede access to the 
courts.
47
 The state should therefore not pass any legislation that prohibits recourse to courts 
or removes the power of the courts to perform their constitutional functions.
48
 It is submitted 
that this negative obligation extends beyond active measures prohibiting or curtailing the 
power of the courts, and includes failure to take action to remove existing impediments. This 
assertion is supported by the HRC‘s finding in Oló Bahamonde v Equatorial Guinea.49  
There, the HRC stated that since the notion of equality before the courts and tribunals 
encompasses the very access to the courts, a situation in which a person‘s attempts to notify 
the competent jurisdictions of his or her grievances are systematically frustrated runs counter 
to this guarantee.
50
 Thus, the State has an obligation to address any situation which 
‗systematically frustrates access‘ if the guarantee of equal access is to be enjoyed. The 
‗situation‘ in question in the Oló Bahamonde case was one of apparent control of the 
judiciary by the executive. Every effort by the author to bring his grievances before the 
relevant judicial and administrative bodies was thwarted.  
It is submitted that the types of situations contemplated would include one in which 
wide-spread anti-foreigner sentiment among law enforcement officials frequently leads to 
intimidation or victimisation of foreigners wishing to utilise the State‘s justice mechanism. 
This is especially so if the situation is so pronounced that it causes victims of crime or 
injustice to avoid seeking remedies. Failure on the part of the State to take action which 
addresses such practices, even though it is well-known and well-documented, constitutes a 
                                                 
46
 Ibid, 417 para 22. See also Zondi v MEC for Traditional and Local Government Affairs and Others 2005 (3) 
SA 589 (CC) paras 61, 63. 
47
Brickhill & Friedman (note 42 above). 
48
 Ibid.  
49
 Oló Bahamonde v Equatorial Guinea, Communication  No 468/1991, UN Doc CCPR/C/49/D/468/1991 
(1993) . 
50
 Ibid, Para 9.4. emphasis added. 
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violation of the State‘s negative obligation not to impede access. Where it is refugees who are 
prejudiced by such inaction on the part of the State, then the State is also in violation of its 
obligations under Art 16 of the UN Refugee Convention which guarantees access to courts 
for refugees. This is so given that access to court in criminal matters is largely dependent on 
the efforts of the State‘s law enforcement officials. As chapter five will subsequently 
demonstrate, this is an issue of serious concern to refugees‘ access to justice in South Africa, 
the impact of which is just as bad as positive action restricting access. 
The positive obligations of the State were elaborated in President of the Republic of 
South Africa and Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd
51
 as follows: 
The first aspect that flows from the rule of law is the obligation of the State to provide the necessary 
mechanisms for citizens to resolve disputes that arise between them. This obligation has its corollary in 
the right or entitlement of every person to have access to courts or other independent forums provided by 
the State for the settlement of such disputes .... The mechanisms for the resolution of disputes include the 
legislative framework, as well as mechanisms and institutions such as the courts and an infrastructure 
created to facilitate the execution of court orders.
52
 
It is clearly deducible from this dictum that the duties of the State include the duty to 
establish and ensure the effective running of independent courts and other forums for dispute 
resolution, the duty to pass laws that facilitate access to those courts and the duty to establish 
the means by which the remedies obtained from court can be effectively enjoyed. Even 
though it is not mentioned, it is submitted that assistance to access those courts and such 
remedies is part of the ‗necessary mechanisms‘ envisaged, for courts and laws in themselves 
would serve no purpose if the practical means of using them were not available. Guidance on 
this is taken from international law as discussed in chapter two.
53
 As the case of Airey 
showed, instances exist where persons may have access to the courts in the sense that they 
can go before those courts, yet they are unable to effectively place their cases before the court 
without legal assistance. Where this is the case and the person is unable to afford legal 
assistance, the State is under obligation to provide such legal assistance. Further support is 
obtained from the Guidelines on Fair Trials which requires States to provide legal assistance 
                                                 
51
 President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC). 
52
 Ibid, paras 39 and 41. 
53
 See sections 2.7.2 and 2.7.4. 
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in all matters in which the interest of justice requires it, but a person is unable to afford it.
54
 
The role of legal assistance will be discussed in greater detail further on, but first, I will 
briefly establish how well South Africa‘s constitutional guarantees on access to justice reflect 
the standards set under international law.  
 
3.5.2 The interpretation of section 34 
There is a rich store of jurisprudence on s. 34 of the Constitution, which mostly conforms to 
standards established in international law. The jurisprudence displays a broad interpretation 
of what constitutes a violation of the right of access to justice, similar to the positions taken 
by the HRC and ECtHR in interpreting similar provisions. Thus for instance, the court has 
found that marital power under customary law which, subject to certain exceptions, permits a 
wife to litigate only with the consent of her husband, limits the wife‘s access to the courts and 
was therefore unconstitutional.
55
 This accords with the finding of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights (IACHR) in Ato del Avelland v Peru
56
 wher  similar restriction in a Peruvian 
law was struck down.  
The courts‘ conception of the right contained in s. 34 has also tended to validate the 
international law position, as effectively articulated in Airey.
57
 The right of access to court is 
thus seen as going beyond the mere right to gain entry before a court, to include meaningful 
and effective access, as well as a remedy. The courts have reiterated several times that 
substantive justice, rather than textual justice is what the guarantees anticipate.
58
 In President 
of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd,
59
 the 
Constitutional Court saw in s. 34, not merely a right of access to court, but also the right to an 
                                                 
54
 African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial 
and Legal Assistance in Africa 2001, DOC/OS(XXX)247; 12 International Human Rights Report 1180 (2005) 
para H(a). 
55
 Prior v Battle and Others 1999 (2) SA 850 (TK) 859.  
56
 Ato del Avelland v Peru, Communication 202/1986, UN Doc Supp 40 (A/44/40) 196 (1988) para.10.2. 
57
 Airey v Ireland (1979) 2 EHRR 305. 
58
 See for instance S v Zuma and Others 1995 (4) BCLR 401 (CC) para 16; Shaik and Others v S 2007 (12) 
BCLR 1360 (CC) para 43.  
59
 President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (note 51 above). 
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effective remedy.
60
 It is apparent that the court takes a position that the right goes beyond the 
mere ability to gain entrance to court, but also to obtain a useful result.  
Even where there has been a significant departure from the position in international 
law, such departure has been necessitated by socio-political considerations which had 
important implications for nation-building. Thus, in Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) 
and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others,
61
 the applicants applied 
for an order declaring s. 20(7) of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act
62
 
(Reconciliation Act) unconstitutional on the grounds that it was inconsistent with the right to 
have justiciable disputes settled by a court of law or other independent and impartial tribunal 
in terms of s. 22 of the Interim Constitution (equivalent to s. 34 of the final Constitution). 
Section 20(7) of the Reconciliation Act empowered a committee to grant amnesty for gross 
violations of human rights committed during apartheid provided the applicant for amnesty 
made a full disclosure. The Constitutional Court found that s. 20(7) would be a violation of 
the constitutional right of access to courts if it were not for the fact that there was another 
provision in the Constitution which allowed such an amnesty.
63
 The Court‘s refusal to strike 
down that provision in the Reconciliation Act stands in stark contrast to the rulings of the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights in cases of this nature,
64
 as well as to the ACHPR 
Guidelines on Fair Trials which specifically declares that the grant of amnesty to absolve 
perpetrators of human rights violations from accountability is a violation of the right of 
victims to an effective remedy.
65
 However, the court‘s observation that but for the 
constitutional provision which protected such an amnesty, the Reconciliation Act would have 
been void, shows that indeed, the Court‘s thinking was in tandem with the position in 
international law. The finding of the court in this case was primarily determined by the 
                                                 
60
 Ibid,  para 51, emphasis added.  
61
 Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 
1996 (4) SA 671 (CC). 
62
 Act 34 of 1995. 
63
 Supra paras 9–10.  
64
 Consuelo et al v Argentina, Case 10.147, 10.181, 10.240, 10.262, 10.309, 10.311 Report No 28/92, Inter-
Am.C.H.R, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.83 Doc. 14 at 41 (1993) paras 32, 50; and Mendoza et al  v Uruguay, Cases 10.029, 
10.036, 10.145, 10.305, 10.372, 10.373, 10.374 and 10.375, Report No. 29/92, Inter-Am.C.H.R., 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.83 Doc. 14 at 154 (1993). The cases consolidated into Consuelo and Mendoza raised similar 
issues before the Inter American Commission on Human Rights in respect of Argentina and Uruguay.  
65
 Guidelines on Fair trials (note 54 above) Para C. 
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particular socio-political situation prevailing in South Africa at the time. The imperative of 
peace and reconciliation was the deciding factor.  
It has been found on several occasions that laws which do not allow sufficient time 
within which to file claims prevent access to court and as such constitute a material limitation 
on the right of access to court and are therefore unconstitutional.
66
 Laws which prohibit legal 
representation in civil proceedings before courts applying customary law have also been 
found to be unconstitutional on the ground that they would render entirely nugatory the right 
of access to court and to having legal disputes settled by courts.
67
 This right of access to court 
is not however a constitutional guarantee against wrong decisions,
68
 nor is it a guarantee of 
equality of outcome.
69
  
 
3.5.3 Types of matters 
The second issue relates to the nature of the matters that are covered by s. 34. The guarantee 
of access to courts or other fora embodies the requirements that there be a ‗dispute that can be 
resolved by the application of law‘.70 Unlike equivalent provisions in the ICCPR, the African 
Charter and the ECHR,
71
 this provision does not expressly mention criminal charges in its 
wording, and so there is no indication whether s. 34 applies to criminal matters.  However, 
the Constitutional Court clarified the issue in S v Pennington
72
 when it noted that the words 
‗any dispute‘ may be wide enough to include criminal proceedings, but that that is not the 
way such proceedings are ordinarily referred to. Furthermore, noted Chaskalson P, that s. 34 
                                                 
66
 Moise v Greater Germiston Transitional Local Council 2001 (8) BCLR 765 (CC) para 15; Mohlomi v 
Minister of Defence 1997 (1) SA 124 (CC); Administrator, Transvaal, and Others v Traub and Others 1989 (4) 
SA 731 (A) 764E; Engelbrecht V Road Accident Fund and Another 2007 (6) SA 96 (CC) 30–32. 
67
Bangindawo and Others v Head of the Nyanda Regional Authority and Another 1998 (3) SA 262 (TK) 277 
paras E–F. 
68
 Lane and Fey NNO v Dabelstein and Others 2001 (2) SA 1187 (CC) 1190 para 4. 
69
 Van der Walt v Metcash Trading Ltd 2002 (4) SA 317 (CC) 325 para 14. 
70
 Cheryl Loots ‗Access to the courts and justiciability‘ in Chaskalson et al (eds) Constitutional law of South 
Africa (Revision Service 5) (Juta: Cape Town 1996) 8–2. 
71
 Art 14(1) ICCPR refers to ‗criminal charge ... or ... rights and obligations in a suit at law‘, Art 6(1) ECHR 
refers to ‗civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge‘. The wording of Art 7(1) African Charter does 
not refer to criminal charges, but subsequent paragraphs of the same article clearly indicates that it applies to 
criminal matters, referring, as it does, to the right to be presumed innocent. 
72
 S v Pennington 1997 (4) SA 1076 CC. 
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has no application to criminal proceedings seems to follow from the fact that s. 35 of the 
Constitution specifically governs the manner in which criminal proceedings are to be 
conducted.
73
 It can therefore be safely said that while s. 34 applies to civil matters, criminal 
matters are excluded from its ambit. 
Following the logic of the Constitutional Court in Pennington, it is submitted that the 
section does not refer to administrative actions either, given that s. 33 specifically governs the 
way administrative matters are conducted as discussed above. Further support for the notion 
that administrative actions are not included in the purview of this provision is found in the 
nature of administrative actions. While the result of an administrative action could trigger a 
dispute, administrative actions are not in themselves disputes. It is only when the result of 
such administrative action is disputed that the issue becomes a ‗dispute‘ as contemplated 
under s. 34.
74
 This notion receives support from the Constitutional Court in Islamic Unity 
Convention v Minister of Telecommunications and Others.
75
  
Thus while s. 34‘s ‗dispute that can be resolved by the application of law‘ is clearly 
narrower than the conception of the ‗suit at law‘ under art 14 of the ICCPR, separate 
provisions contained in s. 33 and s. 35 of the Bill of Rights ensures that South Africa‘s 
guarantees in respect of access to justice is not narrower than in international law.  
 
3.5.4 Publicity of hearings, independence and impartiality of judiciary 
The principle that court hearings should be in public, as opposed to in camera, is widely 
accepted in South African law as in international law. This keeps the public fully informed, 
helps to avoid the secret trials employed in totalitarian states
76
 and reassures the public of the 
independence, integrity, impartiality and fairness of the judiciary.
77
 The courts however 
recognise certain exceptions similar to those elaborated by the HRC in its General Comments 
32.
78
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 Ibid, 1093 paras 45–46.  
74
 Currie & de Waal (note 7 above) 705.  
75
 Islamic Unity Convention v Minister of Telecommunications and Others 2008 (3) SA 383 (CC) para 55. 
76
 Klink v Regional Court Magistrate NO 1996 (3) BCLR 402 (SE). 
77
 South African Broadcasting Corp Ltd v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2007 (1) SA 523 CC. 
78
 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32, Article 14: Right to equality before courts and tribunals 
and to a fair trial, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32 (2007) Para 12; namely reasons of morals, public order or national 
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 With respect to independence and impartiality of courts and tribunals, it will be recalled 
that the Guidelines on Fair Trials developed by the ACHPR requires that judicial 
independence be a constitutional requirement.
79
 South Africa meets this requirement by 
virtue of s. 165(2) of the Constitution which guarantees the independence of the judiciary, 
making it subject only to the Constitution and the law, which must be applied impartially and 
without fear, favour or prejudice. Section 165(3) goes further to prohibit interference with the 
functioning of the courts by any person or organs of state. Conditions to ensure independence 
are further provided for in s. 177 of the Constitution which prescribes the process of 
appointment of judges, their remuneration and security of tenure. These provisions compare 
in all material respects with the pronouncement of the HRC in its General Comments 32
80
 
and with the Fair Trial Guidelines of the ACHPR
81
 as discussed in chapter two.
82
 So does the 
jurisprudence, which highlights the importance of the judiciary‘s independence and 
impartiality to the doctrine of separations of powers and for the ability of the courts to uphold 
the Constitution.
83
  The court must be independent and seen to be independent
84
 It is agreed 
among scholars that generally speaking, the South African judiciary enjoys a high level of 
independence as envisaged by the Constitution.
85
 In a 2007 report by Transparency 
                                                                                                                                                        
the parties or the interest of minors so requires, W v W 1976 (2) SA 308, 310; in tax cases, or in special 
circumstances where, in the opinion of the court, publicity would be prejudicial to the interests of justice 
Cerebos Food Corporation Ltd v Diverse Foods SA (Pty) Ltd and Another 1984 (4) SA 149 (T) 
79
 Section A, para 5. 
80
 Paras 19 and 20. 
81
 Section A para 5. 
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 See section 2.6.4. 
83
 See generally SA Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath 2001 (1) SA 883 (CC); De Lange v Smuts 
NO  1998 (3) SA 785 (CC); Van Rooyen and Others v The State and Others (General Council of the Bar f South 
Africa intervening) 2002 (5) SA 246 (CC).  
84
 President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v South African Rugby Football Union and Others 1999 
(4) SA 147 (CC) para 48. Cf Karttunen v Finland, Communication  No 387/1989, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/46/D/387/1989 (1992); International Pen and Others v Nigeria (2000) AHRLR 212; Constitutional 
Rights Project (in respect of Zamani Lekwot and 6 Others) v Nigeria (87/93), 8
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African Commission on Human and People‘s Rights, 1994–1995, ACHPR/RPT/8th/Rev.I. 
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 Hugh Corder ‗Judicial independence and responsiveness in a changing South Africa‘ in Peter H Russell & 
David M O'Brien Judicial independence in the age of democracy: Critical perspectives from around the world 
(Charlottesville and London: University Press of Virginia, 2001) 194–206; John Orr ‗South Africa‘ in Linda 
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International, South Africa ranked 9
th
 in a measurement of the actual enjoyment of 
independence by the judiciary,
86
 a remarkable achievement considering that it was ranked 
alongside more developed European countries. However in the last four years, several 
political cases have called this independence into question.
87
 
The preceding discussion has demonstrated that broadly speaking, South Africa‘s 
constitutional provisions on access to justice is generally in compliance with the requirements 
of international law. I will now discuss in greater detail those aspects that have unique 
implications for refugees and asylum seekers and which are important for the purpose of this 
thesis. 
 
3.6 SPECIFIC ELEMENTS OF THE ACCESS TO JUSTICE PROVISIONS WITH 
UNIQUE IMPLICATIONS FOR REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS  
The defining characteristic of refugee-hood is that persons so defined are not citizens of the 
country in which they reside, having been forced out of their own countries because of 
persecution and danger to their lives and limbs.
88
 They are also unable to return for the same 
reasons, and they cannot rely on any form of assistance from their home State, since the fact 
that that State is unwilling or unable to help them is what led to their becoming refugees in 
the first place. They are thus different from other classes of migrants. Other classes of 
migrants are not forced to leave their home countries, they can return if they so wish, and 
they can depend on their home country for some form of assistance if they get into trouble. 
The implication of this difference is that, when other migrants find that they are at a distinct 
disadvantage in the host country, they can resort to diplomatic channels for assistance or 
                                                                                                                                                        
jurisdictions (Cape Town: Siber Ink, 2006) 114–160; Amy Gordon & David Bruce ‗Transformation and the 
independence of the judiciary in South Africa‘ Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation. Available at 
http://www.csvr.org.za/docs/transition/3.pdf [accessed 12 September 2010]; Geoff Budlender ‗Transforming the 
judiciary: The politics of the judiciary in a democratic South Africa‘ Presentation at 11th Alan Paton Lecture, 
University of Kwazulu-Natal 25 July 2005. Available at 
http://dbnweb2.ukzn.ac.za/unp/library/alanpaton/alanpaton2005%20Budlenderpdf.pdf [Accessed 12 September 
2010]. 
86
 Transparency International Global Corruption Report (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 25; 
see also Lars Veld & Stefan Voigt ‗Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross-country evidence using 
a new set of indicators‘ (2003) 19 European Journal of Political Economy 492, 525;   
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return home. Refugees cannot do that. They are essentially at the mercy of the country which 
hosts them. Their only hope then is to turn to the institutions of the host country, usually its 
courts, for help. But because they are not citizens, they are automatically faced with certain 
challenges. For instance, can they expect to be treated equally, the way citizens are? How will 
they put forward their cases, given the almost certain probability that they speak a different 
language from that spoken in the host State? Can they rely on any form of assistance? These 
issues are of critical importance to refugees and asylum seekers in the context of access to 
justice, and need to be examined in-depth. The following section addresses this. 
 
3.6.1 Equality before the law  
As previously noted above, s. 9 of the Constitution which entrenches the principle of equality 
before the law is not a direct access to justice provision. It applies in respect of all the rights 
contained in the Constitution. However, the principle of equality before the law is of great 
importance in any discussion about a class of people who are in the minority and face the 
possibility of discrimination.
89
 Its implications are therefore relevant here.  
One of the principal elements of access to justice, as established in chapter two, is the 
right of equal access. It was shown that international law recognises two dimensions to this 
guarantee, namely equal access to court
90
 and to equal treatment by that court without any 
discrimination.
91
 Why this is important in the context of a discussion about refugees is 
obvious; they are, by definition, not citizens of the country that hosts them and therefore are 
in danger of being discriminated against. This is particularly crucial in any country which has 
an urban refugee policy as South Africa does. As I have previously noted in chapter one,
92
 
South Africa‘s urban refugee policy means that a refugee-specific framework for service 
delivery, as would be found in a camp setting, does not exist. Thus refugees and asylum 
seekers have to access all services, including legal services, in much the same way as 
everyone else. Unfortunately, as has been shown in chapter one and will be reinforced in 
subsequent chapters, in the contest for limited resources, refugees and asylum seekers are 
                                                 
89
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(1993)  Para 9.4. 
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disadvantaged. Their status as non-citizens is frequently used as a reason for denying them 
services.
93
 This guarantee of equality is therefore important in establishing the standard that, 
in the context of seeking justice, their status cannot, or should not, be used as a reason to 
deny them access to a court of law or to justify any discriminatory treatment while before the 
courts.   
Section 9 is also important to the discussion of access to justice because, unlike Art 14 
of the ICCPR and para 2 of ACHPR‘s Guidelines on Fair Trials, s. 34, which is the 
Constitution‘s substantive provision on access to justice, does not use the word ‗equal‘ in 
describing access to courts. Therefore the standard of equality which this provision 
establishes is important in the reading of that, and other sections of the Constitution.  
Given its history, it was inevitable that equality and non-discrimination would be 
important aspects of the new constitutional order in South Africa, and this is indeed the case. 
S. 9(1) of the Constitution provides a broad guarantee of equality which applies across all 
aspects of life, not only in respect of access to justice. The section reads: ‗everyone is equal 
before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law‘. In making 
everyone – government, citizens, non-citizens – equal before the law, the section highlights 
the supremacy of the rule of law.  
In applying this section to the right of access to justice, the Constitutional Court‘s 
interpretation of s. 9 is very much in line with the conception under international law. In Van 
der Walt v Metcash Trading Ltd,
94
 the court noted, per Goldstone J that ‗ ... the provision 
means that all persons in a similar position must be afforded the same right to access the 
                                                 
93
 For instance opening bank accounts, accessing health care services, etc. See generally Tebogo Segale ‗Forced 
migrants and Social exclusion in Johannesburg‘ in Loren Landau (ed) Forced migrants in the new 
Johannesburg: Towards a local government response. (Johannesburg: Forced Migrations Studies programme, 
2004); Florencia Belvedere et al, National refugees baseline Survey: Final report (Johannesburg: Community 
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‗Access to health care among Somali forced migrants in Johannesburg‘ (Unpublished Masters Diss: University 
of the Witwatersrand, 2005); Jo Vearey & Tara Polzer  ‗Key findings of research studies on migrants‘ access to 
health in South Africa: Challenging common assumptions‘ Presentation at Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) Parliamentary Forum, Johannesburg, South Africa. 21 October 2009; Lee  Stone & Shani 
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Africa (Pretoria: National Consortium of Refugee Affairs, 2003). 
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courts and to the same fair and just procedures with regard to such access‘.95 There is no 
indication that such equality is confined to matters of procedure and not substance. On the 
contrary, it has been suggested that the declaration in s. 9(2) that ‗equality includes the full 
and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms‘ shows that what the Constitution envisages is 
substantive equality.
96
 Achieving such substantive equality may sometimes necessitate 
disparity of treatment, if the purpose is to obtain equal results.
97
 This position is not in 
conflict with the earlier assertion that the conception of equality under international law 
requires equal access to court and to equal treatment by that court without any discrimination. 
It must, however, be noted that the difference in treatment that is sanctioned here is that 
which, if not employed, would result in a situation that is detrimental to the objective of 
substantive equality, rather than discriminatory treatment on the basis of those non-
discrimination grounds listed in s. 9.
98
 An example would be a situation where a court 
adjourns proceedings so that interpretation can be arranged for a refugee who only speaks 
Swahili, but adjournment is refused so a South African citizen who is very fluent in the 
official language the court is using, but insists on speaking a non-official language such as 
Italian, and for that demands an adjournment to arrange for interpretation. In such an 
instance, the objective of justice would be defeated if the refugee were not granted 
interpretation as he could not otherwise follow proceedings and he would be placed at a 
disadvantage vis-à-vis his opponent.
99
 But the same is not true of the South African citizen 
and he could not on that basis assert that his right to equal treatment by the court had been 
violated.
100
  
Thus, it can be seen that achieving equality is just as much about difference of 
treatment as it is about similarity of treatment. As Chaskalson et al put it, ‗[i]n certain cases it 
is the very essence of equality to make distinctions between groups and individuals in order 
                                                 
95
 Ibid para 24; similar to the equality of treatment positions taken variously by the ACHPR and the ECtHR. See 
generally  Avocats sans Frontières (on behalf of Bwampamye) v Burundi (2000) AHRLR 48 (ACHPR 2000) 
para 27; Bulut v Austria (1996) 24 EHRR 84, para 47. 
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 Currie & De Waal,   (note 7 above) 233. 
97
 Pierre De Vos ‗Grootboom, the right of access to housing and substantive equality as contextual fairness‘ 
(2001) 17 South African Journal of Human Rights 263, 266. 
98
 Currie & De Waal  (note 7 above). 
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 See Bulut v Austria (1996) 24 EHRR 84, para 47. 
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 Cf Mthethwa v De Bruin NO and Another (1998) 3 BCLR 336 (N) discussed in section 3.6.2.1 below; See 
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to accommodate their different needs and interests‘.101 The Constitutional Court has gone so 
far as to find that a failure to differentiate may be as discriminatory as a positive act of 
discrimination.
102
 This means that the goal of substantive equality requires a recognition that 
the multiplicity of circumstances represented in a society means that a single, one-size-fits-all 
measure may be inadequate to address everyone‘s needs. In respect of access to justice 
therefore, there is an obligation on the State to recognise the different challenges that 
different segments of society face in accessing court, and it has to adopt different measures 
which ensure that ultimately, everyone has equal access. This means that South Africa must 
recognise those particular issues that could stand in the way of actual and effective access to 
justice for refugees and asylum seekers and ensure that such issues are adequately addressed, 
even if this would mean that they are treated differently from the way citizens and other 
segments of society are treated.  
Applied to the broad conception of access to justice which was adopted in chapter one, 
this equality provision means that South Africa is obliged to adopt measures which ensure 
that refugees and asylum seekers are not discriminated against and are able, to the same 
extent as its citizens, to access the justice system – its courts and other formal forums; that 
they have access to justice – i.e.  that its courts provide the same fair and equitable results that 
a citizen would have; and that they have equal access to legal aid – advice and representation 
when required. This can only be done in the policy and through programmes adopted to give 
effect to the provisions of the Constitution. The next chapter will look at whether the State 
has taken any steps to ensure equal access for refugees.  
The preceding section has established that refugees and asylum seekers have a right to 
equal access to justice. It has shown that the equality required is substantive, rather than 
formal equality, and in this regard, the State needs to take active steps to ensure such 
equality. 
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3.6.2 Language  
Section 34 guarantees a fair public hearing, but does not define what ‗fair‘ means. It is 
however certain that the term contemplates the enjoyment of each of the elements that s. 34 
sets out, such as public nature of hearings, independence and impartiality of the court or 
forum, the beneficiaries of the right, etc. There are, however, other elements which, though 
not expressly stated in s. 34, have come to be accepted as requirements for the objective of 
fairness. The jurisprudence is very helpful in this regard. In De Beer NO v North-Central 
Local Council and South-Central Local Council and Others,
103
 the Constitutional Court 
concerned itself with the scope of the fair hearing component of s. 34 in a court of law. One 
of the critical elements of fairness, the court held, is that the audi alterem partem rule must be 
respected, which requires that the other party to a proceeding must have notice of the matter 
against him. In pursuit of the objective of fairness, the court noted, there is a prerequisite that 
a person gets a court hearing before an order is made against him or her. In order to ensure 
this, reasonable steps must be taken to bring the hearing to the attention of the person 
affected.
104
   
The corollary to this principle that each party must be notified of the matter against him 
or her, is that such a person must also be able to understand and participate effectively in the 
proceedings affecting him or her. The issue of language proficiency is significant in this 
regard. It is important that persons involved in court proceedings are sufficiently proficient in 
the official language(s) of the court, otherwise they could not participate in any shape or 
form; they cannot follow signs or directions posted at the court, comprehend pleadings and 
court forms, communicate with court staff or participate in court proceedings, much less 
effectively present their cases.
105
 This is true of anybody accessing the justice system, 
whether citizen or foreigner. It is an issue of particular importance to refugees and asylum 
seekers in South Africa, most of who come from countries where none of South Africa‘s 
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Available at http://calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/reports/2005_Language-Barriers_Report.pdf [Accessed 3 July 
2007]. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
103 
 
official languages is spoken.
106
 Their access to justice would be negatively impacted by 
inability to understand the language if adequate measures were not put in place to specifically 
address this issue. Chapter two has already set out the position of international law on the 
subject.
107
 There, it was established that international law takes the position that the right to a 
defence includes the right to understand the charges brought against oneself, and where a 
person is tried in a language he or she does not speak fluently, this constitutes a violation of 
the right of access to justice. That chapter also set out the obligations of a State in respect to 
language proficiency. I will now look at the position under the Constitution.  
The State‘s obligations in respect of language is well articulated in the Constitution‘s 
provisions on fair trials in the criminal context. Section 35(3)(k) of the Constitution confers 
upon every accused person, the right to be tried in a language he or she understands, or where 
this is not practicable, to have the proceedings interpreted in that language.
108
 The 
Constitution further provides that arrested, detained or accused persons have the right to 
receive required information in a language they understand.
109
 These provisions are 
comparable in most respects to the provisions of Art 14(3)(e) and (f) of the ICCPR; Art 
6(3)(e) of the ECHR; Para 2 (iv) of the ACHPR‘s Right to Recourse and Fair Trial and Para 
N of the Guidelines on Fair Trials. Read in relation to refugees and asylum seekers,  s. 
35(3)(k) of the Constitution confers a right for them to be tried or have proceedings in a 
language they understand, subject to the proviso as to practicability, to which I will return 
later. Where it is not possible to have proceedings in a language they understand, refugees 
and asylum seekers have the right to receive interpretation in a language they understand. 
They also have the right to receive required information in a language they understand. As 
shown in the international context, such information would include the charges against them, 
evidence adduced, translation of all documents or statements etc.
110
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 Migrant Rights Monitoring Project ‗National survey of the refugee reception and status determination system 
in South Africa‘ MRMP Research Report Forced Migration Studies Programme, University of the 
Witwatersrand, February 2009. 
107
 Section 2.7.3. 
108
 S. 35(3)(k)  of  the South African Constitution. 
109
 Ibid, s. 35(4). 
110
 Leudicke, Belkacem and Koc v Federal Republic of Germany (1978) 2 EHRR 149, para 40; see also 
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The final Constitution does not contain an equivalent provision with respect to civil 
proceedings; it is interesting to note however, that the Interim Constitution had one. It 
provided in s. 107 that a party to litigation, an accused person or a witness may use the South 
African language of his or her choice during court proceedings. The person may also require 
such proceedings of a court in which he or she is involved to be interpreted in a language that 
he or she understands.
111
 Does the failure to replicate this guarantee in the final Constitution 
or of s. 34 to specifically include language guarantees mean that the final Constitution does 
not provide any language guarantees in civil matters? It is submitted that in spite of this 
seeming shortcoming of the final Constitution, the constitutional guarantee of the right of 
access to courts in s. 34 includes the right to have proceedings conducted in a language 
understood by the parties, or at least for the parties to have competent interpretation. The 
provisions of s. 35(3)(k), even though articulated in the context of criminal matters, can be 
read into the interpretation of s. 34. This is so for several reasons. Firstly, it is illogical to 
argue that the mere fact that an element expressly required for a fair criminal trial has not 
been expressly required for a fair civil trial means it is by implication, excluded in civil 
trials.
112
 Such an argument could only degenerate into absurdity – one would then also have 
to argue that the right to adduce evidence, which is contained in s. 35(3)(i), but not expressly 
stated in s. 34, is not a requirement in civil proceedings. But it is trite that the right to adduce 
evidence is an indispensable aspect of civil proceedings, just as the right to have proceedings 
in the language one understands is.  
An even more compelling argument is the nature of the issue at stake. As Lamer CJ put 
it in the Canadian case of R v Tran
113
 ‗the very legitimacy of the justice system in the eyes of 
those who are subject to it, is dependent on their being able to comprehend and communicate 
in the language in which the proceedings are taking place‘.114 Snyckers and Le Roux buttress 
this argument, contending that the provision in s. 35(3)(k) is not merely intended to ensure 
that accused persons understand the proceedings and are able to make informed choices and 
exercise their rights to defend themselves; the provision is also intended to ensure that they 
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are conscious participants in the exercise of the State‘s power over their persons.115 It affords 
reality to the notion of collective self-government, and enables the accused to locate the 
coercive power of the criminal justice system and the deprivation of his freedom within the 
context of participatory governance.
116
 Considering that the coercive powers of the State are 
inherent in the courts‘ mandate to hear cases, and is required for the execution of judgments 
in civil proceedings, the same argument holds true in respect of civil matters. It is therefore 
important, for the sake of the legitimacy of the court process in the eyes of those subject to it, 
that the language guarantees be applicable in civil matters, just as they are in criminal 
matters.  
Lastly, one cannot argue that a person has had access to justice merely because his case 
was heard in court, even though his inability to understand the language used meant he was 
unable to take any part in the proceedings. In fact, such inability to take part in proceedings 
due to language incompetence has been described as being tantamount to not being present at 
one‘s trial.117 Given this demonstrated importance of language proficiency to access to 
justice, any proceedings – civil or criminal – in which a person cannot effectively take part 
cannot be said to comply with the requirements of fair hearing as envisaged by the 
Constitution and in international law.  
This issue will frequently come into play in any proceedings involving refugees and 
asylum seekers. As the court noted in Mponda v S
118
 ‗South Africa is ... a haven for a 
significant population of African refugees. Many of these people are not sufficiently 
proficient in any South African language to be able to use any such language should they 
become involved in a trial‘.119 Given this situation, it is important that South Africa‘s 
obligations in this regard are clearly defined. As the ambit of this right is more clearly 
developed in the criminal context, I will use the guidelines developed in the criminal context 
to elaborate its implications, and such implications are deemed to apply in the civil context 
except where they can only apply to criminal proceedings.  
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3.6.2.1 The right to be tried in a language they understand  
It is clear from the wording of s. 35(3)(k) that it does not confer a right to be tried in one‘s 
own language, but rather a right to be tried in a language that one understands. This is the 
interpretation of equivalent provisions in international law as shown in chapter two.
120
 Thus if 
a refugee understands one of South Africa‘s official languages, he or she can be tried in that 
language. The question however is, what level of understanding or proficiency is required 
and how is this to be determined? This is important because, while rudimentary knowledge of 
a language may be sufficient to get by on a day-to-day basis, it may be inadequate for 
effective participation in court proceedings.
121
  
Refugees and asylum seekers in South Africa are likely to pick up one or more of the 
local languages with time, but rather than reducing the obligation on the State, it is submitted 
that this places an extra obligation on its courts to ensure that the level of proficiency is 
sufficient to the point where there would not be a miscarriage of justice if the matter were 
conducted in that language. This, in turn, places an obligation on the State to develop 
objective standards and guidelines on the determination of proficiency which should be 
applicable across all courts and all proceedings. Leaving the determination of proficiency to 
the discretion of individual judges could only create room for miscarriage of justice. 
Guidance can be taken from the case of R v Tran
122
 on what the standard should be. That case 
suggests that in determining language proficiency, the standard to be adopted by the court 
should be the defendant‘s ability to follow the proceedings to the same extent as he would 
have been able to if they were carried out in the language in which he had the greatest 
facility.
123
 As the court held in S v Ngubane,
124
 partial understanding of a language is 
inadequate to meet the standard that s. 35(3)(k) imposes. A person must fully understand the 
language.
125
 It is therefore important that in order to meet the access to justice needs of its 
refugee population, South Africa must have in place an adequate language policy for use in 
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its courts, which sets out guidelines and criteria for judges and court personnel to follow 
when dealing with refugees and asylum seekers. Whether or not such objective standards or 
policies exist will be examined in the next chapter.  
Section 35(3)(k) also does not confer on a refugee or asylum seeker the right to be tried 
or to have proceedings held in  a language of his or her choice. This was the finding of the 
court in Mthethwa v De Bruin NO and Another.
126
 In that case, the trial court refused an 
application by the accused, a school teacher who was fluent in English, to be tried in his 
home language, Zulu. On appeal, he contended that the court‘s refusal to allow him to be 
tried in a language of his choice was unlawful and unconstitutional. The appellate court held 
that it was impracticable for him to be tried in any language other than English or Afrikaans 
given that the majority of magistrates, judges, court officials, and advocates in the region did 
not have Zulu as their home language. The court held that the section merely conferred on the 
accused, the right to be tried in the language he or she understands, or where impracticable, to 
have proceedings translated into the language he understands. This, presumably, is the 
standard with respect to civil proceedings too.  
It is however, worth pointing out that Mthetwa demonstrates a lack of effort on the part 
of the State, specifically its Department of Justice, to meet the linguistic needs of the people it 
is meant to serve. The first respondent in that case averred, and it was accepted by the court, 
that about 98 per cent of cases brought before the courts in Kwa-Zulu Natal involved Zulu 
speaking persons. Yet, of the 37 judges, only four spoke Zulu. The statistic was similarly 
skewed in respect of court personnel and prosecutors, with a heavy preponderance of non-
Zulu speakers among them. Surely, the State has a duty to ensure that its judiciary is more 
able to meet the needs of the people it is meant to serve, by appointing more court personnel 
with the required language skills? While it is accepted that the right to be tried in a language 
that one understands is subject to practicability, it is also true that practicability is indicative 
of objective facts being taken into consideration. In this regard, one of the most significant 
objective facts is that the Zulu language is the predominant language of the region. It should 
therefore not be impractical to be tried in that language. The onus is on the State to appoint 
more persons who speak the local language to the courts, so that ‗practicability‘ is not used as 
an excuse to avoid conducting cases in languages which parties to proceedings are more 
comfortable speaking. This would certainly be more in the spirit of s. 6 of the Constitution 
                                                 
126
 Mthethwa v De Bruin NO and Another (1998) 3 BCLR 336 (N). 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
108 
 
which, while giving the government the freedom to use any of the official languages, sets out 
certain criteria that should be taken into consideration. These are ‗usage, practicality, 
expense, regional circumstances and the balance of the needs and preferences of the 
population as a whole or in the province concerned‘.127 Commenting on Mthetwa, Hlope JP, 
has noted that the courts have continued to lay too much emphasis on practicality, thus 
stifling the noble goal of language parity envisaged by the Constitution.
128
 
With respect to refugees and asylum seekers, the case would be understandably 
different. The most commonly spoken languages among South Africa‘s refugees are French, 
Somali, Lingala and Swahili.
129
 None of these is an official language in South Africa. This 
fact, along with the proviso as to practicability in s. 35(3)(k) and the pronouncement of the 
Court in Mthetwa make it easy to accept that a refugee in South Africa could not reasonably 
expect to be tried in Swahili for instance. But in view of the fact that the right to understand 
proceedings is a fundamental requirement of a fair hearing, whether in the civil or criminal 
contexts, such a refugee could reasonably expect to be provided with some interpretation in 
the language that he is fluent in. That such a language is not an official language in South 
Africa, or that it would be difficult to obtain interpretation in it, would not be an acceptable 
reason for denying interpretation.  
 
3.6.2.2 The right to interpretation 
Section 35(3)(k) goes on to provide that where it is impracticable to be tried in a language 
that one understands, there is a right to have the proceedings interpreted. This right to 
interpretation evolved from the same common law principle of audi alterem partem as 
mentioned above. As with the right to be tried in a language they understand, the right to 
interpretation is grounded in the concept of natural justice, which requires that a person be 
given prior notice of the charge against him and an opportunity to meet that charge.
130
 The 
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right to interpretation raises a number of significant issues, including what aspects of 
proceedings require interpretation, who bears the responsibility for the cost of such 
interpretation and who should do the interpretation. As shown in chapter two, the right to 
interpretation is not limited to oral testimonies only, but includes pre-trial proceedings, 
communicating rights upon arrest as well as the translation of documents which allow a 
person to effectively understand the case against him or her.
131
 The interpretation of oral 
testimonies must be simultaneous to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
132
  
With respect to who bears the cost, s. 35(3)(k) is not as direct as equivalent 
international law provisions examined in chapter two.
 
Art 14(3)(f) of the ICCPR and Art 
6(3)(e) of the ECHR both refer to ‗free‘ interpretation; para 2(iv) of the ACHPR‘s Resolution 
indicates that such interpretation is to be ‗without charge‘; and para N of the Guidelines on 
Fair Trials clearly states that assistance with interpretation is free and cannot be qualified by a 
requirement that the accused pay for the costs of an interpreter regardless of the outcome of 
the trial. It can therefore be deduced from all these that the cost of such interpretation is to be 
borne by the State.
133
  
It would seem logical that distinction be made in respect of who bears responsibility for 
the cost of interpretation in civil proceedings. Where the civil matter in question is between 
private parties in the determination of private interests, the logical conclusion would be that 
the cost should be borne by them. This however does not take into consideration the 
implications that such a position will have on refugees who are generally in an economically 
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weak position.
134
 The importance of certain matters such as the determination of refugee 
status, suggest that in view of the far-reaching consequence of a miscarriage of justice, it is in 
the interest of justice that the host State bears the cost of such interpretation even in civil 
cases. Furthermore, such a stance waters down the responsibility that the State has to ensure 
access to justice. I have shown, in my argument above, that linguistic accessibility is an 
important aspect of access to justice. If the State is allowed to absolve itself of the obligation 
to provide interpretation in civil proceedings before its courts, and then refugees and asylum 
seekers find that their ability to avail themselves of judicial remedies is frustrated because 
they cannot afford the cost of interpretation, then they cannot be said to enjoy access to 
justice. Such a situation would in fact, fall within the concept of ‗situations which 
systematically frustrate access‘ as articulated by the HRC in the case of Oló Bahamonde 
above.
135
 It is therefore in the interest of justice that South Africa‘s policy on access to justice 
includes the provision of court interpreters free of charge in civil cases involving refugees. 
With respect to who should conduct the interpretations, it is important that interpreters 
be qualified and adequately competent, as serious concerns can arise in cases where non-
professional interpreting or translation services are provided.
136
 In some cases, miscarriages 
of justice can even occur where the interpretation services is inadequate or provided by an 
unqualified interpreter. In S v Harksen; Harksen v President of the Republic of South Africa 
and Others
 137
 the Constitutional Court found that because a portion of the evidence had not 
been properly interpreted by the interpreter, who was also unsworn, it was in the interests of 
justice and equity that the proc edings as a whole should be set aside.
138
 In S v Abrahams,
139
 
the accused, a deaf mute, had been assisted by an interpreter who was conversant with sign 
language but whose Afrikaans, the language of the proceedings, was weak. The record 
indicated that the interpreter experienced great difficulty in understanding the accused‘s 
evidence and translating it correctly. At one stage the interpreter had interrupted the 
                                                 
134
 Loren B Landau & Karen Jacobsen ‗Refugees in the new Johannesburg‘ (2004) 19 Forced Migration Review 
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135
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136
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137
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magistrate to say that he was not following what was being said, and asked the magistrate to 
speak slowly. The accused was convicted. On review, the Court pointed out that s 6(2) of the 
Magistrates‘ Courts Act140 required that if evidence is given in a criminal case in a language 
with which the accused is not in the opinion of the court, sufficiently conversant, the court 
must call a competent interpreter to translate the evidence into a language with which the 
accused appears to the court to be sufficiently conversant. The Court held that it is clear from 
this provision that the magistrate had been obliged to appoint a competent interpreter and his 
failure to do so constituted a serious irregularity. A prerequisite of a fair trial is that the 
accused understands the proceedings at all times.
141
 The Court accordingly set the conviction 
and sentence aside.  
The logical conclusion then is that the State‘s obligation to provide i terpretation is also 
qualitative; it must ensure that the interpreter is competent and that the interpretation 
provided is sufficient.
142
 This is the only way to ensure that enjoyment of the right to free 
interpretation is both practical and effective.
143
 The competence of the interpreter and quality 
of interpretation is particularly significant where the matter in question involves the 
adjudication of a claim for asylum. The decision whether or not to grant asylum often hinges 
on the applicant‘s story, and where interpretation is inaccurate, it could mean the difference 
between protection and exposure to danger. For instance where an applicant for asylum says 
he fled his home country ‗due to persecution‘, but the interpreter renders it as ‗due to 
prosecution‘, the adjudicatory body finds itself deciding the case of a fugitive from justice 
rather than someone seeking protection from danger to life and limb.  
The preceding discussion has highlighted the importance of linguistic accessibility as 
an integral aspect of access to justice for refugees and asylum seekers. There is no doubt that 
the constitutional provisions contain sufficient safeguards in this regard. Those safeguards in 
turn ascribe certain obligations to the State which need to be addressed in any policy on 
access to justice. Such policies must necessarily include adequate guidelines on proficiency 
in the language of the court and adequate guidelines on the provision and quality of 
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interpretation services for those requiring it. The next chapter will examine whether this is 
indeed so.  
 
3.6.3 Legal representation  
One of the central themes that characterise the conception of access to justice in international 
law is the notion of effective access. As the discussion above has shown, that notion also finds 
expression within South Africa‘s jurisprudence on the matter. Intrinsically linked to this 
notion of effective access is the right to legal representation. Chapter two demonstrated the 
existence in international law, of a basic obligation on States to provide legal assistance in 
some form when it is required, in order to ensure access to justice.
144
 It was shown that this 
obligation is not only required to ensure equality of arms between parties, but that in fact, the 
very idea of ‗access‘ depends on it in some cases. It was also shown that, subject to certain 
criteria such as the severity of the penalty involved and complexity of the case, there is 
almost always an obligation to provide legal representation in criminal matters if the accused 
cannot afford one. The obligation with respect to civil matters, though not clearly defined in 
the provisions of Art 14 of the ICCPR and Art 6 of the ECHR, has been interpreted to be 
somewhat similar to the standard in criminal matters albeit to a lesser degree. The right to 
legal assistance, the courts have found, is implicit in the right to a ‗fair‘ trial.145 The 
Guidelines on Fair Trials, on its part, sets out clearer and more specific provisions which are 
similar to the interpretations of the Art 14 of the ICCPR and Art 6 of the ECHR. Read 
together, these instruments place an obligation on the State to also provide legal 
representation in civil cases where the interests of justice and the imperative of effective 
access demand it.
146
  
With respect to refugees, it was established that while the provisions of the ICCPR, the 
African Charter and the ECHR apply equally to refugees and asylum seekers, there are even 
more specific guarantees to be found in refugee law on this issue.
147
 By virtue of Art 16 of 
the UN Refugee Convention refugees are to be assimilated to the status of nationals of the 
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asylum state for purposes of legal assistance. Thus in all types of matters in which South 
Africa would ordinarily provide legal assistance to its citizens, it is obliged to do the same for 
refugees.
148
 
S. 34 of the Constitution does not make any mention of legal assistance. However, that 
such an obligation exists in criminal matters is not in doubt. Section 35(2) and (3) make this 
clear. They provide that every detained or accused person, including sentenced prisoners, has 
the right to have a legal practitioner assigned to him or her by the State and at State expense, 
if substantial injustice would otherwise result. While the right to free legal assistance in 
criminal matters is explicit in these provisions, it is also clear that the right is not 
unconditional. Free legal assistance is only to be provided where ‗substantial injustice‘ would 
result if legal representation were not available to the accused or detained person. It would 
appear that this restriction is related to the cost to the State of providing free legal assistance 
to all.
149
 In any event, the restriction corresponds to the ‗interest of justice‘ principle in 
international law, as outlined in chapter two.
150
 The test for ‗substantial injustice‘ in criminal 
cases relate to whether the accused is in danger of being imprisoned without option of fine,
151
 
which, again, corresponds to the ‗severity of the penalty‘ test adopted in international law.  
The High Court has elucidated the position of refugees (albeit under the general term of 
‗foreigners‘) in respect of their right to legal assistance in criminal matters. In S v Manuel,152 
the accused person, an Angolan refugee, was refused legal assistance by the Legal Aid Board 
because he was ‗not lawful in the RSA‘. Thereafter, he elected to represent himself and was 
convicted. The High Court found that he had not made an informed decision because the 
magistrate had failed to explain to him his constitutional right to legal representation at State 
expense. The magistrate had wrongly acted on the advice of the Legal Aid Board that the 
refugee was not entitled to legal assistance at State expense. In overturning the conviction, 
the High Court stated:  
                                                 
148
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The equality provisions contained in s 9 of the Constitution ... read jointly with the right to legal 
representation in s 35(3) afforded ‗every accused‘ also accrue to foreigners accused of criminal conduct 
within the borders of South Africa. An accused who is illegally present within the Republic is entitled to 
be treated equally with all other accused, protected against unfair discrimination because of his ethnic 
origin and to legal representation afforded by the Legal Aid Board in accordance with its generally 
accepted means tests.
153 
 
The court thus clearly established that in criminal matters, refugees have a right to legal 
assistance at State expense to the same extent that citizens do. On a different note, this case 
offers an interesting perspective into the lack of understanding of refugee law displayed by 
the magistrate. As chapter five will later demonstrate, such lack of understanding is not an 
isolated incidence.
154
 Apart from the erroneous assumption on the part of the Legal Aid 
Board, which was accepted by the magistrate, that persons unlawfully in the Republic are not 
entitled to legal aid, there is also a deeper, more fundamental misunderstanding of the nature 
of a refugee. If the accused was indeed a refugee, then he was lawfully in the country, and so 
the decision not to provide him with legal assistance should not have been based on the 
lawfulness or otherwise of his residence. Rather, both the Legal Aid Board and the magistrate 
should have recognised that he was lawfully in the country, and the magistrate should have 
then considered whether as a non-citizen, he was entitled to legal aid. As the dictum above 
shows, the result should still have been the same – that regardless of his citizenship or non-
citizenship, he was entitled to legal aid. The magistrate‘s lack of understanding of a refugee‘s 
status could easily have resulted in the violation of the principle of non-refoulement. It 
certainly resulted in a miscarriage of justice, but for the High Court review.  
It is cases like this that demonstrate how important access to legal assistance is to 
refugees. It is rather unfortunate that the High Court did not take the opportunity to 
specifically highlight the position of a refugee, as derived from international human rights 
law, international refugee law and domestic legislation. This would certainly have been more 
helpful than the general terminology of ‗foreigners‘, and would have helped to establish that 
the refugee‘s right to legal assistance is not a gratuitous act of goodwill, but a legal obligation 
deriving from both South Africa‘s Constitution and its commitments under international law.  
The issue of the right to legal representation in civil matters is, unfortunately, not as 
clear-cut as it is in criminal matters. But the notion of fairness in the context of a fair hearing, 
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the principle of equality of arms inherent in the provisions of s. 34 – as the Constitutional 
Court noted in Shilubana and Others v Nwamitwa
155
 – and the imperative of meeting the 
standards of international law, all make it worthwhile to consider whether or not there is an 
obligation to provide free legal assistance to refugees in civil cases. Other than the duty to 
provide children with legal representation in civil matters concerning them, contained in s. 
28, there is no other provision in the Constitution placing a similar duty on the State in 
respect of civil cases. Since the Constitution does not spell out the elements of a fair civil trial 
as it does in respect of criminal trials, it is left for the courts to interpret s. 34 and determine 
whether there exists in the civil context, a right to civil legal representation at state expense. 
Unfortunately, the courts have failed to do this. The Constitutional Court in particular 
has passed up on opportunities to pronounce on this important issue, thus missing the chance 
to settle once and for all, the ambit of the State‘s obligations with respect to legal 
representation in civil matters. In S v Vermaas, S v Du Plessis
156
 for instance, one of the 
issues put before the Constitutional Court was whether the respondents were entitled to 
obtain legal representation at State expense in terms of s. 25(3) (e) of the Interim 
Constitution, which is similar to s. 35(3) of the final Constitution. The Constitutional Court 
chose not to address it, preferring instead to leave it to the trial judges. It did set out some 
parameters for when this right would apply in a criminal matter, which are similar to those 
established in international jursprudence referred to previously: the ramifications and 
complexity or simplicity of a case; the accused person‘s aptitude or ineptitude to fend for 
himself or herself; gravity of the consequences of a conviction; and ‗any other factor that 
needs to be evaluated in the determination of the likelihood or unlikelihood that, if the trial 
were to proceed without a lawyer for the defence, the result would be ‗substantial 
injustice‘.157 It could have gone on to elaborate the ambit of the provision in the civil context 
as well, but chose not to. Unfortunately, the situation remains that there is no clarity from the 
judiciary on whether there is a right to legal representation at State expense in civil matters.  
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Yet, because of the far-reaching effect of some civil matters such as child-custody 
cases, and in view of the fact that lack of legal representation is more likely to result in 
adverse outcomes for the poor litigant in civil matters,
158
 the issue of civil legal 
representation at State expense is very important. Clarity in this is particularly important for 
the access to justice needs of refugees who are often poor, and as the literature suggests, face 
significant problems of a civil nature. For instance, the literature shows that refugees and 
asylum seekers face a widespread problem of illegal evictions.
 159
  They regularly go through 
phases of homelessness when they are evicted, often illegally, by home owners taking 
advantage of their non-citizen status.
160
 Field work undertaken for this study also shows that 
labour-related problems are common.
161
 In addition, there are several practices by both public 
and private entities which violate the rights accorded to them in law.
162
 No doubt, there are 
many other cases of a civil nature which refugees face, such as matrimonial or custody issues. 
Though all these cases do not carry the possibility of imprisonment, they are just as important 
to the well-being of refugees and asylum seekers as criminal matters. If they are to challenge 
these practices, they need to institute civil litigations in court, which they are ill-equipped to 
do without legal assistance. 
The clearest interpretation of the State‘s obligations in respect of civil legal 
representation, and from which its obligations to refugees can be inferred is found in the case 
of Nkuzi Development Association v Government of the Republic of South Africa and 
Another.
163
 There, the Land Claims Court found that persons whose right to security of tenure 
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in terms of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act
164
 and the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) 
Act,
165
 is threatened or has been infringed have a right to legal representation at State expense 
if substantial injustice would otherwise result. The conditions under which substantial 
injustice would result include, but are not limited to, cases where the potential consequences 
for the person concerned are severe, and cases where the person concerned is not likely to be 
able effectively to present his or her case unrepresented, having regard to the complexity of 
the case, the legal procedure, and the education, knowledge and skills of the person 
concerned.
166
 In making the order, the court stated that ‗there is no logical basis for 
distinguishing between criminal and civil matters. The issues in civil matters are equally 
complex and the laws and procedures difficult to understand‘.167 
When it applied the ‗substantial injustice‘ criterion, the Court in Nkuzi appears to have 
appropriated the standard in s. 35(2) and (3) of the Constitution in respect of the right to legal 
assistance in criminal matters. Although there is no express constitutional backing for the 
Court‘s approach in Nkuzi, and its interpretation has yet to be applied outside the context of 
that particular case, it is highly possible that if the matter of civil legal representation were to 
come up specifically, the court‘s approach would receive backing. This is so for two reasons. 
Firstly, as noted above, it is difficult to argue that the mere fact that an element expressly 
required for a fair criminal trial has not been expressly required for a fair civil trial means it is 
by implication excluded in civil trials. Secondly, the court‘s application, in the civil context, 
of a criterion specifically attached to the criminal context is not arbitrary. There is sufficient 
reference from international law to apply the substantial injustice test to a civil case as the 
court did in Nkuzi. The findings of the ECtHR in a number of cases, such as Airey,
168
 A v 
United Kingdom
169
 and Bobrowski v Poland,
170
 as well as the ACHPR‘s Guidelines on Fair 
Trials are cases in point.
171
 The interest of justice imperative that guided these cases, 
correspond with the avoidance of ‗substantial injustice‘ proviso of s. 35 of the Constitution. 
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Not only that, the conditions that Nkuzi identified as possibly resulting in substantial injustice 
– severity of the damage to the unrepresented litigant, and the complexity of the case – are in 
the spirit of these ECtHR cases and of the Guidelines on Fair Trials, as discussed in chapter 
two. Lastly, the court‘s decision was well within the scope of the obligation which s. 39(1) of 
the Constitution (as interpreted in S v Makwanyane
172
) imposes on courts to use international 
law as instruments of interpretation when interpreting the Bill of Rights.
173
   
In view of the position in international law, it is submitted that until the position 
articulated in Nkuzi is either overturned or rejected by a higher court, the position ought to be 
read as being that refugees have a right to legal assistance in certain civil matters, subject to 
the criteria laid out in Nkuzi. If it is accepted, as it should be, that instances exist in which the 
State is obliged to provide legal assistance in civil cases, then presumably, the limitations that 
apply to such a right in criminal cases would also apply in civil cases. In interpreting s. 
25(3)(e) of the Interim Constitution, the Constitutional Court agreed with the trial judge in S v 
Du Plessis that the section does not confer on the accused person a right to choose his own 
legal representative at State expense.
174
 However, it has been suggested, that where possible 
there is no reason why the State should not attempt to accommodate the choice of the 
detainee.
175
 The same principles would also apply in civil matters too. 
The foregoing section has established that in line with the position in international law, 
the State has a constitutional obligation to provide free legal assistance to refugees in criminal 
matters. While the position regarding civil matters is not so clear cut, the literature and the 
jurisprudence suggest that the complexity and potential impact of some civil matters also 
necessitates access to free legal representation in the interest of justice. What all this means, 
or should mean for refugees is that if they wish to challenge actions or practices which 
negatively impact them, or need to defend themselves in litigations of such complexity that 
they cannot conduct it themselves, but cannot afford the cost, they should be able to access 
legal representation at State expense. Whereas the courts have not adequately taken on the 
challenge of establishing a clear cut standard, it is possible that this gap is addressed in the 
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policy and legislation on access to justice. It therefore remains to be seen whether this is so, 
and this will be done in the next chapter.  
 
3.6.4 Other tribunal or forum  
Thus far, the discussion of access to justice has focused on guarantees related to the formal, 
State justice system. However, as was noted in chapter one, access to justice often goes 
beyond the administration of justice in state-sanctioned forums to include the resolution of 
disputes by other informal bodies. In fact, scholarly discussions about access to justice almost 
always refer, in one way or the other, to the role of informal justice systems. Some scholars 
take the position that the goal of access to justice, especially for the poorer, marginalised 
sections of society cannot be fully realised without the participation of non-state justice 
systems.
176
 Since refugees and asylum seekers often fall into the category of ‗poorer, 
marginalised sections of society‘, it is reasonable to assume that such informal bodies would 
have some bearing on this discussion of access to justice for them. It is therefore important, to 
examine the nature of the forums which s. 34 envisages, and to determine whether such 
informal bodies are within the contemplation of its guarantees.  
Chapter two already showed the position of such bodies under international law, noting 
that since the HRC has clearly stated in General Comment 32 that the notion of a ‗tribunal‘ 
referred to in Art 14(1) designates only forums that are established by law,
177
 that article does 
not apply to informal systems. The Guidelines on Fair Trials, on the other hand, discusses 
extensively the position of traditional justice systems which, it was shown, could be formal or 
informal in nature.
178
 Section 34 of the Constitution refers to courts or ‗another independent 
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and impartial tribunal or forum‘. Unlike Art 14(1) of the ICCPR and Art 6(1) of the ECHR, s. 
34 does not include the qualification ‗established by law‘. Could this be read as a sanction of 
non-state forums – i.e.  informal bodies not backed by law – or does the section refer only to 
State-sanctioned forums such as mediation bodies like the Commission for Conciliation, 
Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA)? I am not here referring to traditional or customary 
courts, which are recognised under s. 166(e) of the Constitution as ‗other courts established 
by an Act of parliament‘, and therefore form part of the legal system of South Africa.179 The 
Constitution recognises customary law and the institution of traditional leaders, including in 
the administration of justice, subject to compatibility with the Constitution.
180
  
I am here talking about those systems of justice which exist completely outside the 
control of the State and are often referred to as ‗informal justice systems‘. As Schärf notes, 
however, the term ‗informal justice‘ does not suit every circumstance181 as it encompasses 
many different forms of ordering, each having its own origins, purpose and peculiarities. 
Schärf and Nina use the term ‗non-state ordering‘, to label all ordering that occur outside of 
the State‘s immediate control, whether complementary to, or in opposition to the State.182 I 
use the term ‗non-state justice systems‘ here to refer to all forms of justice provision bodies 
that are not created or controlled by the state, and it encompasses such terms as traditional 
justice systems, informal justice systems, non-traditional informal justice systems,
183
 
collective justice, people‘s courts and popular justice systems. These non-state justice 
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systems are popular in South Africa, just as they are in most African countries
184
 and usually 
occur in two forms: ‗popular justice‘ and ‗private justice‘.185 ‗Popular justice‘ develops 
organically in communities
186
 and its nature is captured in this description by Albie Sachs, of 
popular justice in Mozambique: 
[P]opular justice meant justice that was popular in form, in that its language was open and accessible; 
popular in its functioning, in that its proceedings were based essentially on active community 
participation; and popular in its substance, in that judges drawn directly from the people were to give 
judgment in interests of the people.
187
 
‗Private justice‘ on the other hand, is justice organised by the private sector, mostly NGOs, 
using mediation to solve interpersonal problems in the community.
188
    
It is important to determine the position of these non-state justice systems in a 
discussion about refugees‘ access to justice, because as chapter six will subsequently 
demonstrate, this is an important aspect of access to justice, which has many implications 
both for the State and for refugees and asylum seekers themselves. This is only to be 
expected, as migrant populations tend to transport their cultural practices to their new 
homes.
189
 These cultural practices invariably include the administration of justice and dispute 
resolution mechanisms,
190
 and it is only to be expected that refugees in South Africa will 
have such institutions. As chapter six will show, those forums do indeed exist among 
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refugees in South Africa, and play an important role in their access to justice. What then is 
the position of such forums in relation to the constitutional guarantees on access to justice, 
and what does it mean for the State which is the primary organ vested with the administration 
of justice?  
In determining what the position of these non-state justice systems is and whether the 
guarantees contained in s. 34 apply to them, recourse is had to the Constitutional Court case 
of Lufuno Mphaphuli & Associates (Pty) Ltd v Andrews and Another.
191
 Although that case 
relates to private arbitration of a commercial contract, which of course is regulated by law,
192
 
the private arbitration itself is a private process and the arbitrators are not provided by the 
State but are rather, private agents employed by parties for the resolution of disputes.
193
  This 
therefore makes them similar in most respects to the non-state justice systems under 
discussion here. One of the questions for determination before the court in Lufuno was 
whether the term ‗another independent and impartial tribunal‘ in s. 34 includes private 
arbitration. The court found that it does not. In reaching this conclusion, the court, per 
O‘Regan ADCJ emphasised the private and non-independent nature of private arbitration as 
the main characteristics which takes them out of the contemplation of s. 34.
194
 The forums 
which s. 34 contemplate have to be public and independent. Furthermore, the questionable 
‗impartiality‘ of the judges in those forums, the lack of clear standards and guidelines, as well 
as the general lack of enforcement mechanisms are some of the general characteristics
195
 – 
and criticisms – of non-state justice systems, which further differentiate them from the 
forums contemplated by s. 34.
196
 In view of this, it is difficult to argue that non-state justice 
systems are part of the forums to which s. 34 refers. But as previously stated, this does not 
mean that they should be ignored. In fact, the opposite is true; it raises critical issues which 
are important for the State to consider in conceptualising its obligations to refugees on access 
to justice.   
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Firstly, as the court noted in Lufuno, the effect, when a person chooses private 
arbitration for the resolution of a dispute, is that they have chosen not to exercise their rights 
under s 34.
197
 Therefore all of the important access to justice guarantees discussed in chapter 
two and in this chapter are jeopardised. Refugees seeking justice before these forums may 
therefore find that they are subjected to a private process where they have no guarantees of 
due process. Lack of respect for human rights, especially the discriminatory treatment of 
women, is one of the major criticisms of these forums. In view of this, the State must 
seriously consider the implications of allowing a system to thrive within its borders, which 
operates outside the values of its Constitution. In order to do this, it first needs to recognise 
their existence. Any policy or programme on access to justice must therefore bear in mind 
that these forums exist, and that those who use them are virtually excluded from the 
safeguards of the Constitution. It is only by recognising that these forums exist among 
refugees them that the State can engage with them and, if necessary, promote their positive 
aspects and ensure that they function in accordance with national laws and international 
human rights standards. It is important to note that the conclusion that persons who choose 
private arbitration have chosen to deprive themselves of the protection of s. 34 does not make 
the Constitution irrelevant. Arbitration agreements must not contain provisions that are in 
conflict with the Constitution or contra bonos mores,
198
 and this must apply to the workings 
of non-state justice system among refugees too. 
Secondly, the State needs to recognise the potential of these forums to act as 
instruments for improving acc ss to justice. Despite their shortcomings, scholars recognise 
that non-state justice systems serve a useful purpose. They help to alleviate the courts of the 
workload of petty crimes and disputes which can be resolved outside the formal court system, 
thus freeing up scarce judicial resources and reducing delays – one of the more common 
access to justice problems. Scholars are further impressed by these forums emphasis on 
restoring social cohesion after disputes.
199
 Their focus on reconciliation, restitution and 
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rehabilitation is seen to have served justice as opposed to the formal courts‘ winner-takes-all-
approach that leaves feelings of bitterness and injustice.
200
 It is therefore submitted that in 
view of their potential benefits in the overall goal of achieving access to justice, there is an 
imperative for the State to take positive steps to harness the power of these forums. Failure to 
do so would constitute a deficiency in the State‘s efforts to meet its obligations on access to 
justice for refugees. Doing so, on the other hand, would certainly be in the spirit of the 
conceptualisation of access to justice in the literature, in international law and in the 
jurisprudential discourse, as I have demonstrated up to this point. In all three areas, it is 
recognised that access to justice is less concerned with the availability of judicial 
infrastructure than it is with meaningful and effective access to a process that provides fair 
and equitable results. These forums could help to achieve this if properly utilised, and this 
ought to be addressed in any policy on access to justice. Thus in order to meet the access to 
justice needs of its refugee population, South Africa‘s policy on access to justice must 
recognise, address and harness the workings of these systems. 
The third critical issue in respect of non-state justice systems among refugees and 
asylum seekers is that, regardless of how well they are harnessed or utilised, their existence 
cannot be construed by the State as justification to abdicate its duties to provide to refugees, 
an accessible justice system which meets international standards. Rather, their existence 
should be seen as a challenge to the State to ensure that recourse to non-state justice systems 
are not attributable to the inaccessibility of its own courts, but rather are a matter of (cultural) 
preference. In studies of refug es‘ access to justice in camp situations, scholars have found 
that States essentially abdicate their duty to provide access to justice, allowing informal 
justice systems to take on the primary role of the administration of justice.
201
 Furthermore, 
when such forums acted in ways that violated rights, it was explained away as ‗that is their 
culture‘.202 Clearly, such a situation goes against the obligations that the State has under 
international law and under its Constitution. Thus, South Africa must ensure that these 
forums do not become the primary means of redress for those refugees seeking justice. The 
                                                 
200
 Joanna Stevens (note 183 above) 9. 
201
Rosa Da Costa The administration of justice in refugee camps: A study of practice (Geneva: UNHCR 
Department of International Protection, 2006) 27; Julie Veroff ‗Justice administration in Meheba Refugee 
Settlement: Refugee perceptions, preferences, and strategic decisions‘ (MPhil Diss. to the Department of 
International Development, Oxford University, 2009). 
202
 Veroff (note 201 above) 4. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
125 
 
policy and legislation must reflect the standard that the State justice mechanism is the 
primary means of access to justice and include efforts to ensure that refugees are able easily 
to use it.  
Lastly, studies show that there is a strong correlation between certain vulnerabilities 
(particularly poverty) and the use of non-state justice systems.
203
 It is the poorer, 
marginalised sections of society who tend to resort to non-state justice systems, and this is 
usually because they find the formal justice system inaccessible.
204
 Since this is the case, the 
State has an obligation to take steps aimed at ensuring that categories of people who face 
greater barriers when they seek justice, and are thus more likely to resort to non-state justice 
systems, are able to receive help which enables them to overcome their disadvantages.  
The first step in this regard is to recognise and categorise them as vulnerable persons. 
This goes beyond the mere adoption of a specific nomenclature – ‗vulnerable persons‘ – but 
rather requires a policy-making culture in which strategies and programmes on access to 
justice are shaped by an understanding of the challenges that specific people face and reflect 
practical efforts to address them. In other words, South Africa‘s policy on access to justice 
must recognise as vulnerable persons, those people who face challenges that force them to 
resort to non-state justice systems because they find the State justice system inaccessible. 
Such policies must also include special measures designed to meet the specific challenges of 
these classes of people. Thus for instance, if women as a class of people are deemed to be 
vulnerable persons, there needs to be gender-appropriate measures which reflect sensitivity to 
their unique challenges.  
The same holds true for refugees and asylum seekers who, it is submitted, are some of 
the most vulnerable classes of people in South Africa. Not only do they face the same 
difficult challenges faced by vulnerable South Africans such as poverty, they also are 
confronted with the widespread problem of discrimination and xenophobia.
205
 This is so 
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much so that the Constitutional Court has specifically declared that non-citizens in South 
Africa, among who are refugees, are a vulnerable group because of the severe levels of 
discrimination they face.
206
 In order to adequately meet their needs therefore, the State has an 
obligation to recognise and classify refugees and asylum seekers as vulnerable persons who 
require assistance in accessing justice. Its policy on access to justice must reflect that 
recognition, and include specific measures designed to address the challenges that they face. 
Failure to do so could only lead to a situation whereby refugees and asylum seekers are 
forced to resort to forums where their rights could be violated. The other alternative is that 
they choose to forego their quest for justice altogether because they are not willing to subject 
themselves to the disadvantages of non-state justice forums. 
The foregoing section has established that the previously discussed constitutional 
guarantees, though admirable and of an international standard, operate only within the 
framework of the State justice system. There are those who may be forced, or may choose to 
seek justice outside the confines of the State forums for some reason. Even then, there are 
implications for the State in respect of its obligations on access to justice, and these need to 
be addressed in its policy and legislation on the matter. The next chapter will show whether 
this has been adequately done.  
I will now look at the last aspect of the constitutional provisions on access to justice 
which is of particular significance to refugees and asylum seekers. This relates to the rules of 
standing or locus standi, one of the most important ways in which the Constitution guarantees 
access to justice. The discussion will show how these provisions have been beneficial and 
have enabled refugees and asylum seekers to take advantage of the other rights recognised for 
them in South Africa.  
 
3.6.5 Standing  
The rules of standing or locus standi operate to protect the justice system from abuse, by 
determining which cases to allow through the doors of the court and which to keep out.
207
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Under common law, only persons who have a direct interest in a case, being personally 
adversely affected by it, may approach the courts for relief.
208
 This narrow approach to 
standing has traditionally been a barrier to access to justice in that it effectively 
disenfranchised persons who were unable to approach the courts by themselves for one 
reason or another.
209
  
There are several factors which, together or alone, could make it difficult for refugees 
to approach the courts on their own. Poverty, which has been alluded to above,
210
 is one such 
problem. So is lack of knowledge of rights. A study by the Human Science Research Council 
for instance, found that 69.5 per cent of South Africans had either not heard of or did not 
know the purpose of the Bill of Rights. Neither had they heard of or knew the purposes of 
several bodies integral to the protection of human rights.
211
 That study did not involve 
refugees, but it is quite possible that the situation is the same or even worse among them. Yet 
it is trite that knowledge of rights is vital in the decision whether or not to pursue a claim. In 
the absence of such knowledge, ascertaining whether or not a cause of action exists in a given 
situation would usually involve a costly visit to a lawyer, which again, speaks to the adverse 
socio-economic position of refugees.  Thirdly, the impoverished socio-economic conditions 
of refugees also means that a large number of them reside in Townships, which though in 
urban areas, are significantly under-serviced by lawyers and courts.
212
 Geographic factors 
could therefore make it difficult for refugees to approach courts on their own. The effect of 
these factors would be to prevent refugees and asylum seekers from approaching the courts 
for redress. Fortunately howev r, certain constitutional provisions could mitigate this.     
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One of the most significant ways in which the Constitution facilitates access to justice 
is the broad approach that s. 38 brings to the rules of standing. That section introduces far-
reaching changes to the common law rule on standing.
213
 Its provisions are couched in terms 
liberal enough to provide access even to the most disadvantaged, such as refugees and asylum 
seekers. Each of the five sub-sections of s. 38 recognises a category of persons who may 
approach the courts for relief, namely: a person acting in his own interest; a person acting on 
behalf of another who cannot act for themselves, such as if the person is detained and 
prevented from approaching the court themselves;
214
 persons acting as members of a group or 
class of persons; persons acting in the interest of the public and lastly an association which is 
acting in the interest of its members. However, it applies only in respect of violations or 
threatened violation of rights contained in the Bill of Rights.
215
  
Through its recognition of representative action (litigation on behalf of a person who 
cannot do so himself or herself), class action suits (litigation on behalf of an entire group of 
people affected by the subject matter of the case) and public interest litigation (litigation in 
the interest of the general public), s. 38 enhances access to justice in that it gives an aggrieved 
person who is unable to approach the courts by himself or herself, several avenues to do so. It 
also benefits the State as well, as these forms of litigation allow judicial resources to be more 
efficiently utilised. A single class action prevents the inefficiency of multiple judges 
hearing the same case and ruling on the same issues. The importance of this generous 
approach to standing is best appreciated from the significant body of jurisprudence that has 
developed as a result of persons or groups taking advantage of it, and the important, often 
life-changing results that have been achieved.  
In Ngxuza and Others v Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape
216
 
for instance, the court highlighted the capacity of s. 38 to enhance access to justice. In that 
case, the applicants brought an action on behalf of themselves and 100,000 others who had 
had their disability grants suspended without due process of law. Relying on s. 38, the court 
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rejected the respondents‘ objection that the applicants did not have standing to sue on behalf 
of others. The court held that a flexible and generous approach to representative and class 
actions was called for, to make it easier for disadvantaged and poor people to approach the 
courts.
217
 The judgement demonstrated the Constitution‘s intention to ensure that the right of 
a litigant to sue and to enjoy access to court is not undermined by poverty or technical rules 
which often constitute a barrier in access to justice.  
For refugees and asylum seekers, who often arrive in the country of refuge ‗only with 
the clothes on their backs‘, poverty stricken and without any means of support,218 this 
position is especially significant. Indeed, litigation would be a daunting task for them, even 
without socio-economic disadvantages, considering that they are faced with the intimidating 
prospect of navigating a foreign legal system. Standing rules which allow others to litigate on 
their behalves therefore provide much needed assistance to those who cannot do so. One of 
the clearest demonstrations of the benefits that could accrue to refugees and asylum seekers 
from representative and class action suits involved the right to work. Given that the 
government does not provide any form of subsidies or assistance to refugees and asylum 
seekers in South Africa, this right is particularly important to them.  
In the early days of the implementation of the Refugees Act, asylum seekers did not 
have the right to right to work or study pending the determination of their status. Refugees 
however, pursuant to s. 27 of the Act were entitled to seek employment. Asylum applicants 
received permits which stated: ‗EMPLOYMENT AND STUDY PROHIBITED‘. Only if a 
decision was not made within 180 days, could an applicant approach the Standing Committee 
for Refugee Affairs to have the prohibition against work and study lifted. Needless to say, 
this produced serious hardships for asylum seekers who were already disadvantaged in the 
job market. In 2002, an asylum seeker brought a legal challenge to this prohibition in the case 
of Watchenuka and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others.
219
 The second applicant, 
the Cape Town Refugee Forum, acted on behalf of all asylum seekers in South Africa. The 
first applicant, Muriel Watchenuka, a widowed pharmacy technician and her disabled 20 year 
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old son applied for asylum after entering South Africa from Zimbabwe. Ms Watchenuka 
claimed that she left Zimbabwe because she feared that her son would be forced to join 
militant supporters of the ruling ZANU-PF. Shortly after applying for asylum she secured a 
place for her son to study at a Cape Town college. Ms Watchenuka‘s savings had been 
depleted and she needed to secure employment in order to support herself and her son. She 
applied to the Cape High Court for an order declaring the prohibition against work and study 
contained in her asylum seeker permit to be in contravention of her rights to life, dignity, 
equality and administrative justice and therefore unconstitutional. She sought an order 
directing the Department of Home Affairs and the Standing Committee on Refugee Affairs to 
permit her and her son to be employed and to study respectively pending the finalisation of 
their asylum application. The High Court found in favour of the applicants, declaring the 
prohibitions ‗inconsistent‘ on the grounds that the Ministers‘ decision to prohibit work and 
study had not been made in accordance with the appropriate procedure. He did not however 
make any rulings as to the constitutionality of the prohibitions.
220
 On appeal, the Supreme 
Court of Appeal found the prohibition of employment and study to be unconstitutional.
221
 
This judgment represented a significant improvement to the socio-economic conditions of 
refugee and asylum seekers. Not only has it improved their ability to survive, but is also a 
contribution to their sense of dignity and self-worth, as well as enabling them to participate in 
and contribute to their host communities.
222
 
The nature of class actions and public interest litigation is such that a diverse group of 
people who share only one commonality, but are different in every other way, are able to 
enjoy the benefits of a single litigation.
223
 This characteristic greatly enhances access to 
justice for refugees and asylum seekers in South Africa, as it has enabled them to benefit 
from class action suits brought by others who are not refugees or asylum seekers, but share a 
similar disadvantage. A case in point is the famous case of Minister of Health and Others v 
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Treatment Action Campaign and Others
224
 which involved access to anti-retroviral drugs 
(ARVs). While refugees do not necessarily display higher rates of HIV infection than other 
segments of society, the vulnerable conditions under which they live often leaves them 
susceptible to diseases including HIV,
225
 and access to ARVs is therefore important to them. 
Being significantly under-resourced and unable to access private health care centres, public 
health facilities is their primary source of health care services and of access to ARVs if 
needed.
226
 Prior to the Treatment Action Campaign case, it was not possible to obtain ARVs 
in public health facilities, which of course had negative ramifications for refugees.  
A group of NGOs acting in the public interest launched a constitutional challenge 
against the South African government‘s policy of restricting the antiretroviral drug, 
Nevirapine, to research sites.
227
 That case compelled the government to make the drug 
available in public hospitals and clinics, and thus led to tens of thousands of lives being 
saved.
228
 Those lives are not only those of South Africans, but also of refugees and asylum 
seekers. In the years following the judgment, the Department of Health has taken steps to 
include asylum seekers and refugees in its strategic planning and regulation. Its HIV, AIDS 
and STI National Strategic Plan for South Africa specifically identifies refugees, asylum 
seekers and foreign migrants as marginalised groups who have ‗a right to equal access to 
interventions for HIV prevention, treatment and support‘.229  
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Like the Treatment Action Campaign case, the twin cases of Khosa and Others v 
Minister of Social Development and Others; Mahlaule and Others v Minister of Social 
Development and Others
230
 also demonstrate how class actions have benefitted refugees. 
Both cases concerned a constitutional challenge to certain provisions of the Social Assistance 
Act.
231
 The Constitutional Court‘s finding that exclusion from access to social grants on the 
sole ground of citizenship amounted to unfair discrimination paved the way for refugees to 
access social grants.
232
 The subsequent class action suit by a group of refugee foster parents 
in Bishogo and Others v the Minister of Social Development and Others
233
 enhanced their 
enjoyment of this right, as it removed a further barrier placed in their way by the Department 
of Social Services, which required beneficiaries to be in possession of a 13-digit identity 
book in order to access social grants.
234
  
While these cases illustrate the important implications which the constitutional 
provisions on standing, representative and class actions have for refugees and asylum seekers 
access to justice, they also highlight the key role played by civil society organisations. By 
instituting litigation on behalf of refugees and asylum seekers, or supporting actions brought 
by them, more capable and better resourced organisations like the Cape Town Refugee 
Forum were able to achieve something that individual asylum seekers could probably not 
achieve. It is worth noting that s. 38 does not introduce public interest or class action suits to 
South Africa. These were already in use all during the apartheid period,
235
 and were in fact, 
one of the benefits to develop from opposition to apartheid.
236
 What this provision does is to 
give these forms of litigation constitutional backing, and to help shift the momentum, post 
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apartheid, to litigation whose objectives are to test and enforce constitutional rights.
237
 It has 
also helped to underline the critical role that civil society plays in the promotion of access to 
justice.
238
 As a result of the leeway that s. 38 gives to public interest groups such as NGOs, 
churches, and community groups to challenges the violation or non-implementation of 
constitutional rights, ‗the majority of the cases decided by the Constitutional Court which 
have made an impact on the lives of disadvantaged South Africans have been brought by 
organized interest groups‘.239 Fortunately, there are a number of NGOs working on refugee 
issues which have been willing to engage in such litigations, but these are insufficient. Given 
the beneficial role they are capable of playing, it is obvious that one way of improving access 
to justice for refugees is through the participation of civil society. The implications of this for 
the State and its obligations on access to justice, will be discussed in chapter five.
240
  
Secondly, the cases discussed above illustrate the inter-connected nature of human 
rights, and why the rights of refugees need to be addressed holistically in order to meet their 
access to justice needs, and also gives credence to the argument put forward in chapter two 
that access to justice enables other rights to be enjoyed. With regard to the Watchenuka case 
for instance, South Africa was well within its rights to prohibit the right to work both 
constitutionally and under international law and practice.
241
 Section 22 of the Constitution 
clearly limits the right to choose a trade or profession to citizens. Critically, however, the 
court distinguished a situation where employment is the only reasonable means for a person‘s 
support. According to the court, the issue then becomes not merely a restriction on a person‘s 
capacity for self-fulfilment, but a restriction on his or her ability to live without positive 
humiliation and degradation.
242
 The court noted that the freedom to engage in productive 
work, even where that is not required in order to survive, is an important component of 
human dignity, which is one of the foundational values of the Bill of Rights.
243
 Like the right 
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 Saras Jangwath ‗Democracy, civil society and the South African Constitution: Some challenges‘ UNESCO 
Management of Social Transformations (MOST) Discussion Paper 65, 16. 
238
 Sandra Liebenberg Socio-economic rights in South Africa: Adjudication under a transformative Constitution 
(Cape Town: Juta, 2010) 90. 
239
 Jangwath (note 237 above) 16.   
240
 Chapter five section 5.5. 
241
 This issue is discussed at length in Ex parte Chairperson of the constitutional Assembly: In re certification of 
the amended text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, 1997 (2) SA 97 (CC)  paras 17–21. 
242
 Minister of Home Affairs v Watchenuka (note 226 above) para 32. 
243
 Ibid, para 27.  
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to work, the court found that the freedom to study is also inherent in human dignity ‗for 
without it a person is deprived of the potential for human fulfilment‘.244 This is important for 
refugees and asylum seekers because one of the first things that the refugee situation 
threatens to strip from them, when they find themselves displaced, without the protection of 
their own governments and at the mercy of a foreign state is their dignity.
245
 Cases like 
Watchenuka demonstrate how access to justice for refugees and asylum seekers – whether 
individually or as a class of persons – not only enables them to enjoy specific human rights, 
but serve the more critical purpose of restoring and protecting their human dignity and 
affirming their worth as persons. Chapter five will subsequently demonstrate how their 
tenuous work situations influence refugees‘ decisions on accessing justice.246   
Thirdly, these cases demonstrate that refugee rights in South Africa is following a trend 
that has been on an upswing around the world in recent times – the judicialisation, or 
involvement of the judiciary, in refugee issues. In the past, as chapter one showed, refugee 
matters were treated as part of general immigration and left under the bureaucratic control of 
immigration administrators. The power of the courts to review such matters were usually 
curtailed or completely prohibited.
247
 Today however, the judiciary is often called upon to 
adjudicate matters pertaining to refugees and this is visible everywhere including in Europe, 
Canada, the United States,
248
 and as the cases above show, now in South Africa.  
While the judicialisation of refugee issues was primarily only seen in the area of core 
refugee protection, it has now extended to issues of other rights and conditions of stay. It 
affirms the argument put forth in chapter one that access to justice is just as important to 
refugee protection as the granting refugee status is.
249
 In fact, scholars argue, domestic courts 
have become the primary agency for the protection of refugees and immigrant aliens because 
                                                 
244
 Ibid, para 36; Cf Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 13, The right to 
education (Twenty-first session, 1999) U.N Doc. E/C.12/1999/10 (1999)  para 1. 
245
 Peter Billings & Richard A Edwards ‗Safeguarding asylum seekers' dignity: Clarifying the interface between 
Convention rights and asylum law‘ (2004) 2 11 Journal of Social Security Law 83–111.  
246
 Section 5.4.1. 
247
 See Chapter one, page 21for instances of previous South African immigration laws explicitly forbidding 
courts from hearing any matters related to refugees. Similarly, Canada‘s Immigration Act of 1952, explicitly 
forbade the courts from reviewing immigration matters (s. 39, Immigration Act, R.S.C 1952, c. 325).  
248
 Dagmar Soennecken The growth of judicial power over the fate of refugees: A comparison of Canada and 
Germany (PhD diss., University of Toronto, 2009) 1. 
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 Chapter one, section 1.6. 
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it has been the courts that have tended to open or strengthen rather than deny or curtail access 
to rights traditionally only granted to citizens,
250
 as seen for instance in the cases of 
Watchenuka and Khosa. Joppke attributes this trend to ‗independent and activist courts‘, 
mobilising domestic law against restriction-minded, governments.
251
 Gibney‘s argument that 
legal developments that acknowledge refugees and asylum seekers as rights bearers, and vest 
them with new legal protections have been effective in restraining the policies of restriction 
in the political realm
252
 is amply supported by the cases above. In South Africa, much of 
these legal developments are attributable to the use of representative and class actions as the 
discussion above has shown. 
Compared with the position set out in chapter one, in which the default government 
position was to restrict access to courts, refugees and asylum seekers today certainly are in a 
better, more rights-enhancing position than ever before. It is therefore important that the 
State, in its access to justice policies and programmes should not only avoid any measures 
that restrict the ability of civil society to utilise their human and financial resources to litigate 
on behalf of disadvantaged refugees, it is also important that, in its programming for access to 
justice, the State‘s efforts should include measures that will enhance the capacity of civil 
society. In this way, it would also be meeting its obligations on access to justice for refugees.  
  
3.7 CONCLUSION 
I have attempted in this chapter to look at South Africa‘s constitutional provisions on access 
to justice. It has been established that in the main, these provisions comply with international 
standards and with the country‘s obligations under international law. The South African 
Constitution is designed to address the inequality and injustice of the history that led to its 
                                                 
250
 Soennecken (note 248 above) 9. 
251
 Christian Joppke ‗The legal-domestic sources of immigrant rights: The United States, Germany, and the 
European Union‘ (2001) 34 (4) Comparative Political Studies, 339–366, 339. Some governments have 
responded by attempting to use legislative measure to cut off avenues for legal appeals of asylum decisions. For 
example, Australia, USA and the UK.  See Matthew J Gibney & Randall Hansen ‗Asylum policy in the West: 
Past trends, future possibilities‘ Discussion Paper No. 2003/68 World Institute for Development Economics 
Research (WIDER) United Nations University, September 2003. 
252
 See generally, Matthew J Gibney ‗The state of asylum: Democratization, judicialization and the evolution of 
refugee policy‘ in Susan Kneebone (ed) The Refugees Convention 50 years on: Globalisation and international 
law. (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003) 19–46. 
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adoption,
253
 and viewed in the context of that history, it is easy to see why both its provisions 
and the interpretations given to them by the courts have tended to place emphasis on the 
achievement of substantive justice and equality. The Constitution guarantees equal and 
unfettered access to courts for everyone within South Africa, with further guarantees to 
ensure that such access is to competent bodies that meet international standards. Not only 
that, the constitutional provisions show a leaning towards effective access as opposed to mere 
access to courts, and the jurisprudence further reinforces the commitment to procedural as 
well as substantive access to justice. I also showed that while these guarantees are important 
for everybody‘s access to justice, there are certain elements which hold specific significance 
for refugees and asylum seekers simply because of the nature of their relationship with the 
country. In this regard, I identified the issue of language competency and interpretation, 
access to legal assistance, recourse to non-state justice systems and the possible consequences 
of that, as well as the impact of standing rules on their access to justice.  
The guarantees contained in s. 34 together with the broad approach to locus standi 
contained in s. 38 have had the effect of making the courts more accessible either through 
self-representation, class actions or public interest litigation by groups and individuals. The 
advantage this offers to under-resourced people, including refugees, has been enormous as it 
has allowed them ‗to be represented by organizations with expertise, and sometimes more 
importantly, resources to conduct expensive and time-consuming litigation‘.254 It is often 
only because of these litigations that refugees and asylum seekers have been able to enjoy 
some of their other constitutionally recognised rights. In this regard, the area of socio-
economic rights has proved to be a fertile ground for high-impact, precedent-setting 
judgments which have helped to improve the lives of refugees. Although they are formally 
granted many of the rights afforded South African citizens including the right to health care, 
education and social assistance, in attempting to convert these legal rights into effective 
protection, refugees face significant obstacles in ways that harm them and the communities in 
                                                 
253
 President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) para 41. 
254
 David Cote & Jacob van Garderen ‗Barriers and challenges to public interest litigation in South 
Africa‘ Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Law and Society Association, Renaissance Chicago Hotel, 
Chicago, IL, May 27, 2010 Available at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p408551_index.html [Accessed 22 
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which they live.
255
 Having access to the country‘s courts has helped to remove some of these 
obstacles.  
The highlighted cases also show that in litigation involving refugees, as with other 
disadvantaged persons, what is often at stake is more than the particular right implicated, but 
also the inherent dignity and worth of the human person. As the court noted in Watchenuka 
for instance, the right to work is not merely a restriction on a person‘s capacity for self-
fulfilment, but a restriction on his or her ability to live without positive humiliation and 
degradation. By being able to resort to the courts to have such a restriction removed, refugees 
and asylum seekers are given avenues to have their dignity restored. Access to justice for 
refugees and asylum seekers therefore needs to be seen within the broader context of human 
dignity and equality since it enables them not just to challenge injustice, but to have their 
worth as human beings acknowledged and upheld. Thus, when South Africa protects, 
promotes and fulfils refugees‘ right to access to justice, it is affirming their worth as persons, 
not as problems.  
Having established in this chapter that the South African Constitution contains adequate 
guarantees regarding all these elements of access to justice, it is pertinent, since merely 
having those guarantees does not translate into automatic enjoyment, to look at the measures 
in place to give them effect. The next chapter therefore looks at the legislative and policy 
frameworks in place to facilitate access to justice for refugees in South Africa.  
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Chapter Four 
Policy and Legislative Efforts 
on Access to Justice in South Africa 
Justice is itself the great standing policy of civil society;  
any eminent departure from it lies under the suspicion of being no policy at all.
1
 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The preceding chapter established that there is a generally good convergence between South 
Africa‘s constitutional guarantees on access to justice and the standards set in international 
law. It was shown that the guarantees that exist are applicable to citizens and non-citizens 
alike, by virtue of the universal applicability of the Constitution to all persons in South 
Africa. The chapter went on to show that beyond the fact of their applicability to refugees 
however, certain aspects of the guarantees have unique implications for the access to justice 
needs of refugees and asylum seekers, and these need to be specifically addressed if South 
Africa is to meet its obligations to them. In this regard, I identified the issues of equality, 
proficiency in court languages, access to legal assistance, the use of non-state justice systems 
and the implications thereof, as well as the importance of the rules of locus standi contained 
in the Constitution. I showed that generally speaking, the constitutional guarantees on these 
aspects afford many rights to refugees and asylum seekers. It is trite, however, that the 
recognition of rights does not necessarily translate into their enjoyment – steps need to be 
taken to give them effect. Usually, such steps are manifested in legislation, policies and 
programmes. In the celebrated case of Government of the Republic of South Africa and 
Others v Grootboom and Others,
2
 the Constitutional Court succinctly articulated this 
connection between the enjoyment of rights and the legislative, programmatic and policy 
actions of the government, when it observed:   
The State is obliged to act to achieve the intended result, and ... legislative measures will invariably have 
to be supported by appropriate, well-directed policies and programs implemented by the Executive. 
These policies and programs must be reasonable both in their conception and their implementation. The 
formulation of a program is only the first stage in meeting the State‘s obligations. The program must also 
                                                 
1
 Edmund Burke Reflections on the Revolution in France 1791. 
2
 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC). 
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be reasonably implemented. An otherwise reasonable program that is not implemented reasonably will 
not constitute compliance with the State's obligations
.3 
 
This dictum establishes clearly what is expected of the State, if the rights outlined in chapters 
two and three of this thesis are to be enjoyed by refugees and asylum seekers. Put simply, the 
State needs to act. It needs to act by adopting legislation; by making policy and creating 
programmes; and lastly, by implementing, in a reasonable manner, those policies and 
programmes.  
In furtherance of the objective of evaluating how well South Africa meets the access to 
justice needs of refugees therefore, this chapter will examine what policy, programme and 
legislative measures the State has taken to give effect to the guarantees contained in the 
Constitution. I will look specifically at how the needs of refugees and asylum seekers are 
articulated in the pieces of legislation, policy documents and programmes that have been 
adopted at various points to address access to justice in the country. The focus will be on 
those elements previously identified in chapter three, and r ference will necessarily be made 
to the position in international law and the Constitution, in order to establish the strengths or 
weaknesses of the legislations, policies and programmes under discussion.  
My main argument in this chapter is that, notwithstanding the constitutional framework 
which undergirds them, the policies and programmes which are meant to address problems 
related to access to justice largely ignore South Africa‘s obligations to refugees. Its 
commitments to refugees unde  international law appear to have no bearing on its 
programming for access to justice, and as a result, the peculiar vulnerabilities which make 
accessing justice difficult for refugees and asylum seekers are not addressed. It is hoped that 
by the end of this chapter, a clear picture will have emerged, of the shortcomings in the 
policy and programmes and that the picture which emerges will help one to understand the 
experiences which the next chapter describes.  
Since South Africa only officially began receiving refugees in the 1990s, this chapter 
will focus only on those access to justice legislations, policies and programmes adopted since 
the beginning of the democratic dispensation, with brief references to previous era to provide 
a context for the discussion.  
  
                                                 
3
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4.2 A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF POLICIES, PROGRAMMES AND 
LEGISLATIVE MEASURES ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE SINCE 1994 
Former Justice Minister, Dullah Omar, once observed that under apartheid, the larger 
proportion of the South African populace was victim of the justice system rather than 
beneficiaries of it.
4
 The system of justice, he noted, was moulded around the needs of the 
white population, which made up 20 per cent of the national population, while the remaining 
80 per cent had marginal services that were segregated and of a low standard.
5
 Even if there 
were any desires to challenge the status quo, the judiciary was significantly constrained by 
various laws which curtailed its powers.
6
 Courts could not declare an Act of Parliament 
invalid because it violated human rights. The only grounds on which they could declare an 
Act invalid was if it had not been passed in accordance with laid down procedure.
7
 Very little 
could, therefore, be achieved by recourse to the courts for violations of human rights. The 
whole system in short, was designed to stifle access to justice, at least with respect to human 
rights for some sections of society. There was therefore need, post-apartheid, to overhaul the 
legal system and use it to promote social justice.  
The first major attempt to do this and make it more representative of the needs of the 
populace, came in 1997, when the then Department of Justice (DoJ) developed the ‗Justice 
Vision 2000‘ policy framework. The framework was described as the basis for making 
systematic changes to the justice system in order to bring the administration of justice in line 
with the Constitution and the new democratic values. It laid out a five-year national strategy 
to identify and eliminate weaknesses in the justice system, while creating a legitimate, 
effective, accountable and accessible justice system.
8
 The document sought to advance a 
conceptualisation of justice that was predicated on the all-inclusive policy of ‗ensuring justice 
for all‘. In keeping with the values of constitutionality, democracy and equality, the DoJ 
sought to move towards a human rights-based rule of law paradigm. Seven key result areas 
for transformation of the justice system were identified, viz:  
 an integrated, efficient and representative Department of Justice; 
                                                 
4
 Dullah A Omar Justice Vision 2000: And justice for all – five year national strategy for transforming the 
administration of justice and the state legal affairs (Pretoria: Department of Justice, 1997) iii. 
5
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6
 Ian Currie & Johan de Waal The Bill of Rights handbook 5
th
 ed (Cape Town: Juta, 2005) 3. 
7
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 a legitimate, service-oriented and efficient system of courts and other structures 
administering justice that is staffed by people who represent everybody in South 
Africa; 
 safety, security and freedom from crime for everybody in South Africa; 
 fair and equal access to justice for all taking into account the diversity of people‘s 
needs; 
 effective and efficient human resources development systems; 
 a well trained, broadly representative, accessible and evenly distributed legal 
profession; and 
 effective and efficient provision of legal and legislative services to the state.9 
The Vision 2000 policy document remains South Africa‘s primary policy on the 
administration of justice in the country. Most relevant to this thesis is the fourth objective in 
the list above, i.e.  ‗fair and equal access to justice for all, taking into account the diversity of 
people‘s needs‘. I will now examine how the State has given effect to it.  
 
4.3 EQUALITY OF ACCESS 
Preceding chapters have shown that both under international law and under the Constitution 
of South Africa, the notion of ‗equality‘ is critical to the conceptualisation of access to 
justice. Chapter two established the existence of a right under international law, of everyone, 
‗regardless of nationality or statelessness ... whether asylum seeker or refugee‘ to enjoy 
within the territory of a State Party to the ICCPR, equal access to justice without 
discrimination.
10
 Such equal access, it was shown, has two dimensions, namely equal access 
to court
11
 and to equal treatment by that court without any discrimination.
12
 Chapter three 
then showed that the notion of equality of access also finds expression within South Africa‘s 
Constitution. The chapter discussed the equality provision contained in s. 9 of the 
Constitution, showing that the provision applies generally  in respect of all rights contained in 
the Constitution, and thus includes the right of access to justice contained in ss. 33, 34, 35 
                                                 
9
 Ibid. 
10
 Human Rights Committee General Comment No 32, Article 14: Right to equality before courts and tribunals 
and to a fair trial, UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/32 (2007) para 9. 
11
 Oló Bahamonde v Equatorial Guinea Communication No 468/1991, UN Doc CCPR/C/49/D/468/1991 (1993)  
Para 9.4. 
12
 General Comments 32 (note 10 above)  para 8. 
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and 38 of the Constitution. In its interpretation of what that equality provision means in 
relation to access to justice, the Constitutional Court has stated that it means that all persons 
in a similar position must be afforded the same right to access the courts and to the same fair 
and just procedures with regard to such access‘.13  
It was asserted in chapter three
14
  that in view of the foregoing, any policy designed to 
promote access to justice must place emphasis on equality of access, and such equality must 
be substantive rather than mere equality on paper. Achieving such substantive equality may 
require different treatment of different categories of people; a failure to differentiate may in 
fact, be construed as discriminatory action.
15
 In order to achieve substantive equality, there is 
therefore need to recognise the diversity of circumstances and needs represented in society, 
which may require the adoption of special measures to help certain categories of people. In 
particular, I highlighted the position of those who may be classified as vulnerable persons, 
such as refugees and asylum seekers, and the need to adopt measures which adequately 
address their vulnerabilities and ensure that they have equal access to justice.
16
  
The language in which the goal of access to justice is formulated in the Vision 2000 
policy document suggests that the State is cognisant of these issues. The goal, phrased as ‗fair 
and equal access to justice for all, taking into account the diversity of people‘s needs‘ reflects 
an intention on the part of the State to act in line with the constitutional and international law 
standards regarding equality. The use of the word ‗equal‘ clearly suggests that intention, and 
the qualifying statement ‗  king in o    o n   h  div   i y o  p opl ‘  n  d ‘ reflects 
cognisance of the fact that going beyond formal equality to achieving actual or substantive 
equality, may require taking different measures to meet different needs. The question then is: 
do the legislation, programmes and strategies adopted to give effect to this goal reflect that 
intention? Do they actually ensure equality of access for refugees and asylum seekers, who 
after all, are included in the term ‗all‘?  
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 Van der Walt v Metcash Trading Ltd 2002 (4) SA 317 (CC) 325, para 24; similar to the equality of treatment 
positions taken variously by the ACHPR and the ECtHR. See generally  Avocats sans Frontières (on behalf of 
Bwampamye) v Burundi (2000) AHRLR 48 (ACHPR 2000) para 27; Bulut v Austria (1996) 24 EHRR 84, para 
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4.3.1 Refugees as vulnerable persons 
As has been previously stated, the first step towards ensuring equal access to justice for all, is 
to recognise as vulnerable persons, those categories of people who face greater barriers when 
they attempt to access justice. The policy and programmes should then reflect practical 
efforts to address the challenges that they face.  
There are indications that the DoJ has attempted to do this. In 2005, a ‗Chief 
Directorate: Promotion of the Rights of Vulnerable Groups‘ was created to improve the 
efficiency of the court system for vulnerable persons.
17
 The mandate of the chief directorate 
was to develop policies to support the implementation of legislation and programmes to 
protect and promote the rights of the vulnerable in courts, to coordinate efficient and effective 
service delivery, to monitor and evaluate the impact of legislation and policies on courts and 
the justice system, and to develop effective and efficient information management systems. 
Vulnerable groups are defined to include women, children, the elderly and the disabled.
18
 In 
furtherance of the objective of improving access to justice for these categories of people the 
DoJ adopted a Gender Policy Statement to address some of the legal challenges women face, 
including issues of sexual and domestic violence and child maintenance; child justice issues 
and creation of family courts.
19
 It also adopted a ‗Service Charter for Victims of Crime‘ in 
order to give additional support to victims of crime and reduce the secondary victimisation 
that is frequently experienced, especially by women and children, which often leads to 
withdrawal of charges.
20
  
Several pieces of legislation have also been passed in furtherance of the objective of 
improving access to justice for vulnerable persons. These include the Child Justice Act,
21
 
which establishes a child justice system for children in conflict with the law. Since it applies 
                                                 
17
Available at  www.justice.go.za [Accessed 14 November 2010]. 
18
 Department of Justice Annual Report 2006/2007, Part Two (Pretoria: Justice and Constitutional Development, 
2007) 59; The Department reports that R10 million was allocated for 35 buildings to be made fully accessible 
for the disabled and the elderly in the 2006/07 financial year. 
19
 Department of Justice ‗Gender policy: 1999‘.  Available at 
 http://www.justice.gov.za/policy/gender/1999_GenderPolicy_CHP03e.pdf  Accessed 12 October 2010.  
20
 Department of Justice ‗Service Charter for Victims of Crime in South Africa‘ 2007, Available at  
www.justice.go.za [Accessed 14 November 2010]. 
21
 Act 75 of 2008. 
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to every child in South Africa,
22
 this Act applies to refugee children and asylum seeking 
children, whether accompanied or unaccompanied. Therefore refugee children who find 
themselves before South African courts have the benefit of the special treatment afforded by 
the Act. Before the enactment of the Child Justice Act, the Criminal Procedure Act of 1977 
determined how such children were dealt with. With the coming into effect of the Child 
Justice Act, children accused of crimes will be treated in accordance with the child justice 
process that the Act establishes and not in terms of the normal criminal procedure applicable 
to adults. The Act aims to ensure that child justice matters are managed in a rights-based 
manner, and that children suspected of committing crimes receive assistance to turn their 
lives around and become productive members of society.
23
  
Other laws which have been passed in furtherance of protecting vulnerable groups and 
improving their access to justice include the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related 
Matters) Amendment Act
24
 which is designed to aid in country‘s fight against sexual crimes 
particularly vulnerable persons such as women, children and people who are mentally 
disabled;
25
 the Maintenance Act
26
 which aims to ensure a sensitive and fair approach to the 
determination and recovery of maintenance;
27
 the Domestic Violence Act,
28
 which aims to 
afford the victims of domestic violence the maximum protection that the law can provide and 
eliminate domestic violence
29
 which is primarily perpetrated against women and has been 
described as ‗one of the most prominen  features of post-apartheid South Africa‘.30 
Clearly these steps, particularly the creation of a directorate on vulnerable persons, 
represent positive action by th  State to ensure equal access to justice. But what about the 
glaring omission of refugees and asylum seekers, or migrants generally, as a category of 
vulnerable persons? This omission is incomprehensible, considering the enormous amount of 
                                                 
22
 Section 4, Child Justice Act. 
23
 Department of Justice ‗Child Justice Act 2008‘.Available at http://www.justice.gov.za/vg/childjustice.html  
[Accessed 19 October 2010]. 
24
 Act No. 32 of 2007. 
25
 Chapters 1-4, 7. 
26
 Act No. 99 of 1998. 
27
 Ibid, preamble. 
28
 Act No. 116 of 1998. 
29
 Ibid, preamble. 
30
 Lisa Vetten ‗Addressing domestic violence in South Africa: Reflections on strategy and practice‘ Centre for 
the Study of Violence and Reconciliation. Available at www.csvr.org.za [Accessed 23 October 2010]. 
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evidence that shows that this group of people face significant challenges when accessing 
services, due to negative public perception and widespread discrimination.
31
 The 
Constitutional Court has gone so far as to state that in view of the severe levels of 
discrimination that they face, non-citizens in South Africa are a vulnerable group.
32
  
Even with regard to access to justice specifically, there is ample evidence to suggest 
that refugees and asylum seekers face significant challenges that effectively deny them any 
kind of access.
33
 The following excerpt from a report by the Consortium for Refugees and 
Migrants in South Africa, describes how the actions of the communities they live in serve to 
deny access to justice to refugees and asylum seekers: 
In many cases, victims of xenophobic violence are unable to access justice. Perpetrators are often not 
held accountable which results in a perception of impunity for crimes against foreign nationals. In a 
number of cases, victims of xenophobic violence are intimidated into dropping charges in return for 
reintegration or are too afraid to press charges against perpetrators. There is a need to improve the 
accountability of perpetrators of xenophobic violence by fast tracking such cases through the courts. This 
reduces the opportunity for other community members to lobby for charges to be dropped and enables 
plans for reintegration or other solutions to proceed.
34
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 Busani Tshabangu et al ‗Violence against foreigners in North-West Province‘ Migrants Rights Monitoring 
Project Occassional Report, Forced Migration Studies Programme, University of the Witwatersrand, June 2007; 
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for Southern Africa 1–23; Vincent Williams ‗Xenophobia in South Africa: Overview and analysis‘ (2008) 3 
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against non-nationals (Johannesburg : South African Human Rights Commission, 2010). 
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 Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa ‗Taking action on threats of xenophobic violence: 
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Clearly, xenophobic actions by local communities act as a barrier to refugees‘ access to 
justice. But this problem is not a malaise that affects only ordinary members of local 
communities who do not know better; there is another dimension to the problem, one which 
shows that even the justice system itself, denies access to justice to refugees. Fuller and Valji 
note that African foreigners are often worst affected by violent crime and their situation is 
compounded by the fact that they are not afforded the same protection by the state, either 
because of their status or because of similarly xenophobic attitudes among officials, which 
leads to them being victimised.
35
  
While these attacks are obviously against foreigners of African origins generally, 
refugees and asylum seekers make up a large percentage of this demographic.
36
 Facing 
xenophobia from the general populace and from law enforcement has the effect of twice 
victimising refugees and asylum seekers – xenophobic attacks harm them physically, 
psychologically and economically, and secondly, xenophobic tendencies prevent them from 
accessing justice. Further support for why South Africa needs to address the needs of 
refugees specifically is found in the commitments it made in international law, when it 
became party to the UN Refugee Convention and the OAU Refugee Convention. 
International law recognises refugees as a different class of migrants and the obligations that 
hosts states have to them is more clearly defined than economic migrants for instance. South 
Africa‘s failure to acknowledge refugees and asylum seekers as vulnerable persons in the 
policy is therefore, not just a matter of ignoring the scholarly or media evidence, it also 
represents a choice to ignore South Africa‘s commitments in international law.  
As hosts of the 2001 World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, 
Xenophobia and Related Intolerance,
37
 South Africa is well aware of, and has adopted the 
Durban Declaration which highlighted several steps the State needs to take in respect of 
access to justice for refugees and migrants. Among these, significantly enough, is paragraph 
11 of the Durban Declaration, which encourages States, including South Africa, to identify 
                                                 
35
 Romi Fuller & Nahla Valji ‗South Africa: Scarcity sets fire to country‘s xenophobic tinderbox‘ Business Day 
22 May 2008. 
36
 Marie Wentzel et al ‗Contemporary South African migration patterns and intentions‘ in Pieter Kok et al (eds) 
Migration in South and Southern Africa:  Dynamics and determinants (Cape Town: Human Sciences Research 
Council, 2006) 175. 
37
 Report of the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance 
UN Doc A/ CONF.189/12 (2001). 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
147 
 
factors which prevent equal access to the administration of justice, and to take appropriate 
measures to remove the obstacles identified. As I have said, the first step towards doing this 
is to recognise in the policy that refugees constitute a vulnerable group. Paragraph 81 of the 
Durban Declaration also encourages States to prohibit discriminatory treatment against 
foreigners in access to justice. Paragraph 30(e) of the Durban Declaration also encourages 
South Africa to ensure that the police treat migrants in a dignified and non-discriminatory 
manner, in accordance with international standards. Furthermore, as a party to the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
38
 the 
state has an obligation to protect persons who are facing discrimination. The first obvious 
step towards such protection would surely be to recognise them as a vulnerable group and 
ensure that they are not excluded from any efforts or initiatives to ensure vulnerable groups 
have access to justice.  
In view of this kind of evidence, it is submitted that the failure to recognise refugees 
and asylum seekers as vulnerable persons constitutes a policy failure, insofar as it means that 
no specific measures are put in place to address the vulnerabilities which makes equal access 
to justice difficult for them. This is indeed the case. There is no programme within the justice 
system that is specifically tailored towards addressing discrimination or xenophobia towards 
migrants generally or refugees and asylum seekers in particular.  
The situation is unfortunately the same in respect of legislation. South Africa has not 
adopted any legislation specifically addressing xenophobia, although by virtue of its adoption 
of the Durban Declaration, it ought to do so. Paragraph 68 of that Declaration encourages 
States to adopt and implement national legislation that expressly and specifically counters 
racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance whether direct or indirect, in 
all spheres of public life in accordance with their obligations under the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. There is sufficient 
evidence to suggest that the such legislation has been under contemplation for a while. There 
are frequent references in speeches by officials of the DoJ to a ‗Bill on the Prevention and 
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 GA Res 2106 (XX), Annex, 20 UN GAOR Supp (No 14) at 47, UN Doc A/6014 (1966), 660 UNTS 195, 
entered into force 4 January, 1969. 
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Combating of Hate Speech, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance‘.39 
But thus far, no such Bill has been placed before Parliament.  
At present, all cases involving racial discrimination, hate speech and harassment are 
currently dealt with in terms of Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act (Equality Act).
40
 The DoJ‘s goal of implementing the constitutional 
provisions on equality and dignity has been helped in large parts by the passage of the 
Equality Act which was created to deal with the issue of unfair discrimination.
41
 Under the 
Act, specialised Equality Courts were established to deal with unfair discrimination cases 
other than those relating to employment equity and every High Court is designated Equality 
Court for its area of jurisdiction.
42
 In terms of access to justice, the Equality Courts have 
helped to improve physical access to the country‘s courts for disabled persons.43  
Unfortunately, there are as yet no reported Equality Court cases in which refugees have 
taken up the issue of xenophobia in relation to access to justice. However, an ongoing case is 
set to change that. In fact, this case could potentially force to State to re-define its access to 
justice policy, such that the issue of xenophobia as a barrier to accessing justice is addressed. 
                                                 
39
 See for instance Speech by Mr. Andries Nel, MP, Deputy Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 
during the Debate on Budget Vote 23: Justice and Constitutional Development in the National Assembly on 
Wednesday, 5 May 2010. 
Available at http://www.justice.gov.za/m_speeches/2010/20100505_depmin_budgetvote.html [Accessed 29 
January 2011]. 
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 Act No 4 of 2000. 
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guides: In Larbi-Odam v. MEC for Education (North West Province) 1998 (1) SA 745 (CC) Mokgoro J stated 
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unfair.  Para 112.  
42
 Department of Justice Equality Act booklet (Pretoria: Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, 
2003). 
43
 See Article 13 International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons 
with Disabilities, GA Res 61/106, Annex I, UN GAOR, 61st Sess, Supp No 49, at 65, UN Doc A/61/49 (2006), 
entered into force 3 May, 2008.  
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The case is related to the infamous xenophobic attacks that rocked South Africa in May 2008. 
As can be seen from above, those attacks were neither sudden nor unprecedented, since over 
the years, there had been several incidents. One such incident had just occurred a couple of 
months before, in the Zwelethemba Township near Worcester in the Western Cape. Victims 
alleged that during the attacks that targeted Ethiopian and Somali traders, local police stood 
by and offered no assistance as shops were looted. It was alleged that some even encouraged 
the looters and laughed as this went on. They also alleged discrimination, saying that a 
number of South African-owned businesses were protected while foreigner-owned stores 
were ignored. Such a situation obviously goes against the spirit of s. 9(1) of the Constitution 
which guarantees equal protection of the law. Equal protection of the law requires that law 
enforcement work to protect refugees just as it does other members of society. But it was not 
only during the attacks that the right to ‗equal protection and benefit of the law‘ for refugees 
was violated. Victims allege that efforts to report the matter to the police afterwards were 
systematically thwarted, thus denying them access to justice. They further alleged 
discrimination during subsequent investigations into the attacks.
44
 
The University of Cape Town Law Clinic (UCT Law Clinic) brought a case in the 
Equality Court against the Minister of Safety and Security, the national and provincial police 
commissioners and the station commissioners of Worcester and Zwelethemba police stations 
on behalf of eleven of the foreigners whose properties were destroyed in the violence. The 
suit, Said and Ten Others v Minister of Safety and Security and Four Others
45
 seeks inter 
alia, a structural interdict requiring the police to establish a training program aimed at 
instructing police officers on dealing with the rights of refugees in a sensitive manner; an 
order compelling the respondents to fulfil their duties to provide safety and security to all 
including foreigners and to conduct a full investigation into the discriminatory practices of 
the police. They are also claiming R5.7 million in damages and an apology from government 
authorities. 
From a strategic litigation perspective, the potential impact of this case is significant.  
The UCT Law Clinic believes that a ruling in its clients‘ favour would impress upon the 
police and security services that their obligation to protect is not limited to South African 
                                                 
44
 These allegations are contained in court documents in a case instituted by victims. See note 45 below . 
45
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citizens.
 46
  The structural interdict in particular, if upheld, could help create a police force 
that is conversant with and respects the rights of refugees and asylum seekers. As the first 
point of contact in the quest for justice, a more tolerant police force resulting from this case 
would certainly improve access to justice for refugees and asylum seekers. It is hoped that 
this will help to bring an end to the situation described above where the justice system itself 
acts as a barrier to refugees in their quest for justice. Most importantly, the clinic believes that 
judgment in its clients‘ favour would help steer government towards developing the political 
will to deal with widespread xenophobia in both South African communities and government 
institutions.  
 
4.3.2 Do measures to promote equal access to justice live up to South Africa’s obligations? 
Whereas the Constitution guarantees equal access to justice for all, and the Vision 2000 
Policy document suggests that the State has the intention of ensuring such equal access, the 
evidence from the programmes and the lack of appropriat  legislation demonstrated above, 
suggest that refugees and asylum seekers do not feature among the groups of people whose 
equal access the State wishes to guarantee. The failure to address xenophobia in particular is 
a glaring shortcoming of the State‘s policy and programming for access to justice. Negative 
perception and stereotyping of foreigners, which is prevalent in the country
47
 makes recourse 
to the police, which is the first step to accessing the criminal justice system, an option that is 
not viable for refugees as it might result in further victimisation by the authorities.
48
 
Unfortunately, the policies and programmes on access to justice ignore this issue and as a 
result fail to address one of the most significant barriers to equality in access to justice for 
refugees and asylum seekers. The commitments made in terms of various international 
instruments on equality, discrimination and xenophobia and on refugees, do not appear to 
have had any bearing on South Africa‘s programming for access to justice, and as a result, the 
peculiar vulnerabilities which make accessing justice difficult for refugees and asylum 
seekers are not addressed. This is an issue of great importance to refugees access to justice 
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 Interviews with Fatima Khan, Varne Moodley, refugee attorneys at the University of Cape Town Law Clinic 
(12 September 2009). 
47
 Bronwyn Harris ‗Xenophobia: A new pathology for a new South Africa?‘ in Derek Hook & Gillian Eagle 
(eds) Psychology and social prejudice (Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press, 2002) 169. 
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 Ingrid Palmary ‗Refugees, safety and xenophobia in South African cities: The role of local government‘. 
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and is discussed in greater detail in the next chapter, along with anecdotal evidence of the 
various forms in which it is manifested.  
4.4 GREATER ACCESS TO LEGAL REPRESENTATION  
Scholars generally agree that the biggest barrier to access to justice in South Africa is the 
high cost of legal services.
49
 The average South African household would need to save a 
week‘s income in order to afford a one-hour consultation with an attorney. For black 
households (mostly poorer than the average), the barrier to access is even higher.
50
 It is no 
wonder therefore, that the DoJ prioritised the improvement of access to legal assistance for 
the poor. This prioritisation is anchored on even stronger considerations than just a desire to 
help the poor – it is constitutionally mandated and has significant importance for the 
protection of other human rights. As was discussed in chapter three,
51
 s. 35(c) of the 
Constitution imposes a duty on the State to provide free legal representation to persons 
accused of a crime where substantial injustice would otherwise occur. The ruling of the court 
in Nkuzi demonstrates that there are certain instances where this duty also exists in civil 
cases.
52
 This is in line with the position in international law which, chapter two showed, 
requires States to provide legal representation in criminal matters if the accused cannot afford 
one, and in some civil cases if effective access to court cannot be had without it.  
In South Africa, state-funded legal aid is the primary means for providing access to 
legal advice and representation for indigent persons who find themselves in conflict with the 
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 Afrimap ‗South Africa: Justice sector and the rule of law - A di     ion p p  ‘ (Johannesburg: Open Society 
Foundation for South Africa, 2005) 113; Jeremy Sarkin ‗Promoting access to justice in South Africa: Should the 
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legal aid in South Africa: The Nkuzi case‘ for an in-depth discussion on the potential impact of the Nkuzi case, 
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law. The body on which the duty rests to provide such representation is the Legal Aid Board 
(LAB). The LAB was already in existence before the adoption of both the 1996 Constitution 
and the Vision 2000 policy document, but to bring its operations in line with the new 
constitutional order, it required some overhaul. The following section provides a brief 
historical context for the discussion of the role of the LAB in promoting access to justice. 
 
4.4.1 Historical background of legal aid in South Africa 
As with most aspects of South African society, access to legal advice and representation and 
the role of the LAB has evolved in line with developments in the country‘s race relations.53  
In its early stages, the establishment of Legal Aid Bureaus was a matter of private initiative, 
with the South African Institute of Race Relations setting up the first legal aid offices in 
Johannesburg (1937) and in Cape Town (1941).
54
 Others were subsequently established in 
Bloemfontein, Port Elizabeth, Durban Pietermaritzburg, and East London. The Bureaux were 
financially assisted with a grant from the Department of Social Welfare until 1 July 1953, 
when the Department of Justice took over control of all the Bureaus.
55
 The government 
subsequently started a national legal aid scheme in 1962, but this never came into full 
operation and disintegrated fairly quickly.
56
 
Some of the Bureaus confined themselves to either civil or criminal cases, while the 
Johannesburg and Cape Town offices undertook both. The Johannesburg office extended its 
scope to include representation in political matters in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Given 
the political situation prevailing during this period, it was only a matter of time before this 
arrangement ran into trouble. A system that provided legal representation to persons seeking 
to challenge their subjugation obviously ran counter to the government‘s policy of elevating 
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 See generally Lovell Derek Fernandez A comparison between the legal aid systems of South Africa and West 
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one race while subjugating others – its own interpretation of justice, if the words of the then 
Secretary of the Cape National Party are anything to go by: 
To gain a clear view regarding fair treatment and the rights of non-Europeans, we should first answer 
another question, and that is: do we stand for the domination and supremacy of the European or not? ... 
For if you stand for the domination and supremacy of the European, then everything you do must in the 
first place be calculated to ensure that domination.
57 
 
The government‘s response to the Johannesburg Bureau‘s provision of legal aid in political 
cases was quite predictable – it terminated its subsidies as well as those of the Durban and 
Port Elizabeth Bureaus. The Cape office had closed earlier, having been crippled by 
inadequate funds. The enormity of the mass political trials led to the start of fund raising 
campaigns to raise money for these trials. After the trials, the South African Defence and Aid 
Fund was established to finance defence costs in political trials and support destitute families 
of political detainees. In 1966, the apartheid state outlawed the Defence and Aid Fund, on the 
grounds that some of its administrators were communists and it was being used for 
subversive activities.
58
  
In order to deflect political pressure occasioned by the banning of the Defence and Aid 
Fund, the LAB was established
59
 to provide legal aid to indigent persons.
60
 During its early 
years the LAB was grossly under-funded. It spent most of its budget on civil matters such as 
divorces and personal injury claims at the expense of criminal matters, and was for all intents 
and purposes, in hibernation.
61
 With the dawn of the democratic dispensation, things changed 
dramatically, in terms of the mandate of the Board and funding for it.
62
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4.4.2 Statutory provisions on legal aid and mandate of the LAB 
Firstly, to fully bring the LAB into compliance with the new role envisioned for it in a 
democratic State, its enabling Act was amended by virtue of the Legal Aid Amendment 
Act.
63
 The amendment was designed to amplify the objects and powers of the Legal Aid 
Board, make provision for a Legal Aid Guide,
64
 and set guidelines for granting legal aid. It 
also provided for the appointment of additional members to the Legal Aid Board.
65
 The most 
significant purpose however, was that it made the principal legislation, the Legal Aid Act, of 
1969, applicable throughout the Republic. Until the amendment, the so-called ‗homelands‘ of 
the apartheid era had been excluded from its provisions. The amending Act also repealed 
corresponding legal aid laws of those homelands.
66
 
In the years since the transition to democracy, the LAB‘s functions have expanded 
tremendously, as the State has committed more resources towards ensuring that more people 
requiring legal assistance receive it. The exponential increase in the LAB‘s budget from 
R66.3 million in 1994-5 to about R917.4 million in the 2009/10 budget year is a clear 
illustration. This is largely due to the obligations that the Constitution and others pieces of 
legislation impose on the State to provide legal assistance. Apart from the Constitution, the 
other obligations for the State to provide legal assistance are further defined by the Criminal 
Procedure Act,
67
 the Restitution of Land Rights Act,
68
 the Extension of Security of Tenure 
Act
69
 and the Child Justice Act.
70
 The State endeavours to meet these obligations through the 
LAB. The LAB‘s main objective is to render or make legal aid available to indigent and 
vulnerable persons within its financial means
71
, as contemplated in the Legal Aid Act, and to 
provide legal representation at State expense as contemplated in the Constitution.
72
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The term ‗indigent‘ is not defined in the Legal Aid Act, but s. 3(a) empowers the LAB 
to publish periodically, a Legal Aid Guide that includes details of policies and procedures for 
providing and administering legal aid. By virtue of this, the LAB lays down a means test, 
which is revised from time to time. The means test determines indigence for the purposes of 
consideration for legal aid.
73
  This is important, since resource constraints mean the LAB 
cannot provide unlimited legal aid to everyone who asks for it. Unfortunately however, critics 
maintain that its means test excludes large numbers of people, who though not indigent, are 
unable to afford private legal representation
74
 – a situation that the LAB itself admits is 
undesirable.
75
 With regard to vulnerable persons, the LAB  identifies as vulnerable persons, 
‗people, who may be at risk of being abused, unfairly discriminated against or exploited, eg 
women, children, people living with HIV, refugees, farm workers‘.76 As can be seen, 
refugees are classed among those who are considered vulnerable, and are therefore a target 
priority for the LAB‘s services. How well this is demonstrated in practice will be discussed 
later on,
77
 but first, I continue to look at the different pieces of legislation that define the 
mandate of the LAB in respect of different classes of matters.  
 
4.4.2.1 Criminal matters 
Since the introduction of the new Constitution, the LAB has had primary responsibility for 
providing legal aid in criminal cases where accused persons were unable to afford a lawyer 
because of indigence and ‗a substantial injustice would otherwise result‘ if they were not 
represented.
78
 This obligation is further defined in terms of s. 73 of the Criminal Procedures 
Act and ss. 82 and 83 of the Child Justice Act. The LAB has determined that the conditions 
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for providing legal assistance at state expense is met where the accused cannot afford the cost 
of legal representation and any of the following circumstances are present:  
 if convicted s/he would probably receive a sentence of imprisonment of which the 
unsuspended portion would be more than three months, without the option of a fine, 
or if given the option of a fine, such fine would not be paid after two weeks from the 
imposition of the sentence; 
79
 
 In criminal appeals, when a convicted person is sentenced to an effective term of 
imprisonment of more than 3 months and if given the option of a fine, the fine is 
unpaid 2 weeks after the date of sentence, and he/she is unable to afford legal 
representation.
80
 
 
4.4.2.2 Civil matters 
Chapter three highlighted the fact that other than in matters affecting children, as set out in s. 
28 of the Constitution, there are no other constitutional provisions which mandate the State to 
provide civil legal aid.
81
 Furthermore, there is no clarity in the jurisprudence regarding the 
obligations of the State with regard to civil legal since the courts have failed to delineate clear 
guidelines on the matter. It was, however, argued that in view of the lack of clarity in the 
jurisprudence regarding the right to legal assistance in civil matters, the position of the court 
in Nkuzi ought to be adopted because it fits in with the position under international law. 
Fortunately, the LAB has gon  a step further than the courts in this regard. The Legal Aid 
Guide has established guidelines under which the LAB will provide legal representation in 
civil matters. Depending on the availability of resources and where substantial injustice 
would otherwise result, a litigant who is indigent in a civil matter will be granted legal aid if 
the matter has prospects of success, on a balance of probabilities.
82
 Specifically the following 
criteria will be taken into consideration:  
 the seriousness of the issue for the person, for example, if the person‘s constitutional 
rights or personal rights are at risk; 
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 the complexity of the relevant law and procedure; 
 the ability of the person to represent himself or herself effectively without a lawyer; 
 the financial situation of the person; and 
 the person‘s chances of success in the case. 
 Whether the applicant has a substantial disadvantage compared with the other party 
in the case.
83
 
It is immediately obvious that the criteria set out correspond almost exactly with the 
guidelines laid down in international law as discussed in chapter two.
84
 It also suggests that 
the LAB was swayed by the reasoning of the Land Claims Court in Nkuzi, since these criteria 
also reflect those set out there. This undoubtedly represents some progress in establishing 
clear guidelines on civil legal aid in South Africa. Unfortunately however, there is a severe 
shortcoming: the grant of civil legal aid, even when these criteria are met, is made subject to 
‗the LAB [having] the necessary resources and the other requirements of this Guide [being] 
met‘.85 In other words, the LAB has a wide, resource-related discretion on whether or not to 
grant civil legal aid. The effect of this limitation is predictable – the constitutional imperative 
to provide assistance in criminal cases means that the LAB‘s resources would be 
disproportionately dedicated to criminal legal aid at the expense of civil matters, and this is 
indeed, the case. For example, only 7 per cent (30 309) of new matters taken on by the LAB 
during the 2008/09 financial year were civil matters, and the rest (404 613) were criminal 
matters.
86
 In other words, not much has changed in terms of the availability of civil legal aid.
 
87
 
Other matters in which the LAB has specific obligation to provide legal assistance are 
those related to children and to land matters. Its obligations to children are defined in s. 
28(1)(h) of the Constitution which imposes a duty on the State ‗to have a legal practitioner 
assigned to the child by the state, and at state expense, in civil proceedings affecting the 
child, if substantial injustice would otherwise result‘ In addition, the LAB has established a 
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unit to assist children in estate matters.
88
 Its obligations in respect of land matters derive from 
the constitutional imperative to address the issues of land restitution and security of tenure. In 
terms of the Restitution of Land Rights Act and the Extension of Security of Tenure Act any 
party to a land restitution claim who cannot afford to pay for its legal representation before a 
Land Claims Court, is entitled to civil legal aid at State expense.
89
 This provision has offered 
great advantages for land claimants, many of whom live in extreme poverty and do not have 
access to legal representation.
90
  
The section above has set out the statutory role of the LAB, as the primary means by 
which the State meets its obligations to provide legal assistance in terms of the Constitution 
and other legislation. The section below discusses how the State‘s obligations to refugees are 
met through the auspices of the LAB. The LAB‘s identification of refugees as a vulnerable 
group, and hence a priority target for its services, is the frame of reference for this discussion.  
 
4.4.3 Access to legal aid by refugees and asylum seekers 
Chapter two established the importance that international law attaches to the issue of legal 
assistance for refugees within the framework of access to justice.
91
 It was shown that, 
regardless of the formal recognition of their right to access to justice, refugees often face 
obstacles which stand in their way of getting justice. For this reason, Art 16(2) of the UN 
Refugee Convention confers on refugees the right to legal assistance in the territory of State 
Parties, to the same extent that citizens of State Parties enjoy legal assistance at State 
expense. The standard of treatment attached to this right is that referred to as ‗treatment as 
favourable as that accorded to nationals of the host state‘.92 Refugees in South Africa are 
thus, to be afforded the same right to legal assistance when it is required, to the same extent 
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as South African citizens are.
93
 This means that if South Africans are guaranteed a right to 
legal assistance in civil or in criminal matters, refugees must be entitled to the same. This 
would of course also mean that whatever limitations apply to citizens would also apply to 
refugees.  
On the constitutional front, chapter two established that the right to legal representation 
contained s. 35 of the Constitution applies to every accused person in South Africa, including 
refugees and asylum seekers. This is further supported by the Refugees Act, which 
specifically guarantees to refugees all those rights contained in the Bill of Rights,
94
 and this 
of course includes the right to legal representation as found in s. 35 of the Constitution. I 
argued that regardless of the lack of established guidelines regarding access to civil legal 
assistance at State expense, refugees ought to be afforded access to legal representation in 
civil matters, and especially so in certain cases, because of the nature of the issue at stake. 
Cases in point are matters relating to the adjudication of asylum, where failure could lead to 
refoulement, which for some, could be tantamount to a sentence of death or torture.
95
 I have 
already established above that the LAB lists refugees among the categories of vulnerable 
persons who are its priorities. The terms under which refugees are entitled to legal aid from 
the LAB are discussed below.  
 
4.4.3.1 Legal aid to refugees in criminal matters 
The LAB does not have a section dedicated to refugees and asylum seekers, but matters 
involving them are addressed in the Legal Aid Guide. With respect to criminal matters, the 
Guide does make it clear that all indigent persons, including refugees and asylum seekers, 
who qualify for legal aid under the Guide and are physically resident in South Africa, are 
entitled to legal aid.
96
 This provision certainly demonstrates an improvement, following the 
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earlier discussed case of S v Manuel.
97
 In that case, the LAB advised the magistrate that an 
accused person who was a refugee was not entitled to legal aid, following which his case was 
conducted without any legal representation and he was convicted. In overturning his 
conviction, the High Court established that all persons, including non-citizens, even if they 
were illegally in the country, were entitled to legal assistance in criminal cases if their right to 
a fair trial would be jeopardised without such representation. The position of the court in that 
case, which apparently has been adopted by the LAB represents the position in international 
law on the subject. The position of refugees and asylum seekers in respect of legal assistance 
in criminal matters is therefore that, where they are unable to afford private legal 
representation, and they pass the LAB‘s means test, they are entitled to have the services of a 
lawyer assigned to them free of charge, if substantial injustice would otherwise occur.  
 
4.4.3.2 Legal aid to refugees in civil matters 
With respect to the position of refugees and asylum seekers on civil matters other than 
asylum, unfortunately, the Legal Aid Guide is not as clear. Paragraph 4.2 of the Legal Aid 
Guide establishes clearly who qualifies for civil legal aid. It provides:  
The LAB grants legal aid in civil matters to: 
• All children resident in SA. 
• Any indigent person who qualifies for legal aid under this Guide and who is both physically resident in 
the Republic of South Africa and a citizen or permanent resident of the Republic of South Africa. 
Thus in order to enjoy legal aid in civil matters, a person has to be indigent in terms of the 
means test set out by the Legal Aid Guide; he or she needs to physically present in South 
Africa; and he or she needs to be a citizen or permanent resident of South Africa. This 
provision would automatically exclude all refugees and asylum seekers who are not 
permanent residents from accessing civil legal aid. In fact, it totally excludes every asylum 
seeker, because in terms of the Refugees Act, refugees need to have been so recognised for at 
least five years before they can apply for permanent residence.
98
 Asylum seekers are persons 
who have not yet been recognised as refugees and so they cannot apply for permanent 
residence.  
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Paragraph 4.2.1 of the Guide goes on to set out exceptions regarding residence, 
citizenship and permanent residence. It provides, inter alia, that ‗the requirement of ‗physical 
residence‘ does not apply to cases involving Asylum seekers and the Hague Convention‘. On 
the face of it, this provision appears to solve the problem that para 4.2 presents, but a closer 
reading shows that the wording is rather unfortunate, as it only serves to create confusion 
about the intentions of the LAB. Firstly, by specifically singling out asylum seekers for 
exemption from the requirement of residence, does this mean that physical residence is 
required for cases involving refugees? If this is the case, it would be very strange indeed. 
International law accords more rights to recognised refugees than it does to asylum seekers, 
as can be seen from the various standards of treatment that the UN Refugee Convention sets 
out.
99
 This same approach is followed in the Refugees Act. Section 27 makes the rights 
contained in the Bill of Rights applicable to refugees, but not asylum seekers. For instance as 
noted above, refugees can apply for permanent residence, asylum seekers cannot. Refugees 
can apply for social grants, asylum seekers cannot. The paragraph as it stands, suggests that 
the LAB is turning around the different standard of treatment between both categories of 
people. It means that an asylum seeker who is not physically resident in South Africa (for 
example a Zimbabwean, newly-arrived at the Beit Bridge who applies for asylum) can 
receive civil legal aid in all matters in which the LAB provides such, but a refugee, who is 
not physically resident (for example s udying on a scholarship in Botswana) cannot enjoy 
same.   
Secondly, the phrase ‗cases involving asylum seekers‘ seems to suggest that access to 
civil legal aid is attached to who is involved, i.e.  asylum seekers, and not to the type of 
matter, i.e.  asylum cases. Thus, it would seem that access to civil legal aid is available for an 
asylum seeker for matters such as divorce or evictions, for which the LAB provides legal 
aid.
100
 However, this suggestion is contradicted by para 4.15 of the Legal Aid Guide. Under 
the heading of ‗Asylum Seekers‘, it sets out the matters for which legal aid is available to 
asylum seekers, namely applications for asylum, determination of asylum or appealing the 
rejection of an application for asylum.  
Given the incongruent situation between the rights of refugees and asylum seekers 
created by a literal reading of para 4.2.1, as well as the express enumeration of the categories 
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of matters listed in para 4. 15, it is submitted that the wording of para 4.2.1 should be 
considered an unfortunate error, rather than the actual intention of the LAB. What the LAB 
probably intends, is to make the exception as to physical residence contained in para 4.2 
applicable to ‗asylum cases‘ rather than to ‗cases involving asylum seekers‘, since it would 
not make sense to accord more rights to asylum seekers than to refugees, contrary to the 
positions of international law and the Refugees Act.   
Even this probable reading leaves some lingering problems. If one accepts the probable 
explanation that what para 4.2.1 intends is that exclusion from the requirement of physical 
residence applies to legal aid for asylum seekers in asylum cases, rather than civil matters 
involving asylum seekers, then the express mention of asylum matters suggests that asylum 
seekers are excluded from accessing civil legal aid in all other matters. This would mean that 
in matters such as illegal evictions, which I have previously pointed out as a major problem 
for refugees and asylum seekers, they could not obtain legal aid.   
Furthermore, since the exclusion contained in para 4.2.1 would apply only in respect of 
asylum seekers, refugees must fulfil the conditions in para 4.2 in order to qualify for civil 
legal aid. This means they must be indigent in terms of the means test, they must be 
physically resident in South Africa, and they must be citizens or permanent residents. An 
indigent refugee who is physically resident would not be able to access civil legal aid unless 
he is also a permanent resident. This constitutes a severe limitation on the right of refugees 
and, it is submitted, is a violation South Africa‘s obligations under the UN Refugee 
Convention. As has been previously noted, Art. 16(2) of that Convention assimilates refugees 
to the status of nationals for the purposes of accessing legal aid. Refugees are therefore 
entitled to have civil legal aid when it is required, to the same extent that South African 
citizens do.
101
 As the primary body tasked with the provision of such assistance, the LAB 
ought not to exclude refugees from the services it provides in civil matters. By limiting the 
LAB‘s assistance to processes that will lead to the grant or refusal of asylum, under para 
4.15, the Guide places some severe limitations on both refugees and asylum seekers.  
 
4.4.3.3 Legal aid to refugees in asylum matters 
The importance of legal representation in asylum matters is clearly demonstrated in the 
literature. Various studies show that access to legal representation plays a critical role in the 
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outcomes of the refugee status determination process.
102
 Some indicate that a represented 
asylum seeker is four to six times more likely to win refugee recognition than an 
unrepresented one.
103
 Another study showed that the represented applicant‘s chances were 
two times better than the unrepresented, and that even unconventional forms of legal aid, 
including limited services by supervised non-lawyers showed a positive impact on asylum 
seekers‘ cases.104 This important connection between legal assistance and asylum is perhaps 
why much emphasis is placed on it is Western countries, where pro bono legal aid for 
asylum-seekers has become one of the most important developments in systematic refugee 
rights advocacy since the 1980s.
105
  Refugees also usually have access to low cost legal aid, 
funded by the government.
106
 The opposite is true for developing countries where refugees 
rarely have access to such services, although there have been recent efforts to address this. In 
January 2007 for instance, 15 refugee legal aid providers from developing countries met in 
Kenya and produced two instruments intended to spur the growth of legal aid for refugees.
107
 
Any efforts by the LAB in this regard would therefore represent positive development 
towards access to legal aid in asylum adjudication in Africa. 
In terms of the Legal Aid Guide, the LAB provides legal representation not only for the 
initial application for asylum and the refugee status determination process, but also for 
appeals arising from asylum adjudication. The Legal Aid Guide makes allowance for the 
provision of legal aid to asylum seekers applying or intending to apply for asylum in terms of 
the Refugees Act. The criteria for accessing such legal representation are the same attached to 
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civil matters, as set out above.
108
 However certain exceptions as to domicile and place of 
application are made.  
Applicants for legal aid ordinarily have to be resident in South Africa,
109
 but this 
restriction does not apply to asylum seekers. For this purpose of applying for legal aid in 
respect of an asylum matters, physical presence in South Africa at the date of application is 
sufficient.
110
  If the application for legal aid is in respect of the initial application for asylum 
in terms of Section 21 of the Refugees Act, an asylum seeker can make that application 
anywhere in the country. However, if the  application for legal aid is for the purposes of the 
actual determination on refugee status in terms of S.24 of the Refugees Act; or a review of 
the decision regarding his refugee status by the Standing Committee on Refugee Affairs in 
terms of S.25 of the Refugees Act;  or an appeal to the Refugee Appeal Board in terms of 
S.26 of the Refugees Act; such a person may also apply anywhere in South Africa, but his 
application will be sent to and handled only by Justice Centres in Pretoria, Johannesburg, 
Cape Town, Port Elizabeth or Durban since this is where the Tribunals hearing those matters 
are located.
111
  This represents a change in the position of the LAB. Under the old Legal Aid 
Guide of 2002, such applications could only be made in any of those 5 cities, which meant 
asylum seekers applying for legal aid had to travel to any of those cities if they were to 
receive any assistance. This change augurs well for access to justice as it removes the barriers 
of distance and cost of travel for asylum seekers. 
Where legal aid is granted for the purposes of the initial application for asylum in terms 
of Section 21 of the Refuge s Act, the mandate of the legal practitioner instructed to 
represent the asylum seeker terminates once the application is lodged and the legal 
practitioner reports and accounts to the Board‘s Chief Executive Officer.112 Considering the 
length of time it takes for the Department of Home Affairs to process asylum applications, 
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this is a  more judicious approach than to retain the practitioner until the asylum seeker‘s 
status is determined, which in the past has taken anything from six months to three years.
113
 
Responsibility for processing applications for legal aid in respect of proceedings in 
terms of s. 24, s. 25 and s. 26 of the Refugees Act are vested in the legal aid officers in the 
Boards offices which are located in Pretoria, Johannesburg, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and 
Durban. The legal aid officers then distribute legal aid instructions, giving preference firstly 
to co-operation partners who specialise in refugee matters, secondly to Justice Centres and 
thereafter to legal practitioners in private practice in accordance with the Board‘s applicable 
rotation list.
114
 The Guide makes provision for fees payable in respect of Asylum matters 
which are dealt with on a Judicare basis.
115
 This means that the LAB pays a private attorney a 
fee to represent a person who qualified for legal aid.
116
 
The provisions concerning legal aid by the LAB for asylum matters appear to be well 
thought out and sufficient to address the needs of asylum seekers. It is rather unfortunate 
however, that evaluating actual performance, for the purposes of this study, has been 
impossible due to lack of data. In none of its annual reports over the years does the LAB 
feature any feedback on what legal assistance it has provided for refugees and asylum 
seekers. This is curious given the fact that the Board expressly describes its efforts to improve 
coverage to other vulnerable groups, including children, women, the rural poor, the landless 
and the aged.
117
 Refugees are conspicuously absent in this list. Repeated efforts to obtain data 
from the LAB on its refugee-related cases proved abortive. Interviews were sought with 
officials of the Board and despite repeated attempts, no one was willing to be interviewed.  
Visits to the Cape Town offices of the Board merely resulted in instructions to ‗direct any 
enquiries to Pretoria‘. Even then, repeated emails to the designated person remained 
unanswered. In the absence of any information, it is therefore impossible to measure any 
progress in this area. Given the silence of the LAB on its role in asylum matters, it can only 
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be assumed that this class of people do not feature highly in the groups of people to whom it 
provide access to legal representation.  
 
4.4.4 Do the measures on access to legal representation meet South Africa’s obligations?  
It is generally accepted that access to legal representation for the poor and other vulnerable 
persons in South Africa is still largely inadequate,
118
 but scholars also admit that the LAB is 
one of the success stories of post-apartheid South Africa.
119
 Generally speaking, the statistics 
of service delivery alone are impressive. In the 2009/2010 financial year, it provided legal 
assistance in 416, 197 new legal matters, including 59, 266 matters which involved 
children.
120
 It provided legal representation for criminal matters in every court in the 
country.
121
 The short-coming it seems lie in the provision of legal assistance in civil cases 
which make up only 10 per cent of its work.  
However, with regard to refugees and asylum seekers, the absence of data on asylum 
matters suggests that LAB does not provide much in terms of legal assistance to refugees and 
asylum seekers. Furthermore, as the primary organ through which the State meets its 
obligations on free legal assistance, the LAB does not take cognisance of the fact that South 
Africa is obliged to treat refugees in the same way as nationals for purposes of legal 
assistance. This only serves to create an impression that South Africa‘s commitments to 
refugees and asylum seekers under international law, were not taken into consideration in the 
development of its guidelines on legal assistance. The LAB‘s requirement of permanent 
residence in respect of access to civil legal aid, and the limit of assistance to asylum matters 
for asylum seekers clearly demonstrate this. The unfortunate consequence of this is that, 
except in criminal matters, refugees and asylum seekers cannot turn to the LAB when they 
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require legal assistance, and consequently are denied effective and equal access to justice if 
they cannot afford legal representation by themselves. This situation stands in stark contrast 
to what international law expects of South Africa, and whether or not it has any effect on 
refugees‘ access will be seen in the next chapter. 
 
4.5 LANGUAGE AND EQUALITY OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR REFUGEES 
The notion of fair and equal access to justice, it was established in chapters two and three, 
requires that persons who are involved in court proceedings should be able to participate 
effectively in those proceedings. Both international law and the South African Constitution 
identify the issue of language proficiency as an important component of such fair and equal 
access.
122
 Thus, they confer on every arrested, detained or accused person, the right to be 
tried and to receive required information in a language that he or she understands. Where this 
is not possible, the State has an obligation to provide interpretation free of charge. Although 
this right is more properly articulated in the criminal context, it has been shown that the 
implications of the right for the very legitimacy of the justice system itself means that the 
right is not limited to criminal matters, but includes civil matters as well as those before 
administrative bodies.
123
  
Apart from the Constitution, there are other statutes and Rules of the Court which 
address the issue of language in the court system. The Magistrates‘ Courts Act124 for instance 
provides for the provision of an interpreter if, in the opinion of the court, the accused is not 
sufficiently conversant in the language in which evidence is being given.
125
 The High Court 
imposes a similar duty by virtue of Rule 61(1) of the Uniform Rules of Court which provides 
that where evidence in any proceedings is given in any language with which the Court or a 
party or his representatives is not sufficiently conversant, such evidence shall be interpreted 
by a competent interpreter, sworn to interpret faithfully and to the best of his ability in the 
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language concerned. If in the opinion of the court it is expedient to do so, then the court may 
satisfy itself as to the competence and integrity of the interpreter.
126
 The cost of such 
interpretation is borne by the State.
127
 
The issue of language proficiency is of particular relevance to refugees and asylum 
seekers in South Africa, most of whom, as stated in chapter one, come from countries where 
none of South Africa‘s official languages are spoken. The languages most commonly spoken 
among South Africa‘s refugees are French, Somali, Lingala and Swahili.128 Thus, conducting 
cases in South African courts would present a significant challenge for them if competent 
interpretation were not available. Given this fact, it was argued in chapter three that in order 
to meet the access to justice needs of its refugee population, South Africa is obliged to 
address in its policy and programming for access to justice, any challenges which may arise 
as a result of linguistic limitations. Such policy and programme must consider and address 
issues relating to proficiency in local languages including the development of clear guidelines 
on this. It must also ensure adequate and competent interpretation across the entire spectrum 
of the justice system, from the police force, as the first point of contact in the criminal justice 
system, to all adjudicatory forums which s. 34 of the Constitution may cover. Such 
interpretation services must be available free of charge, in both civil and criminal cases, and 
must include measures to make would-be users aware that such services are available. I will 
now look at whether these issues have been addressed in the policy. I start by setting the 
general context of the country‘s policy on language use in the administration of justice.   
 
4.5.1 Language policy in the administration of justice 
Until the end of apartheid, English and Afrikaans were the official languages of the court in 
South Africa. With the transition to democracy and the adoption of a new Constitution, new 
obligations emerged for the government with regard to language use, including by the justice 
system. In addition to English and Afrikaans, Section 6 of the Constitution accords official 
language status to nine indigenous African languages whose usage and status were previously 
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diminished.
129
 All 11 are therefore, official languages of the court and may be used in 
proceedings, and ostensibly, as the language of record.
130
  
The DoJ has responsibility for developing a language policy for use in the justice 
system. However, as at 2010, no language policy has been adopted, although there has been 
talk of one for many years.
131
 This situation is indicative of the general government attitude, 
because, despite the constitutional bias towards multilingualism in South Africa, achieving it 
has not been a priority for the government.
132
 Several years after the advent of democracy, 
there is still no legislation to promote multilingualism as required by the Constitution. A 
South African Languages Bill has been in the pipelines since 2000, and has not yet been 
passed, although a recent High Court ruling which directs the government to enact a language 
act within two years holds out hope that that may soon change.
133
  
The absence of a policy does not mean however, that nothing has been done by the DoJ 
on the subject of languages to be used in the administration of justice. The DoJ has translated 
some laws into some or all of the 11 official languages,
134
 and in 2009, it initiated an 
‗Indigenous Language Pilot Project‘ in 27 district courts countrywide through which it 
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promotes the use of indigenous languages as languages of the court and of record.
135
 The 
project involves designating the most common language spoken by users of each court as the 
official language to be used in that particular court.
136
  
However, as laudable at these are, they do not make up for the absence of a language 
policy framework that enunciates the department‘s plans on the subject, and provides 
guidance on the establishment of measures that will help to improve linguistic accessibility as 
a component of equal access to justice. This lack of a language policy also has implications 
for refugees‘ access to justice, bearing in mind that the notion of effective access requires that 
a person be able to participate fully in any proceedings involving him or her. This has been 
expressed as the right to be tried in a language he or she understands or, where that is not 
possible, to have interpretation at State expense. I will now look at each of these aspects 
separately. 
 
4.5.2 The right of refugees to be tried in a language they understand 
The first implication of the lack of a language policy is to be found in the import of the right 
contained in s. 35(3)(k). That section, as established in chapter two, only confers a right to be 
tried in a language that one understands, not necessarily in one‘s language or a language of 
one‘s choice. The most important implication of this relates to proficiency in local languages. 
There is no doubt that the longer refugees settle in South Africa and intermingle with their 
hosts, the more likely that they will begin to understand some of the local languages. This 
then means that refugees who understand any of the official languages, can be tried in that 
language in court. However, in the interest of equal access to justice, it is important that all 
parties have enough linguistic competence that they can fully comprehend the implications of 
all that is being said and all that they say. As the court held in S v Ngubane,
137
 partial 
understanding of a language is inadequate to meet the standard that s. 35(3)(k) imposes. A 
person must fully understand the language.
138
  This is where the lack of a policy and 
established guidelines becomes a problem, for in the absence of clear guidelines, how is a 
refugee‘s proficiency in the local language to be determined? In discussing this issue, certain 
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critical observations of scholars in this regard must be borne in mind. Moore and Mamiya for 
instance, note that immigrants who arrive in their new country as adults often only master the 
local language at a conversational level, rather than at a fully bilingual level.
139
 Not only that, 
but the unfamiliarity, formality and the anxiety-inducing nature of court processes is such that 
it can have negative effects on a person‘s ability to express himself even in his home 
language, much less in a second language.
140
 Since language is the means by which legal 
issues are formulated and resolved, it is very important that both sides are able to express 
themselves as clearly as possible, and the policy must reflect that standard. 
But as already noted, no guidelines currently exist by which the proficiency of a person 
is tested. The closest thing to a guideline is found in the provision of the Magistrates‘ Court 
Act and the High Court Uniform rules of court referred to above.
141
 However, the standard 
set out there is very low. All that is required is that it should ‗appear‘ to the magistrate that 
the accused is not sufficiently conversant with the language. This has been interpreted to 
mean that the judge or magistrate only needs to form an opinion as to whether or not the 
accused is conversant with the language of the witness.
142
 In other words, such determination 
is left to the discretion of each magistrate or judge, who then has to make an ad hoc and 
untrained guess as to the linguistic capacity of those appearing before them.  
Not only could this situation lead to arbitrariness and the possibility of entrenching 
unequal access to justice for refugees and asylum seekers, it also puts judges themselves 
under additional pressure. Language is not simply a matter of words. It includes such things 
as idioms, colloquialisms, slangs and nuances that a non-native speaker may not pick up, but 
which are important for understanding a language.
143
 Thus, not only do judges have to 
balance the interests of justice as guaranteed by the Constitution, they are also forced to 
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undertake functions in a speciality they probably have no expertise in. Furthermore, 
discretion could be utilised in such a way that it goes against the principle of equal treatment.  
One would expect that, especially in relation to non-citizens like refugees and asylum 
seekers, there would be guidelines requiring professional linguistic assessment. Guidelines 
help to remove arbitrariness and entrench objectivity, rather than subjectivity. They help to 
ensure equal treatment of all persons. This is the overall goal of the access to justice 
guarantees found in international law and under the Constitution. Thus, a language policy 
which recognises South Africa‘s obligations in respect of access to justice for non-citizens, 
including refugees and asylum seekers would address those kinds of issues. It would 
empower administrators to establish measures which address the need of trial judges to have 
effective and efficient assessment tests that will help them to determine whether a Congolese 
refugee who speaks Xhosa actually requires the help of an interpreter. The lack of such a 
policy, it is submitted constitutes a failure in this regard.  
4.5.3 Is there a case for use of refugees’ languages in court? 
In S v Saidi,
144
 the court highlighted the fact that there is ‗an increasing demand for casual 
interpreters to render translation services for accused persons who are immigrants from other 
countries on the continent‘ and who are not proficient in any of the 11 official languages.145 
African migrants, said the court have become a significant feature of post-apartheid South 
Africa, and will invariably have encounters with the justice system.
146
 The DoJ therefore 
urgently needs to address their requirements with regard to language interpretation. But 
should the justice system l mit its intervention only to matters of interpretation? is there an 
argument that the DoJ ought to make provision for the use of one or more of the languages 
most commonly spoken by foreigners of African origins, such as Swahili or French given that 
they constitute a significant population group? This question is worth asking, in view of s. 
6(5) of the Constitution. 
That section, it is interesting to note, is a recognition by the Constitution that there are 
population groups within South Africa whose primary languages are none of the official 
languages listed in s. 6(1). It thus provides in Section 6(5)(a)
147
 for the creation of a Pan-
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South African Language Board (PANSALB), which has the responsibility to promote and 
develop the country‘s official languages as listed in s. 6(1) as well as the Khoi, Nama, San 
and sign language. The Board also has the job of promoting and ensuring respect for 
languages ‗commonly used by communities in South Africa, including German, Greek, 
Hindi, Portuguese, Tamil, Telegu and Urdu‘ as well as languages of religious significance 
such as Arabic, Hebrew and Sanskrit. It is clear from the wording of s. 6(5)(b)(i) that the list 
of languages whose use are to be promoted is not exhaustive, in that it refers to ‗all languages 
commonly used by communities in South Africa including ... ‘ Given the open-ended nature 
of the list, surely, if it can be established that French, for instance, or Swahili, is a language 
‗commonly used by communities in South Africa‘, then the PANSALB has an obligation to 
promote its use. An aspect of promoting the use of a language is its use in court.
148
   
Furthermore, utilising the criteria set out in s. 6(2) in respect of languages to be used by 
government in each province, i.e.  ‗taking into account the usage, practicality, expense, 
regional circumstances and the balance of the needs and preferences of the population as a 
whole‘ it is submitted that there is no reason why the DoJ cannot adopt one or more foreign 
African languages for use, if it meets that criteria. Thus, if it is established that a specific area 
with large migrant populations uses Swahili, court proceedings, especially in smaller courts 
serving those areas (such as community courts) could be conducted in such a language if it is 
practicable.  There is an argument, deriving from the State‘s obligations to ensure access to 
justice for refugees and asylum seekers, that such a practice would better meet the goal of 
equality in access to justice. 
However, there are several limitations to these arguments. Firstly, ‗a State is never 
obligated to conduct all of its activities in every language which is spoken by the inhabitants 
of its territory‘.149 That would be too onerous a burden. Secondly, the State‘s first duty is to 
                                                                                                                                                        
A Pan South African Language Board established by national legislation must  
a. promote, and create conditions for, the development and use of   
i. all official languages;  
ii. the Khoi, Nama and San languages; and  
iii. sign language ; and  
b. promote and ensure respect for   
i. all languages commonly used by communities in South Africa, including German, Greek, Gujarati, 
Hindi, Portuguese, Tamil, Telegu and Urdu; and Arabic, Hebrew, Sanskrit and other languages used 
for religious purposes in South Africa. 
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its citizens, and the focus of its efforts should be on advancing the use of South Africa‘s 
indigenous languages in courts. That is what the Constitution requires and it is quite clear that 
the duty of the State in respect of languages in common use is quite different to that with 
respect to indigenous languages. PANSALB is expected to create conditions for development 
of the indigenous languages, but only promote use of and respect for the languages in 
common use by communities. It is thus difficult to argue that there is an obligation for South 
Africa to use refugee languages in courts, or to establish courts which use those languages.  
It does appear however that this is a possibility that the DoJ itself has considered. In its 
medium-term strategic framework, 2005/06-2008/09
150
 the DoJ builds upon the goals set in 
the Justice Vision 2000 policy document and describes its strategy on how to deliver on its 
mandate going forward. One of its strategic objectives in the achievement of access to justice 
is the provision of services in all the official languages, as well as in sign language and 
Braille. Interestingly, it lists as one of its key performance indicators – the measurement of its 
performance/success in this regard – ‗Provinces with capability for most international and 
immigrant/refugee languages used in local areas by 2008/09‘.151 Unfortunately, there is no 
available data on how far or how well the DoJ has done in terms of empowering all provinces 
to be able to use immigrant and refugee languages. According to the department, that idea is 
still in progress.
152
 It bears pointing out that while having these indicators point to the 
importance the DoJ attaches to the issue, the details may be a little more complicated given 
the fact that refugee populations vary by waves.
153
 While Zimbabweans may predominate 
one year, the following year could be one in which Congolese refugees and asylum seekers 
dominate, and with them the language needs.  
But while there is no obligation with regard to using the languages that refugees speak 
in court, there certainly is one with regard to their right to use those languages themselves 
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and to be provided with interpretation that will enable them to do so. This is the second area 
which is affected by the lack of a language policy. 
  
4.5.4 Refugees’ right to interpretation 
In terms of the Constitution, where it is impracticable to conduct a trial in a language 
understood by the refugee, the State has to provide interpretation free of charge. As shown in 
chapters two and three, the right to interpretation is not limited to oral testimonies in court but 
includes pre-trial proceedings, communicating rights upon arrest as well as the translation of 
documents which allow a person to effectively understand the case against him or her, and to 
have the benefit of a fair trial.
154
 In criminal matters, this would include communication with 
the police and other law enforcement agents. 
The South African Police Service (SAPS) forms part of the administration of justice, in 
view of its duties in relation to arrest, detention and trials in terms of s. 35 of the Constitution, 
and given that it produces documents required for court purposes. The lack of a language 
policy in the administration of justice therefore has implications not only in court, but also at 
the preliminary stages, with the police in criminal matters.  
Section 35 of the Constitution entrenches several rights for accused and detained 
persons, each of which requires some language proficiency in order to be enjoyed. Arrested 
persons have the right to be informed of their right to remain silent and the consequences of 
not doing so; they have the right to be told why they are being detained; they have the right to 
be informed of their right to consult a legal practitioner, and of the right to have one assigned 
by the State if they cannot afford it. These rights of arrest and detention in s. 35 of the 
Constitution are to be read in conjunction with s. 39(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act
155
 
which require a person effecting an arrest to inform the arrested person of the reasons for his 
arrest. These rights are important because they enable an arrested and detained person to 
know the basis for his or her arrest and detention, and to challenge the lawfulness of it if they 
wish to do so. It also enables them to avoid self-implication and enjoy the right to be 
represented by a lawyer. These rights are in line with those accorded by international law,
156
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and it is clear that they are supposed to enhance an arrested and detained person‘s ability to 
prepare and present his case in court. Obviously if a refugee or asylum seeker is to enjoy 
these rights, they need to be communicated by the police, and they must be communicated to 
him or her in a language s/he understands, or be interpreted into a language s/he understands. 
In view of the earlier described problems of police and xenophobia, the issue of language 
competence and interpretation becomes even more significant.   
Unfortunately, the lack of a national language act or policy means that there is no over-
arching framework guiding how the SAPS is to address the issue of language in its 
interactions with the populace, citizen and non-citizen alike. However, in the absence of a 
language policy, the SAPS has adopted its own set of guidelines on this area.
157
 Each police 
officer is supplied with a pocket book which sets out the rights on arrest and detention. The 
rights are printed in the 11 official languages, and an arresting officer must provide this 
information to the arrested person in a language s/he understands. If the police office is 
unable to establish what language the arrested person understands or if the officer cannot 
speak the language the arrested person understands, then the rights are to be communicated in 
English. Upon arrival at the police station, the officer then has to inform the Community 
Service Centre Commander that the arrested person does not understand English. The 
Commander then has to ascertain what language the person speaks in order to convey the 
information in that language. If the commander is able to speak that language, s/he must then 
convey the contents of the right to the detainee. If the commander is unable to communicate 
in that language, then s/he must find someone who can speak that language to communicate 
the rights. If s/he is unable to find someone who speaks that language, then the contents of 
the right must be read out to the detainee in English, and then all reasonable steps must be 
taken to find a person who speaks that language. If it is impossible to determine any language 
that a person in custody understands, then such a person must be advised of his or her rights 
in English or any other language which the commander speaks.
158
  
The initiative of the SAPS in developing its own guidelines is commendable. The 
procedure suggests that efforts are to be made to ensure that foreigners, such as refugees and 
asylum seekers know and understand their rights when they are arrested or detained. 
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However, given the strong anti-foreigner rhetoric that surrounds crime and criminality in 
South Africa,
159
 these procedures are not only patently inadequate, they are so disconnected 
from reality as to be construed as a deliberate violation of the rights of foreigner, including 
refugees and asylum seekers to access to justice. This is so because, in an environment in 
which foreigners, including refugees and asylum seekers, get the blame for high crime rates, 
African migrants make up a large percentage of police arrests.
160
 Regardless of the fact that 
the main purpose of these arrests seems to be to help police officers meet their weekly arrest 
targets,
161
 and that most of those arrested are simply released after short periods of detention 
(usually after paying a bribe),
162
 the fact remains that as arrested and detained persons, they 
are entitled to the rights contained in s. 35 of the constitution. The frequency of arrests alone, 
is in itself, strong argument that the police has an obligation to make much better efforts to 
address the language needs of foreigners.  
Admittedly, the rights contained in s. 35(1) only require an arresting police officer to 
inform the arrested person of his rights in a language s/he understands and not in his or her 
own language,
163
 but the fact remains that they must understand it. If a significant percentage 
of those who are being arrested and detained do not speak the 11 official languages, then 
making the rights of arrested and detained persons available only in those languages serves 
no useful purpose. Neither does the precaution of reading the rights in English when an 
officer cannot determine the language of the detainee. As the court noted in R v Lee Kun 
164
 
the effect of trying a person in a language s/he does not understand is tantamount to a trial in 
absentia. The effect, it is submitted, of informing a person of his or her rights in a language 
s/he does not understand is similar to that – it simply means that they have not been informed 
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of their rights. This is a clear violation of the fair trial rights contained in s. 35 of the 
constitution, and it means that refugees and asylum seekers‘ rights to equal access to justice 
are being violated.  
The right to equality and equal protection of the law contained in s. 9 of the 
Constitution means that all arrested and detained persons, regardless of the language they 
speak, must be informed of their rights. Failure to do so could lead to violation of the many 
access to justice rights for refugees and asylum seekers, since they would not be able to take 
advantage of the right to remain silent or to have legal representation. What is expected, in 
view of the above is that police stations, particularly those located in areas inhabited by 
significant numbers of foreign persons, including refugees and asylum seekers, would 
employ the services of interpreters who can translate those rights into the languages mostly 
spoken by them, such as French, Swahili, Lingala and Somali. Even if it were impossible to 
retain those services on a full time basis, ad hoc access to a pool of interpreters at short notice 
would still be very helpful in ensuring that arrested foreigners have interpreters during 
questioning, but this does not appear to be the case. A 2010 investigation by the Public 
Service Commission for instance found that 50 per cent of sampled police stations, all located 
in World Cup host cities, did not have provisions for interpretation into foreign languages, 
even with preparation for the World Cup in top gear.
165
  This provides an insight into what is 
the normal state of affairs, when an important event like the World Cup is not in the offing.  
Some measures adopted during the World Cup also give an insight into what is 
possible. During the tournament, SAPS established a telephone interpreting service to help 
stranded tourists, whereby persons who could not speak any of the official languages why 
assisted by interpreters over the phone. There is no reason why this cannot be adopted on a 
permanent basis. However, in what is somewhat indicative of the scant attention paid to the 
needs of African migrants, who make up the vast proportion of South Africa‘s refugee 
population, this worthy initiative was marred by the fact that the service was mostly focused 
on serving tourists from outside the continent. Other than French, there were hardly any 
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provisions made for African languages.
166
 Such occurrences only serve to reinforce 
perceptions of discrimination against African migrants in South Africa.  
Other simple, yet useful, approaches towards appraising arrested and detained refugees 
and asylum seekers of their rights, include translating those rights into the foreign languages 
and having them available in written form to be prominently displayed and also handed out to 
arrested and detained persons. While this cannot replace the need to orally appraise them of 
their rights, the information gleaned from those written materials would, in the interim, 
reduce the problems occasioned by an inability to find a speaker of the relevant language, as 
the arrested person can then choose to remain silent or request the services of a lawyer.  
Unfortunately, the situation is that the procedure in place does not place as much emphasis on 
effective communication as it does on meeting the spirit of the law, with the result that 
refugees and asylum seekers live in a situation where they are highly vulnerable to arrest, but 
do not enjoy the safeguards that the Constitution put in place to protect them in the event of 
such arrests. The situation of inequality that this situation engenders is obvious – while 
citizens can have their rights communicated to them in any of the 11 official languages, and 
thus given the opportunity to request the presence of a lawyer, refugees cannot enjoy the 
same treatment. This is yet another demonstration of how the policy falls short of the 
constitutional standard. The right to interpretation however, extends beyond communication 
with the police, to communication during trial itself. With regard to this right in court, the 
most important issues relate to the availability and competency of interpreters.  
 
4.5.4.1 Availability  
The question of whether or not foreign language interpretation is available in South African 
courts was addressed during a parliamentary question and answer session in 2003. Within a 
prevailing atmosphere of public hostility towards foreigners, shaped largely by the perception 
that the rise in crime levels was the fault of foreigners, the issue of linguistic accessibility of 
courts to foreigners was raised by Ms. Sheila Camerer of the Democratic Alliance who 
wanted to know if the DoJ employed ‗foreign language interpreters in the courts in centres 
like Johannesburg, where many accused speak only foreign languages; if not, why not; if so, 
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what are the relevant details?‘ She also wanted to know if the DoJ had taken or intended to 
take any steps to ensure that cases against foreigners were not withdrawn because of a lack of 
appropriate interpreters. The then Minster of Justice, Dr Penuall M Maduna replied:  
‗Yes, where required, foreign language interpreters are employed on a casual basis when there is a need. 
Supervisors of court interpreters in each court centre also keep a register of suitable foreign language 
interpreters to utilise them whenever there are cases involving foreigners.  
The Department has urged supervisors of court interpreters to keep a list of foreign language interpreters 
to avoid withdrawal of cases when appropriate interpreters are not available. The Prosecuting Authority 
has been requested to give advance notice of specific requirements regarding foreign accused or 
witnesses that require appropriate interpreters, so that such interpreters can be appointed if required‘.167  
The Minister‘s response at that time still reflects the position regarding availability of foreign 
language interpreters now, i.e.  that the DoJ employs on an ad hoc basis, foreign language 
interpreters when required. However, what the Minister‘s response does not reflect is the fact 
that access to foreign African language interpreters is alarmingly inadequate. So much so, 
that the courts have repeatedly called on the DoJ to address the problem.
168
  Mponda v S
169
 
illustrates quite well, the challenge posed by this situation. That case involved a Malawian 
national charged with rape. The trial court was unable to find an interpreter who spoke the 
accused person‘s language (wrongly recorded as Nyanza and Kenyaza, but determined by the 
High Court to be Chichewa). Because the accused indicated that he had lived in Zimbabwe at 
some point, efforts were made to obtain a Zulu language interpreter because that was 
determined to be the language closest to isiNdebele, which is spoken in the Matabeleland 
area of Zimbabwe. However, the accused had lived in Harare not Matabeleland, and isiShona 
is the predominant language there.
170
 Furthermore, the accused could only communicate in 
English at a basic and unsophisticated level.
171
 Eventually, a person from the Malawian 
embassy was found to act as interpreter.  
The record did not show that the magistrate made any efforts to satisfy himself as to the 
expertise of the interpreter. Instead, what appeared from the record was that the interpreter 
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and the accused experienced some difficulty understanding each other, but the case was 
allowed to proceed anyway. Under the circumstances the High Court was not satisfied that 
the accused had had a fair trial. In setting aside his conviction, the court lamented the fact that 
a person who was in all probability, guilty, had to be let off due to such inadequacies.
172
 The 
court observed:  
‗South Africa is also a haven for a significant population of African refugees. Many of these people are 
not sufficiently proficient in any South African language to be able to use any such language should they 
become involved in a trial. The difficulty reported by the attorney, together with those, described earlier, 
experienced by the Wynberg court in finding an appropriate foreign African language interpreter would 
suggest that measures are necessary to address the language interpretation requirements likely to arise in 
comparable cases.
173 
 
The court went on to suggest that the DoJ establish a panel of officially accredited ad hoc 
interpreters qualified in the various foreign African languages spoken by significant numbers 
of people living in South Africa so that courts and legal practitioners who required such 
services would have a ready means of access.
174
 There is no reason why this cannot be done, 
given the considerable population of African foreigners, who, as will be demonstrated in 
chapter five are usually quite well educated. According to officials of the DoJ, one of the 
main problems is that when posts are advertised, foreign language speaking people who have 
proper credentials not apply for these positions.
175
 
But the fact remains that the onus is on the State to ensure that such interpretation is 
available. Like the SAPS, the DoJ was able, during the 2010 FIFA World Cup, to establish a 
corps of trained foreign language interpreters
176
 If it saw fit to go the extra mile to obtain 
such services for a temporary event like the World Cup, surely the longer term presence of 
refugees and asylum seekers, and indeed of African migrants in general, is greater incentive 
to take extra, even innovative, steps to ensure that such interpretation is available. The 
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consequence of not doing so defeats the administration of justice, as Mponda clearly 
illustrates, and it goes against the obligation that South Africa has under international law and 
the Constitution. 
 
4.5.4.2 Competence  
Where interpreters are available, the other issue relates to the competence of such 
interpreters. The principle is that persons involved in proceedings must be able to understand 
the proceedings at all times and the interpretation received must be as close as possible to a 
situation where they are in a language that he or she understands.
177
 In order to meet this 
obligation it is essential that the interpreter is sufficiently competent in the languages he or 
she is interpreting. His or her competence will affect the testimony of witnesses, the ability of 
legal representatives to properly examine witnesses and make correct submissions,
178
 as well 
as the outcome of the case.
179
  
As previously noted, the Magistrates‘ Courts Act and High Court Uniform Rules of 
Court require magistrates and judges to call for an interpreter if evidence is being given in a 
language with which the court or other participant is not sufficiently conversant. It is 
interesting to note that the onus on the court is not only to determine whether the accused is 
sufficiently proficient in the language of the court, but also to provide a ‗competent‘ 
interpreter. How does the magistrate determine who is a competent interpreter? As with the 
issue of a person‘s language proficiency, there are no guidelines on this, either in the Act and 
Rules, or in a policy document. It is only required that the magistrate or judge be satisfied as 
to expertise of the interpreter and this is ordinarily achieved by swearing in the interpreter in 
open court, and by questioning him or her appropriately.
180
  
The failure of the DoJ ‗to provide clear guidelines for the execution of interpreting in 
South African courts of law‘,181 has been a cause for concern for scholars, who maintain that 
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this affects the quality of interpreting available.
182
 The quality is affected not only by the lack 
of guidelines, but also by the professional standard and level of training provided. Interpreters 
are supplied to the court from within the ranks of those employed by the DoJ,
183
 and the duty 
to ensure that the corps of interpreters is adequately trained and sufficiently competent lies 
with the DoJ. However, the current standard, qualification required and level of training 
provided for interpreters is considered to be quite substandard.
184
 Scholars and practitioners 
in the field maintain that, given the complexity of legal proceedings, the only way to attain a 
threshold of competence for court interpreters is for them to be well educated, preferably at a 
tertiary level and to have a certification system that accurately tests their skills and 
abilities.
185
 But at present, the qualification required for appointment as a court interpreter is a 
Grade 12 certificate or equivalent and good knowledge of the languages spoken in the region 
where the candidate is to be appointed.
186
  
On appointment, they are provided with a six-week training course which gives them 
an overview of court procedures.
187
 This training course is supposed to take place before the 
court interpreter is assigned to a particular court, but in some instances, court interpreters wait 
for up to five years before attending the course, and therefore must acquire any interpreting 
expertise through self-training.
188
 Furthermore, the profession itself is not regulated by any 
professional code or code of conduct prescribed either by law or by a legally constituted 
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regulatory body.
189
 This has led to situations in which ‗unscrupulous court interpreters exploit 
the loopholes apparent in the system, by intentionally misinterpreting the evidence in order to 
influence the outcome of the case‘.190  
Unfortunately, refugees and asylum seekers are among those most likely to be affected 
by incompetent interpreters, because as stated above, there is a dearth of foreign African 
language interpreters that the DoJ has access to. Therefore, much reliance is placed on ad hoc 
interpreters, who have not had the benefit of even the limited training referred to above. Lack 
of competence by such interpreters could have very significant effects. This is especially so 
in criminal cases, as Mponda and Saidi demonstrate, as well as in cases before asylum 
adjudicatory bodies, where decisions turn on the oral story of the applicant. An incompetent 
interpreter would have a far-reaching negative effect on the outcome of an asylum seekers‘ 
application, and consequently on his life, if as a result, he is subjected to refoulement. Even 
where there is no possibility of such a drastic outcome, the possibility of injustice remains. 
During the course of the fieldwork conducted for this study, I came across several 
instances of problematic interpretation, which highlighted why interpreters should be 
adequately skilled, not just linguistically, but also in the nuances and intricacies of 
communication. In one such instance a French-speaking refugee testified under cross-
examination that his assailants had tracked him in a car. Asked what colour the car was, he 
said ‗marron‘ which is French for brown. The interpreter translated this as maroon. The 
defence lawyer asked ‗Like red?‘ ‗No‘, he replied, ‗like beige‘, which again, for a French-
speaker is more akin to brown. For the next several minutes, the cross-examination revolved 
around whether maroon was similar to red or beige, and therefore the accuracy of the 
refugee‘s testimony. The anxiety that this lack of understanding caused to the refugee as he 
tried to explain himself was clearly visible. It was unfortunate that the interpreter did not 
grasp that fine detail and point out that those similar words actually have different meanings 
in French and English.  
Such instances illustrate why it is important, in the interest of equal and effective access 
to justice, that interpreters be adequately trained. Such training, it is submitted, must not only 
                                                 
189
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be limited to understanding legal jargon and court processes, but must also bear in mind the 
role of the interpreter as a bridge between the cultural gaps that exist among participants in 
courts.
191
  As scholars point out, competence on the part of the interpreter is not only a matter 
of bi-lingualism or multi-lingualism. It includes what has been described as ‗bi-cultural 
sensitivity‘.192 This term essentially acknowledges that culture lies behind spoken words, and 
the norms, value systems and symbols that make up a culture shape the meaning of those 
words. Thus, the same words could have different meanings to persons from different 
cultures.
193
 It is therefore important that interpreters understand ‗differences in gestures, 
reactions, attitudes towards time, and forms of personal address, if their interpretation it to be 
accurate‘.194 Given the cultural diversity of the refugee population in South Africa, it is 
important that interpreters who are appointed to interpret in cases involvi g them have some 
knowledge of their cultural backgrounds, as part of the competence required. Here, the 
refugee population itself serves as an important resource. If adequately trained, they would 
help to reduce the current shortage of interpreters and South Africa in the process will more 
adequately meet its obligations to provide equal access to justice for refugees and asylum 
seekers.  
  
4.5.5 Do the measures on linguistic accessibility meet South Africa’s obligations to 
refugees and asylum?  
It has been shown that equality of access, in respect of access to justice requires linguistic 
competence. Where a refugee‘s ability to defend himself or to conduct a case in court is 
restricted by his or her inability to understand the language of the court, this raises serious 
questions about the entire justice system. Such a system is clearly not equally accessible and 
it is therefore incumbent on the State to address the situation. Ideally, this should be 
addressed in policy which set out directive principles to guide the State‘s efforts. Legislation 
is also helpful in this regard as the sanctions and penalties which such legislation may contain 
                                                 
191
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can help ensure that the policy is carried out.
195
 Unfortunately, the government has failed to 
adopt an overarching policy or legislation, which would cut across all spheres, including in 
the administration of justice. As a result, each unit of government is left to decide its own 
guidelines, as the SAPS has done. As there is nothing against which to benchmark the 
individual policies adopted by difference departments, the unfortunate fact is that guidelines 
that do not adequately address the language needs of refugee and asylum seekers cannot be 
challenged as being against State policy.  
The DoJ on its part has failed to adopt any language policy at all. Issues that could have 
been identified and addressed by a proper policy, such as foreign language use and 
interpretation in court proceedings and guidelines on interpretation etc, are left unattended. 
As has been argued above, this only leaves room for ad hoc and inconsistent determinations 
of linguistic capability which could lead to miscarriage of justice. Thus, despite the fact that 
some efforts have been made, they are salutary, especially in relation to refugees and asylum 
seekers, and clearly, they are not enough. There needs to be clear demonstration of 
compliance with international and constitutional obligations, and unfortunately, a system 
characterised by inadequate interpretation services will not create confidence in the justice 
system by those refugees and asylum seekers who find themselves with language challenges. 
Again, this is a reflection that South Africa‘s programming for access to justice does not take 
into consideration, the obligations imposed by the commitments it made to refugees under 
international law.  
 
4.6 WHAT ABOUT ALTERNATIVE JUSTICE SYSTEMS? 
It is estimated that in most developing countries, non-state justice systems account for 80 per 
cent of total cases resolved every year,
196
 and this is especially so in Africa.
197
 On the 
position of these non-state justice systems, chapter three established that while the provisions 
of the South African Constitution on access to justice do not apply to justice systems 
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operating outside the control of the State, the fact remains that those systems do exist, and 
this fact has important implications for the State in respect of refugees‘ access to justice. 
The first implication is that South Africa needs to recognise that such forums do exist 
within its borders. Its policy on access to justice must therefore reflect such recognition and 
include measures to engage with them, and most importantly, to address any inherent dangers 
related to their functioning. The most significant danger is the potential of such forums to 
violate human rights.
198
 This is especially true with regard to the kinds of punishments they 
sanction, for instance the use of physical violence such as flogging.
199
 Furthermore, they are 
characterised by an absence of set minimum standards or guidelines in their administration of 
justice, and so they tend to violate the right to equality and non-discrimination, especially 
where women are concerned.
200
 In view of these problems, and of the State‘s obligations to 
protect human rights within its borders, it is important to acknowledge these potential hazards 
and regulate these non-state justice systems to ensure that such abuses do not occur. To fail to 
do so amounts to the South Africa condoning human rights abuses in its territory. 
Secondly, a proper access to justice policy needs to recognise the potential benefits of 
non-state justice systems in achieving the goal of access to justice. It is the view of many 
scholars and experts, both in South Africa and abroad, that in order to achieve the goal of 
access to justice, non-state forums must have a place in the administration of justice.
201
 This 
is because these forums serve a useful purpose, in that they represent an easily accessible 
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system where simple matters can be quickly adjudicated, thus freeing up the formal courts to 
handle more complex cases and saving judicial resources.
202
 They are less expensive to use, 
do not require the services of lawyers, and they usually conduct their business in the local 
language of the community, thus addressing the language problem and legal representation 
issues discussed above.  
The existence of non-state justice systems is not in itself a violation of the Constitution, 
or even of international law. As the Constitutional Court noted in Lufuno Mphaphuli & 
Associates (Pty) Ltd v Andrews and Another
203
 ‗... we need to bear in mind that litigation 
before ordinary courts can be a rigid, costly and time-consuming process and that it is not 
inconsistent with our constitutional values to permit parties to seek a quicker and cheaper 
mechanism for the resolution of disputes‘.204 In furtherance of its goal of promoting access to 
justice therefore, the State is entitled to, and in fact, is obligated to harness the advantages 
offered by such bodies. To ignore them, while saddled with an over-burdened judiciary, a 
high crime rate, and an expensive justice system is unrealistic. The State would simply be 
turning its back on a readily available mechanism that helps it meet its obligations to the 
populace. The question then is whether South Africa‘s access to justice policy reflects any 
consideration of these issues? 
The Justice Vision 2000 policy document, the country‘s principal access to justice 
policy, declares that in order achieve the goal of improved, fair and equal access to justice for 
all, one of its strategies would be to ‗improve access to alternative ways of dispute resolution, 
including the integration of informal dispute resolution methods into both the criminal and 
civil justice systems‘.205 The formulation of this strategy demonstrates that South Africa 
recognises the existence of non-state justice forums and that forums other than courts have a 
role to play in improving access to justice. It also demonstrates a recognition that the State 
needs to actively utilise them if it is to meet its obligations on access to justice. How then has 
it implemented this strategy? 
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The bulk of the responsibility of promoting the use of alternative justice systems has 
fallen on the South African Law Reform Commission (SALRC), the body tasked with 
advising the Government on the development, improvement, modernisation or reform of the 
law.
206
 Since 1996, the SALRC has spear-headed the country‘s exploration of alternative 
ways of dispute resolution and the use of traditional justice systems as a means of relieving 
the overburdened court system.
207
 As a result, it has undertaken a lot of research, received 
public input, made recommendations on the subject and led the efforts to create legislation 
and programmes that will give effect to those recommendations. Its work has resulted in 
some initiatives which will no doubt improve access to justice in South Africa. For instance, 
the final report of a project committee set up to look into the issue of informal justice 
recommended the incorporation of such systems into the justice system, through the 
mechanism of customary courts with full powers to determine cases in both criminal and civil 
matters subject to certain limitations.
208
  Such courts would apply customary law or other law 
which they may be authorised to apply.
209
 A draft Bill followed and in addition to the 
recommendations above, offered communication between and referrals to the customary 
courts by other structures in the justice system such as the Magistrates‘ and Small Claims 
Courts and the police.
210
 Both the report and the Bill are still receiving attention from the 
SALRC
211
 and have full support from government.
212
 The SALRC‘s work has also resulted in 
the creation of community courts, which are ‗neighbourhood-focused courts that attempt to 
harness the power of the justice system to address local problems, [focusing] on creative 
partnerships and problem solving‘.213 The advantages of these courts are that they are fast, 
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accessible by local people,
214
 and adopt easy-to-follow procedures as well as alternative 
sentences such as community service.
215
   
Unfortunately, even though these initiatives are beneficial for the goal of access to 
justice generally, the overall strategy suffers from the same deficiency that plaques most of 
the other policies and programmes that have been discussed up to this point – it fails to 
acknowledge, much less address, how this issue affects refugees and asylum seekers, or even 
migrant groups generally. This is significant because, as the SALRC acknowledges following 
its wide-ranging research and consultations, non-state justice systems are ubiquitous and 
highly significant among communities in Africa.
216
 Given the fact that African migrant 
groups, including refugees and asylum seekers, constitute a significant population in South 
Africa, one would expect that, as part of the State‘s responsibility to protect the rights of all 
persons in the country, some thought would be given to how those systems operate among a 
class of people who are acknowledged as being most likely to have them. 
Furthermore, the SALRC acknowledges that non-state justice systems are mostly used 
by the marginalised who find it difficult to access the State justice system.
217
 Since, as 
previously noted, it is a widely acknowledge fact, even in government circles, that migrants 
including refugees and asylum seekers, are some of the most marginalised groups in South 
Africa, it goes without saying that they are most at risk of using those systems. The SALRC 
in the interest of promoting equal access to justice, countering human rights abuses in the 
administration of justice, and promoting respect for traditional systems of justice has an 
obligation to address this issue as it relates to migrant groups too. Unfortunately, it has not 
done so, and its efforts therefore fall short of meeting South Africa‘s obligations to refugees.   
This is not an argument that the initiatives spearheaded by the SALRC as described above, do 
not benefit refugees. Indeed, initiatives such as community courts would certainly be 
beneficial to refugees and asylum seekers, provided they know about them. Rather, it is an 
argument that the failure to address the issue of non-state justice systems in relation to 
refugees constitutes inequality of treatment.  
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It is the contention of some scholars that in programming for access to justice, failure 
by the State to recognise justice systems other than formal, state-controlled courts, is in itself 
discriminatory or exclusionary, and hence inequitable.
218
 Such generally discriminatory 
attitude towards non-state justice is clearly not the case in South Africa, as can be seen from 
the efforts of the SALRC. What is the case is a failure to include within its contemplation, the 
workings of those systems as they exist among refugee population groups, and this therefore 
amounts to discrimination. The nature of non-state justice systems makes it difficult to argue 
that current initiatives in relation to South African non-state and traditional justice systems 
apply equally to refugees and asylum seekers. This is because non-state justice systems 
generally reflect prevailing community norms and values and derive their legitimacy from the 
customs accepted by the particular community they serve. Difference in customs among 
refugee communities and South African communities would therefore defeat any 
generalisation. What is required is specific examination of the systems that operate among 
refugees and asylum seekers, just as has variously been done among South African 
community groups, and then efforts be put in place to regulate them. Therefore the selective 
engagement with non-state justice systems as they exist within South African communities, 
but not within migrant communities goes against the requirement of equality of treatment in 
access to justice as international law and the constitution requires.  
In trying to regulate, and perhaps incorporate the workings of informal and non-state 
justice systems into the country‘s administration of justice, the SALRC would promote 
greater access to justice for those who prefer such systems or are unable to access the formal 
systems. At the same time, such regulation or incorporation would curb their excesses and 
ensure they operate within the framework of national law and international human rights 
norms. But leaving out those forums that are not local to South African communities, 
suggests not only a tacit condonation of whatever excesses or violations those forums may be 
guilty of, it also suggests that there is no desire to utilise such systems to improve access to 
justice for refugees and asylum seekers as it wishes to do for its citizens. Equal treatment 
requires that whatever efforts the State undertakes to promote access to justice and avoid 
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human rights violations in the administration of justice for its citizens, it must do the same for 
refugees and asylum seekers. Clearly, the State fails in this regard.   
This failure is made all the more poignant by the fact that difficulty in accessing the 
formal justice system because of earlier-described discrimination, makes non-state justice 
forums a more attractive option. The danger here is that such systems could supplant the State 
justice system as the primary source of justice in the view of refugees and asylum seekers. 
Yet, such systems would operate outside any kind of guidelines that ensure they respect the 
rights of those who use them. The overarching obligation of the States to ensure the 
protection of human rights, even by non-state bodies, requires that it engage with the non-
state justice systems among refugees and asylum seekers, not only to regulate them, but also 
to understand why those who use them do so, and to establish the primacy of the State justice 
system. This would enable the State to become aware of the issues and customs, and thus be 
able to address them. Such knowledge would help it to effectively respond to the particular 
strengths and weaknesses of those systems and help it in its programming for access to 
justice. The failure to address this issue means that the State is unable to do any of these, and 
this can only have a negative effect on refugees‘ access to justice. whether or not this is so 
will be seen in chapter six.  
There is no doubt that non-state justice systems within refugee communities would 
provide an avenue for them to resolve simpler issues, particularly simple civil matters that 
generally implicate fewer human rights concerns, without the disadvantages that make the 
state justice system unattractiv . But it is important that such systems benefit from some form 
of State supervision or regulation. How the government does that is left for it to decide. Some 
scholars advocate incorporating non-state forums into the justice system, such that they are 
administered by the state.
219
 This would combine the virtues of such systems like 
accessibility, informality, affordability and familiar language with those of the state legal 
system such as impartiality, legitimacy, and powers of enforcement. Other scholars advocate 
a complementary role where both the formal and the informal systems exist side by side. The 
best elements of both would be combined and a cross-referral and cooperative system put in 
place to ensure access to justice.
220
  Nina calls this ‗the dual paradigm of justice‘ – a holistic 
approach to access to justice which recognises and frames itself within a culture of rights and 
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the multiple forms of accessing justice that take place in the country.
221
 This appears to be the 
model favoured by the SALRC as the traditional courts Bill suggests.  
Having said all that, it is important to reiterate that the primary duty of providing access 
to justice rests with the State. An acknowledgement of non-state justice system cannot be 
construed as an excuse for the State to abdicate its duties to provide access to justice for all 
within its territory. Therefore, it must be accepted that the State justice mechanism is the 
primary means of access to justice and include efforts to ensure that refugees are able easily 
to use it. However, non-state justice systems are a fact that cannot be legislated or wished 
away. The options are either to ignore them or to regulate them. In view of the State‘s 
obligations on access to justice, the better option is to regulate them. But it would appear that 
South Africa has opted to ignore them and thus created a loophole in which those systems can 
operate outside the confines of international human rights norms and national laws.  
 
4.6.1 Do the measures on non-state justice systems meet South Africa’s obligations? 
This section has attempted to evaluate how well South Africa‘s access to justice policy 
addresses the use of non-state justice systems among refugees and asylum seekers. As 
Budlender reminds us, access to justice is not purely a court-centred concept. If poor people 
are to achieve access to justice, they need effective access to the other institutions which 
determine whether they will receive justice.
222
 This is especially so when the poor people in 
question also face significant challenges from discrimination by State officials in accessing 
the courts. Such unequal access to state justice systems drive vulnerable refugees to seek 
alternative ways of accessing justice. Regardless of the reasons for using them, there is an 
obligation on the State, as the primary agency responsible for the protection of human rights 
and for the administration of justice to ensure that such systems do not engender human 
rights abuses within its territory. Doing so requires it to acknowledge and engage with such 
systems. Unfortunately, South Africa‘s policy on access to justice does not reflect such 
engagement, at least with respect to refugees. What it reflects is a selective engagement, a 
discriminatory engagement which, while attempting to address such issues in local South 
African communities, completely ignores such systems among refugees. This situation falls 
                                                 
221
 Daniel Nina ‗Access to justice in South Africa: Towards a holistic approach‘. Position paper presented to the 
Ministry of  Justice Planning Unit, September 1997, 3–4. 
222
 Budlender (note 88 above) 11. 
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short of the equality standard recognised in international law and the Constitution, and needs 
to be addressed.  
 
4.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter took a close look at the policies, programmes and legislative measures that have 
been adopted to give effect to previously discussed constitutional guarantees of refugees to 
access to justice in the country. The first step was a recognition that post-apartheid 
administration of justice had to reflect the needs of all people in South Africa rather than a 
select minority. Anchored on this belief, the Justice Vision 2000 policy, the principal policy 
guiding the administration of justice in the country, was developed. Its purpose is the 
achievement of ‗justice for all‘. The aims of the policy were informed by each of the 
constitutional guarantees on access to justice – and from them flowed programmes and 
legislations designed to meet those aims. It is within this legislative, programmatic and policy 
framework, that South Africa‘s efforts to meet the access to justice needs of refugees, is 
located.  
Without doubt the framework and the strategies that have flowed from it are laudable 
and relevant to the goal of access to justice. But as former British Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill once said, ‗however beautiful the strategy, you should occasionally look at the 
results‘. In looking at the results, one is confronted with a number of uncomfortable gaps. 
Chief among this is the glaring failure to address the needs of refugees and asylum seekers in 
the country‘s programming for access to justice. This is the one thread that consistently runs 
through the policies and programmes examined.  
Under international law, as chapter two showed, a host state is obliged to ensure 
unfettered and unrestricted access to courts for refugees and asylum seekers in its jurisdiction. 
Refugees in South Africa should therefore have unfettered access to the courts of South 
Africa and they should have legal representation when required, at the same level that South 
Africans do. Unfortunately, this standard is not reflected in the policies and programmes on 
access to justice. Particularly worrying is the issue of access to legal representation. As the 
discussion above shows, the LAB, as the State‘s primary instrument for providing legal 
assistance has an important role to play in ensuring access to justice for refugees and asylum 
seekers. But the LAB‘s mandate to refugees is significantly limited. It certainly is not at the 
same level as that accorded to citizens, which is the standard prescribed in international law. 
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The apparent limitation of its services to asylum matters, and to criminal matters as mandated 
by the Constitution, while ignoring civil matters constitutes a fundamental failure. This is 
particularly so when Art 16 of the UN Refugee Convention, the equality and non-
discrimination provisions of the Constitution, and the decision in Nkuzi are taken into 
consideration. 
Other issues which have been recognised as important for improving access to justice 
have simply failed to recognise the person of the refugee, much less adopt measure that meet 
their needs. In this regard, the question of linguistic capacity and its importance to access to 
justice is not addressed in any language policy, as the DoJ has not adopted any. Interim 
efforts are inadequate to meet the needs, and the jurisprudence shows that finding competent 
interpreters in African languages is a major challenge, which the courts repeatedly call on the 
DoJ to address.  
Similarly, while efforts have been made to address how alternative ways of dispute 
resolution could be used to improve access to justice, the same has not been done in the 
context of refugees and asylum seekers who fall within the demographics of those most likely 
to use them. The result is that such systems, where they exist, are given free rein to carry on 
without any regulation, and the possible human rights violation that could result from that.   
The preceding analysis has shown that in theory and in terms of its constitutional 
guarantees, South Africa is well within the framework of equality and equal access to justice 
which international law upholds. However, in terms of actual practice, and at the policy and 
programme level, the picture in South Africa is considerably less positive and falls well short 
of the ideals of the Constitution. Perhaps the greatest failings of government efforts is the 
failure to classify refugees and asylum seekers as vulnerable persons, and thus develop or 
modify strategies to adequately meet their needs. This failing on its own jeopardises equality 
of access. On the other hand, concluding that refugees and asylum seekers do not enjoy 
access to justice as they should, on the basis of what is not written in the policy guidelines 
and programmes discussed above is mischievous. The discussion of policies, programmes 
and legislation is but one step in the evaluation process. The best measure of how well 
refugees have access to justice can only be found in the factual experiences of those refugees 
and asylum seekers who have attempted to or have used the courts. These experiences will be 
discussed in detail in the next chapter.  
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
196 
 
Chapter Five 
Refugees’ Experiences in Accessing Justice in South Africa 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter two identified and discussed the obligations that South Africa has under international 
law to refugees and asylum seekers in the area of access to justice. The fulfilment of those 
obligations, it was shown, would put refugees and asylum seekers on the same footing as 
everyone else in terms of access to justice. Ultimately, effective and equal access is the ideal 
which South Africa is expected to strive towards. Subsequent chapters then evaluated how 
well South Africa complies with its obligations, by looking at the constitutional guarantees 
and the policies and programmes in place to give them effect. It was shown that, while the 
Constitution lives up to the ideal of equal access to justice for all as espoused in international 
law, policies and programmes fall well short of achieving that standard. The main problem, it 
was argued in chapter four, lies in the fact that South Africa‘s policies and programming for 
justice appear to be formulated independently of the country‘s obligations to refugees under 
international law. As a result, the peculiar vulnerabilities which make equal access to justice 
difficult for refugees and asylum seekers are not addressed by legislation or in the policy and 
programmes. 
This chapter continues that evaluation, utilising a different yardstick – the practical 
experiences of refugees and asylum seekers and those who work with them as they confront 
justice issues in their daily lives. My argument is that because policies and programmes do 
not address the question of refugees‘ and asylum seekers‘ vulnerability in accessing justice, 
their access to justice is significantly impaired. By detailing actual experiences in accessing 
justice, this chapter will serve to confirm that the shortcomings identified in the previous 
chapter do indeed have the effect of denying refugees equal access to justice. This chapter 
hopes to achieve two further objectives. Firstly, by presenting real-life access-to-justice 
issues as refugees and asylum seekers experience them, I hope to highlight how these 
correspond to or differ from the ideals contained in international law and the Constitution, as 
established in chapters two and three. I also hope, in the process, to highlight the factors 
responsible for such similarity or difference as the case may be, and thus be able to make 
recommendations to address them. Secondly, I hope to fill a gap in academic knowledge that 
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currently exists in the area of how refugees‘ interact with the law in an urban setting. As was 
noted in chapter one,
1
 most of the research on refugees have focused on social and cultural 
areas of vulnerabilities such as access to social services, xenophobia, resettlement, cultural 
challenges in host communities and other challenges that refugees face. Research on 
refugees‘ access to justice (beyond status determination) is scanty, and all known ones focus 
on refugees in a camp situation.
2
  
However, South Africa operates an urban refugee system, so the assumption is that the 
justice issues that its refugee population faces would be markedly different from those of 
refugees in camps. For instance, Da Costa‘s study found that theft and sexual and gender 
based violence were by far, the most prevalent legal and justice issues in all the refugee 
camps surveyed.
3
 The close quarters in which refugees in camps live is surely an important 
factor in this. The study also identified the remote location of refugee camps, coupled with 
restrictions on movement, as a major barrier to access to justice for refugees.
4
 That would not 
be a factor for South Africa‘s refugee population whose movements are not restricted and 
who mostly live in urban areas and not remote locations.
5
  
                                                 
1
 Section 1.2. 
2
 The most definitive and expansive in terms of coverage, is a 2006 study conducted in 52 refugee camps in 13 
countries for the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) by Rosa Da Costa. See Rosa Da 
Costa The administration of justice in refugee camps: A study of practice (Geneva: UNHCR Department of 
International Protection, 2006); Other studies have since been carried out, but like Da Costa‘s work, all focus on 
access to justice in camp-based situations. These include: Ilse Griek ‗Access to justice in Kenyan refugee 
camps: Exploring the scope of protection‘ (MSc Diss. to the Department of Public Administration, Leiden 
University, Netherlands, 2007); Julie Veroff ‗Justice Administration in Meheba Refugee Settlement: Refugee 
perceptions, preferences, and strategic decisions (MPhil Diss. to the Department of International Development, 
Oxford University, 2009); International Rescue Committee ‗Assessment of protection issues, with a focus on 
access to justice and the rule of law: Mae Le Camp, Tak Province and Sites One and Two Camps, Mae Hong 
Son Province‘ (2006) cited in Veroff supra. 
3
 Da Costa (note 2 above) 10. 
4
 Ibid, 6; Veroff (note 2 above) 20. 
5
 Loren B Landau ‗Protection and dignity in Johannesburg: Shortcomings of South Africa‘s urban refugee 
policy‘ (2006) 19 (3) Journal of Refugee Studies 308–327, 311; Fedde Groot ‗Challenges of the UNHCR‘s 
programme for urban refugees in South Africa‘ in Loren Landau (ed) Forced migrants in the new 
Johannesburg: Towards a local government response (Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand, 2004) 
37–42, 40. 
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The only people who could validly answer any questions about how refugees 
experience access to justice in South Africa are the refugees and asylum seekers themselves 
who have had the experiences, as well as those who assist them in the process. In other 
words, a field study was necessary in order to answer these questions. The result of that field 
study is what this chapter and the next one present. This chapter details the experiences of 
refugees and asylum seekers‘ when seeking to access the formal or state justice system, and 
shows that the guarantee of equal access which international law and the Constitution 
espouse are not a reality for refugees and asylum seekers in South Africa. This is followed in 
the next chapter with a discussion of other avenues by which they seek justice, whether as a 
result of exclusion or as a matter of choice. Again, their experiences in this area demonstrates 
the shortcomings of the South African justice system and policy in addressing the needs of 
refugees and asylum seekers.  
This chapter is structured in the following way: the first part describes the research 
methodology and data sources as well as the limitations and other factors that should guide 
interpretation of the results presented. The second part presents the results and aims to 
achieve the first objective stated above. 
 
Part I 
This part sets out the methodology adopted in the fieldwork, definition of terms, selection 
criteria and demographics as well as the limitations of the study. 
 
5.2 METHODOLOGY AND MATERIALS – DATA SOURCING 
As was alluded to in chapter one, it is generally accepted among scholars in the field of 
forced migration that researching refugees and other forced migrants poses a series of 
common difficulties.
6
  First of all, there is the need to be sensitive to the fact that one is 
                                                 
6
 See generally Karen Jacobsen & Loren B Landau ‗The dual imperative in refugee research: Some 
methodological and ethical considerations in social science research on forced migration‘ (2003) 27 (3) 
Disasters 185–206; Alice Bloch ‗Methodological challenges for national and multi-sited comparative survey 
research‘ (2007) 20 Journal of Refugee Studies 230–247; Catriona Mackenzie et al ‗Beyond ―Do no harm:‖ the 
challenge of constructing ethical relationships in refugee research‘ (2007) 2 Journal of Refugee Studies 20 299–
319; Graeme Rodgers ‗‗‗Hanging out‘‘ with forced migrants: Methodological and ethical challenges‘ (2004) 21 
Forced Migration Review 48–49; Barbara Harrell-Bond & Eftihia Voutira ‘In search of ‗invisible‘ actors: 
Barriers to access in refugee research‘ (2007) 20 (2) Journal of Refugee Studies 281–298; Darshan Vigneswaran 
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dealing with a vulnerable group. As Turton admonishes, research into others‘ suffering can 
only be justified if alleviating that suffering is an explicit objective.
7
 One cannot therefore 
approach a study on refugees as a mere academic exercise without an awareness of possible 
negative impacts, which could be anything ranging from the psychological, such as when a 
respondent is forced to recall a painful incident, to the physical, such as danger to life and 
limb. Of major importance is the question of security. Being highly vulnerable, and often 
living in fear and mistrust, it is important to ensure that the identity of the research population 
is protected and that their safety is not jeopardised.
8
 Closely linked to this is the issue of 
confidentiality.
9
 
Secondly, the diversity and size of migrant populations make representativeness of the 
research an important issue – in order to make well-founded policy recommendations about 
migrants, large-scale, quantitative data is often required.
10
 This raises major financial and 
logistical challenges for anyone conducting such surveys. Unless they are funded by major 
organisations, such surveys are usually unaffordable and are therefore few and far between.
11
 
This obviously has an impact on the ability to generalise the findings of isolated, small-scale 
case studies such as this one.  
The methodology adopted by researchers is also identified as a major problem and this 
also impacts on the validity of data obtained. The key concern here is the quality of the data 
collection process. In this regard, the lack of a sampling frame and researchers‘ tendency to 
use unrepresentative sampling methods in order to address the lack of a sampling frame is 
                                                                                                                                                        
‗Lost in space: Residential sampling and Johannesburg's forced migrants‘ 2007 Migration Methods and Field 
Notes 4, Forced Migration Studies Programme, University of the Witswatersrand; Dina Birman ‗Ethical issues 
in research with immigrants and refugees‘ in Joseph E Trimble & Celia B Fisher (eds) The handbook of ethical 
research with ethnocultural populations and communities (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2006); Jennifer Leaning 
‗Ethics of research in refugee populations‘ (2001) 357 Lancet 1432–1433. 
7
 David Turton ‗Migrants and Refugees‘ in Tim Allen (ed) In search of cool ground: War, flight, and 
homecoming in Northeast Africa (Trenton: Africa World Press, 1996) 96–110, 96. 
8
 Patricia Hynes ‗The issue of ‗‗trust‘‘ or ‗‗mistrust‘‘ in research with refugees: Choices, caveats and 
considerations for researchers‘ (2003) New Issues in Refugee Research UNHCR Working Paper 98. 
9
 Works in note 6 above. 
10
 Jacobsen & Landau (note 6 above) 195. 
11
 Tara Polzer ‗The value of non-probability surveys: Collecting data on migrants through service provider 
NGOs‘. Paper presented at the African Migrations Workshop, Rabat, Morocco 26–29 November 2008. 
Available at  http://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/pdfs/tara-polzer-amw-08 [Accessed 2 February 2010]. 
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flagged as a concern. So also is reliance on organisational gatekeepers (such as refugee 
service providers) for access to data, refugee clients and participants and sometimes even to 
identify refugees for inclusion in studies. This means that surveys with refugees will often 
include selection bias and gatekeeper bias.
12
 Furthermore, the fact that these surveys are often 
conducted in areas where migrants congregate leads to the problem of a data biased towards a 
particular area. As most refugees in South Africa tend to stay in the large urban cities where 
the Refugee Reception Offices are found, the urban bias of most studies involving refugees in 
South Africa migrants is almost automatically a major challenge.
13
 Other challenges 
identified by scholars include shortage of statistically analyzable data, projecting one‘s bias 
into the study, the fact that there is often a high rate of non-response to questionnaires as well 
as the likelihood of dishonest and strategic responses by respondents.
14
  
Perhaps the most basic problem identified is the non-disclosure by researchers of the 
methodology adopted in carrying out a study. According to Jacobsen and Landau, most 
studies on refugees simply proceed to state the outcomes without stating how the data was 
obtained. Fortunately, that is an easily avoided problem, and so in the interest of making this 
study as relevant as possible, it was imperative to bear in mind all of the pitfalls listed above 
and avoid them as much as possible. The following section presents an overview of the 
research methodology adopted in doing the fieldwork associated with this study. However, 
the nature of this study is such that many of the problems simply could not be avoided. The 
challenges and shortcomings are discussed below in the section on ‗limitations‘. 
 
5.2.1 Definitions 
To ensure conceptual clarity, the study adopted a technical/legal definition of the terms 
‗refugee‘ and ‗asylum seeker‘ as envisaged by the Refugees Act of 1998.15 Thus only persons 
who had been recognised as, and were in possession of valid Refugee Status (or s. 24) 
permits issued by the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) were included in the study in the 
                                                 
12
 Jacobsen & Landau (note 6 above) 193, 195; James T Fawcett & Fred Arnold ‗The role of surveys in the 
study of international migration: An appraisal‘ (1987) 21 International Migration Review, 1523–1540, 1531.  
13
 Polzer (note 11 above) 8; Faecett & Arnold (note 12 above) 1532. 
14
 All of these factors are indentified in the works cited in note 6 above. 
15
 Refugees Act No 130 of 1998.  
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category of ‗refugee‘. Similarly, only persons who were in possession of valid Asylum 
Seeker (or s. 22) permits issued by the DHA were enlisted in the category of ‗asylum seeker‘.  
As stated in chapter one, a broad definition of the term ‗access to justice‘ is adopted in this 
study, and encompasses access to courts and other forums as well as access to legal 
representation and advice.
16
 The term non-state justice is adopted to include all informal 
justice mechanisms.
17
   
 
5.2.2 Research methods – interviews, questionnaires, participant observation, archival 
research. 
The data for this study was obtained over a period of 22 months, from February 2008 to 
December 2009. Four methods were used to collect data – questionnaires, interviews, 
participant observation and archival research. The most extensively used primary material 
came from the questionnaires and interviews. For this, ethical approval was sought and 
obtained from the University of Cape Town‘s Ethics Committee. The objectives of the 
questionnaire and interviews were explained to p rticipants from the beginning. Their 
permission was obtained to use a tape recorder and to write down their responses. Where 
anyone objected to tape recording, I only wrote down their responses. Respondents were 
assured of anonymity and their names were not included on the questionnaire or during the 
course of the interviews. 
The questionnaire was structured to elicit information about patterns of use and 
perceptions of the justice system (Appendix A). Sometimes, where a participants‘ experience, 
gleaned from responses to the questionnaire was such that it needed to be explored further, I 
followed up with an in-depth interview. In all, 30 refugees were interviewed to obtain their 
experiences with the justice system. As a number of these interviewees made copious 
references to their own previous experiences with non-state justice mechanisms within their 
own communities here in South Africa, I interviewed 5 persons involved with the workings 
of these informal justice systems. 10 refugee lawyers and staff of refugee legal service 
providers were interviewed in order to understand some of the key issues from the point of 
                                                 
16
 Chapter one, section 1.3. 
17
  Difference in terminology previously discussed in chapter three, section 3.6.4. 
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view of a service provider. Most of the interviews took place face to face in Cape Town, but 
some took place over the phone. 
The interviews were structured and non-structured, utilising both closed and open-
ended questions. Most of the interviews were conducted at the University of Cape Town Law 
Clinic which has a project specifically aimed at refugees and provides legal services to the 
refugee community. Some were conducted at other locations including at places of work, 
meeting places and in a church. The interviews were conducted in English, as was the 
questionnaires. All of the respondents were from African countries and most spoke English to 
some extent. For those who did not speak English well enough, translation was provided by 
another refugee of the same nationality who spoke English. Fortunately, translation was only 
needed in Somali and French, two language groups very well represe ted and for which 
translators were easily accessible. Sometimes, however, the translators struggled with finding 
the right words in English, to express a Somali word for instance, and had to seek the 
assistance of another Somali waiting in the waiting room.  
Although some respondents were initially wary, I found that participants warmed up to 
me as soon as they discovered I was a foreigner myself and they were more willing to take 
part and more candid in expressing their opinions and relating their experiences. This was 
also true of interviews conducted outside the Law Clinic, such as at a Congolese church and 
with the Somali Association. Respondents often displayed a propensity for denoting an 
existing affinity between them and me, describing situations in terms of ‗us‘ (non-citizens, 
myself included) and ‗them‘ (South Africans). This I believe resulted in more openness. 
Participant observation occurred in courts where I had the opportunity to see how 
refugees related to and conducted themselves in court. I attended several court hearings in 
both the Magistrates Court and the High Court (sitting as the Equality Court) in Cape Town. 
Archival research involved an analysis of over 5000 cases in the UCT Law Clinic‘s 
case files from 2005–2008. This data helped establish trends and provide information about 
the demographics and cases that the clinic has dealt with over the years.  This analysis did not 
look at the outcomes of those cases, especially as many led to referrals.  
Access to the Clinic‘s case log of clients obviously raises the question of privacy and 
confidentiality. It also brings to mind the issue of gatekeeper bias referred to above. But this 
was necessary because seeking refugees independently of the refugee assistance agencies 
would have required a serious amount of logistical and financial layout, to find willing 
refugees and asylum seekers all around the city, for which this study was not equipped. 
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Personal experience with refugee clients at the Clinic showed that, quite understandably, 
persons seeking assistance stopped going to the legal assistance agencies once they had 
received the help needed. As the study focused on persons who had had cause to resort to the 
legal system, it was quite likely that asking for volunteers would have meant that only current 
clients of the organisations would be available for interviews, with the result that the study 
would have a preponderance of persons who had no experience with the legal system. The 
question of gatekeeper bias did not arise as the Law Clinic did not in any way limit the client 
data I had access to or interfere in the selection process.  
 
5.2.3 Selection criteria and demographics 
Most of the refugee respondents to the questionnaire and interviews were adults who had 
approached the clinic for assistance with legal matters other than obtaining refugee permits or 
representation at appeal hearings about their status as refugees. In other words, refugee status 
determination (RSD) matters were excluded from the category of legal matters discussed with 
respondents. However, the archival research looked at all matters in the Law Clinic‘s case 
files, including RSDs. Some of the respondents were first time visitors to the Law clinic 
while others were repeat clients, including those who had been clients of the clinic for several 
years.  
5.2.3.1 Nationality 
Figure 1 below shows the nationality of participants. While it appears to fly in the face of 
current conventional wisdom that suggests that Zimbabweans make up the majority of South 
Africa‘s refugee population, it needs to be borne in mind that this study focuses on persons 
who have had interactions with the justice system. The groups most likely to fall into this 
category are those who have been in the country for longer periods of time, and consequently 
are more likely to have had their claim for asylum recognised. The Zimbabwean refugee is a 
more recent phenomenon, motivated by a collapsed economy, lack of jobs, hyper-inflation 
and human rights violations that began to characterise Zimbabwe in the early 2000s.
18
 Most 
of them fall within the ‗asylum seeker‘ group.19  
                                                 
18
 Alice Bloch ‗Gaps in protection: Undocumented Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa‘ Working Paper No. 
38 Forced Migration Studies Programme, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg; Lawyers for Human 
Rights The documented experiences of refugees, deportees and asylum seekers in South Africa: A Zimbabwean 
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The participant distribution is therefore reflective of the historical trends of South 
Africa‘s refugee population, which was largely made up of refugees from the Great Lakes 
region, DR Congo, Angola and Somalia.
20
  In order to avoid having only one nationality 
group or the most heavily represented nationality group as the sole respondents, an effort was 
made to limit the number of people selected from a particular country. However, the numbers 
chosen for each group was greatly influenced by the ability to reach them, as explained under 
limitations below. 
FIG 1: NATIONALITY OF RESPONDENTS 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
case study (Johannesburg: Lawyers for Human Rights, 2006); Monica Kiwanuka & Tamlyn Monson 
‗Zimbabwean migration into Southern Africa: New trends and responses‘ (2009) Research Report, Forced 
Migration Studies Programme, University of the Witwatersrand; Darshan Vigneswaran ‗Special report: Fact or 
fiction? Examining Zimbabwean cross-border migration into South Africa‘, available at 
http://cormsa.org.za/wp-content/uploads/Research/SADC/fmsp-2007-b-zimbabwe-border-1.pdf [Accessed 2 
June 2010]. 
19
 Tara Polzer ‗Population movements in and to South Africa‘ (2010) Migration Fact Sheet 1, Forced Migration 
Studies Programme, University of the Witwatersrand. 
20
 Loren B Landau ‗Protection and dignity in Johannesburg: Shortcomings of South Africa‘s urban refugee 
policy (note 5 above) 313; Baruti Amisi & Richard Ballard  ‗In the absence of citizenship: Congolese refugee 
struggle and organisation in South Africa‘ (2005) Centre for Civil Society and the School of Development 
Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal, 1. 
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5.2.3.2 Gender and age distribution 
The percentage of females amongst the respondents is low (20 per cent), but this is reflective 
of the general client distribution at the UCT Law clinic (19 per cent)
21
 and indeed of the 
general refugee population in South Africa.
22
  In terms of age distribution, (Table 1), most of 
the participants fell into the 18–39 age bracket. This again, is reflective of the general refugee 
population in South Africa where 90 per cent are youthful, aged between 18-39.
23
  
TABLE 1: AGE DISTRIBUTION 
 
Age category (years) 
 
Frequency 
 
per cent 
 
 
18–29 
 
10 
 
33.3 
 
30–39 
 
17 
 
56.7 
 
40–45 
 
3 
 
10.0 
 
 
5.2.3.3 Level of education  
All respondents had some level of formal education, with 76 per cent having had up to 
secondary education or more (Table 2). This confirms the findings of a study on Congolese 
refugees in Durban which found that 96.4 per cent of respondents in that study had some 
                                                 
21
 Refugee Rights Project, University of Cape Town Law Clinic ‗Narrative Report for 2009‘. Obtained from the 
Law Clinic. (Hereinafter referred to as UCT Law Clinic Narrative report). 
22
 Florence Belvedere et al National Refugee Baseline Survey: Final Report, Johannesburg: (2003) Community 
Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE), Japan International Cooperation, and United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees; UNHCR, 2005 Statistical Year Book (South Africa) available at www.unhcr.org (Accessed 12 
October 2009); Migrant Rights Monitoring Project ‗National survey of the refugee reception and status 
determination system in South Africa‘ (2009) Research Report, Forced Migration Studies Programme, 
University of the Witwatersrand. 
23
 Ibid.  
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levels of education and 46.5 per cent had some tertiary education.
24
 It also confirms the 
findings of a 2003 national survey of 15057 refugees and asylum seekers from African 
countries, which found that most were educated and that ‗nearly a third of refugees and 
asylum seekers were tertiary students before they came to South Africa‘.25 Various studies on 
the use of the formal court system suggest that education plays a key role, with the more 
educated, more knowledgeable sections of society being more likely to seek formal resolution 
of disputes.
26
 People with no educational qualifications were less likely to take any form of 
legal action to deal with their problems, a survey of the ‗recourse to law‘ habits of 3000 
people found.
27
 
TABLE 2: LEVEL OF EDUCATION  
 
Educational status 
 
Frequency 
 
per cent 
 
 
Primary 
 
7 
 
23.3 
 
Secondary 
 
10 
 
33.3 
 
Tertiary 
 
 
13 
 
43.3 
 
                                                 
24
 Baruti Bahati Amisi ‗An exploration of the livelihood strategies of Durban Congolese refugees‘ Working 
Paper No. 123, UNHCR Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit (Geneva: United Nations High Commission for 
Refugees, 2006) 11; Owen Sichone ‗Together and apart: African refugees and immigrants in global Cape Town‘ 
in David Chidester et al (eds) What holds us together: Social cohesion in South Africa (Cape Town: HSRC 
Press, 2003) 120–140, 132. 
25
 Belvedere et al (note 22 above) 5; Loren B Landau & Karen Jacobsen ‗Refugees in the New Johannesburg‘ 
(2004) 19 Forced Migration Review 44–46, 44; Mail & Guardian Online ‗National Survey: Most refugees in 
South Africa are skilled‘ 11 December 2003, 1 (cited in Amisi, note 24 above). 
26
 See for instance Hazel Genn et al Paths to justice: What people do and think about going to law, (Oxford: 
Hart, 1999) 69; La Salle Institute of Governance ‗Background paper on access to justice indicators in Asia-
Pacific region‘ (United Nations Development Programme, 2003).  
27
 Genn (note 26 above) 69. 
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5.2.3.4 Asylum status 
About 60 per cent of respondents were recognized refugees who had been in the country for 
at least three years. These recognized refugees were the most likely to have sought legal 
assistance for their problems, often being the complainants, rather than respondents or 
accused in the cases they were dealing with. This suggests a correlation between certainty of 
status, a better awareness of rights, and more willingness to make use of state resources 
including the justice system. Indeed refugee assistance organizations are finding that in terms 
of rights, their clients come with a knowledge of the rights afforded to them as refugees and 
they are seeking help to have those enforced.
28
 This was not the case as recently as four or 
five years ago. But because refugees have stayed longer in the country, they have, to a certain 
extent, educated themselves on what their rights are and what it is they can ask for.
29
 
Conversely, asylum seekers in the country tend to lie low, and try as best as possible to 
remain unseen by authorities to avoid getting into trouble or being arrested and possibly 
deported.
30
 This probably explains why asylum seekers interviewed were the most likely not 
to be seeking a judicial resolution to their legal problems, but rather other alternatives. These 
other alternatives are discussed in further detail in chapter six.   
 
5.2.4 Limitations of the study 
While the desire was to avoid all of the ethical and methodological challenges described 
above, the nature of this study is such that many of the pitfalls simply could not be avoided.  
One of the major ones is obviously the question of representativeness. Being such a small 
study, it cannot be generalised. In this regard, scholars note that: 
One of the most significant problems of small-scale studies is that while they yield in-depth and valid 
information, they are not necessarily representative of the target population about which the researcher 
                                                 
28
 Telephone interview with Kaajal Ramjathan-Keogh, Lawyers for Human Rights, Johannesburg (9 December 
2009); Interview with Sasha Paschke  refugee lawyer, UCT Law Clinic (28 July 2008).Interview with Fatima 
Khan Director, Refugee Rights Project, UCT Law Clinic (12 September 2009). 
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 Khan (note 28 above).  
30
 See generally Alice Bloch ‗Carrying out a survey of refugees: Some methodological guidelines and 
considerations‘ (1999) 12 4 Journal of Refugee Studies, 367–383; Jean Pierre Misago et al ‗Towards tolerance, 
law, and dignity: Addressing violence against foreign nationals in South Africa‘ International Organization for 
Migration (IOM), Regional Office for Southern Africa. Available at www.iom.org.za [Accessed 10 July 2009].  
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wishes to make claims. As such, they do not allow us to make accurate descriptive inferences about the 
groups in which we are interested.
31 
 
It must be stated that from the outset, in view of the financial cost and human resources that 
would be required to carry out a study that would provide any widely representative answers 
about the access to justice issues of a group of people as large and disparate as South Africa‘s 
refugee population, this project did not set out to make any definitive claims about the 
subject. The study was meant to be a presentation of limited research that is sufficient to 
provide practical illustration of issues raised, providing an insight into some of the main 
justice issues that refugees face, accessibility of the justice system from a refugee‘s point of 
view and how well the justice system itself is responding to the needs of a class of people it 
had not, until recently, had to deal with.  
The original plan for the study was to conduct a random sampling of refugees, with 
participants selected from the database of legal assistance organisations. Indeed the research 
started out like that, randomly selecting every third person on the database of the UCT law 
clinic who had approached the clinic for assistance with some legal issue. However, the 
infamous xenophobic attacks of May 2008 disrupted that schedule. Persons who had been 
shortlisted and/or contacted for interviews were displaced and it became quite difficult to 
trace them. Furthermore, because of the hectic schedule thrown at the refugee assistance 
organisations as a result of those attacks, it became increasingly difficult to isolate persons 
who fit the criteria set forth initially. In the end, I resorted to purposive sampling (or 
purposeful sampling).
32
  
Social scientists define purposive sampling as a research method that requires a 
researcher to intentionally pick a small number of cases that will yield the most information 
about a particular phenomenon.
33
 Typically, purposive sampling targets a particular group of 
people from which a small sample size that addresses the research question is selected. One 
of the main advantages of purposive sampling, which was important to this study, is that it 
                                                 
31
 Jacobsen & Landau  (note 6 above) 194–195. 
32
 Michael Quinn Patton How to use qualitative methods in evaluation (Los Angeles: SAGE Publication, 1987) 
51. 
33
 Abbas Tashakkori & Charles Teddlie Foundations of mixed methods research: Integrating quantitative and 
qualitative approaches in the social and behavioural sciences (Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, 2008) 178–
179; Earl Babbie & Johann Mouton The practice of social research (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) 
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provides greater depth of information than random sampling, as the participants would 
usually only be people who fit the criteria sought.
34
 In this way, a great deal more is learned 
by focusing on a small number of carefully selected people, than would be learned from 
gathering a little information from a large statistically significant sample.
35
 Random sampling 
on the other hand, designed to provide greater breadth of information from a larger sample 
that is representative of the population of interest
36
 may not have yielded as rich information 
in terms of actual experiences.  
Another benefit of the purposive sampling method adopted is that it helps address the 
issue of bias which might otherwise raise its head in the context of the sampling frame. Since 
participants are deliberately selected and are expected to be, any concerns that selecting 
participants from the UCT Law Clinic could have raised are effectively addressed. Refugee 
respondents for the questionnaires and interviews were generally targeted because records 
showed that they had been involved in or had sought assistance for some legal problem with 
the UCT Law Clinic. Since those interviewed had had some experience seeking to resolve 
legal matters, they were best placed to answer questions on access to justice in South Africa 
and thus fit the criteria that the purposive sampling method required. Legal assistance 
providers were targeted for the obvious reason that they were best placed to provide the 
information sought.  
As stated in the section on methodology, the interviews were conducted in English. In 
view of earlier chapters which identified language as a major problem, using English as my 
medium of interview obviously represents some sort of contradiction. However, as the 
section on demographics explained, participants were persons who had been in the country 
for significant periods of time. Many had acquired better English language skills, and 
combined with the simple, non-technical language adopted for the questionnaire and 
interview, the issue of language was not a barrier. For the few refugees who did not speak 
English well enough, translation was provided by another refugee of the same language who 
spoke English well. The risk associated with the use of translators is acknowledged. Jacobsen 
and Landau warn that there is a risk of biased response resulting from the use of translators or 
local research assistants and these could result in translation problems and inaccuracies.
37
 On 
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 Ibid. 
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Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
210 
 
the other hand they acknowledge that using translators also increases the reliability and 
validity of data. The possibility of the translator projecting his own experiences or opinions 
into the interview participant‘s responses cannot be overlooked. However, as only three 
respondents, (two Somali-speaking and one French-speaking), required translation, I am 
confident that my findings are fair and accurate.   
In view of the limitations laid out above, the findings of the study cannot be generalised 
to the entire refugee population as a whole nor are they presented as a definitive 
representation of the state of refugee interactions with the justice system in the entire country.  
Having said that, however, it is equally important to point out the significance of the study in 
highlighting this often-ignored aspect of refugees‘ lives. The purposive data-gathering 
method used offered an important advantage in the sense that the quality of information 
obtained from the carefully selected participants with relevant experience was very good. 
While the limited data size precludes generalisation, the study provides an insight into an 
important area of refugees‘ rights and protection that is characterised by a dearth of academic 
literature. The study provides a useful and rich repertoire of descriptive and anecdotal data, 
which suggest patterns, variables and hypotheses that can serve as the basis for further study 
in this area.
38
 According to Jacobsen and Landau, in areas or circumstances about which little 
is known, descriptive data obtained from in-depth interviews reveal much about how forced 
migrants live, the problems they encounter, their coping or survival strategies, and the 
shaping of their identities and attitudes.
39
  This study has succeeded in doing just that with 
regard to refugee interactions with the justice system. It presents a compressed and informed 
account of some problems
 
confronting refugees with regard to the search for justice. In doing 
this, it provides an insight into the various strong barriers that prevent refugees and asylum 
seekers from seeing the justice system as an ally in the struggle for equality.   
 
Part II: Survey Results 
This part presents the results obtained from the field study. It details what the major legal 
issues are that confront refugees and asylum seekers and the challenges involved in 
addressing those issues. It also describes refugees‘ attitudes, experiences and impressions of 
the system, as well as the mechanisms through which they access the justice system, the 
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organisations that assist them and the role of courts themselves. Each of the issues discussed 
illustrate how the absence or inadequacy of measures to ensure access to justice for refugees 
affects them in real life. Given the limited nature of this field study, reliance is also placed on 
the work of other scholars to support the arguments made in this section. 
Each section is concluded with a brief summary showing how the issues discussed 
interface with the access to justice guarantees contained in the Constitution which, as 
discussed in previous chapters, reflect international law standards. It is worth pointing out 
again that the findings are not presented as conclusive evidence generalisable to the entire 
refugee and asylum seeker population. They should rather be read primarily as illustrations of 
broader trends. 
 
5.3 PREVALENT LEGAL AND JUSTICE ISSUES AMONG REFUGEES AND 
ASYLUM SEEKERS  
Legal and justice issues among respondents vary in nature and can be broadly classified into 
civil, criminal and administrative justice matters. Civil matters range from cases of unfair 
dismissal, insurance claims, civil damages for loss suffered as a result of xenophobic attacks, 
unlawful arrests, detentions and police brutality. The determination of prevalent legal matters 
among refugees and asylum seekers was based on two sets of data: The first was from 
questionnaires and interviews with respondents seeking assistance for matters other than 
administrative issues and with refugee service providers. The second was the case log of the 
UCT Law Clinic for administrative matters.  
A significant number of cases among respondents related to enforcement of rights. 
Conversely, there is a reluctance to pursue criminal matters by reporting crimes. This finding 
is corroborated by a refugee lawyer‘s description of the types of cases refugees his 
organisation is usually asked for help with: 
What is interesting is that [refugees] are very reluctant to charge a corrupt refugee official; they don‘t 
want to lay criminal charges against people who want to extort money from them. But on the whole they 
have been perfectly happy about going to court on civil matters, on matters relating to rights under the 
Constitution and the Refugee Act.
40
 
Figure 2 below depicts the types of matters that respondents in the study had sought legal 
assistance for. It does not include administrative matters, which as has been pointed out, 
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virtually every client of the Law Clinic had sought assistance for at one time or the other. 
Administrative matters are discussed separately below.   
FIG. 2 TYPES OF MATTER 
 
 
5.3.1 Criminal matters  
Physical assault was the major type of cases that respondents indicated that they had sought 
legal assistance for. Ironically, police officers were frequently the perpetrators in these cases. 
Of the 13 respondents who reported having been assaulted, 5 (38.5 per cent) had been 
assaulted by the police. Often the assault resulted from attempting to seek police assistance 
for other matters. Several of the respondents who have reported matters to the police found 
that that was as far as their matters went. Those in fact, appear to be the lucky ones. Others 
found that the police turned on them, made them out to be the criminals and physically 
assaulted them. The Law Clinic at UCT indicated that this is not unusual, as it has received 
many such reports: ‗We have many reports of police beating our clients. Commonly, the 
client reports having called for assistance from the police and, rather than getting help, they 
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end up getting beaten by the police‘.41 Scholars assert that the reason behind such clearly 
illegal behaviour, which contravenes the duty to protect and violates refugees‘ right to access 
justice for infringements on their persons, is xenophobia. That xenophobia is a widespread 
problem within South Africa is a well documented fact.
42
 However, when it comes to access 
to justice, it is its manifestation among law enforcement officials that is most significant, as it 
has a huge effect on the criminal justice system. 
  
5.3.1.1 Xenophobia and access to the criminal justice system 
Several studies document what has been termed ‗xenophobic tendencies‘ within the country‘s 
police force.
43
 According to Masuku, several years since the end of apartheid, the values and 
attitudes of a significant proportion of police officers has yet to change. And although there 
are no available statistics to quantify the problem, ‗studies suggest that xenophobia takes 
different forms and that the problem in the SAPS is not limited merely to attitudes, but often 
involves violence, abuse, and ill-treatment of foreigners‘.44 How these attitudes are 
manifested is illustrated by one of the cases that I followed in the course of this study. It was 
a particularly disturbing incidence of police brutality against a 28-year-old refugee from the 
DRC named Jonas.  
Like many Congolese refugees
45
 in the city, Jonas worked as an informal car guard 
whenever he could find an opening. One night, after trying unsuccessfully to find a car 
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 UCT Law Clinic Narrative Report (note 21 above). 
42
 See chapter four, footnotes 31& 33. 
43
 Ingrid Palmary ‗Refugees, safety and xenophobia in South African cities: The role of local government 
research. Available at www.csvr.org.za [Accessed on 14
th
 July 2009]; Loren B Landau ‗Urbanization, nativism 
and the rule of law in South Africa‘s ―forbidden‖ cities‘ (2005) 26 7 Third World Quarterly 1115–1134 ,1125–
1126; Nyaoro Dulo ‗The short arm of the law: Migrants‘ experiences of policing in Johannesburg‘ (Masters 
Diss. Forced Migration Programme, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg  2007); David Bruce & 
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of the SAPS‘ in Reconstruct, The Sunday Independent, 10 December 2000; Lee Rondganger ‗Xenophobic 
officers tarnish image and efficiency of SAPS‘. The Star 17 April 2006, A6. 
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 Themba Masuku ‗Targeting foreigners: Xenophobia among Johannesburg‘s police‘ (2006) Crime Quarterly 
19–24, 19. 
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guarding position in Cape Town‘s Long Street, he decided to return home. An unmarked car 
occupied by several people (who later turned out to be plain-clothes police officers) parked 
beside him and the occupants began to question him as to where he was going at that time of 
the night. Jonas kept walking away from them, thinking they were criminals. He was then 
arrested and taken to the Woodstock police station where he was subjected to such brutal and 
sadistic assault over the course of the night that he was hospitalised. Two of the officers, both 
female, made him strip naked and repeatedly assaulted him with different objects. He also 
had his face and genitals sprayed with some ‗burning chemicals‘. Bleeding profusely, he was 
continually beaten until he lost consciousness and awoke the next morning to find himself 
locked up in a cell. The police officers who took over the next morning let him go. Jonas 
stated that during the course of his ordeal, he was continually referred to as a ‗foreign 
criminal‘ even though he had committed no crime and he was not charged with any. The 
UCT Law Clinic assisted him to lay a criminal complaint against the two police officers. 
Police prejudice and denial of access to justice is not always displayed in the form of 
violence, however. Sometimes it is found in the not-so-subtle hints that an officer makes to a 
complainant. Some respondents reported being advised to ‗go back to your country‘ when 
they tried to report a matter. One reported being told: ‗you people are Congolese, you should 
solve your own problems‘.46 This finding is corroborated by the UCT Law Clinic, which 
reports that sometimes, its clients are given the impression that they cannot access the justice 
system because they are foreigners. In one such instance ‗... a police official advised our 
client that they could not get a protection order because the matter of domestic abuse should 
be resolved within the Somali community without calling for outside assistance‘.47  In 
another instance, a refugee reported a case of assault by his employers at the Wynberg police 
station. Rather than open a case of assault, the police officer who attended to him helped him 
to draft a letter to the DHA asking to go back to his country. Not being very fluent in English, 
he took the letter to the DHA from where he was directed to the UCT Law Clinic to have his 
voluntary repatriation processed. During the interview in preparation for his repatriation, he 
was very surprised to learn what was contained in the letter.  
                                                                                                                                                        
and Congolese refugees in South Africa (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2005);  Sichone (note 24 above) 
133. 
46
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Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
215 
 
Further tied to the issue of police discrimination as a barrier to justice, was the general 
perception among respondents that in matters affecting non-South Africans, the police is 
usually apathetic. They felt there was a lack of interest in taking up the matters that were 
reported to them, simply because they were foreigners. Interestingly, several respondents 
indicated that if the police had shown some interest, they would have been happy to pursue a 
matter and to go to court if necessary. But the overwhelming refrain was that there was 
simply no interest on the part of the police. Even in cases where arrests were made and 
perpetrators charged, there seemed to be an unwillingness to follow through with 
prosecutions – a state of affairs that has received media attention48 – and is naturally cause for 
much dissatisfaction on the part of victims. A respondent stated:  
I reported a case of [physical assault]. I was beaten by local community people because I was not from 
their country. What happened in the case? The police seemed to be searching for the criminals, but after a 
week I was watching these same guys in the city. No, I was not satisfied with the way the police handled 
the case, because no case was made. I was called for the case, but after four months, the guys were free.
49 
 
Further compounding things is a strange practice that seems to have developed in the police 
force, whereby they tell complainants to go and look for and bring their assailants to the 
police station. One respondent said: 
The police – they don‘t care. They didn‘t take me seriously. They said I should go and look for the 
person because they don‘t know him. Even after I gave them his name and address, they did not arrest 
him. I think they don‘t want to help because he is a South African. He is their brother. I don‘t know what 
I will do next if the police take up the matter. Maybe I will come here [UCT Law Clinic] again for 
further assistance.
50
 
The police‘s practice of saddling victims with the responsibility of bringing their assailants to 
the police station, or in effect arresting them, has been noted by the UCT Law clinic because 
several of their clients have reported being asked to do the same.
51
  
Admittedly, these accusations of apathy and ineptitude are not a uniquely ‗foreigner 
problem‘. According to recent government pronouncements, South African citizens 
sometimes face the same problem of apathy and inept handling of cases when they go to 
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police stations. So much so, that large numbers of cases go unreported because people have 
lost faith in the criminal justice system.
52
 However, this does not negate the fact that 
foreigners appear to be more disproportionately affected, and where the reasons for failure to 
act is linked to the complainant‘s non-citizen status, then that clearly is prejudice. It is rather 
telling that not a single respondent in this study who reported having made a complaint to the 
police was satisfied with the way in which the police handled the matter. 
Researchers suggest that one of the main factors behind xenophobia within the SAPS is 
that police officers receive inadequate training on dealing with race and discrimination,
53
 
despite evidence that the responsible government departments are quite aware of the 
situation.
54
 This, coupled with the inability of police officers to differentiate between various 
classes of foreigners,
55
 as well as a widespread perceptions among police officers that crime 
is largely driven by foreigners,
56
 all form perfect conditions under which asylum seekers or 
refugees approaching the police for help can often expect to be met with a prejudicial 
attitude. Landau proffers further explanations: 
As police seek to overcome their apartheid-era stigma and supplement their meagre incomes, they are 
exploiting poor oversight, xenophobic discourses and immigrants‘ vulnerabilities to legitimise a set of 
illegal or extra-legal practices. At the most basic level, by targeting non-nationals ‗the usual suspects‘ 
(refugees, asylum seekers and other immigrant groups unlikely to have proper identification documents) 
– police are able to meet periodic arrest targets.57  
Poorly paid and unsupervised, police officers have few incentives for promoting abstract 
principles of justice, Landau concludes.
58
 Unfortunately, xenophobia is not merely a blight on 
the reputation of the police, it has severe implications for refugees and asylum seekers‘ 
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access to justice. Its effect is that it prevents those who are victims of it from accessing 
justice, thus twice victimising them. It also has implications for South Africa, as this puts it in 
violation of the constitutional and international law obligations elaborated in chapters two 
and three.  
Firstly, as was shown in chapter three, in order to be effectively enjoyed, the right of 
access to justice imposes both negative and positive obligations on the State. The negative 
obligation is a duty not to impede access to the courts and that duty binds all organs of the 
State.
59
 That negative obligation, I argued, extends beyond active measures which curtail the 
powers of the courts, and includes failure to take action to remove existing impediments. This 
assertion is supported by the finding of the HRC in Oló Bahamonde v Equatorial Guinea.
60
  
There, the HRC stated that since the notion of equality before the courts and tribunals 
encompasses the very access to the courts, a situation in which a person‘s attempts to notify 
the competent jurisdictions of his or her grievances are systematically frustrated runs counter 
to this guarantee.
61
 Thus, the State has an obligation to address any situation which 
‗systematically frustrates access‘ if the guarantee of equal access is to be enjoyed. It is 
submitted that the types of situations which that case contemplates include one such as this, 
where xenophobic tendencies within the SAPS frequently leads to intimidation or 
victimisation of foreigners wishing to utilise the State‘s justice mechanism. This is especially 
so if the situation is so pronounced that it causes victims of crime or injustice to avoid 
seeking remedies, which, as will be demonstrated further on, is the case here.
62
 Failure on the 
part of South Africa to take action which addresses such practices, even though it is well-
known and well-documented, constitutes a violation of the State‘s negative obligation not to 
impede access. Such inaction also puts the State in violation of its obligations under Art 16 of 
the UN Refugee Convention, to ensure unrestricted access for refugees to its courts.  
Secondly, such practices go against the principle of equality and equal protection of the 
law as laid down in s. 9(1) of the Constitution. Equal protection of the law requires that law 
enforcement work to protect refugees just as it does other members of society. It also requires 
them to fulfil properly, their role as the gateway to the justice system. As the Constitutional 
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Court noted in Van der Walt v Metcash Trading Ltd,
63
 ‗all persons in a similar position must 
be afforded the same right to access the courts and to the same fair and just procedures with 
regard to such access‘.64 The test here is clearly objective – anyone who needs the protection 
of the law should get it. Everyone should benefit from the law, regardless of nationality or 
immigration status. When the police, who are the embodiment of the law and the primary 
instrument of the State‘s protection, are themselves violators of those rights, this guarantee is 
ineffectual.  
This situation illustrates one of the inadequacies of South Africa‘s policy on access to 
justice, as asserted in chapter four. I argued in that chapter that by failing to recognise 
refugees as vulnerable persons who face difficulty in accessing justice, and thus devising 
measures which address their vulnerability, the access to justice policy and programmes will 
not achieve the ideal of equal access to justice that the Constitution upholds. Thus, what 
currently obtains, to paraphrase the ECtHR in Golder v UK,
65
 is an absurd situation where the 
Constitution describes in detail the procedural guarantees afforded to persons seeking justice, 
yet there is no guarantee of that which alone makes it possible to benefit from such 
procedures, that is access to court.
66
 This situation urgently needs to be changed. It calls for 
concerted and determined effort, firstly to acknowledge it and, secondly, to put measures in 
place to address it. The ultimate goal would be to create a police force in which 
discrimination has no part, which is conversant with the rights of refugees and asylum 
seekers and which protects those rights. The final chapter of this thesis makes 
recommendations in this regard. 
To avoid creating an inaccurate picture, it is worth pointing out that despite being 
widespread, prejudicial attitudes towards non-citizens cannot be ascribed to all officers in the 
police force. On the contrary, in some of the matters in which respondents had decided to 
seek redress for abuses by police officers, it had been fellow officers, mostly from the same 
stations, who had advised them to do that and had even directed them to the right places 
where they could find help. For instance Josephine
67
 a Rwandan refugee was assaulted by 
police officers after a tenant reported that she had locked him out. The police came to her 
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house at night while she and her family were in bed. When she demanded to see a warrant, 
she and her husband were beaten up and the whole family, including her young children, 
were tear-gassed to force them into submission. She took down the number of the police van 
and then reported the matter at the Manenberg police station the following day. The officer 
who attended to her advised her to open a case and directed her to seek legal assistance from 
Legal Wise. Legal Wise decided to bring a case against the Minister for Safety and Security 
and the two officers involved.  
However, when Legal Wise called the police station to get details of her police report, 
they were told there was no such case on their register, despite Josephine‘s insistence that she 
had given a statement and seen them take down her particulars. When she asked to see the 
officer who had attended to her on the day she made the report, she was told he was ‗not 
around‘. She felt that the police officers were then trying to cover up for their fellow officers. 
After this she became afraid that if the men involved knew she was planning on taking them 
to court, they could kill her. So she approached the UCT Law Clinic to help her get a 
protection order against them, and also to help process an application for resettlement to 
another country.  ‗I didn‘t flee genocide in Rwanda to come and die in South Africa‘ she 
said.
68
   
Similarly, in the case of Jonas described earlier,  it was one of the police officers who 
took over the following morning that advised Jonas to lay a charge of assault against the 
officers involved. He referred Jonas to the UCT Law Clinic, and even called a photographer 
to document his injuries and then advised him to go to Groote Schuur Hospital. 
Unfortunately, as with Josephine, this officer who assisted him in getting help initially, later 
became aloof and did not want to be involved in the case. This sudden change in attitude by 
officers who try to do the right thing raises questions about the possibility of pressure being 
exerted by colleagues to toe a certain line or to shield misbehaving officers.  
 
5.3.1.2 How police attitudes influence refugees willingness to seek remedies  
Much of the literature on access to justice suggests that lack of awareness about rights is one 
of the main reasons people do not have recourse to the courts.
69
 But in this study, respondents 
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showed a remarkable awareness of their rights, and knew they had to seek a lawyer‘s 
assistance for matters of a legal nature. Yet in many instances, there was a disconnect 
between knowledge of their rights and a willingness to follow through with the processes 
needed to see those rights enforced. Sixteen of the 30 respondents (53 per cent) said even 
though there had been several instances when they had felt they had legitimate claims that 
should be settled in court, they had not sought judicial resolution for various reasons. The 
main reasons expressed were fear, unwillingness by the police to follow through, or distrust 
of the system. One Congolese respondent stated, when asked why he had chosen not report a 
crime against him: ‗I did not go [to report the case] because of the feeling and thought of not 
being helped by a South African organization to solve my problem mostly if the other party is 
also South African‘.70 This corroborates the findings of a 2006 survey by Wits University that 
forced migrants were less likely to report crimes against them to the police, mostly because 
they do not trust the police.
71
 
The question arose as to what respondents would do if police officers were the 
perpetrators of the crime against them, a legitimate question considering the wide-spread 
demonstration of xenophobia on the part of the police as described earlier. In this instance 
there was far greater dichotomy between knowledge of rights on the one hand, and where to 
go for redress and willingness to seek that redress on the other. Knowledge about further 
sources of redress was low among respondents. Only one respondent indicated that he had 
tried to take a case of brutality further than the police station, reporting it to the Independent 
Complaints Directorate – the civilian body responsible for investigating complaints of 
misconduct and criminality made against members of the South African Police Service and 
Municipal Police Services. Other respondents had not heard of the ICD. It is probably worth 
pointing out that knowing where to go would not necessarily translate into getting the redress 
                                                                                                                                                        
o  l  : A di     ion p p  ‘ (Johannesburg: Open Society Foundation for South Africa, 2005) 108; Sally Lloyd-
Bostock ‗Fault and liability for accidents: The accident victim‘s perspective‘ in Donald J Harris et al 
Compensation and support for illness and injury (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984) 159; Mauro Cappelletti & 
Brian Garth ‗Access to justice: The worldwide movement to make rights effective‘ in Mauro Cappelletti & 
Brian Garth (eds.) Access To Justice – Vol.1 A World Survey (Milan: Sijthoff & Noordhoff 1978) 15–16; Genn 
et al (note 26 above); Janet Gross Stein & Adam Cook ‗Speaking the language of justice‘ in Julia Bass et al 
(eds) Access to justice for a new century: The way forward (Toronto: Law Society of Upper Canada, 2005) 163. 
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sought. Even for legal assistance agencies, accessing the available redress mechanisms on 
behalf of their clients can be quite onerous. According to the UCT Law clinic,  
Personnel at police stations (Caledon Square and Khayelitsha) refused to open dockets for foreign 
nationals who alleged that they had been assaulted by police from that station … We refer complaints to 
the Independent Complaints Directorate, who usually are meticulous in acknowledging the complaint.  
However, the rate at which we [get] results from the ICD is in direct proportion to the pressure we 
maintain on getting an individual case investigated.  We do have some assault cases still pending from 
last year that are waiting to go to Court, but their progress is extremely slow.
72
   
There were other reasons for the low interest in seeking further redress among respondents, 
which will be discussed in the section on perception of the justice system below. The most 
common reason however, was widespread fear of intimidation or physical injury related to 
their non-citizens status. As a Somali refugee put it ‗if they know, they can kill me‘.73 He had 
been arrested at the Bellville taxi rank ‗for loitering‘. During his arrest he was physically 
assaulted and had his arm broken. The arresting officers took him to hospital, chained him to 
the bed and told him he would have to appear in court after he was discharged. However, 
when his friend paid R1000 to the police officers, he was let off. He stated that when he 
complained about the fact that they had broken his arm, he was intimidated. ‗They asked me 
―what are you going to do about it?‖‘ He then decided that the best recourse was to leave the 
country as he could not be sure something similar would not happen to him again. I met him 
at the UCT Law clinic where he had gone to apply for resettlement to another country.  
This man‘s response is replicated many times over in the resettlement case log74 of the 
UCT Law Clinic and among the respondents, and it highlights an interesting finding: many of 
those who had approached the Law Clinic to report cases of police brutality and unlawful 
arrest had not in fact gone there to seek any redress against the police. Rather, they had gone 
to ask to be resettled either to another part of the country or more commonly, out of South 
Africa. They would often state ‗I do not want to bring any case – I just want to leave this 
country‘. This is an obvious indication of their perception of and level of confidence in the 
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South African justice system. For many, justice was not seen as bringing a perpetrator to 
book, but rather it was fleeing the country and going ‗where they cannot get me‘.75 Refugee 
lawyers who were interviewed all confirmed their clients‘ general disenchantment with and 
apathy towards the legal system.  
This apathy towards the justice system is worrying, not only because it is a 
manifestation of denial of access to justice, but also because it raises the spectre of 
subterranean forms of justice, which refugees and asylum seekers may be forced to resort to 
in the absence of help from the State. As the Constitutional Court noted in Lesapo v North 
West Agricultural Bank and Another,
76
 the right of access to court contained in s. 34 of the 
Constitution is a ‗bulwark against vigilantism‘, one that ensures ‗peaceful, regulated and 
institutionalised mechanisms to resolve disputes, without resorting to self-help‘.77 Without 
doubt, refugees and asylum seekers will continue to confront issues that require the justice 
system to resolve. But when they are unwilling to do so, as a result of police intimidation or 
the perception that they will not be helped, there is the possibility that they will take the law 
into their own hands. The police, in other words, could be inadvertently encouraging 
vigilantism and a resort to self-help, thus effectively undermining the purpose of s. 34 and the 
rule of law. Even if they do not resort to vigilantism, the probability of resorting to non-state 
justice systems, with the attendant risks, is increased. This issue is discussed in further detail 
in chapter six. 
The discussion above suggests that in accessing the criminal justice system, the major 
problems for refugees and asylum seekers exist in the preliminary stages where they deal 
with law enforcement officials and those who act as the gateway into the justice system. 
Unfortunately, the policy and programmes on access to justice do not address this, thus 
confirming my earlier argument that, in so far as it fails to acknowledge refugees as a 
vulnerable group requiring assistance to enjoy equal access to justice, South Africa‘s access 
to justice policies and programmes do not meet the needs of refugees and asylum seekers.   
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5.3.2 Civil matters 
With respect to civil matters, there were several different kinds for which respondents had 
sought assistance. These included unlawful evictions, which often necessitated 
representations to or before a housing tribunal by the UCT Law Clinic; transfer of property; 
road traffic matters which essentially were cases in which the respondents had been 
wrongfully fined for not being possession of a licence and for which the law clinic made 
representations to have charges withdrawn; and lastly cases of domestic violence in which 
spouses or partners, often women, approached the law clinic seeking to have protection 
orders taken out against the other partner. One respondent had sought legal assistance to 
obtain access to his medical records in order to have his Unemployment Insurance Fund 
payout processed, and another was seeking assistance to bring medical malpractice suit 
against a surgeon at the Victoria Hospital in Wynberg. 
The largest category of civil matters for which respondents had sought legal assistance 
were labour-related.
78
 Refugees and asylum seekers inhabit a delicate space in relation to jobs 
and job opportunities in the country,
79
 and some of the cases reflected those challenges. 
These range from unfair dismissals, employment without contracts, withheld wages, unfair 
discrimination, to illegitimate barriers to permanent employment, such as the requirement of 
a 13 digit ID document for permanent employment. The UCT Law Clinic typically referred 
these cases to the CCMA, the Department of Labour or to the relevant bargaining council, but 
in some instances represented the refugee before the CCMA until conclusion.
80
 No 
respondent indicated they had been turned away from these bodies, and the UCT Law Clinic 
is not aware of any instance of a refugee or asylum seeker being turned away.
81
 
Inability to obtain or renew necessary permits from DHA was one of the major factors 
in the labour cases. Many of those problems arose either from concerns by employers that 
they would be fined for employing ‗illegal‘ immigrants since some of the workers had 
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expired permits,
82
 or simply out of a desire to take advantage of the ‗cheap labour‘ that 
asylum seekers in particular represent, due to the precarious nature of their legal status. They 
are often employed without contract and then have their employment terminated without due 
regard to any proper procedure. Some employers in fact refused to pay for work done, relying 
on the fact that the victims would be too afraid to seek help from any statutory body. Such 
cases were rampant in the past,
83
 and according to some respondents and the UCT Law 
Clinic, still happen. The Clinic said it had noticed an increase in reporting of discrimination 
by South African employers, including exploitation of refugee labour.
84
 But the increase in 
the reporting also demonstrates a greater awareness of labour rights by refugees and a desire 
to seek redress for unfair labour practices.  
In one instance, a respondent, a 26-year-old Congolese refugee was employed by a 
security company without any written contract. After working for three months without being 
paid, he wrote to his supervisor asking for the promised salary. The company promptly fired 
him. He then approached the UCT Law Clinic to help him recover the wages due to him. 
Staff at the clinic wrote a letter of demand on his behalf, and also referred him to the CCMA 
to seek redress for wrongful dismissal. Thereafter, he was subjected to threat after threat of 
physical harm if he did not withdraw the case from CCMA.
85
 He did not succumb to those 
threats, returning every time to the Clinic to inform his attorney of developments. This would 
not have been the case a few years ago, as he would have been intimidated into giving up. 
Khan observes that refugees and asylum seekers are more aware of rights nowadays, and of 
the fact that there are minimum wages below which they should not be paid, and as 
foreigners should not be paid less.
86
 It is however, worth pointing out that labour exploitation 
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reported is not unique to migrants however. Poor and vulnerable South Africans are often 
also similarly exploited.
87
 
It appears, on the strength of statements by legal service providers and refugees 
themselves, that in respect of labour rights and labour issues, refugees have greater access to 
justice, and this is due in no small part to the level of labour rights-awareness, and the 
commendable work of the CCMA. Scholars and practitioners are generally happy with the 
work of the CCMA, both in terms of accessibility and the relative speed of its processes.
88
 In 
terms of accessibility, as noted above refugees are not turned back, and they also have access 
to interpretation. However, the CCMA provides interpreters in the 11 official languages only. 
Foreign language interpreters are allowed, but need to be arranged by the referring party at 
his own cost.
89
 As previous chapters have established, linguistic accessibility is an important 
aspect of access to justice, and lack of it effectively negates equal access. The cost of 
providing such interpretation may prove to be a barrier to many wishing to use the system. In 
all likelihood, those refugees requiring interpreters would likely resort to bringing a friend or 
compatriot along, who speaks better English. But as chapter four demonstrated, the issue of 
interpreters is not limited merely to availability. It is also critically important that such 
interpreter be competent in order to avoid miscarriage of justice.  This is an area that the DoJ 
would do well to look at, and on this point, it bears reiterating the recommendation of the 
court in Mponda v S that the DoJ needs to establish a panel of officially accredited ad hoc 
interpreters qualified in the various foreign African languages to which courts, legal 
practitioners and bodies like th  CCMA, can have recourse.
90
 
Beyond the question of access to interpretation, the findings in relation to labour issues 
show that arbitral forums are beneficial in combating exploitative labour practices. The 
relative accessibility of the CCMA to refugees and asylum seekers demonstrates the 
importance of the recognition within s. 34 of the Constitution, of the role forums other than 
courts can play in ensuring access to justice. Certainly, in this area, the State‘s efforts to 
promote access to justice have been beneficial to refugees and asylum seekers.  
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5.3.3 Administrative matters  
Administrative justice is an important aspect of access to justice, and for refugees and asylum 
seekers, particularly so because their enjoyment of asylum and hence, their continued 
presence in South Africa is largely a result of administrative action. Access to a decision-
maker may make the difference between protection and refoulement and the consequent 
danger to life and limb. However, access to justice in the administrative context is not merely 
a matter of having access to a decision-making body. As with criminal and civil justice, the 
removal of arbitrariness and ensuring respect for principles of fairness and the rule of law are 
integral to enjoying administrative justice. As every respondent, at one time or the other had 
been a subject of administrative action, the study only focuses on how practices within the 
administrative process affect their access to administrative justice and other areas of life. The 
data for this aspect of the study is based on the case logs of the UCT Law Clinic and on 
interviews with service providers at the Legal Resources Centre. Judging by the sheer volume 
of administrative matters that these legal service providers attend to, it is clear that 
administrative matters make up the greater proportion of issues that refugees and asylum 
seekers require legal assistance for. For instance, of the 4329 asylum seekers that the UCT 
Law Clinic attended to between January and June 2009, 3462 (80 per cent) were for 
administrative matters. These relate mostly to questions of legal status in the country, or 
compliance with administrative requirements of various professional bodies. But by far the 
biggest administrative matter relates to obtaining permits from the Department of Home 
Affairs (DHA) and appeals against rejected applications for asylum.  
As has been stated, administrative justice is an important aspect of access to justice, and 
in order for refugees and asylum seekers to truly enjoy access to justice in the administrative 
context, there are three elements that must be in place: Firstly, they must have access to the 
administrative body. Secondly, they must have access to resources needed to navigate the 
administrative system, including language assistance; and thirdly, they must have access to 
legal or other knowledge necessary to obtain the services of that administrative body.
91
 I will 
now examine how refugees fare in respect of each of these elements.  
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5.3.3.1 Access to the asylum process 
South Africa‘s obligations to refugees in the administrative context are to be found in Arts 
25, 27 and 28 of the UN Refugee Convention. Those articles require a host State to assist 
refugees in obtaining documents from foreign countries, to provide refugees with identity 
documents and to provide them with travel documents respectively. These obligations have 
been incorporated into South Africa‘s Refugees Act,92 which also incorporates the 
constitutional guarantees on administrative justice.
93
 Those guarantees are found in s. 33 of 
the constitution.  
Given its history of ‗executive autocracy‘, it was important to the drafters of the Interim 
and Final Constitutions that South Africa avoids a repeat of the culture of administrative 
injustice that prevailed in the past
94
 – a culture which saw the power of the courts to review 
administrative actions severely curtailed by the wide discretionary powers invested in 
government officials and by ouster clauses.
95
 Consequently, the country became one of few 
countries in the world which makes administrative justice a constitutional right.
96
 Section 33 
of the Constitution recognises a right to administrative justice and sets out guarantees in this 
regard.
97
 Those guarantees seek to ensure that persons who are subjects of administrative 
action enjoy procedures that are fair and in compliance with the rule of law. To give effect to 
this right, the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act
98
 (PAJA) was enacted. PAJA 
elaborates on s. 33 of the Constitution, setting out specific procedures to be followed by all 
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administrators in the public service. The manner in which the DHA is to deal with refugees is 
therefore guided by the provisions of PAJA. 
Unfortunately, this study, and other research and media reports
99
 show that the 
provisions of the Constitution and PAJA are not implemented as well as they should be and, 
as a result, the asylum determination procedure is characterised by a high degree of 
arbitrariness, which fails to achieve acceptable standards of administrative justice.
100
 The 
problems in this regard are numerous and varied. As already alluded to above, the data 
suggests that one of the biggest problems is access to the asylum determination process. 
Asylum seekers contend that access to the system is almost impossible without a bribe, with 
applicants often having to queue for days on end and even sleeping in front of the offices of 
the DHA, a position supported by existing studies.
101
 Most respondents (56.7 per cent) had 
had to seek legal assistance to gain access to the asylum process.  
Even after eventually gaining access to the asylum process, asylum seekers find the 
process characterised by so much delay that they are left in limbo for long periods of time, 
sometimes years. Although s. 22 of the Refugees Act
102
 and s. 4(1)(b) to the Refugees Act 
Regulations
103
 require that as soon as an individual lodges a claim for asylum, the Refugee 
Reception Officer (RRO) should issue them with a temporary asylum seeker permit, the study 
found that this is often not the case. On average, as Table 3 shows, it took respondents at least 
six months to obtain the relevant permi s from DHA.  
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TABLE 3: LENGTH OF TIME TO OBTAIN PERMIT 
 
Time to get permit 
 
Frequency 
 
Per cent 
 
< 6 months 
 
11 
 
36.7 
 
> 6 months 
 
Unknown 
 
12 
 
7 
 
40.0 
 
23.3 
 
Practitioners have grappled with this endemic problem from as far back as 2000,
104
 and the 
table above in fact, represents a massive improvement in the time-frames that other studies 
reveal.
105
 This improvement is largely attributable to the fluctuating successes of the 
measures adopted by the DHA to address backlogs resulting from its inefficient asylum 
adjudication process.
106
 
The inability of DHA to deal with asylum applications in a timely manner means that 
thousands of asylum seekers remain undocumented for months, sometimes years, despite 
genuine efforts to get Section 22 permits. This has negative impacts on their abilities to get 
jobs, put their children in school, and it has been suggested, even makes them more 
vulnerable to xenophobic exploitation and pressure.
107
 To make matters even worse, when the 
DHA finally gets round to processing their applications, many applicants find themselves in 
limbo: genuine asylum seekers find that their applications are rejected because ‗the situation 
in home country has improved‘, yet the reasons that caused their flight in the first place 
remain. Others find that they eventually get their permits when they could in fact have 
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returned home because their home situation has improved.
108
 As if inability to gain access to 
the asylum process and excessive delays were not enough, the system is also plagued by other 
problems, such as personnel shortages
109
 and the lack of uniformity in procedures adopted at 
the DHA‘s various offices, with each adopting whatever practices suited them, to the 
detriment of asylum seekers.
110
  
The situation described above shows serious shortcomings in South Africa‘s 
compliance with its international law and constitutional obligations on access to 
administrative justice for asylum seekers. The situation goes against every principle of access 
to justice, as has been demonstrated in chapters two and three and amounts to a derogation of 
South Africa‘s responsibility for refugee protection generally, and to ensure access to 
administrative justice specifically. As Landau puts it, the situation is not one of mere 
administrative incompetence; it is a situation of illegality and violation of the right to human 
dignity.
111
 It is quite clear that the problem is not attributable to a lack of adequate guarantees 
or adequate legislation, as the existence of s. 33 of the Constitution and the enactment of 
PAJA and Refugees Act negate that contention. In terms of access to the administrative 
process, the problem lies in the lack of implementation of those laws. The next section looks 
at other problems related to access to administrative justice. 
 
5.3.3.2 Access to language assistance 
As with understanding proceedings in courts, the issue of language is also important in the 
context of administrative justice. For asylum seekers and refugees, this is even more so, 
because the grant or refusal of asylum is largely dependent on the reasons for the applicant‘s 
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flight, and this is usually narrated orally. In this regard, the Refugees Act provides that the 
Minister of Home Affairs may make regulations for the provision of interpreters at all levels 
of the determination process.
112
 Pursuant to this, s. 5 of the Refugees Act Regulations
113
 
requires the DHA to provide interpretation services throughout the application process, where 
practical and necessary. However, a survey by De la Hunt
114
 showed that interpretation was a 
major problem for asylum seekers at the DHA. Asylum seekers either had to bring their own 
– untrained – interpreters or try to make the best of a situation where they could hardly 
communicate with their interviewers. There have been allegations that interpreters do not 
understand the basics of refugee law, sometimes confusing ‗persecution‘ with ‗prosecution‘ 
and oftentimes paraphrasing or reworking the asylum seeker‘s story.115 De la Hunt‘s study 
was carried out in 2002, and even though there are indications that things have improved in 
this regard, more recent studies
116
 show that access to interpretation services is still a huge 
challenge. The legal service providers interviewed for this study stated that their asylum 
seeker clients did not receive any language assistance when their initial status determination 
hearings were originally processed at DHA. This is also corroborated by a national survey of 
the refugee reception and status determination system in South Africa, conducted by the 
Forced Migration Project at Wits University. That survey showed that the DHA provides 
interpreters in only about a fifth of all cases requiring interpreters.
117
 Those who did not 
receive such assistance relied on social networks or private interpreters who solicit clients 
outside of the reception offices. Even then, 16 per cent of applicants were unable to secure 
interpreters, and thus went through the application process without necessarily understanding 
what was happening.
118
 
As was established in chapters two and three, and reiterated in chapter four, linguistic 
accessibility is one of the critical elements of access to justice. A person who is not able to 
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effectively participate in an administrative process affecting him due to lack of proficiency in 
the language, cannot be said to have access to a fair administrative process, as required by s. 
33 of the Constitution. This obviously impacts upon an important feature of administrative 
justice – that the subject of administrative action must have a reasonable opportunity to make 
representation. Not only that, it negates the constitutional imperative that administrative 
action must be lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.
119
 The issue for asylum seekers, is 
not only the inadequate numbers of interpreters available, but also the substance and quality 
of the interpretation services, which is linked to the competence of the interpreter. The 
implications of this has previously been discussed
120
 and applies equally here.  
 
5.3.3.3 Access to legal assistance  
The importance of access to legal assistance in the context of access to justice has been 
reiterated throughout the course of this thesis,
121
 and they also apply in the administrative 
context.  
The application process set out by the Refugees Act and its regulations are as follows: 
asylum seekers are required to lodge an application at one of the five refugee reception 
offices in the country. At the reception office, applicants fill out an eligibility form, have their 
fingerprints taken and are then issued with a s. 22 asylum seeker permit. At a later stage, they 
are interviewed by a refugee status determination officer (RSDO), who makes a decision 
whether or not to grant asylum. If the decision is negative, asylum seekers are entitled to 
appeal to the Refugee Appeal Board.  
The UNHCR, in its 2001 paper on ‗Fair and Efficient Asylum Procedures‘, states that it 
is necessary for asylum seekers to have access to legal counsel at all stages of the asylum 
procedure, and where available, they should have access to free legal aid if needed.
122
 This is 
because lack of access to legal assistance at any stage of the asylum process could have 
dreadful implications, including the possibility of refoulement. However, all the refugee 
service providers interviewed indicated that hardly any of their clients had any legal 
assistance at the initial application or RSDO interview stage, and most are unaware of the 
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right to counsel at any stage. This is corroborated by the findings of the national survey by 
the Forced Migration Studies Project earlier referred to.
123
 That survey found that 95 per cent 
of applicants for asylum were not told that they were allowed to have a lawyer present at their 
RSD interview.
124
 Even if they were aware of that right, they were usually not given any 
notice of their interview dates and could not have brought a lawyer along if they wanted to. 
They simply arrived at the DHA offices to renew their permits and were told they would be 
interviewed on that day.
125
 
Beyond the RSD stage, the Refugees Act makes provision for an applicant to have legal 
representation both during the administrative appeals and judicial review processes if he so 
wishes,
126
 but there is no provision for free legal assistance or even that this right should be 
made known to him. In spite of this, however, the picture regarding legal assistance is 
markedly different at the appeal stage, at least in Cape Town, where this study took place. 
This is because of an interesting practice that has developed at the Refugee Reception Office 
in Nyanga, Cape Town, whereby when asylum seekers are rejected after their RSD 
interviews, DHA officials would provide them with rejection letters accompanied by 
handwritten instructions to ‗see your lawyers at UCT‘.  Consequently, most, if not all rejected 
asylum seekers are able to approach the UCT Law Clinic for assistance with their appeals. 
This no doubt is a major contributor to asylum seekers‘ access to administrative justice as it 
helps them avoid a situation whereby they have to conduct often complex appeals by 
themselves, especially as many are not even proficient in English. However, the issue of 
limited resources means that not everyone can be assisted by the UCT Law Clinic, and so 
many rejected asylum seekers end up conducting their appeals by themselves.
127
 
It is noteworthy that at no point during the course of this study, did I come across any 
refugee, asylum seeker or refugee service provider who mentioned the Legal Aid Board as a 
relevant institution providing legal assistance in the asylum process. It will be recalled that in 
chapter four, an analysis of the LAB‘s Legal Aid Guide, showed that it sets out in great 
detail, how and where it provides legal representation in asylum matters to asylum seekers.
128
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Yet, incongruously enough, not only could I not find any evidence of that, it was strange that 
the DHA, a government department, chooses to refer asylum seekers to an independent non-
governmental organisation, rather than a body created by the government and legally 
mandated to provide such services. As pointed out in chapter four,
129
 no annual report of the 
LAB describes its activities in respect of asylum seekers, and I was unable to obtain any data 
from its offices despite repeated requests. The only conclusion that can be reached from all 
this is that the LAB does not, in fact, pay much attention to its purported role of providing 
legal assistance in the asylum process. This, again is another manifestation of how the 
experience reflects a completely different reality from that which the Constitution, the 
legislation and even the policy suggests.  
The preceding section has demonstrated the experiences of refugees in relation to 
administrative justice. It has shown that asylum seekers‘ right to administrative justice is 
being violated, through administrative incompetence and a flagrant disregard for 
constitutional guarantees. Chapter one illustrated the danger inherent when refugees do not 
have access to administrative justice.
130
 It was shown that this made them highly vulnerable 
to human rights violations and they could even be subjected to actions which endanger their 
lives. Administrative justice also has implications for their quality of life and their access to 
services.
131
 But while the violations that occurred in the pre-Refugee Act era could be blamed 
on the absence of proper legislation, or the lack of a human rights culture, the present 
situation cannot. There are proper legislations in PAJA and the Refugees Act, each grounded 
in human rights. The problem, quite obviously, lies in the lack of implementation and the 
political will that is required to give effect to the guarantees contained in those legislations.    
 
5.4 FACTORS AFFECTING PERCEPTIONS OF, AND RECOURSE TO THE 
JUSTICE SYSTEM  
In the section on criminal matters above, I discussed how prejudice within the ranks of the 
police force serves as a deterrent to those refugees and asylum seekers wishing to utilise the 
justice system. In this section, I examine other factors which shape refugees‘ perceptions of 
                                                 
129
 Ibid. 
130
 Chapter one, section 1.6.1 
131
 Ibid; also section 1.7. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
235 
 
the justice system and their willingness to resort to it, whether in a criminal or civil context. 
What the section describes are the experiences of those respondents who have actually had 
occasion to go to court, as well as the opinions and impressions of legal service providers 
who worked with them through those processes. Among respondents who had had occasion 
to go to court, there was a general attitude of disaffection. Asked to describe their 
experiences, 66 per cent described it as unpleasant. Various factors influenced this 
conclusion. 
5.4.1 The precarious work situations of refugees and asylum seekers in South Africa  
The major reason that made the court experience unpleasant for most respondents was the 
effect it had on their livelihoods. Often linked to the length of time it took to conclude 
matters, the negative impact that court cases had on jobs was a common thread. One 
respondent described his court experience as ‗long and tiring‘, and said that the constant 
adjournments affected his work.
132
 Jobs are hard for them to come by, and for those who do 
find jobs, the work situations are so precarious that they find themselves needing to be extra 
careful in order not to lose their jobs. A court hearing would often mean either not showing 
up for work, or showing up late, and frequently seeking permission to go to court. This leaves 
them vulnerable to disciplinary measures or for those who are self employed, losing out on 
their earnings for the day. In such instances, for many of them, the choice is between 
pursuing the cases until they see ju tice done or keeping their jobs – more often than not, the 
need to keep their jobs wins.
133
  
In the case of Jonas described above, while the case against the police officers who 
assaulted him was going on in the Cape Town Magistrate Court, he found a job with a 
security company. Two weeks after he resumed, he was required to be in court. He was very 
reluctant to have to seek an ‗off-day‘ so soon after resuming work, and it was only after much 
persuasion from his attorney that he did. On the day, anxiety was written all over his face as 
he waited for the sitting to begin. Only one of the accused persons was present, and Jonas 
was afraid the defence would ask for another adjournment. In the event, he was right. The 
scenario had repeated itself so many times that he knew just what to expect. It was either the 
prosecutor did not show up or one of the accused did not, or when they did, there was one 
reason or the other why the case could not proceed. Jonas had on some occasions expressed 
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fear that the prosecutor was in consort with the defence. It seemed the plan was to wear him 
down with constant adjournments to the point where the case was eventually thrown out.  
According to Varne Moodley, the attorney from the UCT Law Clinic who worked on his 
case, this was not uncommon. What is not clear is why the magistrate allowed such blatant 
manipulation of the system. Even though the court was made aware of the heavy toll that the 
adjournments placed on Jonas, it did not seem to make a difference.  
Eric another respondent, described his experience. He was assaulted by another taxi 
driver in what appeared to be a fight over turf. He reported the matter to police at the Table 
Bay police station. The police duly took his statement and documented his wounds, then sent 
him to Somerset hospital. When he went back the next day to follow up, he was arrested and 
charged with assault because the other taxi driver, a South African, had laid a counter-
complaint. He approached the Legal Resources Centre for assistance and was referred to a 
private lawyer. Eric appeared in court on about six occasions, but the prosecutor never 
showed up and sometimes his lawyer did not show up. According to him, on each of those 
occasions, he could not work because he had to be in court. Yet he had to pay his lawyer. 
Eventually the case against him was withdrawn. He said: 
I asked the court ‗are you going to compensate me for all the time I wasted coming here and not being 
able to work?‘ The judge asked me that am I not happy that the case against me is over? Why am I still 
asking for compensation? Then I asked my lawyer, ‗will I get my R1500 back?‘  But my lawyer said I 
should just forget about the case and get on with my life‘.  
Asked whether he had thought of instituting a case of unlawful arrest/prosecution against the 
police, he said no, he could not afford to waste any more time going to court when he should 
be on the road earning money to feed his family. 
Adjournments are of course an inevitable aspect of the formal justice system. It is one 
of the major criticisms against the system, and such negative impacts on livelihoods is one of 
the reasons why. Quite simply, delays in the justice system put pressure on the economically 
weak. Even beyond the impact on livelihoods is the fact that, if frequent enough, 
adjournments themselves constitute a barrier to access to justice, for as the maxim goes, 
‗justice delayed, is justice denied‘. But it is not only the refugee who bears the massive toll 
that adjournments take on employment. So do witnesses, who often have to leave their jobs 
or businesses for the day, only to be told that they would not in fact be called to the stand that 
day and their presence would be required again in a short while. They found this frustrating 
and it was a constant battle to get their attendance. For instance, Moodley reported having to 
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beg the photographer who initially documented Jonas‘ injuries to be in court every time there 
was to be a hearing. Legal service providers describe this as one of the major challenges that 
they have to deal with. According to one refugee lawyer,  
[Refugees and asylum seekers] are not really eager [to go to court] because they don‘t understand why 
court processes should be so lengthy. If a person … feels they have suffered an injury, they are looking 
for a quick and most immediate remedy, and court is never a quick and immediate remedy. So there is 
huge reluctance. Our Equality Court cases, we practically have to beg the clients. They come from far, so 
we literally have to beg them to come to court [for hearings]. It‘s extremely difficult on their part.134 
In chapter three I highlighted the interconnected nature of human rights and flagged how 
other rights impact on access to justice and access to justice impacts other rights.
135
 This 
situation demonstrates clearly how the tenuous nature of refugees‘ employment situations 
negatively affects their ability to utilise the justice system. Not only that, it also demonstrates 
the need for the State to address its obligations to refugees holistically, realising that its 
failure to address one aspect has negative impacts on the other. Its shortcomings in the area of 
administrative justice, ie, failure to device a system which ensures that refugees and asylum 
seekers are always in possession of valid permits, affects their ability to seek or keep 
employment.
136
 At the same time, its failure to address xenophobia has the same effect.
137
 
Together, these factors put severe pressure on their ability or even desire to resort to the 
justice system. Clearly, employment problems do not affect refugees alone – disadvantaged 
South Africans face the same problem. However, various literature already referred to
138
 
show that this is more pronounced for refugees due to these two factors. Furthermore, 
whereas the problems with employment mostly affects the less skilled, less educated South 
African citizens working in the informal sector, skilled and well-educated refugees and 
asylum seekers face the same problem because they usually have to work in informal sectors 
due to inability to get their professional qualifications certified or to obtain necessary 
documents. Thus, although the right to access the justice system is formally accorded to 
them, their enjoyment of that right is negatively impacted by the dire imbalance in their 
socio-economic conditions. 
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5.4.2 Inability to understand the justice system   
Another reason respondents gave for declaring their court experiences as unpleasant was their 
inability to understand the proceedings. The inability of respondents to follow proceedings 
may have been due to absence of interpretation, although unfortunately, this was not 
established. Chapter four showed that, although South African courts have a tradition of 
providing interpreters for those who may not speak the official language of the court, there 
are severe limitations in this area, especially for foreign African languages. In the matters that 
I observed, the situation was mixed. Interpretation was provided during evidence, but where 
the only thing that took place on a day were motions for adjournments (and there were 
several), the argument back and forth as to whether or not it should be granted was not 
interpreted, so the refugee usually relied on his lawyer to explain to him afterwards what had 
happened and why the case was adjourned.   
One respondent, describing his attendance at Cape Town Magistrate Court said he did 
not understand what was going on; he only knew that at the end, he was discharged.
139
 Even 
though he had appeared in court several times, each time he was not sure what was going on. 
After about five appearances, he was told that he was free, no explanations offered. He did 
not try to pursue the matter beyond that, being only too relieved that his ordeal was over. 
Trying to seek answers, however, does not necessarily mean that he would have found them, 
as the case of Eric, the metered taxi driver referred to above shows.  
Eric appeared in court on about six occasions during the assault case against him, but 
the prosecutor never showed up and sometimes his lawyer did not show up. He said he had 
absolutely no idea what was going on each time he was in court. Eventually the case against 
him was withdrawn. His lawyer never explained to him why the case had been withdrawn, 
though in all probability it had to do with the prosecutor‘s absences. As stated above, 
interpretation was provided to the refugee only during evidence in the matters that I observed, 
so this may explain why these respondents had no idea what was going on.  
This practice means that affected persons find that they are not able to follow the 
arguments. While the technical language of the law means any lay person would probably not 
comprehend the arguments, even if interpretation were available, the question does plague 
one‘s mind why lawyers acting for refugees do not make any effort to ensure that their clients 
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understand as much as possible of the whole process. Do lawyers just assume, because they 
are refugees whose first language is not English, that they were incapable of understanding 
anything? Unfortunately, this is an issue that bothered refugees enough to influence their 
perception of the justice system, and it is therefore important that it is addressed. The 
legitimacy of the justice system in the eyes of those subjected to it lies in their ability to 
comprehend what they are being subjected to. It is therefore important that the justice system, 
including lawyers paid to assist refugees, do everything in their power to make the process 
less mysterious. Otherwise the system, even if free and fair, would be viewed with scepticism 
and suspicion, and that can be seen in the examples above.    
 
5.4.3 Fear of retribution and inability to separate the justice system from previous bad 
experiences  
A third factor which influences refugees‘ perception and willingness to use the justice system 
is fear, and this has previously been alluded to in this chapter, in the context of dealing with 
the police.  However, such fears are present whether the issue in question is civil or criminal. 
Often, such fears stems from their status as non-citizens and the belief that this made them 
vulnerable to retribution from ordinary citizens, from those in authority and even from fellow 
refugees. The fear of retribution from fellow refugees is often linked to pre-existing enmity, 
from their countries of origin, which are carried over and remains a part of their lives in the 
host country. According to Refugee lawyer, William Kerfoot of the Legal Resource Centre, 
this fear of harm keeps refugees from seeking justice. They worry that going to court would 
make them visible and put them on a collision course with these other refugees with whom 
some kind of inter-ethnic rivalry or other enmity exists. They would thus, rather lie low to 
avoid coming into contact with those perceived enemies. Kerfoot cites various examples of 
this, including that of a Rwandan client who had a ‗stone cold case‘ with a high probability of 
victory. However, ‗at the last minute when he was due to sign the affidavit, he was informed 
that people had found out about this – his enemies from Rwanda – and that his life would 
have accordingly been in danger, and he didn‘t come back.‘140  
Fears of retribution from South Africans also exist. For instance, in the case of Jonas 
described above, for the three years that his case lasted, he was continually threatened and 
intimidated (including being routinely arrested and told that if he dropped the case against the 
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two officers, his life would be better). Happily for Jonas, he persevered and the case against 
the officers was concluded. The officers were found guilty of assault with intent to cause 
grievous bodily harm, and were each sentenced to one year imprisonment and a fine of 
R8000.
141
 But clearly, Jonas‘ case is not the norm. I have previously referred above to 
respondents who chose not to follow through as a result of fear of retribution.
142
  
Psychological factors also shape refugees‘ perception of the justice system, and this is 
identified by legal service providers. Psychological factors manifest in two ways. First is a 
lack of trust in anything associated with the government. They hold that refugees and asylum 
seekers are so scarred by the government system in South Africa and by xenophobia that they 
often have difficulty making any distinction between various government departments – 
whether it is DHA or the Department of Justice.
143
 Thus, they do not trust the court system 
because they do not think it will do anything for them, or that it is even possible to get a fair 
hearing within the system.
144
  
Second is what Khan describes as ‗an element of temporariness in the refugee psyche‘ 
– the belief that as refugees, or ‗guests‘ in the country, they have very limited time in the 
country and could not spend it involved in a court case.
145
 Khan asserts that if refugees had a 
longer term view of their presence in the country, chances were higher that they would 
consider it important to sort out their legal problems, and would see the legal system 
differently. 
This section has shown that the perception that refugees and asylum seekers have of the 
justice system is largely shaped by the negative experience they have had, and the factors 
responsible for such negative experiences are the same issues related to inequality of 
treatment and unequal access to the protection of the law which this thesis has described., 
Unfortunately, it has been shown, those perceptions negatively affects their willingness to 
utilise the justice system. 
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5.5 THE ROLE OF LEGAL ASSISTANCE AGENCIES  
It will have been deduced from the foregoing discussion that civil society organisations play 
an important role in the lives of Cape Town‘s refugees and asylum seekers. In South Africa, 
social and legal assistance to asylum seekers and refugees is provided through a network of 
UNHCR-supported NGOs in the major cities around the country. Known as ‗implementing 
partners‘ for the UNHCR, these NGOs provide anything from food and accommodation, to 
strategic legal interventions.
146
 As these organisations also play an important role in the area 
of access to justice for refugees and asylum seekers, any discussion of the subject would be 
incomplete without reference to that role.  
 In looking at the work of NGOs which provide legal assistance to refugees and asylum 
seekers, this section argues that the primary function of meeting the access to justice needs of 
refugees has fallen on these NGOs because the State has failed in its obligations. In view of 
this situation, and given the importance of ensuring that refugees have access to justice, it is 
expedient for the State to re-evaluate its approach in this area, and focus instead on 
empowering and enhancing the capacity of NGOs to provide legal aid to refugees, while it 
concentrates on improving the justice system, the administrative processes and the socio-
economic infrastructure. By utilising the knowledge and expertise that such a partnership will 
provide, the end result will be that the State is better able to meet its obligations. 
Chapter three set a foundation for this discussion of the role of civil society 
organisations by demonstrating how, based on the generous rules of standing in s. 38 of the 
Constitution, these organisations have launched, or helped to launch cases whose outcomes 
have had positive impacts on disadvantaged groups.
147
 In regard to refugees and asylum 
seekers in particular, these civil society organisations have been at the forefront of refugee 
rights advocacy, bringing cases whose outcomes have had tremendous impacts on the lives of 
refugees and asylum seekers as a group and as individuals.
148
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As will have been seen in the discussion on access to administrative justice, where the 
State has fallen short in its obligations to provide free legal assistance, civil society has taken 
up the role. But it is not only in the asylum adjudication process that refugees and asylum 
seekers need assistance. The earlier discussion on criminal and civil matters shows that 
refugees and asylum seekers encounter everyday situations in which legal advice or 
representation is required. And like the rest of society, they have the choice of approaching 
private lawyers to assist them. However, the prohibitive cost of private legal representation 
puts this option out of the reach of most refugees and asylum seekers. In this study, only three 
respondents had ever directly approached private lawyers for assistance in their civil or 
administrative matters. However, none stayed with the lawyers until the conclusion of their 
cases. Each had been unable to pay the required fees and their lawyers had referred them to 
the UCT Law Clinic. Their reasons for choosing the lawyers they did were, in two of the 
cases, simply a matter of referral by the Rwandan community to whom the first belonged and 
by the police in the second case. The third randomly chose a lawyer.  
In Cape Town, the network of refugee service providers is known as Tutumike.
149
 The 
primary legal assistance providers in the group are the Refugee Rights Project at the 
University of Cape Town Law Clinic and the Legal Resources Centre. These organisations 
provide refugees and asylum seekers with legal advice on problems facing them, refer clients 
to organisations that could better meet the needs of each particular case, liaise with 
government departments and the UNHCR, provide representation for rejected asylum seekers 
at their appeal hearings and even represent refugees in courts and at the CCMA in some 
matters. The work of these two organisations is widely recognised among refugees and 
asylum seekers, as can be seen from the number of those who use them. For instance, in the 
period between January and September of 2008 the UCT Law Clinic provided legal 
assistance to over 8000 clients and the LRC attended to about 5000 refugees during the 
course of 2008.
150
  
Over the years, these organisations have re-invented themselves, moving from merely 
providing assistance to obtain permits and representing asylum seekers at appeal hearings, to 
actively litigating high-impact cases that have a bearing on the constitutional rights of 
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refugees and asylum seekers.
151
 The work of both the UCT Law Clinic and the LRC are 
important examples of the benefit of s. 38 and also demonstrate the fact that, with adequate 
measures for their implementation, the constitutional guarantees on access to justice in South 
Africa are sufficient to meet the needs of refugees and asylum seekers. 
 
5.5.1 Refugees’ perception of role of civil society organisations 
It can be seen from the above that the work of NGOs have improved refugees‘ access to 
justice, allowing them to be represented by organisations with expertise and resources to 
conduct expensive and time-consuming litigation.
152
 Despite the useful work that these 
organisations do, if refugees do not know about them, they could not serve much purpose, 
since knowledge of where to go for assistance is an indispensable aspect of seeking access to 
justice. As respondents for the study were recruited from the UCT Law Clinic, it goes 
without saying that all were aware of and have made use of this legal assistance agency. 
However, it was important to establish how they came to know about these organisations as 
this would give an indication as to why there is such a high level of awareness about these 
organisations among refugees. As can be seen from the Table 4 below, most refugees and 
asylum seekers were told about these organisations by friends and compatriots they met in the 
queue at the DHA.
153
 This would usually be after trying unsuccessfully to access the asylum 
adjudication process by themselves.
154
 Others were referred to these organisations, 
particularly, the UCT Law Clinic, by the DHA itself. 
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TABLE 4: METHOD OF REFERRAL TO THE LEGAL ASSISTANCE ORGANISATIONS* 
 
Referral 
 
Frequency 
 
Per cent 
 
 
Friends/Compatriots 
 
16 
 
53.3 
 
DHA/UNHCR 
 
7 
 
23.4 
 
Police 
 
4 
 
13.3 
 
Lawyer 
 
2 
 
6.7 
 
  *n = 29 
These responses, coupled with the sheer volume of clients that these organisations attend to 
each year, shows that there is a generally high level of awareness about legal assistance 
organisations among refugees and asylum seekers in Cape Town. As a result, it is quite clear 
lack of knowledge on where to go for assistance is not a barrier to their access to justice. It is 
again interesting to note that none of the respondents had approached the LAB for assistance. 
Surely if it was fulfilling its purpose, it would appear among the organisations to which 
refugees had been referred.  
The survey also revealed that most respondents were likely to have used only one 
agency repeatedly for their legal matters, even though they were familiar with or had made 
use of the services of other legal agencies at one time or the other as well (Table 5). The most 
frequently used organisations were the UCT Law Clinic, the Legal Resources Centre and the 
Cape Town Refugee Centre. The Cape Town Refugee Centre only offers social services and 
therefore referred many respondents to other former two.  Among those who have used more 
than one agency, the main reason has been because they were referred from the first 
organisation they approached. This shows that there is a good referral system among these 
organisations, and a habit of cooperation which clearly, works for the good of refugees and 
asylum seekers.  
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TABLE 5: NUMBER OF AGENCIES USED 
 
Number of agencies 
used 
 
 
Frequency 
 
Per cent 
 
1 
 
19 
 
63.3 
 
2 
 
10 
 
33.3 
 
3 
 
1 
 
3.3 
 
 
In order to get a sense of how refugees and asylum seekers view the services offered by these 
organisations, respondents were asked to rate the services they had received when they 
approached these organisations. On the whole most respondents found these organisations 
very useful. As Table 6 shows, 60 per cent found the help they received from these legal 
assistance organisations to be satisfactory. There was a strong correlation between those who 
thought the service was poor and the failure of the assistance organizations to follow up with 
calls as promised, or refusal to take on their case (appeal cases mostly) or length of time and 
number of visits it took to resolve their issues.  
 
TABLE 6: PARTICIPANTS’ RATING OF LEGAL ASSISTANCE ORGANISATIONS 
 
Rating 
 
Frequency 
 
Per cent 
 
 
Excellent 
 
5 
 
16.7 
 
Satisfactory 
 
18 
 
60.0 
 
Fair 
 
1 
 
3.3 
 
Poor 
 
3 
 
10.0 
 
Not Sure 
 
3 
 
10.0 
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These results show that there is adequate knowledge about and usage of the services of NGOs 
among refugees and asylum seekers seeking legal assistance. Coupled with the high level of 
satisfaction among refugees with the services of these NGOs, it is submitted that, as 
mechanisms for gaining access to justice in South Africa, these NGOs enjoy a greater level of 
legitimacy among refugees and asylum seekers, than State-established bodies like the LAB. 
So much so, that even a government department like the DHA prefers to send its clients to 
them rather than the LAB. Clearly, the LAB, despite its declared provision of assistance on 
asylum matters, does not appear to be doing much to help the State meets its obligations to 
refugees and asylum seekers.  
In view of all this, coupled with the previously mentioned scepticism with which 
government-affiliated bodies are viewed by refugees,
155
 it is perhaps advisable for the State to 
reconsider what its role ought to be if it is to meet its obligations on access to justice for 
refugees and asylum seekers. It is submitted that a more useful approach would be for the 
State to utilise the expertise and knowledge already available within these organisations to 
meet its obligations. Whereas the LAB could continue to focus on legal aid in criminal 
matters, NGOs could be provided with substantive financial and human resources to provide 
legal aid in civil and administrative matters to refugees. Inadequate resources is the biggest 
problems that these NGOs face in carrying out their functions of litigating on behalf of 
refugee. Both the UCT Law Clinic and the LRC expressed the frustrations of dealing with a 
system that required so much financial and human resources they could ill-afford. As a result, 
they have to limit the number refugees and asylum seekers they could assist. Where these 
organisations are not able to assist them free of charge, would-be refugee litigants often 
abandon the thoughts of instituting legal action.
156
 In a case involving custody of a minor 
child for instance, the UCT Law Clinic represented the family of an orphaned refugee child 
who had been taken into custody by a wealthy French lady who then sought to completely 
exclude the family from any contact with the child. Whereas the said lady was able to pay for 
the services of three psychologists and other professionals to testify on her behalf, the Clinic 
battled to pay doctors and psychologists to testify on what was right for the child. In the end, 
faced with the possibility of having to pay costs if the court ruled against them, which they 
could not afford, the Clinic dropped the legal challenge. It is not clear why the Clinic did not 
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 See section 5.4.3 above 
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 Khan (note 28 above). 
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enlist the help of a state funded body like the LAB, but given in view of the evidence 
provided above that the LAB‘s work with refugees is either non-existent or extremely 
limited, it is hardly surprising that this avenue was not explored. 
Clearly, it is a worst-case access-to-justice scenario, when refugees and asylum seekers 
are unable to litigate cases themselves, and at the same time cannot access State-funded legal 
assistance or receive any help from resource-constrained NGOs. Such severe failing on the 
part of the State can be mitigated, by providing resources to NGOs to provide legal aid to 
refugees. In doing this, the State would not be shirking its duties; as things stand, these 
organisations already perform those functions anyway. On the contrary, by providing 
resources and building capacity, the State would enable NGOs to serve greater numbers of 
refugees, and would thus be meeting its obligations under international law and the 
Constitution. It is submitted that this approach falls well within the contemplation of the 
requirement, both in international and under the Constitution that the State put adequate 
measures in place to fulfil the rights international law instruments and the Constitution 
protect. It would be a good example of the State ‗act[ing] to achieve the intended result‘ as 
the Court noted in Grootboom above.
157
  
This section has examined the role of civil society in access to justice for refugees. As a 
highly vulnerable group which often lacks the necessary means of support, refugees and 
asylum seekers require some assistance as they navigate the process of recognition as 
refugees, as well as in utilising the courts to resolve issues that arise during the course of 
ordinary everyday life. The discussion thus far has shown that the State has been failing in its 
obligations to ensure access to justice for refugees. Furthermore, unlike in countries such as 
the USA and Canada with well developed pro-bono culture among lawyers, asylum seekers 
in South Africa find that they cannot simply walk into law firms hoping to find some pro-
bono assistance, as the pro-bono culture is far less ingrained here.
158
 It is therefore fortunate 
that these organisations exist, and have been playing a critical role in bridging the gaps in 
refugees‘ access to justice. Given the expertise present within these NGOs and their 
experience in this area, it is important that the State partners with them by providing 
resources to help them assist even more refugees in the area that it is falling short. In this 
way, the State will better meet its obligations to refugees and asylum seekers. 
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 See chapter four, section 4.1. 
158
 Kerfoot (note 40 above). 
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5.6 COURTS’ ATTITUDES TOWARDS REFUGEE MATTERS 
The characteristics and compositions of courts are important aspects of access to justice, as 
previous discussion of the international law and constitutional provisions have shown.
159
 In 
this regard, the independence, impartiality and competence of courts are the critical elements. 
It was shown in chapter three that, generally speaking South African courts live up to the 
standard set out in international law.
160
 However, in terms of knowledge in refugee matters, –
which speaks to the issue of competence – this study found some uncomfortable gaps, 
although there was also a lot of positives.  
The study found that court attitudes towards refugee matters have been largely positive, 
especially on the part of the High Courts. Refugee lawyers say that High Courts have mostly 
welcomed refugee matters and there has been a willingness to engage and do the right 
thing.
161
 The judges are quite knowledgeable about refugee matters and since refugees 
became a visible part of the South African society, they have taken steps to familiarise 
themselves with the international refugee law.
162
 Although there is no formal or state-
sponsored training on refugee issues, High Court judges receive extensive training on refugee 
law from different agencies – the UNHCR, International Association of Refugee Judges and 
the Refugee Studies Centre at York University, Toronto, Canada on an ongoing basis.
163
  
Problems have mostly been associated with magistrates and prosecutors in the 
Magistrates Courts. Practitioners say even though there is a general acceptance of refugee 
matters in these courts, knowledge and understanding of refugee law is very limited. 
Practitioners allege that some magistrates have gone so far as to make orders that violate 
principles of international protection and non-refoulement which are central to the protection 
of refugees and asylum seekers. According to Khan: 
… Few of the magistrates, unless they have gone and had themselves educated, would be familiar with 
the concept of refoulement. So in a judgment that they make, they may say ‗yes this man is guilty of this 
crime, so he is deportable‘. But he is talking about a refugee now. Do they know that because he‘s a 
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 Chapter two, section 2.6.4. 
160
 Chapter three section 3.5.4. 
161
 Interviews with Khan Moodley, Kerfoot, Ramjathan-Keogh, supra (note 28 above).  
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 Ibid. 
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refugee I have to look at refugee law as well, I have to look at this paramount principle? I don‘t think so. 
I don‘t think that they are that well educated.164 
Some magistrates have been known to tell refugees and asylum seekers that because they are 
foreigners, they are not entitled to legal aid.
165
 In S v Manuel,
166
  for instance, the magistrate 
agreed with the LAB that that the accused, an Angolan refugee, was not entitled to Legal Aid 
because he was a foreigner. The High Court found that the Magistrate had violated s. 35(3) of 
the Constitution when he chose to proceed with the case and then sentenced the accused to a 
term of imprisonment even though he had had no legal representation. According to the 
Court, the violation had been committed by the Magistrate and not the LAB.
167
 
 As worrisome as it may seem, magistrates are not entirely to blame for their lack of 
knowledge of refugee law. It is a relatively new area in South African law and the court 
system has not had enough time to familiarise itself with all the relevant concepts in the 
decade since refugee law came into effect. Secondly, even in countries with long histories of 
refugee matters, this area of law has traditionally been outside the purview of ordinary courts, 
and been handled by specialised courts and tribunals set up for that purpose. Hence the need 
for ordinary courts to keep abreast of the law has not been great.  
However, the onus is on the State to ensure that its judges and magistrates are 
knowledgeable and competent in the matters they are presiding over. As previously stated, 
the guarantees on access to justice contained in international law and in the constitution 
impose positive obligations on the State.
168
 Those obligations, according to Nowak, include a 
requirement that the State set up necessary structures, ie, courts, and provide them with the 
competence to hear matters brought before them.
169
 Failure by the State to provide training 
and knowledge which build the competence of its magistrates on refugee law constitutes a 
failure to fulfil its positive obligations in relation to access to justice for refugees. Given the 
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 Khan (note 28 above). 
165
 Interview with Khan (note 28 above).. 
166
 S v Manuel  2001 (4) SA 1351 (W). 
167
 Ibid, Para 12. 
168
 Chapter three, section 3.5.1; see also President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Modderklip 
Boerdery (Pty) Ltd  2005 (5) SA 3 (CC) paras 39 and 41.  
169
 Manfred Nowak UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary, 2
nd
 ed (Strasbourg: NP 
Engel, 2005) 302–357, 314.  
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earlier reference to magistrates making orders that violate the State‘s obligations on non-
refoulement, this is clearly something that should be addressed by the State. 
Again, in the face of the State‘s failure in the regard, NGOs have taken the initiative. 
To reduce the chances of miscarriage of justice, some NGOs, such as Lawyers for Human 
Rights (LHR), have developed a practice whereby they make oral or written submissions to 
the magistrate and the prosecutor on the accused person‘s asylum status, what laws apply to 
him or her, and how a court decision could potentially impact on his or her protection rights 
or other rights accorded under refugee law.
 170
 These interventions to educate magistrates and 
prosecutors on refugee law are made even in routine matters, and are not limited to LHR 
clients. LHR states that it simply tries to intervene whenever it becomes aware of cases 
involving refugees and asylum seekers.
171
 This is yet another instance of how civil society is 
fulfilling the role that should be fulfilled by the State, and again demonstrates why the State 
could better meet its obligations if it worked in partnership with these organisations.  
I found it interesting, in the course of observing cases in the Magistrate‘s and High 
Courts how individual judges and magistrates struggled to balance the need to ensure that all 
sides had a fair chance to make use of whatever procedures were available to them, with the 
need to take cognisance of the toll that excessive adjournments and prolonged processes took 
on the refugees and asylum seekers involved in the cases before them. A common refrain 
from lawyers representing the refugees was the physical and financial cost to their clients of 
having to travel long distances and leave their jobs to be in court. The judges were often 
sympathetic, trying to keep delaying tactics on the part of the defence to a minimum.  
The generally positive handling of refugee matters, no doubt goes a long way towards 
ensuring that refugees have access to justice. However, there needs to be more concerted 
effort on the part of the State to ensure that its complement of personnel are well-trained, 
adequately informed, and conversant with refugee law. Such training should be available for 
not only magistrates and judges, but also to other staff within the court system, and would go 
a long way toward helping the State better fulfil its obligations to refugees and asylum 
seekers.  
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 Interview with Ramjathan-Keogh, (note 28 above). 
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5.7 CONCLUSION 
Predicated on the trite knowledge that what prevails in practice often differs from what the 
law says, this chapter sought to give an insight into how refugees and asylum seekers actually 
experience access to justice, in view of the constitutional safeguards previously discussed. 
The conclusion is that the safeguards that exist in law are often over-ridden by multiple 
practical and psychological barriers that refugees face when attempting to access the justice 
system. The failure of policies and programmes to anticipate any of these means that, in 
reality, the issues that really matter to refugees are not adequately dealt with. The situation 
then is an incongruous one in which elaborate safeguards exist to ensure that when refugees 
appear before the country‘s courts, they are treated equally as citizens, but there are no 
guarantees to ensure that they are actually able to appear before those courts. The major 
problem does not lie with the courts, even though there are concerns there as well, nor are 
they due to lack of respect for procedural guarantees contained in the law. Rather, it is at the 
preliminary stages – dealing with those who serve as the gateway to accessing justice – that 
they face the most barriers. And it is these barriers that policies, programmes and legislation 
fail to anticipate or address. 
In analysing these barriers, the most critical issue that comes across is the idea that 
being a foreigner can constitute a distinct obstacle to access to justice in South Africa. The 
idea of ‗foreignness‘ as a barrier to access to justice is not one often discussed in scholarly 
articles on the subject. While it is true that the literature often refers to lack of language 
proficiency as a major barrier – an issue contiguous to foreignness – this study suggests that 
being a foreigner in itself is a distinct obstacle, recognised by refugees themselves but not by 
scholars. Foreignness as a barrier to accessing justice in South Africa finds expression in 
personal biases or prejudice stemming from individuals‘ ways of thinking. It is demonstrated 
in refugees and asylum seekers‘ being denied the protection of the law on the sole ground of 
being foreigners. It is demonstrated in the refusal of police to open dockets for refugees, and 
in the practice of telling refugees that as non-citizens they had to settle matters among 
themselves. In other words that being non-citizens means that they have no right to access the 
country‘s courts.  
Practical obstacles are manifested in the delicate balancing act required to protect 
tenuous sources of livelihoods while also seeking justice. These obstacles demonstrate the 
need for the State to recognise that its shortcomings in one area affects the rights of refugees 
in another area, and therefore the rights of refugees need to be addressed holistically. Unless 
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the dire socio-economic circumstances under which refugees and asylum seekers are forced 
to live is addressed, the constitutional guarantees on access to justice will have no meaning 
for them. Taken together, the effect of all these challenges is that refugees and asylum 
seekers do not have equal opportunities to utilise the justice system, the same way that 
citizens do. Equality of access is therefore more of a mirage than a reality.  
This situation is largely a result of policy failure to pay adequate attention to the notion 
of substantive equality that the Constitution espouses.
172
  The result is a failure to recognise 
that refugees and asylum seekers have peculiar vulnerabilities which necessitates the 
adoption of specific measures or modification of existing strategies in order to adequately 
meet their needs. It is true that in an urban refugee model, such as that adopted by South 
Africa, refugees are expected to access services in the same way as everyone else, unlike 
what would be the case in a ‗refugee camp‘ model. This however, does not negate this 
important constitutional principle. Thus, even within the framework of a general access to 
justice policy, the State‘s failure to adopt measures which address issues that matter to 
refugees and asylum seekers, like xenophobia, access to language services and access to legal 
assistance constitutes a derogation of its obligations. 
On the other hand, there are many positives to take away from the study – the 
impressive knowledge of rights displayed by respondents (cognisance is taken of the fact that 
the study‘s respondents represented the more educated category of refugees and asylum 
seekers); the impressive work that non-governmental organisations are doing on behalf of 
refugees and asylum seekers and the willingness of South African courts not only to  protect, 
but to advance the rights of refugees and asylum seekers, are some of these. While refugees 
and asylum seekers face distinct challenges in accessing justice, some (probably unexpected) 
advantage of this is that South African civil society is using this as an opportunity to develop 
its engagement with the law on refugee issues. This is an opportunity for the State to better 
meet its own obligations to refugees, if it is willing to harness the resources that civil society 
organisations possess. 
A peculiar aspect of this study was that it did not find a single instance of a court case 
involving two refugees or asylum seekers on opposite sides – whether between compatriots 
or other refugees of another nationality. But since common sense suggests that refugee 
communities are not conflict-free communities, it is only to be expected that other means 
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exist through which refugees resolve issues. The next chapter therefore looks at the issue of 
alternative ways through which refugees and asylum seekers seek justice. 
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Chapter Six 
Non-State Justice Systems among Refugees and Asylum Seekers in 
South Africa 
I‘d lik  mo           o justice and less access to the courts 1 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The preceding chapter described some of the challenges and opportunities that define how 
refugees and asylum seekers experience access to justice in South Africa. It showed that 
despite generous provisions within the Constitution, which guarantee them equal access to 
justice, refugees and asylum seekers face discriminatory practices and other challenges that 
curtail their ability to utilise the justice system. As a result, they are in a position of 
inequality, vis-a-vis citizens, in terms of their right to access to justice.  
That chapter focused primarily on refugees‘ and asylum seekers‘ interactions with the 
State justice system, mostly in the context of relations between them on the one hand, and 
South African citizens or institutions on the other. Very little reference was made to 
situations in which the only protagonists were refugees and asylum seekers themselves. 
However, one of the issues raised in that chapter is that sometimes, when refugees and 
asylum seekers tried to get the police involved in matters between them and a compatriot, 
they got responses to the effect that such matters were to be settled among themselves and not 
referred to South African institutions.
2
 Clearly this amounts to discrimination, and is yet 
another demonstration of the unequal access that refugees and asylum seekers have to the 
justice system. But the issue goes beyond that; it raises other important questions. For 
instance, in circumstances where they are not allowed to utilise the state justice system, how 
do refugees resolve disputes? What alternatives are open to them, and what factors, other than 
discrimination, would lead them to utilise these other alternatives? Finally, what are the 
implications for the State when refugees and asylum seekers under its jurisdiction are forced, 
or choose to resort alternative ways of seeking justice?  
The issue of alternative or non-state justice systems has been raised at various points 
during the course of this thesis. The position of such forums under international law and the 
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 Survey respondent quoted in Hazel Genn et al, Paths to justice: What people do and think about going to law 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1999) 1.  
2
 See page 261. 
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Constitution were established in chapters two and three respectively.
3
 It was shown that under 
both frameworks, the primary responsibility for providing access to justice rests with the 
State, thus only courts and other forums established by law, and which operate under the 
control of the State, are contemplated by the access to justice guarantees that have been 
discussed up to this point. However, chapter four showed that despite this position, non-state 
justice systems do play an important role in improving access to justice for some segments of 
society, and that the State has an important role to play in relation to ensuring that they do not 
become vehicles for abuse of human rights. Recognising this, South Africa has attempted to 
incorporate the working of a diverse range of informal and non-state justice systems within 
its access to justice policy. The benefits of such approach, chapter four concluded, is that it 
would help to curb the excesses of such forums, while also improving access to justice. The 
shortcoming of the approach is its failure to address non-state justice systems in relation to 
one of the demographics most likely to use it – refugees and asylum seekers.4  
Having already set out in chapters three the obligations and expectations which these 
systems raise of the State, this chapter will focus only on the nature and role of non-state 
justice systems among refugees and asylum seekers. As with the previous chapter, while 
reference will necessarily be made to relevant international law and constitutional provisions 
to set the context for the discussion, the substance of this chapter derives primarily from the 
experiences of refugees and asylum seekers with non-state justice systems. Their experiences 
are gleaned from the same field study described in chapter five, therefore all preliminary 
matters related to the methodology of research, limitations and other caveats described in that 
chapter apply equally here.
5
 It is worth reiterating that these findings are not presented as 
broadly generalisable facts, but should rather be read primarily as illustrations of broader 
trends. 
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  Chapter 2 section 2.6. chapter 3, section 3.6.4. 
4
 Chapter four, section 2.6.4. 
5
 See chapter five, section 5.2 
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6.2 BACKGROUND: SOCIAL NETWORKS AS JUSTICE MECHANISMS FOR 
REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS 
Migrants, forced and unforced, often transport their cultural practices to their new countries 
as a way of retaining some connection to their roots in an unfamiliar environment.
6
 For 
refugees and asylum seekers, these familiar practices bring some stability to the turmoil of 
their move and ensure continuity.
7
 While they often recognise that change is inevitable in 
their new environment, trying to balance this change with their own cultural outlook is a 
challenge that they face. While some embrace the change, others want to restrict and slow it 
down in order to maintain their pre-refugee status, ethnic identity and social equilibrium.
8
 
Holding on to certain traditional practices is a way of achieving this.  
It goes without saying that the observance of these traditional practices requires that a 
certain level of community structures, in the form of social networks, must be in place. These 
social networks, usually comprising others of the same nationality or ethnic background,
9
 are 
important to refugees and asylum seekers and are key to their livelihoods and general 
welfare.
10
 These social networks may spontaneously appear between family members, friends 
and colleagues as a reaction to social exclusion or be purposely organised in the form of 
                                                 
6
 Janet Bauer ‗Speaking of culture: Immigrants in the American legal system‘ in Joanne I Moore (ed) 
Immigrants in courts (Washington: University of Washington Press, 1999) 8; Richard Kolm The change of 
cultural identity: An analysis of factors conditioning the cultural integration of immigrants (New York: Arno, 
1980) 67. 
7
 Pamela De Voe ‗Symbolic action: Religion‘s role in the changing environment of young Somali women‘ 
(2002) 15 (2) Journal of Refugee Studies 234–246 at 236; Gary Yia Lee ‗Culture and adaptation: Hmong 
refugees in Australia 1976–83‘ in Glenn L Hendricks et al (eds) The Hmong in transition (New York: Center for 
Migration Studies, 1986) 55–72;  also see generally Moore, Immigrants in courts (note 6 above); ‗Living 
between two worlds: African refugees battle cultural isolation as they try to adapt to their new home 
in Portland‘.Available at www.streetroots.wordpress.com [Accessed 11 October 2009]. 
8
 De Voe (note 7 above) 236, 243. 
9
 Massey et al define social networks in the context of migrants and migration as ‗sets of interpersonal ties that 
connect migrants, former migrants and non-migrants in origin and destination areas through ties of kinship, 
friendship and shared community of origin‘. See Douglas S Massey et al., Worlds in motion: Understanding 
international migration at the end of the millennium (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) 42. 
10
 Baruti Bahati Amisi ‗An exploration of the livelihood strategies of Durban Congolese refugees‘ UNHCR 
Working Paper No. 123 (UNHCR Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit, 2006) 6; Nancy Farwell ‗Onward 
through strength: Coping and psychological support among refugee youth returning to Eritrea from Sudan  
(2001)14 Journal of Refugee Studies  43–63, 57. 
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refugee associations, ethnic organisations, professional bodies, or as student or 
neighbourhood organisations for the common good.
11
 The former type of organisations, 
commonly referred to as Refugee Community-based Organisations (RCOs), are usually more 
formal, registered entities which take on the role of advocacy on behalf of the community that 
they represent.
12
 They are organisations rooted within and supported by the ethnic or national 
refugee/asylum seeker communities they serve and are established by the refugees or asylum 
seekers themselves – or by their pre-established communities.13 In addition, these community 
organisations perform the functions of overcoming isolation, providing material help, 
defending interests and promoting culture.
14
 They also act to integrate refugees into their new 
social settings while allowing for the retention of their cultural identities.
15
  
In the South African context, the literature points to the existence of a number of RCOs 
and refugee groupings,
16
 but there is no one aggregation of refugees in South Africa that 
serves the common interest of all.
17
 Engagement between different refugee communities is 
informal and based on the needs at hand.
18
 This has been attributed to the urban refugee 
model operating in the country, unlike in a camp situation where all residents would be 
forced to work together.
19
 While acknowledging the roles of both formal and informal 
                                                 
11
 Amisi (note 10 above) 6. 
12
 On the question of the representativeness of these organizations see generally Gail Hopkins ‗Somali 
community organizations in London and Toronto: Collaboration and effectiveness‘ (2006) 19 (3) Journal of 
Refugee Studies 361–380; David Griffiths et al Refugee community organizations and dispersal: Networks, 
resources and social capital (Bristol: The Policy Press, 2005). 
13
 Roger Zetter & Martyn Pearl ‗The minority within the minority: Refugee community-based organisations in 
the UK and the impact of restrictionism on asylum-seekers‘(2000) 26 (4) Journal of Ethnic and Migration 
Studies 676. 
14
 John Rex et al (eds) Immigrant associations in Europe (Aldershot: Gower, 1987) 19. 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Zaheera Jinnah & Rio Holaday ‗Migrant mobilisation: Structure and strategies in claiming rights in South 
Africa and Nairobi‘ in Jeff Handmaker & Remko Berkhout (eds) Mobilising social justice in South Africa: 
Perspectives from researchers and practitioners (Pretoria: Pretoria University Law Press, 2010) 157; Baruti 
Amisi & Richard Ballard  ‗In the absence of citizenship: Congolese refugee struggle and organisation in South 
Africa‘ Centre for Civil Society and the School of Development Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal, 2005; 
Amisi ‗An exploration of the livelihood strategies of Durban Congolese refugees‘, supra (note 10 above) 
17
 Amisi & Ballard (note 16 above) 2.  
18
 Ibid; Jinnah & Holaday (note 16 above) 152.  
19
 Amisi & Ballard (note 16 above) 8. 
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networks in the preservation of culture and in social integration, it is their role in the 
dispensation or promotion of justice that is important for the purposes of this study. Do they 
have any benefits for refugees and asylum seekers in the context of access to justice? If so, 
how? And what forms do they take? The following sections answer these questions. 
 
6.3 RECOURSE TO NON-STATE JUSTICE SYSTEM AMONG REFUGEES AND 
ASYLUM SEEKERS 
Two-thirds of respondents in the study indicated that they were aware of and had resorted to 
some form of dispute resolution mechanism regulated by or operating within their social 
networks. The widespread usage is not surprising because, as chapter four already showed, 
informal justice systems anchored in community relationships are common across Africa.
20
 
All respondents in the study were Africans.  
As Figure 3 below shows, the makeup of the informal justice systems which 
respondents had been part of differed, depending on the cultural backgrounds from which 
each group came. Not every group had established semi-formal ‗institutions‘ (churches, 
elders) to which they referred disputes. For some, disputes were simply brought before a 
respected person or persons within the disputants‘ personal circle of friends. This group of 
people makes up 35 per cent of respondents.  
                                                 
20
 See generally Wilfried Schärf & Daniel Nina (eds) The other law: Non-state ordering in South Africa (Cape 
Town: Juta, 2001); Joanna Stevens Access to justice in sub-Saharan Africa: The role of traditional and informal 
justice systems (London: Penal Reform International, 2000); Sandra Burman & Wilfried Schärf ‗Creating 
people's justice: Street committees and people's courts in a South African city‘.(1990) 24 (3) Law & Society 
Review 693–744; Isaac Olawale Albert et al Informal channels for conflict resolution in Nigeria (Ibadan: IFRA 
1995); Dharmesh Bula &Adelene Africa ‗Proposals for a national community court system‘ (1995) Occasional 
Paper Series 3–95, Institute of Criminology, University of Cape Town; Daniel Nina & Pamela Jane Schwikkard 
‗The ―soft vengeance‖ of the people: Popular justice, community justice and legal pluralism South Africa‘ 
(1996) 36 Journal of Legal Pluralism 69–87.  
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FIGURE 3: RESORT TO INFORMAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS AND TYPES 
IJS Forums
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* - Ethnic and country of origin community of the respondent, including forums of tribal leaders.  
N/A – No resort to Non-state justice forums forums. 
 
Although different in composition, the general characteristics of the informal justice systems 
which respondents described were similar. They are usually led by respected members of the 
society, and their primary aim is to reconcile the different interests of disputing parties while 
maintaining social cohesion. Procedures and norms vary with the participants in the process, 
and closely resemble what other scholars
21
 have variously described. Usually they would 
adopt ‗procedures and norms that have proven historically acceptable to the local community 
rather than those defined in written laws or adopted by state sanctioned courts‘. 22 Community 
                                                 
21
 Ewa Wojkowska Doing justice: How informal justice systems can contribute (Oslo: UNDP, Oslo Governance 
Centre, 2006); see also TW Bennett Customary law in South Africa (Cape Town: Juta, 2004) 164; Boyane 
Tshehla ‗The restorative justice bug bites the South African criminal justice system‘ (2004) 17 South African 
Journal of Criminal Justice 1–16, 13; Jeremy Seekings ‗The revival of people's courts: Informal justice in 
transitional South Africa‘ (1992) 6 South African Review 187; South African Law Commission ‗Alternative 
Dispute Resolution‘ 1997 Issue paper 8 , 33–38. 
22
 Reem Bahdi ‗Background Paper on Women‘s Access to Justice in the MENA Region‘ International 
Development Research Centre, Regional Consultation, 9–11 December, 2007 Cairo, Egypt. Available at 
www.idrc.ca [Accessed 21 May 2010]; see also Wojkowska (note 21 above) 16–23. 
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pressure rather than fear of State sanction, serves as the primary motivation behind parties 
decision to comply with the terms of resolution.
23
 The types of matters they are called upon 
to adjudicate vary, but are usually simple civil matters such as domestic disturbances and 
business disagreements. However, there are also criminal matters such as petty theft, 
domestic violence and cases of assault.  
Not all respondents in the study who were aware of the existence of alternative dispute 
resolution systems were interested in using them. Some said that they preferred to resort to 
the state justice system, even if the other party involved was a compatriot or a fellow refugee. 
Usually the reason for this was a lack of confidence in the impartiality of the system. A 
Burundian respondent for instance said he personally would not resort to any such systems 
put in place by Burundians because ‗Burundians are divided along ethnic lines even here in 
South Africa. It is every person for himself‘.24 
 
6.4 FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR USE OF NON-STATE JUSTICE SYSTEMS  
Chapter five showed that some of the problems that respondents experienced with the State 
justice systems related to accessibility, both in terms of gaining entrance to the system, and in 
terms of the difficulty of balancing precarious work situations with court attendance. There 
were also concerns associated with the lengthy and time consuming process of the justice 
system, as well as fears that they were approaching a system that was biased against them, 
vis-a-vis citizens. These problems do not confront those using the informal justice systems 
available within their communities, and this is one of the reasons that these informal justice 
systems appeal to their users.  
One of the most notable draws of these systems is the accessibility of the forums to 
members of the community. They are popular because of their accessibility to poor and 
disadvantaged people and tend to be quick, cheap and provide culturally relevant solutions.
25
 
They are located within the community, close to where disputants live, thus eliminating the 
need for travel which was one of the main hindrances identified by respondents who had used 
the formal courts. Their flexibility in terms of time is another endearing factor. As one 
                                                 
23
 Ibid.  
24
 Respondent 21 (13 August 2008). 
25
 Boyane John Tshehla ‗Non-state ordering in the post-apartheid South Africa: A study of some structures of 
non-state ordering in the Western Cape Province‘ (LLM Diss., University of Cape Town, 2001); Wojkowska 
supra (note 21 above). 
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respondent describes it, the elders gather together in the evenings or at anytime that is 
suitable for all parties concerned.
26
 Parties do not therefore have to worry about effects on 
their livelihoods which, as chapter five showed, was a very important consideration for those 
needing to appear before formal courts.  
Also important is accessibility in terms of language. The issue of linguistic accessibility 
has been shown to be an important aspect of access to justice, and as chapter four 
demonstrated, the availability of competent foreign African language interpreters is one of 
the major issues confronting the justice system in South Africa. For those utilising these non-
state justice systems, there are no such challenges, as proceedings are conducted in the 
language of the parties. This eliminates the need for interpreters ‗whose accuracy cannot be 
guaranteed, to the detriment of the [parties]‘.27  
The non-requirement of legal representation and the costs attached thereto, which is one 
of the major deterrents to utilising the state justice system, is another factor that recommends 
non-state justice systems. While one of the key requirements in accessing the state justice 
system is legal representation, the situations in which the State is obliged to provide it free of 
charge is limited, thus in those situations where they cannot access free legal services, 
refugees have to bear the cost. Civil society organisations do offer a useful alternative to 
those refugees and asylum seekers who cannot afford the services of a private lawyer, but as 
was shown in chapter five, the services of those organisations are constrained by limited 
resources.
28
 Thus significant numbers of refugees are still unable to access legal services. As 
non-state justice systems do not require lawyers, this problem is eliminated. Furthermore, 
cost associated with using these forums is negligible, as the need for lawyers, filing fees and 
other costs are eliminated. Taken together, all of these factors make for a system that is 
familiar to its users, culturally relevant and acceptable to them.  
However, it is not only these positive factors that make respondents use them. 
Sometimes, it is quite simply a lack of choice. As previously stated, while some respondents 
would have preferred certain issues to be resolved ‗legally‘, they have been forced to take 
disputes before informal forums because the police expect them to treat disputes among 
                                                 
26
 Interview with Abdi Ahmed, chairperson, Somali Association of South Africa, Western Cape branch. 21 
January 2010.  
27
 Brenda Grant & Pamela Jane Schwikkard ‗  opl '   o    ?‘ (1991) 7 SAJHR 304, 307. 
28
 Chapter five section 5.5. 
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themselves as internal issues to be addressed within the community. Reporting on this aspect 
of the challenges that their clients face, the UCT Law Clinic stated: 
We have noticed that some of our clients who report domestic abuse to [our] staff are not aware that the 
South African system for dealing with such events is available to them as foreigners. In one instance ... a 
police official advised our client that they could not get a protection order because the matter of domestic 
abuse should be resolved within the Somali community without calling for outside assistance.
29  
 
A Congolese respondent also indicated that he had been told that ‗you people are Congolese, 
you should solve your own problems‘.30 The consequence of such attitudes has been 
previously alluded to. It was argued in chapter five that such denial of access to justice leads 
to refugees and asylum seekers resorting to subterranean forms of justice, which as the 
Constitutional Court noted in Lesapo v North West Agricultural Bank and Another,
31
 is what 
the constitutional guarantees on access to justice seeks to guard against.
32
 As this study 
demonstrates, this is apparently the case.  
Sometimes, the choice is forced by the consequences which users perceive they will 
suffer if they choose to resort to the state justice system against a compatriot. As case studies 
below will illustrate,
33
 refugee communities often try to discourage members from taking 
each other to court. Choosing to do so could result in ostracism from the society. Others 
discourage litigation generally, seeing it as an action that would expose the community to 
further attacks.
34
 It therefore appears that the loss of community approbation and the desire to 
avoid harm to the community are also factors that compel people who might otherwise have 
preferred the state justice system to resort to the alternative systems existing within their 
communities.  
To illustrate some of the issues raised above, I will now discuss two case studies which 
demonstrate the workings of these systems and what impact, if any, they have in promoting 
access to justice for refugees and asylum seekers. The discussion will focus on the two 
                                                 
29
 Refugee Rights Project, University of Cape Town Law Clinic ‗Narrative Report for 2009‘. Obtained from the 
Law Clinic, 17. 
30
 Respondent 11 (25 June 2008). 
31
 Lesapo v North West Agricultural Bank and Another 2000 (1) SA 409 (CC). 
32
 Ibid, 417 para 22. 
33
 See sections 6.4.1 and 6.4.2 below. 
34
 Ibid.  
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groups most well represented among respondents – Somalis and Congolese, because these 
were the two groups who most reported using them and were familiar with them.  
 
6.4.1 Somalis 
Somalis are one of the most highly visible groups among refugees in South Africa, both 
because of their distinctive physical appearance and their constant presence in the media as 
victims of recurrent xenophobic attacks.
35
 They are also one of the largest and well-
established refugee groups in the country. This should make them one of the best locally-
integrated groups in the country, but as the frequent xenophobic attacks they suffer indicates, 
this is not the case. One of the enduring features of Somali communities, often discussed in 
the literature, is the importance of tribal or clan affiliation in everyday life.
36
 Clan affiliation 
is of the utmost importance to Somalis in their homeland, to the point that civil governance 
has been conducted along clan lines since the implosion of the country in the early 1990s.
37
  
These affiliations are usually transported into host countries, where clan dynamics remain 
very much in play in the way Somalis interact with each other.
38
 
Often, however, the experience of foreignness necessitates the need to interact beyond 
clan affiliations, to present a united front in the face of a common enemy, so to speak. Thus, 
in South Africa, several umbrella bodies to ‗fight for the rights of Somalis‘ regardless of clan, 
                                                 
35
 Sumayya Ismail ‗Somalis live in fear in South Africa‘ Mail & Guardian Online 3 October 2006. Available at 
http://www.mg.co.za/article/2006-10-03-somalis-live-in-fear-south-africa [Accessed 22 February 2011]; United 
Nations Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) ‗South Africa: Fleeing war, Somalis are targets of 
violence in adopted home‘. Available at http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=61298 [Accessed 22 
February 2011]; Sally Peberdy & Zondi Majodina ‗Just a roof over my head? Housing and the Somali refugee 
community in Johannesburg‘ (2007) 11 (2) Urban Forum 273–88; Loren B Landau & Tamlyn Monson 
‗Displacement, estrangement and sovereignty: Reconfiguring state power in urban South Africa‘ (2008) 43 (2) 
Government and Opposition  315–336, 321–323. 
36
 See generally Ioan Lewis Understanding Somalia and Somaliland: Culture, history, society (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2008); A Osman Farah et al (eds) Somalia: Diaspora and state reconstitution in the 
Horn of Africa (London: Adonis & Abbey, 2007); Jeffrey Gettleman ‗Clan politics dictate the future of Somalia‘ 
New York Times 22 January 2007. 
37
 Ibid.  
38
 Cindy Horst Transnational nomads: How Somalis cope with refugee life in the Dadaab camps of Kenya 
(Berghahn Books, 2006);  Mulki Al-Sharmani ‗Livelihood and diasporic identity constructions of Somali 
refugees in Cairo‘ 2004 Working Paper No. 104, Forced Migration and Refugee Studies Programme, American 
University in Cairo, Egypt; Hopkins  (note 12 above).  
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have sprung up over the years.
39
 The largest and most enduring, with which a fairly large 
number of Somalis identify, is the Somali Association of South Africa (SASA).
40
 
Headquartered in Johannesburg, it has branches in every province of the country where there 
are Somalis. It describes itself as a representative of Somali interests in the absence of a 
Somali diplomatic mission in South Africa.
41
 Among its stated objectives:  
 to organize and energize the Somali community in South Africa; 
 to educate the newly arrived Somalis on the dos and don‘ts in South Africa by 
orientating them; 
 to promote the ethos of self reliance and local integration; 
 to promote language skills, higher education among youth, and to organise 
recreation facilities and health awareness; 
 to combat the scourges of xenophobia, racism and all other social ills; 
 to defend the rights and the welfare of the community; and 
 to liaise with all relevant government institutions, national and international 
organizations and civil society groups. 
Abdi Ahmed, president of the association in the Western Cape says the association exists 
simply to help members ‗overcome the difficulties of being a refugee in South Africa –
killings, robberies, xenophobia, etc‘.42 Over the years, it has helped to reintegrate displaced 
members while working in partnership with the government of South Africa, the South 
African National Civic Organisation (SANCO) and the police.  
While its stated objectives do not include access to justice, the dispensation of justice or 
dispute resolution among its objectives, it was obvious from interviews with officials and 
members that that is one of primary functions it carries out. SASA plays an important role in 
dispute resolution among individual members. It is often the forum of first resort in issues 
that cut across clan lines and involve resources.
43
 For instance, a fight between two rival 
businessmen over turf, in which one person attempts to start a business close to an existing 
one, would often necessitate a report to SASA. SASA would get involved by calling the 
members together, trying to mediate an acceptable solution and resolving the issue. In such 
                                                 
39
 Abdi Ahmed (note 26 above) 
40
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41
 Somali Association of South Africa www.somaliassociation.org accessed [12 November 2009]. 
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 Abdi Ahmed (note 26 above). 
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an instance, if they refuse to listen because of clan rivalry, then the elders of the clans, instead 
of the individuals, are called together and given the mandate to resolve it.
44
 The dispute 
resolution format is usually very simple: The elders of the tribes to which the disputants 
belong convene, and each disputant is represented by someone (an elder) from his tribe, as is 
the opposing side and they talk through the issues. Both parties must accept the decisions 
reached by the elders.
45
  
Unlike the formal justice system which has the instruments of state law enforcement to 
enforce its decisions, enforcement in these cases is derived from the disputants need to 
conform to their societal norms, values and expectations. To refuse is to lose the 
community‘s support, approval and one‘s sense of belonging. But according to SASA, it is 
also possible that disputants reject the elders‘ decisions, choosing instead to resort to the state 
justice system. They maintained that there have been instances where disputants have chosen 
the formal route, reported the matter to the police and tried to resolve the issue legally instead 
of accepting the elders‘ decision. But when that happens,   
… and one person says he wants to go to court or they want to go to court, we tell them it‘s ok they can 
go, but we let them know that the community is not behind them. They‘re on their own and we will not 
support them. And they cannot come back to us.
46
 
However, no person interviewed could give an example of a litigated case or the outcome of 
such a case. This statement demonstrates that compulsion is certainly one of the factors 
which influences the choice to resort to the State justice system.  
SASA‘s involvement in facilitating access to justice for the Somali community extends 
beyond individual cases to include the Somali community as a whole. According to Ahmed, 
one of the ways that SASA protects its members is to ensure that they get justice from the 
courts, especially in cases of xenophobia against members of the community: 
Q:  And how do you do this?  
A: We mobilise our members in the communities to attend court hearings and go in large numbers to 
protest against bail for the accused …  
Q:  Do you think this strategy is effective?  
                                                 
44
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45
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A:  Yes our strategy has huge effects. Our presence puts pressure on the court to act justly. For 
example in the case of Dunoon
47
 we all went there whenever there is hearing. We protested and ensured 
they did not get bail and for the magistrate to transfer the case to the High Court which is what we 
wanted. Even during the Zwelethemba case,
48
 we submitted a memorandum to allow SASA to appear 
and support the victims. So our presence, when they see us in person, it is effective and helps us. 
49
  
Clearly, the thinking behind SASA‘s strategy is a recognition by a vulnerable group that 
accessing the justice system as individuals is problematic and difficult, but working together 
as a group and employing the power of the collective is more likely to yield results. While it 
is not possible to determine whether or not ‗such public displays of protest by relatively 
powerless social actors [are] effective‘,50 it is noteworthy that this is the perception within a 
group of people normally perceived as unwilling to engage with State agents or engage in any 
form of agitation to claim their rights because they fear deportation or victimisation.
51
  
Within South Africa‘s refugee community, such large-scale mobilisation in the context 
of seeking justice is not common and, in fact, appears to be somewhat unique to the Somali 
community.
52
 There are very few studies on refugees‘ mobilisation to claim and access rights 
in South Africa, but one which looked at mobilisation within migrant communities (rather 
than refugees specifically), found that migrants do not generally mobilise for rights. They cite 
lack of documentation, discrimination and language barriers as key obstacles to claiming 
rights.
53
 
Within other Somali refugee communities around the world, the kind of mobilisation 
described by SASA is not always the norm. Hopkins‘ study of Somali communities in 
London and Toronto, for instance, found that despite the significant size of the Somali 
community in London, there is a low level of collective mobilisation among them. This is 
blamed primarily on tensions occasioned by clan dynamics, political interests and limited 
                                                 
47
 Dunoon is a township in the Western Cape that had witnessed several cases of attacks against the Somalis by 
members of the local community. 
48
 Discussed in chapter four. page 181. 
49
 Abdi Ahmed (note 26 above). 
50
 Marco Giugni et al (eds) How social movements matter (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999) 
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51
 Amisi & Ballard (note 16 above) 
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funding.
54
 Why they mobilise more effectively in South Africa is not known. But it is quite 
possible that they are motivated by the examples of high profile victories won by post-
apartheid social movements such as that led by the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) in the 
fight against the government and pharmaceuticals on access to anti-retrovirals.
55
 These 
groups have achieved significant results through mobilisation against what would appear to 
be invincible opponents, and their methods – protests, lobbying, litigation – have been 
described as a model which enables the poor to claim the rights promised by democratic 
citizenship.
56
 Yet, attempts to examine refugee communities within a ‗social movements‘ 
framework or to describe them as such have proven difficult for researchers, primarily 
because the forms they take do not fit the classic definition of social movements.
57
   
There is no doubt, however, that SASA attempts through community mobilisation, to 
facilitate access to justice, or at least prevent miscarriage of justice for its members. But with 
no clear-cut markers to evaluate, and in the absence of an objective study, SASA‘s strategy of 
what can only be described as ‗attempting to intimidate through physical presence‘, remains 
in the realm of perception. There is no way of assessing whether or not they do in some way 
serve as a counterweight to any possibility of miscarriage of justice. It is highly improbable 
that magistrates would decide on the proper forum for a case based on the pressure from the 
community to which one of the parties involved belonged. On the other hand, their perception 
cannot be dismissed out of hand. Scholars maintain that social movements and interest groups 
do influence the outcomes in key political and social issues.
58
  
 
6.4.2 Congolese 
Congolese refugees make up a large percentage of South Africa‘s refugee population, and the 
ebb and flows of their movement to South Africa is very dependent on happenings in the 
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 Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC). 
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outcomes of the Treatment Action Campaign case against the Minister of Health‘ (2003) 19 South African 
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home country – renewed conflicts in the country, particularly in the eastern parts, would often 
result in an increase in the numbers seeking asylum, and ceasefires would be followed by 
fewer asylum seekers.
59
  
Amisi and Ballard‘s 2005 study of mobilisation within the Congolese refugee 
community in South Africa found that Congolese refugees tend to congregate along ethnic 
lines and the provinces from which they originate.
60
 These ethnic groupings combine a focus 
on custom and tradition with saving schemes and other local level mechanisms to ameliorate 
material deprivation.
61
 They call themselves ‗tribes‘ or ‗families‘ and are the basic unit of 
their grassroots organisation.
62
 The emphasis on ethnic groups derives from the mistrust and 
exclusion that characterised their relationships back home. This is further reinforced by a lack 
of access to social, economic and health services which they experience in South Africa.
63
 To 
counter the disadvantage thus suffered, social networks of nuclear family, friends and tribe 
members from the DRC take on the role of social protection nets providing support against 
random events such as illness, police arrest and death.
64
 Surprisingly, these networks are 
more interested in and focus more of their energies on political happenings back home, rather 
than on mobilising for rights within South Africa.
65
 As Amisi and Ballard put it, 
They express frustration, at times against the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, at times 
against NGOs, at times about the politics of the DRC, and against xenophobia. They generally do not, 
however, seek to organise to ensure that the conditions for the treatment of refugees laid out in the 
legislation are adhered to.
66
  
Not surprisingly, therefore, there was no evidence of Congolese refugees mobilising as a 
group to seek justice for fellow Congolese with legal problems or who had been victims in 
the same way that the Somalis do. Respondents attributed this to factionalism and a lack of 
common sense of purpose.  
                                                 
59
 Amisi ‗Exploration of livelihood strategies of Congolese refugees in Durban‘ (note 10 above) 24.  
60
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This is not to say, however, that seeking justice within the context of social networks is 
unknown to them. Of the social networks around which Congolese congregate, the church is 
one of the most important. In almost every study of Congolese refugees, the church is an 
important actor, playing a role in everything from the flight from the DRC,
67
 to the provision 
of food and shelter
68
 and helping to establish linkages with fellow Congolese.
69
 It is therefore 
not surprising that the church features prominently in the search for justice among those who 
consider themselves brethren. As with other Congolese social networks, the churches are 
often linked to ethnicity, in the sense that the ethnicity of the pastor often determines the 
ethnicity of the congregation.
70
  
During interviews, the role of the church as an important actor in the dispensation of 
justice was frequently referred to. Although of the eight Congolese refugees interviewed, 
only two said they had referred disputes among them to the church, all eight respondents 
mentioned the church as one of the organisations they would go to if they had any disputes 
with a fellow Congolese. Interview with church officials at a Congolese church
71
 revealed 
that dispute resolution was one of the key functions that the church performs. Most members 
would not even dream of going to a lawyer or court simply because ‗it‘s not in our culture‘ 
they said. Even Congolese who are not regular church-goers, would usually approach a 
church for help in resolving a dispute that his group of friends have been unable to resolve.
72
 
Again the conflict resolution process resembles that described above, among Somalis, except 
that the leading figure here is the pastor. It is worth pointing out that such religion-based 
organisation is not unique to the Congolese, but can be found among many migrant groups.
73
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Scholars maintain that religion cross-cuts every aspect of the refugee journey, providing a 
place where people can gather with each other and offer emotional and material support, and 
is often the first port of call for the counselling on personal matters ranging from 
unemployment to marital problems.
74
 
As with Somalis, Congolese social networks seem to play two contradictory roles in the 
area of access to justice: they help to meet the justice needs of their members on the one 
hand, while at the same time deterring the use of the formal justice system on the other. One 
of the respondent pastors
75
 stated that Congolese churches often discourage their members 
from resorting to legal action, even in cases against South African citizens or institutions, 
because they feel that this would only lead to problems for them as foreigners. They would 
often counsel members to rather bear the indignity than resort to legal action. Being 
foreigners, he said, refugees cannot help but support each other. They cannot afford to rely on 
South African courts to help solve problems because ‗the way they do things is different from 
ours. They will give you a divorce at the slightest provocation. We try to maintain the 
family‘.76 Again, it can be seen that the loss of community pressure and the desire to avoid 
harm to the community are factors that compel Congolese refugees, who might otherwise 
have preferred the state justice system, to resort to the alternative systems existing within 
their communities. 
The two case studies above demonstrate that among refugees and asylum seekers, 
social networks are important vehicles for accessing justice in South Africa. The case studies 
also demonstrate the different factors responsible for this; some of it is a matter of cultural 
practices which users are unwilling to let go of and some of it is the easy alternative that these 
systems represent. It is also sometimes, a matter of compulsion – whether by the failure of the 
State, or by the weight of societal expectation. Regardless of the factors which dictate their 
use, these non-state justice systems have important implications for South Africa as a refugee 
host state. These implications relate to the limitations and disadvantages inherent in non-state 
                                                                                                                                                        
Somalis support a church or mosque group, 59 per cent of Mozambicans and 70 per cent of Congolese did. See 
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justice systems and the way that they operate. The next section discusses these limitations 
and highlights the implications for the State.  
 
6.5 LIMITATIONS OF NON-STATE JUSTICE SYSTEMS  
The argument has been made in chapter four that non-state justice systems constitute a useful 
mechanism for improving access to justice,
77
 and the section above shows this to be the case. 
However, despite their usefulness, these forums suffer from certain limitations. Firstly, unlike 
the formal system, these informal justice systems are not curtailed by any procedural 
guarantees that protect the rights of participants. As shown in chapters two and three, courts 
within the formal justice system are required to be independent, impartial and competent. 
Their activities should be carried out in public and those appearing before them should enjoy 
certain rights, including those encapsulated in the maxim audi alterem partem. As these non-
state justice forums have no such guarantees, there is a high danger and possibility that the 
rights of participants will be violated.  
Related to that is the often-raised criticism that they rely too heavily on customs, 
tradition, community pressure and too often, they sacrifice rights for the sake of consensus.
78
 
The concern here is that refugees and asylum seekers resorting to informal justice 
mechanisms are not enjoying the constitutional protection they would otherwise enjoy if a 
particular matter were being resolved in formal court. And it is here – the likelihood of 
human rights violations – that the major concerns and the implications for the State are most 
pronounced. The State‘s overarching obligation to protect human rights extends even to the 
operation of non-state bodies, and it is therefore important that it ensures that these forums 
are not violating the rights of refugees, especially those in a weaker position, such as women 
and children. This is especially so considering that these forums often emphasise and rely 
heavily on customs and traditions, many of which usually favour the socially or economically 
powerful party.
79
 As such, a woman who finds herself in a situation such as the one the UCT 
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Law Clinic describes above, would be unlikely to get the kind of justice she needs within a 
community as patriarchal as the Somali community. Also of concern is the situation where 
preferred or customary solution directly contradicts human rights standards. For instance, 
whereas a custom may consider public flogging an appropriate punishment for a crime, such 
a punishment violates a person‘s right not to be subjected to torture or cruel and inhuman 
treatment. These limitations clearly need to be recognized by the State so that it can address 
them.  
Secondly, even if these forums do not violate human rights, the reasons why they are 
used also have implications for the State. It is obvious for reasons stated above that there are 
some who prefer to use these forums. But what is also obvious is that some refugees and 
asylum seekers are compelled to use these forums against their will, because they are unable 
to access the State justice system, or because their customs compel them to. The danger, 
when resort to non-state justice forums is compelled, is that in the view of refugees and 
asylum seekers, such systems could supplant the State justice system as the primary source of 
justice. Not only is this a derogation of the State‘s obligations under international law and the 
Constitution, the further result is that the situations in which refugees can seek justice is 
severely curtailed. This is because any non-state justice forum, however admirable it may be, 
only has legitimacy within the particular framework of the community involved. Non-
community members – employers, neighbours, South Africans and other nationalities, even if 
also refugees – can hardly be expected to subject themselves to the authority of a particular 
refugee‘s elders or church. Similarly, there is a limit on the types of cases these forums can 
adjudicate, and they lack enforcement capabilities, other than the loss of community 
approbation, as stated earlier. Thus, they cannot handle most criminal matters or impose 
proper sentences. Again, this translates into a limitation on the types of cases in which 
refugees can seek justice. This means that when they are unable to access the State justice 
system, refugees and asylum seekers are left with choices that significantly undermine their 
right to access to justice. In such instances, the options are either to drop the matter, approach 
non-state justice forums, or worse, resort to self-help.  
However, there is no doubt that non-state justice systems within refugee communities 
are beneficial in the sense that they provide an avenue to resolve simpler issues. They could 
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be useful mechanism through which South Africa meets its obligations on access to justice 
for refugees. But they cannot be construed as an excuse for the State to abdicate its 
obligations on access to justice as defined in international law and the Constitution. Rather, it 
is important that such systems benefit from some form of state supervision or regulation. The 
implication then, is that the State needs to engage with the refugees and asylum seekers on 
the question of these forums. This will help it to effectively respond to the weaknesses of 
those systems while also establishing in the minds of refugees and asylum seekers, the 
primacy of the State justice system in access to justice. This is not a call to attempt to change 
cultural practices, but rather a chance to influence systems which, although problematic in 
some respects, are also beneficial in many respects. Chapter four has already established that 
in its programming for access to justice, the State has failed to include engagement with those 
systems among refugees as part of its strategies. There was no indication during the course of 
the study, that the State has ever attempted to engage with these refugee social networks in 
order to influence or regulate their practices in dispute resolution. As a result, it can be seen 
that within refugee communities, justice mechanisms which are unregulated by objective 
human rights standards are left to play a critical role in access to justice in South Africa, a 
situation which amounts to a derogation of the State‘s duties under international law and its 
Constitution, as has been set out in this thesis.  
Finally, it is worth pointing out that although this study shows that non-state justice 
systems are popular among refugees and asylum seekers, evidence from other studies suggest 
that this may not continue to be so. Hein and Berger‘s research on the issue, for instance, 
suggests that the process of integration
80
 shapes legal adaptation and so attitudes and 
preferences among migrant populations change with length of time in the host country. They 
found that intra-ethnic litigation developed after a considerable period of adjustment into the 
host society. As they integrated into American society, Vietnamese refugees and immigrants 
began to use the American legal system to settle disputes within their own ethnic 
community.
81
 As the nature of the particular host society is an integral factor that shapes who 
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refugees and asylum seekers become after long periods of integration,
82
 it is not unreasonable 
to suspect that non-state justice mechanisms may not continue to be the preferred forums 
through which refugees and asylum seekers in South Africa settle disputes among 
themselves. However, this can only happen if the State addresses the prevailing attitudes of 
discrimination which suggest to refugees and asylum seekers that as foreigners, justice issues 
should be resolved within their communities, without resort to South African institutions.  
 
6.6 CONCLUSION 
In discussing the role of informal justice systems, this chapter has shown that the sum total of 
how refugees and asylum seekers access justice in South Africa cannot not be measured only 
within the narrow confines of what happens within the state justice system. Parallel systems 
do exist which meet some of the needs of the refugee in search of justice. These parallel 
systems, found in social networks with their shared values and experiences, play an important 
role in refugees and asylum seekers‘ access to justice and should not be ignored. However, 
the reasons why these systems exist and why they are utilised are just as important as the fact 
of their existence.  
Both international law and the Constitution place specific obligations on South Africa 
that it has to meet in fulfilment of its duty to ensure access to justice for refugees and asylum 
seekers. In evaluating how well those obligations are being met, the findings of this study has 
led inexorably towards the conclusion that, while there are some important positives, refugees 
and asylum seekers in South Africa do not enjoy equal access to the state justice system. One 
of the reasons for this is prejudice against refugees within the ranks of those who serve as 
gateways to the justice system – the police. The result of such unequal access, this chapter 
has shown, is that refugees resort to informal justice systems within their own social 
networks to resolve disputes. However, this is not the only reason. Sometimes, such resort to 
social networks for justice is because of the consequences which users perceive they will 
suffer if they choose to resort to the state justice system – it could result in being ostracised 
from their ethnic or tribal community, or it could expose the community to attacks or hostility 
from their host community. Again we see the overarching effect of fear induced by 
xenophobia and discrimination reaching into the decisions on access to justice.  
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However, the decision to resort to non-state systems is sometimes also because those 
systems they represent a useful alternative, and their advantages are many. They are much 
more accessible system than the state justice system, with its formality, cost, language 
barriers and the pressure it puts on the employment or livelihoods of  litigants. These systems 
also serve a dual purpose – they enable their users to uphold values and customs that are 
relevant to them, and at the same time enjoy access to justice – a basic human right that they 
could not otherwise adequately enjoy if they were to rely only on the State. Ideally, any 
justice system would conform to certain universally acceptable standards, as outlined in 
chapters two and three. But then justice, as it has been said, should be the product of a living 
community and not something imposed from above.
83
 In claiming and owning their own 
forms of justice, refugee communities are able to deal effectively with disputes in a way that 
is relevant to their needs.  
Caution is taken not to overly romanticise the existence of these systems, however, 
since the very reasons put forward for their existence only serve to highlight the shortcomings 
of the State in meeting the access to justice needs of refugees and asylum seekers. Prejudice, 
fear of attacks and user-unfriendliness do not represent a vote of confidence in the State 
justice system. Instead, these factors only demonstrate further, the need for the State to 
recognise the problems in its access to justice policy which fails to take into consideration, 
the vulnerable position of refugees and asylum seekers, nor to include any measures which 
address them. Clearly, this is something that the State must do, if it is to meet its obligations 
to ensure that refugees and asylum seekers in its territory enjoy equal and effective access to 
justice.  
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Chapter Seven 
Summary of Findings, Recommendations and Conclusion 
The outcome of any serious research can only be to make two questions grow  
where only one grew before.
1
 
 
7.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The quote at the beginning of chapter one of this study made the very salient observation that 
human rights concerns lie at the core of all refugee issues – the causes of refugee flows, the 
protection of the refugees who result from those causes, as well as the solutions to the 
problems that refugees face. What that quote does not say, but which this study has clearly 
demonstrated, is that the human rights concerns are not so much about whether the rights of 
refugees are recognised, as they are about whether those rights are respected.  
Throughout its course, this thesis has reiterated the distinction between recognition of 
refugee rights and the actual enjoyment of those rights, as well as the important role that 
access to justice plays in such enjoyment. Without access to justice, refugee rights, and 
indeed all human rights, take on the characteristic of individual morality – respect for them 
becomes subjective, depending only on the values of each person. The worth of human rights, 
therefore lies not in their recognition, but in the ability to enjoy them and to obtain a remedy 
when they are violated or in danger of being violated. Access to justice is, in other words, the 
bedrock upon which the enjoyment of human rights lies.  
Utilising three sets of evaluative criteria – international law, constitutional provisions 
and policy framework – this study examined the extent to which refugees and asylum seekers 
enjoy access to justice in South Africa. The importance of this evaluation is located in the 
nature of access to justice as described above, but for refugees, there is even more: their 
ability to resort to court in order to prevent or seek redress for violation of their rights, as well 
as to resolve disputes have an impact on their ability to enjoy asylum and the protection it 
offers. From that evaluation, this thesis draws the following conclusions. 
South Africa‘s Constitution contains adequate guarantees which meet international law 
standards on access to justice. Chapters two and three established this fact and in the process 
distilled exactly what South Africa‘s obligations to refugees are on access to justice. The 
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convergence between the Constitution and international law is seen firstly, in the 
characteristic with which access to justice is imbued. As in international law, the South 
African Constitution views access to justice not just as a concept that allows human rights to 
be enjoyed, but as a human right in itself. Further convergence is seen in the due process 
guarantees that exist to guide the administration of justice, and in the way that the South 
African jurisprudence mirrors the way that those guarantees have been interpreted at the 
international level. In this regard, the objective theory that substantive justice, as opposed to 
mere procedural access, is the central focus of access to justice, receives strong affirmation in 
the South African context. This is seen for example in the refusal of the court in Nkuzi to be 
dogmatic about the interpretation of the right to legal representation in civil matters. Most 
importantly, the convergence is seen in the fact that under both international law and the 
Constitution, the relevant guarantees are wide enough to include not just citizens, but aliens 
generally and in particular, refugees and asylum seekers.
2
   
 Despite this critical convergence, however, the thesis also showed that actually meeting 
the obligation to refugees requires more than the availability of blanket, universally-
applicable guarantees. The very nature of refugee-hood means that persons so defined are not 
citizens of the country in which they reside, and are therefore susceptible to certain 
vulnerabilities, such as discrimination, language difficulties, inability to navigate foreign 
legal systems, or exclusion from State justice resources. Each of these vulnerabilities needs to 
be specifically addressed if those guarantees are to be meaningful, and they are to be 
addressed in such a way that ultimately, refugees and asylum seekers enjoy equal access to 
justice as envisaged under international law and the Constitution. 
 While this standard is straightforward enough, the implications for South Africa were 
shown to be a little more intricate. Chapter three of the thesis established that the equality 
standard imposes two somewhat contradictory, but equally important obligations on the State, 
namely that the State must ensure that refugees are not discriminated against, but at the same 
time, it needs to treat them differently in order to ensure they enjoy equal access.
3
 The 
rational for this is located in the meaning of the constitutional provisions on equality, as 
interpreted in the jurisprudence. What s. 9 of the Constitution envisages, the thesis 
demonstrated, is substantive equality, the achievement of which may necessitate disparity of 
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treatment, in order to obtain equal results.
4
 Thus, in some circumstances, distinctions must be 
made between groups and individuals in order to accommodate their different needs and 
interests,
5
 and a failure to differentiate may, in fact, be construed as discrimination.
6
  
Achieving equality in access to justice, therefore, means that the State must recognise the 
different challenges that different segments of society, including refugees, face in accessing 
justice, and it must adopt different measures to address those challenges. Such issues can 
obviously only be addressed at the level in which constitutional provisions are given effect, 
namely in the policy, legislation and programmes on access to justice. It is in analysing these 
policies, legislations and programmes that the thesis reaches its other conclusions, many of 
which are disturbing.  
The thesis demonstrated that while South Africa has adopted a significant number of 
Acts, policies and programmes on access to justice, the country falls far short of meeting the 
obligations to refugee. The inadequacies of these efforts are two-fold. Firstly, they fail to take 
into consideration, South Africa‘s commitments to refugees under international law, and 
secondly, they do not reflect the constitutional standard of substantive equality. With regard 
to the first failing, policy formulations, such as those on access to legal representation, were 
shown to actively contradict the country‘s obligations under international law. Whereas the 
standard set under international refugee law is that a host state is obliged to assimilate 
refugees to the status of citizens for the purposes of access to legal aid, the policy guidelines 
on legal aid in South Africa makes clear distinctions between citizens and refugees with 
respect to the services that each category can enjoy.  
In examining the guiding policy of the Legal Aid Board (LAB), chapter four 
demonstrated that that policy does not take cognisance of the fact that in all instances in 
which South Africa provides legal aid to its citizens, it is obliged to do so for refugees too. 
Thus, while the LAB is mandated to provide civil legal aid in a range of matters, beneficiaries 
of such assistance are required to be citizens or permanent residents. This effectively 
disqualifies refugees from receiving civil legal aid, a situation which amounts to a derogation 
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of South Africa‘s obligations to refugees and asylum seekers.7 Not only that, even in areas 
such as asylum hearings, in which access to legal representation was shown to be critical to 
preventing severe repercussions like refoulement to a place of danger, the LAB is sadly 
lacking. Its guiding policy sets out elaborate guidelines on how and when it would provide 
assistance in such matters, yet the evidence only suggest that it does not fulfil that obligation. 
Perhaps most telling is the fact that refugees, practitioners and even the Department of Home 
Affairs (DHA) choose to resort to non-governmental organisations when legal representation 
is required in asylum matters, instead of the LAB which is mandated by legislation to be the 
primary organ through which the State meets its obligations. The unfortunate consequence of 
all this is that, except in criminal matters, refugees and asylum seekers cannot turn to the 
LAB when they require legal assistance. Consequently, if their asylum applications are 
unsuccessful and they cannot access private legal assistance, or cannot be helped by civil 
society organisations (which are perennially over-stretched) then asylum seekers face the 
danger of refoulement.  
The second aspect in which the access to justice policies and programmes fall short is 
in the failure to uphold the principle of substantive equality set out above. It was argued in 
chapter three that the first step towards upholding that principle is to first recognise the 
diversity of needs and circumstances represented in society and to identify vulnerable persons 
who require assistance in accessing justice. Thereafter programmes can be devised or adapted 
to meet their needs. Interestingly, South Africa‘s primary access to justice policy, the ‗Vision 
2000‘ policy document, recognises and acknowledges the substantive equality principle. It 
articulates its goal of ensuring access to justice in terms that demonstrate that it will adopt 
strategies that address the specific challenges of specific vulnerable groups, and indeed it 
does that. However, while recognising a broad range of vulnerable persons, refugees are 
completely ignored. Chapter four argued the illogicality of such an omission, citing the 
overwhelming evidence, including judicial pronouncements, which show that refugees are a 
vulnerable group in South Africa, and that they face well-known and widely acknowledged 
challenges in accessing justice.
8
  
As a result of the failure to recognise refugees and asylum seekers as vulnerable 
persons, no specific measures have been adopted to address the challenges which makes 
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equal access to justice difficult for them. Such failure does not only mean that refugees are 
not able to enjoy equal access, it also constitutes discrimination on the part of the State 
against refugees. Having adopted measures to assist some categories of vulnerable persons 
such as women, children and the disabled, the failure to do the same for refugees amounts to 
discrimination between various classes of vulnerable persons. This is especially so when one 
takes into consideration the obligations which South Africa owes to refugees in international 
law. South Africa, as a State party to the UN Refugee Convention, is obliged by virtue of Art 
16(2) of that Convention, to ensure that refugees enjoy access to justice even if its own 
citizens do not.
9
 This standard, as incongruous as it may seem, reflects the importance that 
international law attaches to refugees‘ right to access justice. While the enjoyment of most of 
the rights accorded to refugees are approximated to one of three standards of treatment, their 
right to access to justice, like the right not to be subjected to refoulement, is not attached to 
any standard. In other words, it is absolute.
10
 In view of this, the failure of South Africa to 
address the access to justice needs of refugees and the discrimination that follows from such 
failure constitute glaring violations of its obligations under international law.  
In discussing the policies and programmes in respect of linguistic accessibility, legal 
assistance, and recourse to non-state justice systems – issues which have important 
implications for refugees‘ access – it was seen that the common thread running through them 
is the failure to address the needs of refugees, while attempting to address the needs of other 
vulnerable persons. How those policies and programmes are given effect significantly 
undermine equal access for refugees.   
The position in respect of a language policy, or lack thereof, is a good case in point. 
Because the State has failed to adopt an overarching language policy, each unit of the State 
has, over the years, developed its own language policies. However, some of these are so 
patently unrealistic as to be construed as a deliberate violation of the rights of refugees. Of 
particular interest in regard to the administration of justice are the language policies of the 
South African Police Service (SAPS) and the Department of Justice (DoJ). While the SAPS 
has adopted an elaborate system of communicating the rights of arrest to arrested and 
detained persons in all 11 official South African languages, the evidence is that a significant 
proportion of arrested and detained persons are foreign African language speakers, for whom 
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those 11 languages are neither home languages nor second languages in which they are 
sufficiently proficient. Yet, there is no evidence to suggest that efforts are made to ensure that 
those rights are made available in the foreign languages most commonly spoken by refugees 
and asylum seekers, who are among those most prone to arrest. Regardless of the fact that 
most of these are routine arrests designed to help police officers meet weekly arrest targets,
11
 
and that most of those arrested are released after short periods of detention, the fact remains 
that as arrested and detained persons, they are entitled to the rights contained in s. 35 of the 
Constitution. Yet these rights are flagrantly violated by the absence of efforts to ensure that 
they are effectively communicated. 
The DoJ on the other hand has not adopted any language policy and it is plagued by an 
inability to provide foreign African language interpreters in courts. This situation has been 
blamed for miscarriages of justice and has caused a significant amount of concern to the 
judiciary.
12
 So much so, that the courts have been forced to emphasise on more than one 
occasion, the fact that since South Africa is home to a significant number of African refugees 
who are entitled to enjoy the right of access to justice and fair trial rights contained in the 
Constitution, the DoJ has an obligation to maintain a corps of competent foreign African 
language interpreters.
13
 The failure of both the SAPS and DoJ to provide for the language 
needs of non-speakers of South Africa‘s official languages demonstrates the policy 
inadequacies referred to above, in the light of South Africa‘s obligations in respect of 
refugees and asylum seekers.  
The only possible outcome of these policy failures, chapter four strongly asserted, is 
that refugees who have reason to come in contact with the justice system will find that they 
are either not able to access the justice system on an equal footing with citizens, or that they 
are denied access outright. This assertion is corroborated by the experiences of refugees and 
asylum seekers which were set out in chapter five. That chapter presented the result of a field 
study on refugees‘ and asylum seekers‘ interactions with the justice system, an area 
characterised by a dearth of research. In presenting how refugees and asylum seekers 
experience access to justice in South Africa, it was shown that the shortcomings identified in 
the legislation, policies and programmes, do indeed have the effect of denying refugees 
access to justice. The most inimical barrier to refugees‘ access to justice, and the most 
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widespread, was shown to be discrimination based on their citizenship. Characterised as 
xenophobia in the literature, the problem was found to be particularly acute in the criminal 
justice system, where xenophobia within the police serves as a deterrent to those wishing to 
utilise the justice system.
14
 Several respondents in the study had been subjected to various 
kinds of abuse, including physical assault when trying to report matters to the police. Others 
had been given the impression that as foreigners, they were not entitled to use the South 
African justice system. The impact of such xenophobia goes beyond the criminal justice 
system, however. It was shown to have created a negative perception of the entire justice 
system, with the end result that, faced with matters requiring judicial resolution, refugees and 
asylum seekers choose not to resort to the justice system, either for fear of exposing 
themselves to victimisation, or just a lack of trust that they would be treated fairly.
15
  
This situation amounts to a violation of South Africa‘s negative obligations not to 
impede access to justice.
16
 Anchored on the findings of the Human Rights Committee (HRC) 
in Oló Bahamonde v Equatorial Guinea,
17
 it was asserted that regardless of what 
infrastructures and mechanisms are in place for the administration of justice, if refugees are 
prevented from accessing those infrastructures, then South Africa is in breach of its 
obligations. In that case, the HRC stated that since the notion of equality before the courts 
and tribunals encompasses the very access to the courts, a situation in which a person‘s 
attempts to notify the competent jurisdictions of his or her grievances are systematically 
frustrated runs counter to this guarantee.
18
 Clearly then, the thesis argued, the State has an 
obligation to address any situation in which attempts by refugees to utilise the justice system 
are ‗systematically frustrated‘ by the xenophobic practices within the police force, which is 
an agent of the State. And yet, the policies do not acknowledge xenophobia as a barrier to 
accessing the justice system, neither do programmes exist within the justice system to address 
the issue.  
A further consequence of the policy shortcomings is that when refugees are unable to 
access the State justice system or to use it properly, they resort to informal justice systems 
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within their own social networks to resolve disputes. This was shown to be the case among 
respondents in the study. The thesis demonstrated that refugee communities have established 
dispute resolution systems and mechanisms for the dispensation of justice within their own 
social networks. In analysing the workings of these systems, including their advantages and 
the dangers inherent in them, chapter six established that the existence of such forums have 
implications for the State, which must ensure that they do not become avenues for violating 
the rights of their users. But as with other aspects of access to justice, this issue is 
characterised by a failure to address the position of refugees and asylum seekers. While the 
Vision 2000 policy document recognises that vulnerable persons faced with an inaccessible 
justice system are often forced to resort to subterranean forms of justice, the efforts to address 
non-state justice systems and their inherent dangers revolve only around how the issue affects 
South Africans and do not take refugees into consideration. The chapter concludes that this is 
an inexplicable omission, given the recognition that refugees fall into the demography most 
likely to resort to such systems.  
Taken together, the findings of this thesis, show that despite its purported commitment 
to access to justice for all, the inadequacies of South Africa‘s policies and programmes put it 
in violation of its obligations to refugees and asylum seekers under international law and its 
own Constitution. Another consequence is that these policy failures jeopardise confidence in 
the judiciary, which ironically, is the only institution of government that has proven itself to 
be a formidable ally in the fight for refugee protection and rights. As the thesis demonstrated 
in chapter three, when they have had access to the courts, albeit with the assistance of civil 
society organisations, refugees and asylum seekers have obtained very useful results. They 
have seen a far-reaching ban on employment and education lifted; have been granted access 
to social security; have successfully challenged arbitrary arrests and deportations which 
bordered on a violation of the cardinal principle of non-refoulement; and the Department of 
Home Affairs has been forced to improve its asylum adjudication processes. Yet the policy 
failures discussed above serve only to prevent individual refugees from utilising this useful 
resource, and to curtail the courts‘ contribution to refugee protection in South Africa.  
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Most critical to the goal of equal and adequate access to justice for refugees and asylum 
seekers is the need to recognise them as vulnerable persons who require assistance in 
accessing justice. The distinct disadvantages that they face need to addressed, and in 
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addressing them, South Africa‘s policies and programmes must guided by the obligations it 
owes to refugees and asylum seekers under international law. Thus, the ultimate goal must be 
to ensure that they enjoy equal and adequate access to justice in the country, and to achieve 
this, the following measures are important:  
 
In view of the overwhelming evidence, including judicial pronouncements, that refugees and 
asylum seekers are vulnerable persons who face significant and unique challenges in 
accessing services in South Africa, the policies and programmes on access to justice must 
recognise their status as such. Any measures designed to improve access to justice must, 
therefore, include refugees and asylum seekers among vulnerable groups who require 
assistance, with a view to addressing their peculiar vulnerabilities.  
 
As the most invidious obstacle to refugees access to justice, the issue of xenophobia, both 
within the public and within the justice system, need to be decisively dealt with.  Prosecution 
of persons involved in xenophobic attacks is important, in order to avoid an atmosphere of 
impunity, which only corrodes confidence in the justice system in the minds of refugees and 
asylum seekers. So also is the need to train police officers on dealing with discrimination and 
xenophobia and the need to overcome personal biases in the course of duty. Adequate 
oversight is important in this regard. It is also important that means of redress are provided to 
refugees and asylum seekers who are victims of police discrimination. Thus it is suggested 
that an ombudsman be creat d or that the functioning of the Independent Complaints 
Directory should be strongly improved so that it can provide such oversight, and serve as a 
redress mechanism to which refugees can easily resort.  
 
Given that the lack of a proper language policy and inadequate language resources have a 
negative impact on refugees in their interaction with the justice system, it is imperative that 
one is adopted which reflects the multilingual nature of South Africa, including foreign 
languages spoken in the country. Such a policy must include adequate provision to ensure 
that foreign language speakers who come in to contact with the justice system are able to 
communicate effectively both with the police and in court. 
 
Clearer guidelines need to be developed on access to legal aid in civil matters. As it currently 
stands, the formulation of the Legal Aid Guide with respect to legal assistance for refugees 
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and asylum seekers is inadequate and unclear. Clear wording that bring the LAB‘s mandate 
in line with the obligations under UN Refugee Convention should be adopted. That would 
ensure that refugees enjoy legal aid in the same circumstances that citizens do, and that in 
critical matters like the asylum adjudication process, they have the assistance they require. 
Police officers, magistrates and other personnel involved in the administration of justice must 
also be educated on the rights of refugees in order to prevent situations in which they are 
denied access to services like legal aid. 
 
Strategies to improve access to justice for refugees and asylum seekers must be done in 
collaboration with civil society organisations, which at present try to fill some of the gaps left 
by the State‘s failure to provide adequate legal aid. The State needs to support and partner 
with these organisations by providing them with resources which enhance their capacity to 
provide much-needed legal advice and representation, as they are currently doing. It also 
needs to ensure that civil society organisations are not put off valuable litigation due to the 
high cost of litigating cases or the threat of costs being awarded against them.  
 
Non-state justice systems play an important complementary role to the State justice system. 
When utilised to resolve simpler civil matters which have fewer human rights implications, 
the advantage for the State it that they help to preserve judicial resources while also 
improving access to justice. As they are generally more accessible to refugee and asylum 
seekers, these systems also help to deflect the frustrations that could  arise as a result of not 
being able to seek justice. It is therefore important that the State engages with non-state 
justice systems that exist among refugees, both to provide human rights training which 
ensures that those systems do not violate the rights of their users and to serve as a contact 
point through which the State familiarises itself with the needs of refugees and meet its 
obligations to them. However, since the purpose of the access to justice guarantees are to 
encourage people to refer disputes to the courts instead of resorting to extra-legal methods, 
the State must concurrently improve the user-friendliness of the formal justice system in 
order to ensure that those who resort to non-state justice systems do so as a matter of choice 
or cultural preference rather than because they do not have access to the formal justice 
system.  
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Lastly, this thesis has demonstrated that shortcomings in one aspect of refugee rights leads to 
violation of other rights and that inability to enjoy their socio-economic rights impact 
negatively on their access to justice. It is therefore recommended that the State begins to 
address the rights of refugees holistically, ensuring that improvements in access to justice is 
complemented by improved access to work as well as to administrative and social services.  
 
7.2 CONCLUSION 
This study has evaluated access to justice for refugees and asylum seekers in South Africa, in 
light of the country‘s obligations under international human rights law. It differs from 
previous studies on the subject in that, while past studies have focused on how justice is 
administered in camp settings, this project focused on urban refugees, a hitherto unexplored 
area.  While the dearth of research on the matter suggests that scholars and policy makers do 
not often avert their minds to the need to promote refugees‘ right to access to justice as an 
integral part of refugee protection, this study has demonstrated that it is just as important. 
Indeed, access to justice has proven to be as significant a mechanism for refugee protection in 
South Africa as good legislation and international law. It has taken intervention by the courts 
in South Africa for the lives of refugees and asylum seekers to acquire some semblance of the 
dignity which international refugee law, the country‘s Constitution as well as the Refugees 
Act accord to them. The critical point, however, is that such interventions are largely 
attributable to the work of civil society organisations which have utilised their knowledge and 
resources to push for better conditions for refugees.  
In spite of the apparently positive results obtained from utilising the justice system, it 
has proven difficult to answer in the affirmative, the central question that frames this thesis: 
do refugees and asylum seekers in South Africa enjoy access to justice? Rather, what this 
study has found is an incongruous situation characterised by deep contradictions. On the one 
hand, there exists a solid international and constitutional framework in place to ensure that 
refugees enjoy access to justice in South Africa. On the other, the experiences of refugees in 
accessing justice, do not approximate to what those frameworks envisage. The social 
conditions under which refugees live belie the vast array of rights which they are accorded in 
the country, but the evidence is that the justice system is not adequately utilised to challenge 
these. This study has shown that the primary reason for this is the deep gulf that exists 
between the constitutional frameworks on access to justice, and the policy, legislation and 
programmes needed to translate those frameworks into real life. In particular, because they 
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fail to reflect the cardinal principle of substantive equality, which is central to achieving 
adequate, effective and equal access to justice, refugees are prevented from accessing the 
justice system the way they should. South Africa needs to begin to address access to justice 
for refugees within the context of substantive equality. In so doing, it will not only be 
meeting its obligations under international law, it will also be affirming the dignity and worth 
of refugees and asylum seekers as persons, not problems. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS. 
 
 
1. Today's date: ______________________________________________________   
 
2. Place: ____________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Age (please tick only one ): -29 �30-39 �-49 � & above � 
 
4. Occupation: _______________________________________________________ 
 
5. Gender (please tick only one ): � Female � Male  
 
6. Are you currently (please tick only one ): Married � Separated � Widowed� 
Single � Divorced � 
Background 
7. Highest level of education: (please tick only one ):  Primary School� High School 
(Secondary School)�University or other tertiary institution e.g technical college� 
Postgraduate � 
 
8. Country of origin___________________________________________________ 
 
9. Apart from South Africa and your home country, in which other country have you 
lived? _____________________________________________________________ 
 
10. How long did you live there? ___________________________________________ 
 
11. When did you come to South Africa? _____________________________________ 
 
12. What is your status here (What kind of paper do you have from the Department of 
Home Affairs?) Asylum seeker (s.22) � Refugee (s.24) � Other (please specify) 
 
13. How long, from the time you arrived in South Africa, did it take you to get your 
paper? _____________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Did you seek help from anywhere before you got it? Yes, I did�   No, I did not� 
 
15. Why did you need help? 
 
16. Where did you seek help?   
UCT law Clinic � Cape Town Refugee Centre (Forum) � Legal Resources Centre �  
Wits Law clinic �  Other (please specify)____________________________________ 
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17. How did you know of the place?  
An official at Home Affairs told me to go there� Immigration officials at the border told 
me to go there�  UNHCR told me to go there�  Another refugee/asylum seeker told me 
to go there�  Other� (please specify)______________________________
 
18. Which other help have you sought from any of the places in question 16 above?  
 
19. When you went to the place, did you receive the help you needed? Yes�No� 
 
20. In general, would you say the help you got was (Please tick one )  
Excellent, just what I needed...............................1� 
Satisfactory …………………….........................2� 
Good..............................……………………......3� 
Fair.....................................……………………..4� 
Poor....................................……………………..5�
 
 
21. Please explain your choice in question 20 above: 
 

 
22. Have you ever reported a case at a police station? Yes� No�

23. What was it about? 
 
 
 
24. What happened in the case (what did the police do with the case)? 
 
 
25. Were you satisfied with the way the police handled the case? 
 
 
26. If not, why not? 
 
27. If you were not satisfied with police handling of the case, did you try to take the case 
further?  
 
28. What did you do?  
 
29. Have you ever felt that you should take someone to court or other legal body, (like 
the CCMA for example)? Yes � No � Don’t know � 
 
30. Did you? Yes � No � 
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31. If not, why not? 
 
 
32. Have you ever been to court anywhere, for any reason? Yes � No � 
 
33. Have you ever been to court in South Africa, for any reason? Yes �No � 
 
34. Which court was it? 
 
35. Why did you go to court?  

36. How would you describe your court experience in South Africa: 
Pleasant..........................………….………………………………...1� 
Fair.……………………..…………………………………………..2� 
Unpleasant..............……………………………………...............….3�  
Very unpleasant, I will not go there again.…………….................…4� 
I don’t know..............................…………………………………......5� 
 
37. Please explain why? 
 
38. If you answered yes to questions 32 & 33 above, how would you compare your court 
experience in South Africa and in the other country? 
 
39. When you have a problem with someone other than an immediate member of your 
family, how do you resolve it? 
 
40. Was this questionnaire easy to understand and complete? Yes � No � 
 
41. If not, can you suggest ways it could have been better. 
 
 
 
THANK YOU! 
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APPENDIX B 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR LEGAL ASSISTANCE AGENCIES. 
 
Date:……………………………   Place:………………………………. 
 
 
1. Name of organisation:……………………………………………………. 
 
2. Position in organisation:…………………………………………………. 
 
3. Date established:…………………………………………………………. 
 
4. No. of staff:………………………………………………………………… 
 
5. No. of lawyers among your staff:……………………………………….. 
 
6. No. of paralegals:………………………………………………………… 
 
7. Target population: whom is your organisation created to serve? 
 
The general populace� Women and/or children only� Migrants� Refugees and Asylum 
seekers�   The indigent (please state criteria for indigence)� Other � 
 
 
8. Average no of cases you deal with on a monthly basis:……………….. 
 
9. Most common types of cases: 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
10. Other than assistance with obtaining documentation from the Department of Home Affairs, 
what are the most frequent issues refugees and asylum seekers seek help with? 
 
  
 
  
 
   
 
 
11. In your opinion, what legal problems are refugees and asylum seekers most often 
confronted with? 
 
12. Does your organisation provide legal representation to refugees and asylum seekers? Yes�  
No� 
 
13. If so what kind of cases do you represent them in? 
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14. How much of the costs do they bear? None�  All� Part� (please specify what part, 
e.g filing fees): 
 
15. Out of every ten cases, how many are followed to conclusion? 
 
16. What are the reasons for cases not followed to conclusion? 
 
  
17. When refugees and asylum seekers have legal problems your organisation cannot help 
them with, where do you refer them? 
 
 
18. Please specify what kind of legal matters your organisation is unable to help refugees and 
asylum seekers with? 
 
 
19. Why is your organisation unable to help with this? 
 
 
20. Is this limitation specific to refugees, or does it apply to the general populace? 
 
 
PLEASE NOTE: In questions 21–29 below, ‘courts’ and the ‘legal system’ refers to the formal state 
structures in which a person may seek redress in South Africa, including courts, tribunals and 
mediation/arbitration bodies such as the CCMA.  
 
21. How would you describe refugees and asylum seekers willingness to pursue legal claims in 
court? 
 
Very enthusiastic……………………………………..…..…………… 1� 
Willing……………………………………………………….……….…. 2� 
They usually require some persuasion…… ………………………...3� 
Unwilling…………………………………………………………….….. 4� 
Completely opposed to it………………………………………….…... 5� 
 
22. Where they have been unwilling in the past to have recourse to the courts, despite having 
been assured of the legitimacy of their claim, what is the professed reason for their 
unwillingness to go to court? 
 
 
 
23. How would you describe the accessibility of the justice system generally? 
 
 
 
24. How would you describe the accessibility of the justice system to a refugee or asylum 
seeker? 
 
 
25. Do you think refugees and asylum seekers have more difficulty than the general populace 
in accessing the justice system? 
 
26. Please give reasons for your answer. 
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27. Please rate the following factors according to their importance as a barrier to refugees 
accessing the justice system: 
 5  
Has no 
effect  
4  
Unimportant 
 
3 
Mildly 
Important 
2 Important 
 
1  
Very 
important 
 
Costs 
 
     
Language 
 
     
Illiteracy 
 
     
Lack of familiarity with the 
legal system 
 
     
Distance to courts  
 
     
Ignorance about their rights  
 
     
Ignorance about where to seek 
help  
 
     
Cultural beliefs 
 
     
Insufficient number of legal 
aid agencies 
 
     
Inefficient bureaucratic 
structures  
(police losing dockets, lack of 
necessary papers from home 
affairs etc) 
 
     
Fear of victimisation 
 
     
Gender issues 
 
     
Xenophobia  
 
     
Time factor (Lengthy 
proceedings and delays) 
 
     
Other (please specify) 
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28. In your opinion what should be done to make the justice system more accessible to refugees 
and asylum seekers? 
 
 
29. Is your organisation’s ability to assist refugees access the justice system impeded in any 
way?  
 
 
30. What would you say are the major impediments? 
 
 
31. Are you aware of any informal (non-state) dispute resolution/justice system that refugees 
and asylum seekers have recourse to? Yes, I am � No, I am not � 
 
 
32. What is our opinion of such systems? 
 
 
33. Was this questionnaire easy to understand and complete? Yes, � No � 
 
 
34. If not, please you suggest ways it could have been better. 
 
 
 
 
THANK YOU! 
 
